A post financial crisis study of compliance practices and systems in global financial organizations: an institutionalist perspective by Gozman, Daniel
1 
 
The London School of Economics and 
Political Science 
 
 
A Post Financial Crisis Study of Compliance 
Practices and Systems in Global Financial 
Organizations: an Institutionalist Perspective 
 
 
Daniel Peter Martin Gozman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For my father Isaac (1934-2008) and my mother Madeleine 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Information Systems and Innovation 
Group of the Department of Management, London School of 
Economics and Political Science, for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy, London, June 2014. 
2 
 
Declaration 
 
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD 
degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely 
my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of 
others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and 
any other person is clearly identified in it). 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is 
permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may 
not be reproduced without my prior written consent. 
 
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe 
the rights of any third party. 
 
I declare that my thesis consists of 91, 503 words excluding appendixes and 
references  
 
 
Statement of conjoint work (if applicable) 
 
I would like to acknowledge that sections of this thesis have been published in the 
following places. For each of these articles, I wrote the first draft and then amended 
future drafts based on feedback from co-authors and reviewers.  
Peer Reviewed Journal Articles 
Gozman, D and Currie, W. (2014) ‘The Role of Rules-Based Compliance Systems in 
the New EU Regulatory Landscape: Perspectives of Institutional Change’ Journal of 
Enterprise Information Management (forthcoming) 
Gozman, D. and Currie, W. (2013) ‘The Role of Rules-Based Compliance Systems 
in Institutional Change: A Post-Crisis Study,’ Journal of Information Technology, (29) 
44-58. 
Currie, W., Finnegan, D., and Gozman, D. (2011) ‘E-Government for the Economic 
Crisis,’ European Journal of ePractice (11), 55-71. 
Peer Reviewed Conferences 
Gozman, D. and Currie, W. (2013) ‘Building Post Crisis Watchtowers: Investment 
Management Systems and New Institutional Logics for Regulatory Compliance’ 
International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS) 2013 Milan  
Currie, W. and Gozman, D. (2013) ‘From free markets to logics of intense 
supervision: Dynamics of institutional trust, technology and regulatory controls’ 
International Conference on the Outsourcing of Information Services 2013 
Mannheim  
Gozman, D. and Currie, W. (2013) ‘IS capabilities for supporting post crisis 
regulatory compliance’ UK AIS Conference 2013 Oxford 
Gozman, D. and Currie, W. (2012) ‘The Role of Rules-Based Compliance Systems 
In The New EU Regulatory Landscape: Perspectives of Institutional Change’ The 
20th European Conference for Information Systems, ESADE, Barcelona 
3 
 
Currie, W., Finnegan, D., and Gozman, D. (2011). ‘Accounting Information Systems 
as Institutional Carriers: A Case Study of Regulatory Compliance in UK Asset 
Management Houses,’ The 19th European Conference for Information Systems, 
Aalto University, Helsinki,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
4 
 
A Post Financial Crisis Study of 
Compliance Practices and Systems 
in Global Financial Organizations: 
an Institutionalist Perspective  
ABSTRACT 
The financial crisis of 2007–2009 and the resultant pressures exerted on 
policymakers to prevent future crises have precipitated coordinated regulatory 
responses globally. As a result, large scale regulatory change is being enacted 
within this industry to protect investors and economic systems. Very little research 
exists, either prior to the crisis or since, on how compliance practices are managed 
through technology within financial organizations. The research objective of this 
study is to understand how institutional changes to the regulatory landscape may 
affect corresponding locally institutionalized operational practices within financial 
organizations. The study adopts an Investment Management System (IMS) as its 
case and investigates different implementations of this system within eight financial 
organizations, focused on investment activities within capital markets. This study 
makes a contribution by outlining a detailed review of this technology and 
identifying post-crisis practices for organizing compliance and the social forces 
influencing them through technology. Through symbolic systems, relational 
systems, routines and artefacts the IMS diffuses new compliance practices and 
further embeds existing ones. The study shows that this system is not objective and 
is currently in flux as this dynamic and complex environment evolves in the wake 
of the global financial crisis. Correspondingly, social, political and functional 
pressures are acting to deinstitutionalise related behaviours and practices. Yet 
compliance behaviours and practices are simultaneously being institutionalised 
through coercive, normative and mimetic mechanisms. However, the study also 
highlights the ability of some agents to exercise limited control on the impact of 
regulatory institutions. The research found evidence that some older practices 
persisted and so the study suggests that the institutionalization of technology-
induced compliant behaviour is still uncertain. The research makes an additional 
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contribution to practitioners by distilling the findings into a model of IS capabilities 
for compliance and a model to measure the maturity of a firm’s compliance 
capabilities. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Within global markets we are seeing the extensive adoption of technology,  
the globalization and consolidation of industries (Berger et al. 1999) as well as  
increasingly unpredictable and dynamic business environments (Crook et al. 1992; 
Grey 2005). These factors amplify the risks associated with doing business (Beck 
2007). One feature of this environment is an increasing focus on rules and 
regulations (Glaeser and Shleifer 2001; Stiglitz 2001) designed to protect a firm’s 
employees, customers and shareholders as well as the economic well-being of the 
state in which the organization resides (Benston 1998; Benston and Kaufman 1996; 
Goodhart 2002; Goodhart et al. 1998; Llewellyn 1999). This is especially true 
within the financial services sector which has been a heavily regulated industry for 
many years.  
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the resultant Great Recession has 
highlighted how the failure of financial organizations may have dire economic and 
social consequences at a national and global level. Media and political scrutiny has 
focused on various topics. These have included capping bonuses, unethical 
behaviour, systemic risk, bailouts from the public purse of firm’s deemed ‘too-big-
to-fail’, greater regulation of derivatives and hedge funds, and the ‘ring fencing’ of 
investment banking activities from retail banking, to name just a few. While the 
scope of post-crisis regulations is wide reaching, the focus of this study is narrowed 
to those areas of post-crisis regulation which address financial positions and the 
systems and processes for ensuring that trades remain within limits stipulated by 
regulations. Our study adopts an Investment Management System (IMS) as its case. 
The IMS facilitates compliance with areas of regulation which place quantitative 
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restrictions on transactions undertaken by financial organizations on behalf of 
investors.  
As a result of these and other issues, the G20 and regulatory bodies 
worldwide are enacting regulatory change focused on plugging the gaps in 
regulatory systems that have become apparent as a result of the crisis and also post-
crisis organizational failures, such as the Libor or Foreign Exchange (FX) rate 
rigging scandals.  
In 2009, the G20 met in Pittsburgh and defined new measures aimed at 
preventing another financial crisis. Through legislation, both the US and EU 
regulators aim to meet the G20 commitment to strengthen regulatory systems. The 
European Union’s response to the 2007 crisis and G20 agreements has been 
fragmented into several European Directives
1
. In contrast, the US has opted to 
develop a single sweeping piece of legislation known as the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, passed in 2010. The EU and US 
regulatory responses to the crisis are not yet fully crystallized, as some areas of 
post-crisis regulation legislation are currently being redrafted and interpreted into 
rules enforced by Regulators. However, tight deadlines for meeting these new 
requirements require financial organizations to begin working on updating their 
operational practices before regulatory rules and the outcomes they influence have 
been fully determined. The financial services industry is currently facing a 
‘tsunami’ of regulations (FT 2013). The scale of regulatory changes in the financial 
services industry has only previously occurred in the 1920s when very different 
                                                 
1
 Including the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD), Capital Adequacy 
Directive  IV (CAD IV), European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), Markets Abuse 
Directive II (MAD II), Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II), Undertakings for 
Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive IV & V (UCITS III, IV & V), Packaged 
Retail Investment Products Regulation (PRIPS) and Regulation on Short Selling and Credit Default 
Swaps. 
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technologies were available. Consequently, the post-crisis environment provides a 
unique opportunity to investigate how technologies support wide spread regulatory 
change.  
The motivation of the research is not merely to ascertain how regulatory 
rules and conditions are met, but to consider the complex interaction between 
institutional pressures and mechanisms and responses by firms and agents. 
Consequently, the study adopts an institutionalist perspective and embraces an 
interpretivist approach, through qualitative interviews with users of the IMS, to 
understand how technology is implicated in post-crisis changes to compliance 
related practice. In summary, the study does not seek to present contrasting and 
comparative compliance practices adopted by different organizations for complying 
with specific regulatory rules. Instead, the study draws from collective 
interpretations of experiences across eight financial organizations to illustrate a rich 
tapestry of regulatory change and socio-technical issues being driven by shifts in 
the regulatory landscape occurring as a result of recent economic and 
organizational failures. 
1.1. Thesis Structure and Presentation 
Firstly, it is worth highlighting that within this study’s quotes from primary 
and secondary data are presented in italics while quotes from scholarly academic 
literature are not. This is done in order to help the reader differentiate between these 
two distinct but important forms of evidence.  
The following subsections, within this chapter, introduce the study’s high-
level research question and seek to break it down into more manageable sub-
questions. I then introduce a summary of the study’s contributions. The aim of 
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introducing the research questions and contributions early in the manuscript is to 
provide the reader a foundation from which to judge if the research has met its 
objectives.  
The IMS under consideration was originally developed in the US and so has 
its genesis in the US regulatory environment. Furthermore, the participant financial 
organizations all have US and UK based operations and so is subject to both 
jurisdictions’ regulators. Interpretive research requires critical reflection of the 
social and historical background of the research setting (Klein and Myers 1999) and 
so the following subsections of this chapter aim to provide the reader with a 
foundation of the complex and dynamic environments relevant to the study. Firstly, 
a brief history of US and UK regulators is outlined to provide the reader with a 
historical context in which to place this research and to also introduce the role of 
regulatory agencies. Following which, the current regulatory landscape is 
introduced. The Financial Crisis and resultant Great Recession have created global 
regulatory reform and so the crisis and related EU and US regulatory responses are 
discussed. In the following subsections, I provide the reader with a comparison of 
two distinct approaches to regulating firms, rules and principles, and discuss how 
the UK regulator, the primary regulator for the study’s participant financial 
organizations, supervises firms under its jurisdiction. In summary, the remaining 
subsections in this chapter seek to familiarise the reader with relevant background 
information, and so provide a point of departure from which to understand the 
research.   
In chapter two, I draw from some of the issues and events derived from the 
background analysis, in Chapter 1, in order to identify relevant strands of literature. 
I synthesise predominantly scholarly works as well as secondary data sources, such 
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as speeches and codes of governance, to build a review of key issues and challenges 
currently being faced by the financial services industry in relation to the crisis and 
regulatory change. I start by discussing prominent studies related to the social 
construction and technological constitution of markets. I then introduce related 
literature on technological affordances and constraints and discuss their relationship 
with internal controls and compliance. Building on perspectives of control and 
affordance, the relationship between corporate governance, transparency and 
asymmetric information is discussed. The penultimate section discusses gaps in IS 
related literature. Finally, the summary subsection positions this study within 
existing bodies of work and highlights the need to narrow the study’s focus within 
the range of topics and issues discussed in the review.  
Chapter three narrows the study’s focus by identifying and discussing 
specific institutional concepts. The chapter initially builds on the previous reviews 
of scholarly literature and discusses studies that have adopted institutional theory to 
investigate institutionalization and deinstitutionalization. The chapter’s subsections 
seek to evaluate regulatory institutions against twelve defining criteria derived from 
the work of Martin (2004) and so provide the reader with an understanding of 
underpinning institutional meta-theoretical concepts, and also a foundation to 
evaluate the application of institutionalism within this setting.  The discussion 
highlights the tension between structural forces and agency. It concludes by 
identifying the institutional logics perspective as providing an important bridge 
between these two distinct theoretical positions.  
Chapter four builds on these institutional concepts, and seeks to delineate 
the theoretical boundaries of the study by framing the research through the 
institutional logics perspective. In order to do so, the meta-theoretical foundations 
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of this perspective are further discussed in relation to the research context and 
Martin’s (2004) defining criteria of institutions. Institutional studies have developed 
a wide range of theoretical constructs and so the theoretical boundaries of the study 
are further defined by identifying and discussing the key theoretical constructs 
which are utilised to guide the study’s analysis. Specifically, theoretical constructs 
regarding how institutions are carried and diffused (Scott 2008), pressures for 
deinstitutionalization (Oliver 1992) and mechanisms of institutionalization 
(DiMaggio and Powell. 1983; Scott 2008) are introduced. These concepts are then 
distilled into a conceptual model of regulatory compliance.  
The fifth chapter begins by discussing social constructionism which acts as 
the philosophical foundation of the study and so provides underlying ontological 
and epistemological perspectives. The next subsection outlines the research design 
and introduces the eight financial organizations which participated in the study, 
together with the criteria used to select them. The methods of data collection and 
data analysis employed are then discussed. Following Klein and Myers (1999) 
principle of contextualization, this chapter also seeks to contextualise the IMS case 
by providing a discussion focused on the marketplace for such systems. An 
overview of the IMS Vendor and the systems’ functionality and architecture as well 
as services offered by the IMS Vendor is also provided. In this way, sub-research 
questions one to three are addressed.  
Chapter six outlines the empirical findings of this study. The chapter draws 
heavily from primary data collected through interviews and seeks to synthesize 
selected quotes to construct a narrative outlining new interrelated organizing 
practices, derived from the data collection and analysis process, for arranging 
regulatory compliance. These themes encapsulate the changes in practice and 
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behaviours the general research question aims to uncover and were found to operate 
at both the organizational field and intra-organizational levels. However, the 
findings also show the existence of limiting factors which may hamper the 
effectiveness of new compliance practices. The first section of this chapter 
introduces the themes identified. The following section presents the empirical data 
against each of the themes at both the organizational field and intra-organizational 
levels. The final section summarizes the findings at the organizational field level 
diagrammatically. This subsection also summarizes the findings, at the intra-
organizational level, including the factors which may limit new compliance 
practices.   
The seventh chapter directly addresses the fourth research sub-question, 
regarding how the IMS diffuses regulatory institutions. Drawing from Scott’s 
(2008) work on institutional carriers a conceptual model is outlined for addressing 
the fourth sub-question, which is further decomposed against four constituent 
theoretical elements, namely symbolic systems, relational systems artefacts and 
routines.  Each of these constructs is considered against the research findings 
presented in Chapter six, to guide analysis regarding how technology is implicated 
in the transmission of regulations and compliance practices. The analysis shows 
that the IMS is not neutral and may privilege some institutions over others and 
obscure some hazards. Furthermore, while systems such as the IMS may act as 
carriers of institutions they may also act as agents of deinstitutionalization.   
Chapter eight focuses on the fifth sub-research question and also draws 
from theoretical concepts derived from scholarly literature. Oliver’s (1992) work is 
employed to understand how political, functional and social pressures may lead to 
the deinstitutionalization of compliance practices carried through the IMS. Thus, 
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the chapter draws from analyses detailed in previous chapters. The first section 
outlines a conceptual model for understanding the interplay between the IMS and 
pressures of deinstitutionalization. Each of Oliver’s (1992) pressures is then 
considered in turn, within subsections. The chapter makes a contribution by 
outlining the specific compliance practices found to be eroded, the pressures acting 
on them,  as well as empirical predictors of deinstitutionalization in financial 
services.  
The ninth chapter addresses the sixth research sub-question and so focuses 
on understanding the mechanisms and sub mechanisms by which new compliance 
practices and behaviours are becoming institutionalized. However, the study also 
revealed important counter mechanisms which may act to limit institutionalization. 
This chapter draws from the work of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Scott (2008) 
to outline a conceptual model. The following subsections consider how the IMS 
encourages responsible trading through surveillance, monitoring, automation, 
standardization and consolidation, interpretation sharing and learning. I also find 
evidence that some older practices persisted and so this analysis suggests that the 
institutionalization of technology-induced compliant behaviour is still uncertain.  
Chapter ten differs from the previous analysis chapters as it does not seek to 
discuss the findings in relation to the institutional concepts outlined in chapters 
three and four. Instead this chapter seeks to make a contribution to the practitioner 
community by distilling the finding into a guiding framework delineating IS 
capabilities for managing regulatory compliance. I identify eight key capabilities: 
Managing Internal Controls, Measuring, Monitoring and Reporting Transactions, IS 
Development and Procurement, Managing Third Parties, Sharing and Selecting 
Best Practice, IS Leadership, Data Management and Enabling Cultural Change. The 
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identified capabilities and research findings are further developed into a maturity 
model in Appendix 9.  
Chapter eleven closes the research study by summarizing the findings and 
contributions explaining what has been found and why this matters to both 
academia and also the practitioner community. These subsections draw from the 
study’s conclusions outlined in Chapters seven, eight, nine and ten. The limitations 
of the study are discussed and directions for future research are proposed. Finally, 
the chapter and thesis is drawn to a close through several concluding comments.  
1.2. Research Questions 
The research question and sub-questions were derived from analysis of the 
research setting and context, specifically, the pre and post-crisis environment as 
well as the organizational context within which the IMS is deployed and the 
capabilities of the system itself. As the research developed and the findings 
analysed through an institutional lens, the question and related sub-questions were 
continually refined. This study seeks to answer the following general research 
question:  
 How does pre-embedded IMS technology influence behaviours and practices 
for post-crisis regulatory compliance within global financial organizations 
engaged in investment activities? 
In order to address the high level research question, I have decomposed this 
question into sub-questions. The rationale for doing so is to make the research more 
manageable and to thereby assist in the operationalization of the main question 
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(Punch 2000). The following sub-questions are focused on understanding the IMS 
case and contextualising its uses through investigating its environment. 
 How is the post-crisis regulatory landscape in which the IMS operates defined? 
 How does the IMS functionality and architecture contribute to meeting 
regulatory obligations? 
 What are the services offered around the IMS by the systems’ Vendor for 
managing compliance? 
The next four sub-questions are focused on how the IMS influences compliance 
practices and so guide the discussion chapters.  
 How do regulations and compliance practices become inscribed and transmitted 
through IMS technology?  
 How are outmoded compliance practices becoming deinstitutionalised through 
the IMS? 
 How are new compliance practices and behaviours becoming institutionalised 
through the IMS and what factors may prohibit this? 
 What are the IS governance and management capabilities which support 
compliance activities? 
Within the following sections and chapters, these questions are further decomposed 
to incorporate key theoretical constructs, and thereby further operationalise the 
research question. 
1.3. Key Contributions  
The financial crisis has had a hugely detrimental impact on society across 
the globe. However, as the literature review shows, numerous studies have 
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investigated the implications of the crisis through researching financial models and 
products, macro-economic factors and legal implications of regulatory change yet, 
surprisingly perhaps, very little research exists, either prior to the crisis or since, on 
how compliance practices are managed within financial organizations. Studies 
which have considered how technologies may support arrangements for meeting 
regulatory obligations are even scarcer. I believe that this is an important gap as no 
matter how robust a new regulation is if it is implemented poorly through poor 
management of socio-technical factors then its potential to achieve its aims and 
thereby the protection of investors and the economic wellbeing of the state are 
diminished. This study makes a small step towards bridging this gap by identifying 
how technology is implicated in carrying and (de)institutionalizing regulations and 
associated compliance related practices within firms engaged in the ‘buy-side’ 
subdivision of the financial services industry. Through the application of 
institutional concepts to the study of technology induced practices and behaviours, 
for post-financial crisis compliance, the main research question previously outlined 
(see 1.2) is addressed and correspondingly a contribution to scholarly literature and 
practice is sought.  
This study firstly makes a contribution by identifying practices for 
organizing compliance and the social forces which influence them through 
technology. At the time of writing, many of the compliance practices considered 
were newly designed and not universally embedded. Correspondingly, the EU and 
US regulatory responses to the crisis are not yet fully crystallised so a second 
contribution of this study is that it provides a glimpse of this transient environment. 
The study takes an IMS as its case and, as no previous studies address this 
type of regulatory technology, a third contribution is made by unpacking this 
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technology’s competitive environment, its functionality, architecture and the 
changing landscape of value added services its Vendor provides, in the post-crisis 
environment. Often socio-technical studies do not benefit from a sufficiently 
unpacking the black box of technology and so by providing a detailed 
understanding of the technical and operational aspects of the system the reader is 
provided with an enhanced understanding of the role the technology plays whilst 
also facilitating a richer analysis of the causality of social phenomena derived from 
the findings.  
A third practitioner orientated contribution is made by distilling the findings 
into a model of IS capabilities for compliance and through the development of a 
model to measure the maturity of a firm’s compliance capabilities.  
This research draws from institutional theory to provide meta-theoretical 
concepts which assist with understanding and framing this complex and dynamic 
environment. As the literature review shows, studies using institutional theory to 
examine the impact of the crises have been surprisingly scarce given the level of 
institutional change occurring. Here, a fourth contribution is made by employing 
the institutional logics perspective to frame the post-crisis environment and to 
understand the nature of institutions within this context.  
A fifth contribution is made by synthesising Scott’s work on how 
institutions are carried and diffused (Scott 2008), pressures for 
deinstitutionalization (Oliver 1992) and mechanisms of institutionalization 
(DiMaggio and Powell. 1983; Scott 2008) and distilling them into a conceptual 
model of regulatory compliance (see Figure 5). In the analysis sections Figure 5 is 
decomposed into lower level conceptual models, Figures, 14, 15 and 16, addressing 
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each of the key sets of theoretical constructs employed so here, a further 
contribution is made.  
A sixth contribution is made by applying and extending established 
institutional constructs derived from the work of Scott (2008), Oliver (1992), and 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983). 
Finally, the study makes a small contribution through the development and 
successful application of a methodology, which allows a cross disciplinary 
approach to researching the impact of regulatory change on organizational 
practices.  
1.4. A Brief History of UK and US financial regulation 
This section outlines the regulatory history of the UK and US prior to the 
beginning of this research. By doing so, the reader is provided with a historical 
context within which to frame the research. The UK and US context were selected 
as each of the financial organizations participating had operations in at least these 
two countries and so had to comply with regulatory obligations in each jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, London and New York are often considered the two major financial 
capitals of this world.  
1.4.1. US Regulators 
Today the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) is the oldest 
financial regulator in the USA and was established in 1863. The OCC’s role is to 
administer federal laws which apply to national banks. The OCC concerns itself 
chiefly with commercial banking, however there is some crossover between 
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commercial and investment banking regulation, for example in monitoring capital 
adequacy. (Malloy 2003; OCC 2010). 
In 1911, the state of Kansas passed the first Blue Sky Law (Columbia Law 
Review Association 1924). The Blue Sky laws refer to state regulation of securities 
and are so called after a judicial opinion in the case of Hall vs. Geiger-Jones Co. in 
1917 to combat, ‘speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet 
of blue sky’ (Alvarez and Astarita 2010 p. 1).  Though states laws vary 
considerably, they generally contain three aspects. The first prohibits fraud. The 
second address the registration of brokers and dealers. The third requires the 
registration or exemption of securities to be traded. (Hazen and Ratner 2005). Over 
the years state regulation has been altered by federal regulation. (Palmiter 2005). 
The history of the US’s main federal regulator, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, begins with the stock market crash of 1929. The crash occurred in 
October and from the following September until July 1932 the New York Stock 
Exchange lost 83% of its value. (Gabaldon 2008) This economic disaster created a 
downturn in the economy which was a determinate factor in the worldwide 
economic catastrophe known as the Great Depression (Friedman and Jacobson 
1989).  The great crash precipitated the Securities Act of 1933, its aim was to 
ensure that the public was given adequate knowledge regarding a security and its 
issuer. The act also aimed to prevent fraudulent offerings. (Palmiter 2005; SEC 
2009b; US Congress 1933).  
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 was also enacted as a result of the 
crash. This act’s focus was the regulation of exchanges. Consonant to this purpose 
was the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC 
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oversees participants in the US securities industry, ‘including securities exchanges, 
securities brokers and dealers, investment advisors, and mutual funds’ (SEC 2009a 
p.1). The Act necessitated various institutions registering with the Commission, 
including exchanges, brokers and dealers, transfer agents, and clearing agencies. 
Exchanges were designated self-regulatory organizations (SRO) SROs were 
authorised to design rules and measures outlining improper conduct, investor 
protection and market integrity. SRO’s rules supplement the SEC federal laws and 
can differ in specifics and emphasis. These rules were ultimately reviewed and 
approved by the SEC. (US Congresss 1934; Gabaldon 2008; Palmiter 2005; SEC 
2009b).   
The SROs regulated under the SEC include securities exchanges, clearing 
agencies, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), and the Municipal 
Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) (SEC 2009a). However, the regulation of 
commodities in the USA begins with the Futures Trading act of 1921 which 
institutes the regulation of futures trading in grain and the exchanges that trade in 
them (CFTC 2009; Markham 1987). This legislation was closely followed by the 
Grain Futures Act of 1922 which facilitated the creation of the Grain Futures 
Administration (GFA) to administer the Act. The GFA was formed within the US 
Department of Agriculture (USDA). Also created has been the Grain Futures 
Commission which constitutes the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of 
Commerce, and the Attorney General. The Grain Futures Commission was given 
the authority to suspend or revoke boards of trade or exchanges trading in 
commodities. (CFTC 2009).  
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 created the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission which unlike its predecessor the 
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Commodity Exchange Authority, had jurisdiction over all commodities and futures 
trades. The CTFC is designed to be very much like the SEC. It is  an independent 
federal regulatory body who issues rules to be observed by participants in the 
futures industry by, ‘encouraging competitiveness and efficiency, protecting market 
participants against fraud, manipulation, and abusive trading practices, and by 
ensuring the financial integrity of the clearing process’ (CFTC 2010 p. 1).  
A major development in securities regulation occurred with the enactment of 
the Maloney Act of 1938. Its purpose was to bring the same standards and fair 
treatment afforded to users of the exchanges to those operating within the over-the-
counter (OTC) arena (trades conducted outside of exchanges directly between 
counterparties). The Act encouraged the dissemination of appropriate ethics and 
responsibilities through the registration of broker dealer associations as SRO, which 
in turn would be monitored by the SEC. (Loss and Seligman 2004; Mathews 1939; 
The Yale Law Journal 1939). The legislation was touted as the forerunner for self-
regulation in other industries. However, this expectation was not realised and in 
effect this created one self-regulating body, the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD) (Hofmann-Hed 1964). In 2007, the NASD merged with the 
member regulation, enforcement and arbitration functions of the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) to form the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) 
(FINRA 2009).  
The Blue Sky Laws were altered by the Uniform State Laws of 1956. This 
aimed to provide a uniform blueprint for the Blue Sky Laws. The Act was amended 
in 1985 to strengthen powers of state securities administrators and also to reflect 
state and federal developments. By 2000, approximately forty states had embraced 
the Uniform Securities Act as a basis for individual states regulation of securities. 
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Although various states interpreted the Uniform Securities Act differently, it was 
deemed to provide a more rational and consistent pattern for securities regulation 
(Hazen and Ratner 2005; Loss and Seligman 2004). 
However, in 1996 the National Securities Market Improvement Act 
(NSMIA), was enacted by Congress in order to reduce the burdens of state and 
federal legislation by eliminating duplicate and unnecessary regulation and 
reallocating responsibility in securities regulation in a less ad-hoc fashion whilst 
still maintaining investor protection. The Act effectively pre-empted state law and 
so transferred many responsibilities from state regulators to the federal SEC. 
(Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 2010; Dorsch 1997; 
Rutledge 1997; US Congress 1996) 
The last US regulator considered is the Municipal Securities Rulemaking 
Board (MSRB). The MSB was created by the Securities Act of 1975 and is 
different from other SRO’s as it has no members or participants and has purely a 
rule making function (Loss and Seligman 2004). The rules established by the board 
apply to both bank and non-bank municipal dealers and brokers (Municipal 
Securities Rulemaking Board 2010). They concern themselves with professional 
qualification standards and testing, fair practice, recordkeeping, confirmation, 
clearance, and settlement of transactions, and the form and content of quotations 
and rules for the dissemination of information provided by issuers of securities 
(Loss and Seligman 2004).  
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Figure 1: Timeline of US Regulation of Capital Markets Prior to 2010 
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The timeline in Figure 1 presents the history of capital markets regulation 
within the United States, prior to 2010. The US approach to regulation is tiered with 
the SEC enforcing federal securities laws and supervising the SROs who in turn 
have the first line of supervisory authority over firms. Note that the diagram 
excludes exchanges and clearing settlements systems which could be considered 
SRO’s as they have memberships who must adhere to their rules, but these 
exchanges and systems are not primarily devoted to regulating the securities 
industry.  
1.4.2. UK Regulators 
In the USA the Glass Steagall Act of 1933 separated commercial and 
investment banking. Similarly, pre-1980’s retail and investment banking activities 
were also separated. However, this separation was a result of the self-regulatory 
nature of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) with ownership of member firms by 
non-member firms, such as commercial banks, restricted by the LSE’s rules 
(Stefanadis 2003). The LSE role as a regulatory influence for the capital markets 
industry goes back many years. As early as 1692, in places like Jonathan’s Coffee 
House in Exchange Alley, individuals congregated to sell stocks. Defaulters were 
soon shunned and banned from entering Jonathans and so the self-regulatory nature 
of the LSE has its roots in its early inception, with members of the exchange 
ensuring desirable behaviour from other members. (Stringham 2002). 
Other attempts to regulate the UK markets include the Preventions of Fraud 
(Investments) Act of 1939. The Act introduced licensing requirements for securities 
industry participants, issued by the Board of Trade, for entities and individuals 
engaged in securities dealing. However, the act exempted members of bodies such 
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as the LSE, and so the act exempted a large part of the industry and strengthened 
the LSEs position as a self-regulatory body. (Newton 1998; Robb 1997). 
The Bank of England’s (BOE) regulatory role has stemmed from the Bank 
of England Act of 1946 which provided the BOE with powers to request 
information from bankers and to provide them with recommendations. The BOE’s 
focus was on the merchant banks and discount houses with which it had a 
counterparty relationship. By the 1970’s two new review bodies were established 
with supervisory powers. The Joint Review Body was responsible for the general 
oversight of supervision for securities’ markets. While, the Council for the 
Securities Industry was responsible for the supervision of the non-statutory aspects 
of securities markets not covered by the Stock Exchange (Robb 1997). 
Capital markets regulation in the UK changed with the Big Bang which is 
shorthand for a number of measures taken to deregulate the UK Securities industry 
in order to allow the City of London to compete with other foreign financial 
centres, such as New York, Tokyo and Zurich (Pass and Lowes 1993). These 
changes aimed to end perceptions of the existence of an anachronistic ‘old-boy 
network’ that had dominated the City (Forston 2006). The Financial Services Act of 
1986 received Royal Ascent two weeks after the Big Bang. For the first time this 
act set out an extensive framework for the regulation of the UK’s financial 
investment industry. The act provided a two-tier system. The first still depended on 
practitioner involvement through SROs. However, the SRO’s were to be overseen 
by the Securities and Investments Board (SIB), the second tier. (UK Parliament 
1986; Whittaker and Morse 1986). 
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The Financial Services Act made it an offence to conduct investment 
business without authorization. This authorization could be obtained directly 
through the board or through the membership of a SRO or professional body. SROs 
were required to meet specific criteria to gain approval to operate. The SIB had the 
power to establish and withdraw recognition from SROs and professional bodies, to 
alter the SROs rule book and define conduct of business rules. (Barnard 1987). The 
SROs were expected to perform day-to-day monitoring and authorisation of 
practitioners. The SIB eventually authorised five SROs, The Securities Association 
(TSA), the Association of Futures Brokers and Dealers (AFBD), the Financial 
Intermediaries and Brokers Association (FIMBRA), the Investment Management 
Regulatory Organization (IMRO) and the Life Assurance and Unit Trust 
Regulatory Association (LAUTRO).  
The Companies Act of 1989 aimed to reduce the cumbersome legislation 
resulting from having five different SRO rulebooks and the resultant incoherence 
and uncertainty. The act allowed the SIB to define principles which applied to all 
authorised individuals (MacNeil 1999). The end result was that the SROs’ and 
SIRs’ rulebooks were structured at three levels, ten top level principles, forty core 
rules mandated by the SIR to be included in the SROs books and third-tier rules 
specific to the SROs’ scope and derived from the rules and principles outlined in 
the first and second tiers  (Miller 1988). 
 In 1991, the TSA and AFBD merged to become the Securities and Futures 
Authority (SFA). This was achieved by merging the memberships of the two SROs 
as well as their responsibilities. (Newton 1998; Rider et al. 1989) 
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Following the Labour Party’s victory in the 1997 general election, the newly 
appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer announced the reform of financial services 
regulation in the UK and the creation of a new regulator. Banking supervision and 
investment services regulation would be merged into the SIB which formally 
changed its name to the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in October 1997 (FSA 
2005). The Bank of England Act of 1998 established the independence of the BOE 
from government and political influence and allows the BOE autonomy over 
monetary policy and crucially transferred responsibility for banking supervision 
from the BOE to the FSA (Blair et al. 1998).  
The Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) of 2000 provided a 
framework of operations for a single regulator for the entire financial services 
industry, the FSA. Consequently, the act draws together the PIA, SFA, IMRO, the 
BOE Supervision and Surveillance department and the FSA (formally SIB). (HM 
Treasury 2000). The FSA then published a single handbook of rules and guidance 
for all firms authorised by the FSA (FSA 2008d). The act also created the Financial 
Services Practitioner Panel to oversee views and interests of regulated firms in the 
regulatory decision making process, and monitor the regulator's effectiveness. 
(FSPP 2004)  
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Figure 2: Timeline of UK Capital Markets Regulation Prior to 2010 Source:  
author 
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The timeline in Figure 2 represents the history of capital markets regulation 
within the United Kingdom, prior to 2010 and is derived from the review outlined in 
the previous sections. This diagram shows how UK regulation was originally shared 
between a few entities performing disparate tasks. When the UK became more focused 
towards regulating its financial industry, we can see how initially the UK followed the 
US two-tier model of non-government SRO organizations being managed by a 
government regulator. However, Labour’s rise to power in 1997 and the Bank of 
England’s independence established a single national financial services regulator, the 
FSA. Exchanges and clearing and settlement systems have not been included for the 
same reasons as outlined in the US timeline.  
1.5. The Current Regulatory Landscape 
Within capital markets, the post-crisis environment is distinguished by reduced 
margins, higher operating costs, reduced bonus payments and crucially radical changes 
to the regulatory environment as new obligations are introduced (The Economist 
2012b). These factors are causing changes in financial organizations’ operational 
practices, as new logics for arranging compliance emerge. Consequently, organizations 
are reviewing and altering the practices and systems employed to deliver compliance 
and ensure new regulatory requirements are met within designated timeframes and 
managed on an on-going basis. 
1.5.1. The Financial Crisis 2007-2009 
Turner (2009a; 2009b) and the European Commission’s Directorate-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs (2009) suggest that key contributing factors to the 
crisis include the creation of ‘field-economic imbalances’. They suggest that previous 
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to the crisis large current account surpluses accrued in oil exporting countries as well 
as China, Japan and some other East Asian developing countries. However, in the UK, 
USA, Ireland, Spain and some other countries, large deficits in current accounts were 
accumulated. This occurred not least due to high savings rates in countries like China, 
which have created savings in excess of their own domestic investment. Consequently, 
China and other countries had to invest beyond their borders. However, these countries 
have committed to fixed or managed exchange rates and so these investments have 
taken the form of risk-free or low-risk government bonds. This in turn caused a 
reduction in the interest rates of investments deemed ‘risk-free’. In addition, the 
integration of financial markets created large capital flows which were diverted 
towards real estate, causing prices to soar in several countries (European Commission 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 2009; Turner 2009a,b). Turner 
and the EC suggest that lower interest rates in the medium-to-long term have driven 
two effects. Firstly, the rapid growth of credit extension (typically in residential 
mortgages) fuelling property booms with an accompanied reduction in credit standards. 
Secondly, strong desires amongst investors to gain as much as possible above the risk-
free interest rate in order to offset its decline. Both Turner and the EC highlight 
increasing financial innovation as a result of these phenomena. They suggest that the 
macro-imbalances previously described created demand for increasingly complex 
credit securities. Frequently, credit rating agencies misjudged the risks associated with 
credit derivatives and clear conflicts of interest existed where rating agencies helped 
develop new such products and rate them. All of these occurrences have sought to 
satisfy the increased demand for yields beyond the risk-free rate. Turner (2009a p.1) 
criticises the assumption:‘…that by slicing and dicing, structuring and hedging, using 
sophisticated mathematical models to understand and manage risk, we can ‘create 
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value’ by offering investors combinations of risk and return which are more attractive 
than those available from direct purchase of the underlying credit exposures.’ 
Consequently, there followed what Turner defines as ‘self-fulfilling cycles of 
falling risk aversion and rising irrational exuberance to which all liquid traded 
markets seem at times to be susceptible’ thereby creating a cycle of boom and bust 
(Turner 2009a p. 1). The regulatory response to this crisis, from the EU and US, has 
focused on tightening their respective regulative systems and in the case of the EU 
harmonizing regulative practices across member states. The breadth and depth of 
change has been considerable.  
1.5.2. The EU and US Regulatory Response 
In 2009, the G20 met in Pittsburgh and defined new measures aimed at 
preventing another financial crisis. At this meeting it was decided that the G20 would 
replace the Western-dominated G8 as the primary global economic forum. The 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) would coordinate and monitor tougher financial 
regulations and also provide insight into emerging risks. The G20 agreed that banks 
need to hold more capital as a buffer against loss, termed ‘regulatory capital’. 
Furthermore, it was also agreed to change the way derivative transactions were 
conducted to ensure they took place on exchanges or electronic trading platforms and 
cleared through a centralized Clearing House. A deadline for the end of 2012 was set 
for the implementation of these new standards (The Economist 2009). These 
requirements necessitate a high level of process automation only available through IS. 
Unsurprisingly, Chartis Research (2010) forecast that the worldwide financial services’ 
governance, risk and compliance technology market would reach $2 billion by 2013 at 
a compound annual growth rate of 6.5%.  
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Table 1 highlights the various EU responses to the financial crises. 
EU Directive Focus 
Alternative 
Investment 
Fund 
Managers 
Directive 
(AIFMD) 
This directive focusses on regulating various forms of investment 
management, including hedge funds and private equity. Its purpose is to 
harmonize regulatory treatment of investment management across the 
EU. The Directive will increase the amount of disclosure required of 
funds to regulators and investors and will impose requirements on 
managers regarding organization, capital, depositaries and marketing of 
funds. (Europa 2009; HM Treasury 2011) 
Capital 
Adequacy 
Directive  IV 
(CAD IV) 
This directive updates the requirements for organizations to hold capital 
consummate to the risks to which the organization exposes itself, 
regulatory capital.  The key assumption is that organizations entered the 
crisis with insufficient capital of the necessary quantity and quality to 
safeguard against losses. Specifically, the directive requires: enhanced 
quality of capital, strengthening of capital requirements for counterparty 
credit risk, the introduction of a leverage ratio; new capital buffers and 
better disclosure. (Europa 2011a; FSA 2011b) 
European 
Market 
Infrastructure 
Regulation 
(EMIR) 
The regulation aims to implement the G20 agreements on regulatory 
oversight of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. Specifically, EMIR aims 
to increase transparency by requiring financial organization to report 
changes to any OTC derivative contracts, reduce counterparty risks and 
reduce operational risks through the use of electronic facilities for 
documenting and managing OTC trades. (FSA 2011a; Holman Fenwick 
Willan 2011a)  
Markets 
Abuse 
Directive II 
(MAD II) 
The original Market Abuse Directive focused on insider dealing and 
market manipulation practices. The update aims to fill gaps in coverage 
and modernize the directive; strengthen enforcement and the cost-
effectiveness of the regulations as well as improving transparency and 
coordination between regulators. (Europa 2011b; Holman Fenwick 
Willan 2011b) 
Markets in 
Financial 
Instruments 
Directive II 
(MiFID II) 
This directive updates the original MiFID requirements aimed at 
fostering competition and a level playing field between trading venues 
and to ensure appropriate levels of protection for investors. Changes 
are focused on electronic trading, transparency and transaction 
reporting, investor protection, product intervention through setting 
position limits, transparency and increased organizational requirements 
relating to conflicts of interest and the structure of risk and compliance 
functions. (Deloitte 2011; Linklaters 2010; Linklaters 2012; Rennison 
2011) 
Regulation on 
Short Selling 
and Credit 
Default 
Swaps 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, EU member states adopted 
different approaches to the regulation of short-selling and credit default 
swaps. This regulation aims to address this fragmentation by 
establishing a coherent framework across member states. Specifically, 
the regulations aims to: increase transparency on short positions held 
by investors, ensure member states have clear powers to intervene in 
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exceptional situations, ensure co-ordination between regulatory bodies, 
and reduce risks associated with Short Selling and Credit Default 
Swaps. (Europa 2011c) 
Undertakings 
for Collective 
Investment in 
Transferable 
Securities 
Directives V 
(UCITS V) 
The UCITS regulations aim to provide harmonized rules for mutual 
funds and other collective investments throughout the EU. UCITS V 
aims to alter the role of UCITS depositories and the remuneration of 
UCITS managers. The aim is to create better protection for investors 
and to align UCITS funds with AIFMD. The UCITS depositories must not 
only safeguard assets but also ensure that all transactions are in 
compliance with regulatory mandates and fund documentation. Under 
UCITS V, depositories will have increased oversight responsibilities, 
increased liabilities and will have the burden of proof for negligence 
placed on them. UCITS V aims to more closely align the remuneration 
of financial services actors with the interests of investors. (PwC 2011) 
Table 1: EU Responses to the 2008 Financial Crisis 
In contrast, the US has opted to develop a single sweeping 2,319-page piece of 
legislation known as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, passed in 2010. Table 2 summarises this act. 
Dodd-Frank Title Focus 
Title I—Financial Stability—
Systemic Risk Regulation and 
Oversight 
This title creates the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council (FSOC), and the Office of Financial Research 
to support the FSOC with data collection and analysis. 
The title subjects financial organizations classified as 
identified as providing a potential systemic risk to 
supervision by the Federal Reserve Authority (FED).  
Title II—Orderly Liquidation 
Authority for Systemic Risk 
Companies 
This title provides the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) powers to liquidate systemically 
risky financial organizations without using tax payer’s 
money. 
Title III—Transfer of OTS 
Authority to OCC, FDIC, 
Federal Reserve 
This title transfers powers away from the Office of 
Thrift (OTS) supervision. This regulatory body was 
wound up by the act and its powers transferred to the 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), 
the FDIC, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 
and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB). 
Title IV—Regulation of 
Advisors to Hedge Funds and 
Others  
This title brings hedge fund and other private equity 
firms under regulatory jurisdiction. Such firms must 
now report to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) under the Investment Advisors Act.  
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Title V—Insurance Provides reform and streamlining of insurance 
regulation through national coordination.   
Title VI—Improvements to 
Regulation of Bank and 
Savings Association Holding 
Companies and Depository 
Institutions 
Provides the FED with the authority to examine 
subsidiaries of bank holding companies (BHC) and 
Savings and Loan Holdings Companies (SLHC) and 
ensure they are well capitalized. This title includes the 
controversial Volcker Rule. This rule prohibits 
proprietary trading by banks as well as owning or 
sponsoring hedge funds.   
Title VII—Swaps and 
Derivatives Regulation (Wall 
Street Transparency and 
Accountability) 
The title aims to meet the G20 commitment to improve 
the transparency of derivatives trading by introducing 
capital and margin regulatory obligations.  
Title VIII—Payment, Clearing 
and Settlement Supervision 
This title provides oversight and supervision of 
systemically important payments, clearing and 
settlements. 
Title IX—Investor Protections 
and Improvements to the 
Regulation of Securities 
This title aims to improve in investor protection through 
the creation of the Investor Advisory Committee within 
SEC, as well as increasing regulatory enforcement 
remedies and provisions to protect and incentivize 
whistle blowers. The title also reforms short selling 
activities. This title increases the regulation of credit 
rating agencies by requiring they adopt appropriate 
internal controls and provides penalties for misconduct. 
This title also enhances regulation of the securitization 
process. The title strengthens corporate governance 
measures, the oversight of municipal securities and the 
auditing requirements for broker-dealers.  
Title X—Bureau of Consumer 
Financial Protection 
Provides supervisory, examination and enforcement 
authority for banks over $10 billion. Creates the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. 
Title XI—Federal Reserve 
System Provisions (Lending 
Authority, Reserve Bank 
Governance) 
Provides provisions for Federal Reserve emergency 
lending and provides FDIC with the authority to create, 
during times of economic stress, emergency financial 
stabilization programs.  
Title XII—Improving Access to 
Mainstream Financial 
Institutions 
This title allows the US Treasury to create programs to 
facilitate low income individuals the ability to set up 
account at insured depositories and receive small 
loans.   
Title XIII—Pay It Back Act This title reduces authorization of the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP) created in the midst of the 
financial crisis in September 2008 and reduces the 
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funding available under TARP. 
Title XIV—Mortgage Reform 
and Anti-Predatory Lending 
Act 
Requires mortgage firms to be qualified, registered and 
licensed and sets minimum standards for mortgages 
including affordability and resolution.  
Title XV—Miscellaneous 
Provisions 
Restricts use of US funds for foreign governments 
amongst other obligations. 
Title XVI—Section 1256 
Contracts 
Updates how swaps contracts are treated.  
Table 2: Overview of Dodd-Frank Act of 2010  
(Clifford Chance 2010; Mayer Brown 2010; Morrison & Foerster 2010; Morrissey & Cox 2010; US Congress 
2010) 
Analysis into US and EU Directives reveals that post-crisis regulation focuses 
on transactions, assets, capital adequacy and associated limits, concentrations and 
exposures which organizations must remain within and which consequently require 
systems to impose structured rules on the financial organization’s activities to ensure 
compliance. Requirements demand that organizations set quantitative limits on specific 
types of transactions, calculate exposures to certain instruments, calculate risk values, 
perform pre and post-trade analysis, have the ability to perform audits, quickly report 
executed trades to the market and facilitate the clearing and settlement of transactions. 
To ensure compliance, financial organizations may employ IMS which ensures that 
quantitative limits are not breeched, that correct workflows and processes are adhered 
to and that associated data is readily available and auditable. Crucially, the IMS allows 
the definition of automated rules which implement quantitative restrictions on trades, 
ensuring the adherence of regulative rules focused on limits, exposures and 
concentrations.   
It is worth highlighting that those global organizations with operations in the 
EU and the USA will be subject to the regulatory requirements of both areas. For 
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example, a Global Asset Management House with operations in the UK and the US 
will be subject to the jurisdiction of EU and US regulations. In addition, public limited 
financial organizations may be subject to the regulatory requirements of the country 
and exchange where their stock is listed. An example is the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, which requires that if an organization is listed on a US exchange then its foreign 
operations, such as those within Europe and Asia, must also comply with the 
regulations.  
There is considerable cross-over between the EU and US post-crisis 
regulations. For example, the EMIR Directive and Title VII of the US Dodd-Frank Act 
will ensure that over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, which have traditionally 
commanded strong margins, will be traded on regulated markets or electronic 
platforms instead of being privately negotiated. Through these areas of legislation, both 
the US and EU regulators aim to meet the G20 commitment to increase the 
transparency of such transactions and mitigate systemic risk. Within the UK the 
Vickers report, has advocated ring-fencing through the separation of retail and 
investment banking activities (BBC 2012). While the controversial US Volcker Rule 
prohibits financial organizations from proprietary trading and sponsorship of private 
funds, hedge funds and private-equity firms, financial organizations engaging in these 
activities must split their organizations. As a result of on-going regulatory changes the 
BBC’s business editor succinctly notes, ‘…banks will in the coming five years be 
forced to undergo significant financial, cultural and managerial reconstruction.’ (BBC 
2012 p.1). However, although the EU and US regulations create similar obligations, 
their approach to regulation has differed.  
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1.5.3. Rules vs. Principles 
From 1st April 2013, the FSA was abolished and replaced with the Prudential 
Regulation Authority (PRA) and The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). The 
Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) of 2000 provided a framework of 
operations for a single regulator for the entire financial services industry, the FSA. The 
FSMA outlined four statutory objectives for the FSA, while the Financial Services Act 
2012 (FSAA) amended the FSMA and defined three statutory objectives for the FCA.  
The PRA has responsibility for prudential regulation of certain firms in order to 
minimize the disruption caused by any firms if they fail, termed ‘Systemic Risk’. In 
addition, the FCA assumed responsibilities currently undertaken by the FSA. The FSA 
handbook became the FCA Handbook although its contents remained unaltered at the 
point of change. Data for this study was collected predominantly while the FSA was 
functioning. Table 3 depicts the FSA and FCA’s statutory objectives. They are broadly 
similar.  
FSA Statutory Objectives FCA Statutory Objectives 
Maintaining confidence in the UK 
financial system; 
To secure an appropriate degree of 
protection for consumers. 
Contributing to the protection and 
enhancement of stability of the UK 
financial system 
To protect and enhance the integrity of the 
UK financial system. 
Securing the appropriate degree of 
protection for consumers 
To promote effective competition in the 
interests of consumers. 
Reducing the extent to which it is 
possible for a regulated business to be 
used for a purpose connected with 
financial crime 
 
Table 3: FSA and FCA Statutory Objectives (FCA 2013d; FSA 2012b) 
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In meeting these statutory objectives, the FSA was obliged to adhere to six 
‘Principles of Good Regulation.’ These principles include, (1) using resources 
efficiently and economically, (2) the need for [financial organizations] senior 
management to be responsible for its activities and to ensure compliance with 
regulatory requirements, (3) restrictions imposed on the finance industry must be 
proportionate to the expected benefits, (4) to facilitate innovation including launching 
new financial products and services, (5) to cooperate with international and overseas 
regulators while maintaining the UK’s competitiveness internationally and finally (6)  
to reduce the impacts of regulation on competitiveness and to correspondingly 
facilitate competition between firms. (FSA 2009).  
In 2003, the FSA developed these principles of regulation into a wider ground 
breaking approach (McCarthy 2006). Traditionally the approach of US and UK 
regulators has been quite different. Prior to the financial crisis within the UK, The FSA 
adopted a principles based or ‘light-touch’ approach to regulation. This approach was 
contrary to a prescriptive or detailed rules driven approach to regulation and allowed 
firms to ‘…have increased flexibility in how they deliver the outcomes [the Regulator] 
require’ and focused on, ‘…moving away from dictating through detailed, prescriptive 
rules and supervisory actions how firms should operate their business.’ (FSA, 2007 p. 
4 & p. 6). 
The FSA repositioned itself to focus its activity towards setting desirable 
regulatory outcomes in principles and out-come focused rules. The principles set the 
high-level desired outcomes and were underpinned by fewer rules which were also 
outcome focused. The FSA cited a number of reasons for adopting this approach. The 
FSA argued that prescriptive rules had failed to prevent misconduct and ever-
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expanding rule books increased the burden on industry resources. Furthermore, the 
FSA suggested that a focus on outcomes over prescription is better positioned to 
regulate the dynamic changing nature of financial markets and associated financial 
product innovation. They argued that prescriptive rules may be unable to address 
changing circumstances in market conditions as delays occur while appropriately 
detailed rules are defined. Furthermore, detailed rules, they argued, may restrict 
innovation. Ironically, Lord Turner later highlighted financial innovation as a 
contributory factor to the financial crisis, see 1.5.1. 
The FSA also suggested that a highly complex rule book with many thousands of 
detailed rules was a barrier to smaller firms without legal or compliance expertise. 
However, the FSA did concede that no statutory scheme can be a pure-type and 
described its approach as being more principles based, while conceding that, ‘detailed 
rules will remain a part of [their] regulatory toolkit’ (FSA 2009 p.10) particularly with 
respect to European Directives over which the FSA had no discretion. (FSA 2009). 
Two key US regulators the SEC and CFTC, have always been predominately 
rules-focused. In the US, Acts of Congress provide the SEC with powers to ‘...make, 
issue, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations and such orders as it may deem 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors to 
carry out the provisions...’ of each act (See for example: US Congress 1933; US 
Congress 1934; US Congress 1940a; US Congress 1940b; US Congress 1975; US 
Congress 1996; US Congress 2000; US Congress 2002). In summary, the SEC ensures 
the intent of Congress by engaging in rulemaking (SEC 2004). While another key US 
regulator, the CFTC is structured in a similar fashion to the SEC and so is an 
independent federal regulatory body which issues rules to be observed by participants 
48 
 
in the futures industry. Overall, the SEC and CFTC are often characterized as being 
rule oriented and prescriptive regulators (Ford 2008).  
In 2009, the FSA’s ‘principles-based’ approaches to regulation were replaced in 
the wake of the financial crisis. The Regulator’s Chief Executive commented that: 
‘…the limitations of a pure principles-based regime have to be recognized. I continue 
to believe the majority of market participants are decent people; however, a principles-
based approach does not work with individuals who have no principles’- Speech at the 
Reuters Newsmakers ‘event March 12th 2009 (Sants 2009).  
In 2012, Lord Turner, Chairman of the FSA, observed that prior to the crisis: 
‘debates about regulation [were] more focused on fostering London’s competitiveness 
through ‘light touch’ regulation, than on any concern that poor regulation might be 
creating the conditions for future crisis. In retrospect, it was a fool’s paradise – the 
band playing on oblivious to the dangers ahead.’ – Speech at FSA City Banquet at the 
Mansion House, London, 11
th
 Oct 2012, (Turner 2012b).  
Turner highlighted the need to move towards a new approach of ‘intense 
supervision’ (Financial Services Research Forum (Financial Services Research Forum 
2009; International Securities Association for Institutional Trade Communication 
2009; Turner 2009a). The new approach required a far more proactive approach by the 
regulator, seeking to actively influence outcomes as opposed to merely reacting to 
events (Pain 2010). The financial crisis also caused the UK Regulator to reconsider its 
role within society as a result of wide spread criticism from the UK Parliament and 
general public. The Regulator accepted that it had failed to adequately protect investors 
and the wider society, suggesting that previously the principles based approach had 
been supported by ‘the City and society’ but that now society demanded a more 
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stringent supervisory system that would apply judgments on financial organizations 
businesses. In addition to introducing new rules and obligations the financial crisis also 
changed the regulatory landscape by altering the way in which the UK Regulator 
supervised firms (Sants 2009; Sants 2010b). In 2009, the Regulator’s Chief Executive 
directly threatened the banking establishment, Hector Sants outlined ‘…a fundamental 
change. It is moving from regulation based only on observable facts to regulation 
based on judgments about the future… This more 'intrusive' and 'direct' style of 
supervision we call 'the intensive Supervisory Model'… There is a view that people are 
not frightened of the [Regulator]. I can assure you that this is a view I am determined 
to correct. People should be very frightened of the [Regulator].’ - Speech at Reuters 
Newsmakers’ event March 12th 2009 (Sants 2009). 
         However, the Regulator’s Chairman also highlighted how the new supervisory 
approach would be unable to prevent all misconduct and malpractice in advance, 
without deploying an ‘army’ of regulators, the cost of which, would probably outweigh 
the losses it would prevent Lord Turner observed that: ‘the crisis was not a bolt from 
the blue. It arose from poor supervision, from bad rules and structures, from 
dangerous cultures - and the errors were made by regulators, economists, central 
bankers and public policy makers, as well as bankers themselves.’ Furthermore, 
however, refined and enhanced regulatory obligations are and however intense 
supervisory practices are, regulatory structures ‘cannot possibly prevent all 
malpractice in advance, without employing a hugely increased army of supervisors and 
probably not even then. And if [the regulator] did deploy that army, [the regulator] 
might well add more cost to the industry than the cost of customer detriment averted.’ 
– Speech at FSA City Banquet at the Mansion House, London, 11th Oct 2012, (Turner 
2012b) 
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Rethinking the ‘principles based’ approach to regulation was partly driven by 
the perception that it did not protect investors against unethical individuals’ acting in 
self-interest (Turner 2012a). During the post-crisis period, the Regulator became more 
vocal on the importance of ethical and cultural factors to ensure stable financial 
markets. The Regulator recognized that a fundamental disconnect existed between the 
values which financial organizations ascribed to in ethical codes of practices and the 
alignment of such values with employee actions. Despite acknowledging that firms 
often did not ‘practice what they preach’, the Regulator refrained from specifying the 
type of culture a firm should have or the measures and metrics appropriate for 
assessing culture. Instead, the Regulator announced that it would focus on the 
outcomes that the culture delivers and whether the firm can demonstrate it has a 
framework for assessing and maintaining cultural aspects (Sants 2010a). The 
Regulator’s Chief Executive commented: ‘From the Regulators’ perspective it is 
probably the case that seeking to set ourselves up as a judge of ethics and culture 
would not be feasible or acceptable. More realistic would be to relate the 
consequences of culture to regulatory outcomes…’ - Speech at the Annual Lubbock 
Lecture in Management Studies, 12th March 2010, (Sants 2010a). 
1.5.4. Regulators’ Supervisory Approach 
As a general principle, the FSA adopted a risk based approach to the 
supervision of firms. The FSA supervised firms according to the risk the firm presented 
to the statutory objectives previously described. Risk was assessed in terms of the scale 
of impact on consumers and the market as well as the probability of the issue arising. 
Consequently, the day-to-day relationship the FSA maintained with firms depended on 
their utilization of the FSA’s framework for assessing risk: the Advanced Risk-
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Responsive Operating framework (ARROW II) introduced in 2006. This framework 
utilised two main approaches, one for firms and one for themes. The first approach was 
used for assessing risk in individual firms. The themes approach was used for assessing 
risks across several firms or a market. Assigned to a firm (or group of firms) were 
probability and impact scores which determined the intensity of the regulator’s 
supervision (FSA 2008c).  
 
Figure 3:  Arrow II (FSA, 2010) 
Risk assessment was also essential to the FSA’s response to new regulatory 
challenges. Figure 3 depicts the Arrow operating framework and shows how the FSA 
aimed to adopt a risk sensitive supervisory approach (FSA 2006). The FSA successor, 
the FCA, has also adopted a risk based approach using themes and firms as units of 
analysis. Furthermore, the FCA’s operating model also focuses on risk, probability and 
impact. The FCA uses the calculation outlined in Figure 4 to asses if a risk to its 
statutory objectives exists. 
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Figure 4: FCA Risk Calculations as a Product of Impact and Probability (FCA 2013c) 
However, the FCA has signalled that as part of the move towards intense 
supervision it will adopt a new approach termed ‘Firm Systematic Framework’ in place 
of Arrow II (FCA 2012). This approach will also be risk based. Table 4 highlights the 
differences in the FSA’s ARROW II model and the FCA’s Firm Systematic 
Framework.  
FSA: Arrow II FCA: Firm Systematic Framework 
Point-in-time assessment  Form of continuous assessment 
Primarily issues-based – i.e. discovery 
work on issues considered to be higher 
risk 
Assessment of key drivers of conduct 
risk (the risk derived from inappropriate 
execution of business activities) with 
work targeted by business model and 
strategy analysis 
Assessment results in risk mitigation 
programme that frequently has many 
actions 
Assessment results in risk mitigation 
programme focused on a few key 
areas to be addressed 
Extensive follow-up work by 
supervisors 
Follow-up work on less important 
points done by firm with greater use of 
skilled person’s reports, internal audit 
review and non-executive director 
reports. 
Table 4: Differences in the FSA and FCA Operating Models (FCA 2012) 
1.6. Summary 
This chapter has sought to provide the reader with an introduction to the study 
and the historical and current environmental context in which it is set. The general 
research question and related sub-questions have been outlined and a broad overview 
of the study’s intended contribution discussed.  
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The analysis of the historical contexts of the USA and UK regulatory 
environments has provided a picture of two distinct regulatory landscapes. In 
comparison with the UK, the US environment consists of additional layers of 
complexity caused through the use of SRO and multiple regulators operating at the 
state and federal levels. However, both regions have sought to consolidate and 
harmonize regulatory practices through the refinement of their regulatory landscapes. 
For example, the USA has sought to standardise the Blue Sky regulations at the state 
level, while EU Directives have aimed to harmonize regulatory practices across 
member states. The UK has moved away from SRO towards the adoption of single 
regulator and then to two regulators operating from the same handbook. Furthermore, 
while the USA has always adopted a rules-based approach the UK regulator has 
abandoned its principles based approach and outlined a new approach whereby firms’ 
will be subject to a more intensive regime of supervision. Regulators in both 
jurisdictions are now more focused on the systemic risk that large financial 
organizations create for economic well-being and have adopted measures to more 
intensively supervise firms based on the risks they create, such as an approach is 
reflected in both the US Dodd-Frank Act and EU post-crisis Directives.  
The IMS researched was originally developed in the US and enables 
organizations to meet regulatory compliance through the applying quantitative 
restrictions on trades. This is achieved by writing pre-defined rules derived from each 
firm’s regulatory obligations and, through an automated process, applying them to 
trading activities undertaken by financial organizations. Thus, the systems is most 
easily able to apply rules derived from prescriptive rules based regulations, such as the 
post-crisis regulations being introduced in the US and EU.   
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The review of the historical context and current regulatory landscape has 
allowed the identification of a number of factors and issues relevant to this research 
context. Specifically, the sociality of markets, the use of prescriptive rules and the 
affordances they aim to create, the role of governance and transparency, the use of 
information in financial markets and its role in creating regulatory outcomes, the 
erosion of trust in financial organizations as well as ethical and cultural factors 
contributing to organizational and economic failures. The next chapter introduces and 
critically discusses various strands of literature relevant to these areas and also 
highlights related gaps in information systems literature.  
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2. CRITICAL REVIEW OF LITERATURE  
This chapter focuses on providing the reader with a critical review of the 
scholarly literature that relates to the research context. The concepts discussed draw 
from multi-disciplinary bodies of literature, including social studies of economics, 
finance and markets, organizational behaviour, management, IS, finance, accounting 
and law. The review is split into two distinct chapters. This chapter discusses relevant 
prior studies and seeks to identify gaps in IS literature. In addition, the chapter aims to 
draw out key areas of conceptual knowledge which contribute to a stronger 
understanding of the empirical context. Correspondingly, the second review in the next 
chapter draws out the theoretical concepts, related specifically to institutionalism, that 
provide the theoretical underpinnings of the study. In this way, both reviews 
complement each other through facilitating the identification of relevant theoretical and 
empirical derived concepts (Jesson 2011).  
In this chapter, the studies reviewed are chiefly selected on the basis of their 
relevance to the research context. However, other criteria for selection included the 
quality of the journals being sourced. Correspondingly, the Association of Business 
School’s Academic Journal Quality Guide (ABS 2010) and the frequency an article 
was cited in Google Scholar provided important guidance. Although the review did 
include a systematic review of relevant journals ultimately the work included reflects 
the author’s own personal assessment and synthesis of relevant studies and so the 
review adopts a more traditional and critical approach than an overly technical, neutral 
and standardised one (Hart 1998; Jesson 2011; Webster and Watson 2002).   
Within this chapter, literature addressing the social construction of financial 
markets is reviewed first. Secondly, IS related literature on compliance and affordances 
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are considered. The third stream of literature reviewed addresses governance 
transparency and asymmetric information. These streams of literature provide a solid 
point of departure for a social study of institutions, technology, behaviours and 
practices as outlined in the main research question. Fourthly, gaps in the literature are 
identified and discussed before some final conclusions are drawn.  
2.1. Technology and the Social Construction of Markets 
The first body of literature considered addresses the social and cultural study of 
finance often referred to as the ‘the sociology of financial markets’ or ‘new economic 
sociology’ (Knorr and Preda 2004; Preda 2007a). Such literature plays an important 
role in answering the research question and correspondingly making a contribution as 
the finance related practices and behaviours under consideration are essentially social 
phenomena. Related literature views markets not only as mechanistic systems of 
rational exchanges but as social relationships and structures characterised by routines 
and habits that intervene and contribute to market stability but crucially are also 
implicated in how uncertainties arising from transactions are handled (Callon 1998; 
Dobbin et al. 1993; Fligstein 1990; Granovetter 1985; Podolny 2001; White 1981). 
Uncertainty is a key issue within the complex process of regulatory compliance where, 
due to tight deadlines for final adherence, organizations often start planning their 
responses to requirements before the rules are finalised. Overall three interrelated 
theoretical strands have emerged in this body of literature (Fourcade 2007). The first 
views markets as a series of networks of relationships (Granovetter 1985; White 1981), 
the second as institutionalised fields (DiMaggio and Powell. 1983; Dobbin 1997; 
Fligstein 1990; Fligstein and McAdam 2012) and the third, performativity perspective, 
which supposes that economic models do not simply observe and represent economic 
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phenomena but may also intervene and create such phenomena (Callon 1998; 
MacKenzie and Millo 2003; MacKenzie 2006). For such scholars: ‘Economics does 
not describe an existing external ‘economy,’ but brings that economy into being: 
economics performs the economy, creating the phenomenon it describes (MacKenzie 
and Millo 2003 p. 108). For those adopting the performativity perspective economic 
concepts may become more than merely abstract models but, ‘a series of behavioural 
scripts put into practice by implementing theoretical models of market transactions.’ 
(Preda 2007a p. 522).  
 Notable studies in the social studies of finance have focused on the 
performativity of economic models (Callon 1998), the role of conversations and verbal 
interactions in shaping transaction outcomes (Preda 2001), a critique of Callon’s 
performativity perspective  (Miller 2002), globally applied micro social practices in 
currency trading (Cetina and Bruegger 2002), the use of the ‘Black–Scholes–Merton’ 
economic model to legitimise derivative trading (MacKenzie and Millo 2003), the role 
of technology in influencing trading practices (Zaloom 2003), social and symbolic 
expressions on trading floors (Hassoun 2005), search and experimentation processes in 
trading floors (Beunza and Stark 2005) and the performativity of financial models 
(MacKenzie 2006). Post financial crisis, work has addressed the importance of politics 
in post-crisis financial development (Carruthers and Kim 2011), the financial crisis and 
related symbolism and political discourse (Jacobs 2012) and the globalization of the 
US mortgage crisis  and its relationship with banks’ identities, strategies and tactics 
(Fligstein and Habinek 2014).  
A seminal study in the sociology of financial markets is Granovetter’s (1985) 
work on the embeddedness of social relationships within transactions suggesting that 
58 
 
economic contracts are based upon tacit assumptions concerning reliability and 
trustworthiness. This view provides an important critique of Rousseau’s (2006) ideas 
that purely rational contracts underpin social life and economic exchanges (Preda 
2007a). This widening of social perspectives compliments perspectives adopted by 
organizational sociology. Specifically, institutionalists have focused on emphasizing 
the role of institutions and associated belief systems in influencing organizational 
practices. Such perspectives reconsider the role of the rational actor and question the 
implicitness of economic rationality in shaping human behaviours. Specifically, 
Weber’s (2002) perspectives on relentless rationalization and efficiency defining a 
bureaucratic ‘iron cage’ of control have been critiqued by scholars arguing that 
institutionalised rituals, symbols and belief systems provide organizations and 
associated networks with legitimacy and stability and thereby ensure the reproduction 
of such social elements (Berger and Luckman 1966; DiMaggio and Powell. 1983; 
Perrow et al. 1986). Thus, organizational practices are not a function of universally 
applied criteria of rationality, but instead are derived from shared meanings and 
symbols. As Preda (2007 p. 512) succinctly notes: ‘Market transactions can be seen as 
embedded in complex organizational arrangements; therefore, transactions cannot be 
separated from rituals, symbols and belief systems.’ Other scholars have contributed to 
these debates by highlighting the role of cultural factors and the integration of both 
social structural and cultural dimensions in shaping markets (Agnew 1988; Reddy 
1987; Zelizer 1988). Sociological studies of markets have specifically used 
institutionlist concepts to explain the emergence and ongoing dynamics of markets for 
example Dobbin (1997) used institutional concepts to explain why nations adopt 
different policies for organizing industries. Whilst Fligstein’s work on corporate 
interactions with governments and markets (1990), his work conceptualising markets 
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as institutions (2001) and his recent work on mortgage securitization (Fligstein and 
McAdam 2012) and the US mortgage crisis (Fligstein and Habinek 2013) all draw 
from institutional concepts in order to study the social construction of financial 
markets. Furthermore, Fligsteins’ (1996 p.660) study directly brings together the 
sociology of finance, institutionalist concepts and regulatory fields of control, 
suggesting that, ‘Property rights, governance structures, and rules of exchange are 
arenas in which modern states establish rules for economic actors. States provide stable 
and reliable conditions, under which firms organize, compete, cooperate, and 
exchange. The enforcement of these laws affects what conceptions of control can 
produce stable markets.’ In summary, Fligstein conceptualises regulated markets as 
fields guided by formal and informal rules. By doing so, he views such fields as 
networks of relationships, and focuses on the local understandings, institutional forms 
and informal practices that emerge from and stabilise these relationships. Fligstein 
(1990) terms such constructs ‘concepts of control’ (Fourcade 2007).  
Another seminal study in the sociology of economics is the work of White 
(1981) who suggested that markets are composite of inward social networks, which act 
as signalling systems providing information to confirm or disprove each firm’s 
expectations regarding their offerings and trading partners. Consequently, signals 
emanating from such networks facilitate decision making regarding price, quality and 
products. Podolny (2001) built on Whites work and highlighted how information, in 
the form of signals, allows for the processing of uncertainties in Venture capital 
markets. Thus, information consists of signals analogous to electric impulses that 
trigger a reaction in firms (Mirowski 2002). Furthermore, common network pressures 
and corresponding information signals may result in financial organizations acting 
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within a ‘shared perception frame.’ Preda (2007b) provides examples of individuals 
who provide evaluations of securities to traders and investors and so act as 
‘information intermediaries’. In order to evaluate and compare the performance of 
securities they must be classified and placed in sets (e.g. energy derivatives, 
technology stocks, manufacturing stocks etc.) such work creates a ‘perception 
framework’ within which traders and investors make decisions. However, securities 
which do not fit into one clear category or fit into several may lead to inconsistent 
classifications resulting in more volatile prices (Zuckerman 1999). Such perspectives 
resonate well with this study’s research context, financial organizations utilising IMS. 
Such systems seek to categorise trades and financial holdings in order to apply 
regulatory rules and guide investment decisions through the application of benchmarks 
and indices provided by third parties (information intermediaries). Thus, the IMS may 
be thought of a system which facilities its own ‘perception framework’ influenced by 
institutional pressures arising partly from regulatory obligations.  
An associated stream of literature within the social studies of markets, termed 
‘the technological constitution of financial markets’, addresses how technological 
arrangements may define boundaries and delineate domains of activity thereby 
legitimizing and institutionalising them  (Preda 2007b).  Williams (2013 p. 545-546) 
provides a concise definition of this body of work, ‘this literature focuses on the role of 
various mechanisms, devices, and technologies not simply in representing the markets 
and finance, a form of passive recording, but rather in actively shaping and constituting 
the markets on an ongoing basis.’ Such scholars view complex technological 
arrangements as being ‘grafted’ onto financial markets and thereby structure and 
influence transactions and the rules and professional roles which govern them. Thus, 
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technologies may be seen as cultural tools which actually enact the markets (Barry and 
Slater 2002). 
Technologies utilised by traders, such as the IMS, are not neutral in the data 
and information they provide and the responses they elicits (Zaloom 2003). Empirical 
studies focused on technologies which, facilitate trading activities, have examined 
market indices (De Goede 2005), the coordination of currency traders globally, off and 
online, to interpret pricing screens (Cetina and Bruegger 2002), the stock ticker  as a 
recording technology (Preda 2006), visualization software to present complex market 
data (Pryke 2010) and technologies to facilitate both electronic trading and trading 
conducted in ‘open outcry pits’ (Zaloom 2003). Other studies have focused on the 
performativity of formulas and models enacted through technology to construct 
economic activity (MacKenzie and Millo 2003; MacKenzie 2006). All of these studies 
have highlighted the non-neutral nature of such systems. Technologies, such as the 
IMS, are seen to represent ‘the material and discursive assemblages that intervene in 
the construction of markets’ (Muniesa et al. 2007 p. 2). Consequently, such 
technologies may be viewed as having their own agency and ability to exert both 
constraining and constitutive effects, they co-exist with human actors and so are 
participants in socio-technical networks. Markets are viewed as technological 
arrangements composed of artefacts and formulae which project their own paths of 
action to create a ‘calculative agency’ (Callon and Muniesa 2005). Calculative agency 
may be defined as consisting of three elements. Firstly a framing to determine what is 
calculable and what is not. Secondly disentangling boundaries to determine what is 
relevant to the calculations and what is irrelevant. Thirdly, performativity indicating 
the use of technology and formulae in transactions (Callon 2004; Preda 2007b). 
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Consequently, studies addressing the technological constitution of financial markets 
are often seen as following the performative tradition (Fourcade 2007; Preda 2007a).  
Concepts of performativity resemble sociological concepts of agency, here 
defined as the capacity of actors to rise above established rules and routines and to 
open up and follow paths of action which are not predetermined (Preda 2007a). Within 
institutionalism, scholars have long debated the primacy of field level structural forces 
arising from institutional factors and individual agency (Deeg 2010; Giddens 1984; 
Heugens and Lander 2009; Hirsch and Lounsbury 1997; Perrow et al. 1986; Seo and 
Creed 2002). Performative studies of financial technologies, however, may also be 
underpinned by institutionalist concepts regarding the structuration of fields through 
cultural, legal, political and economic factors. Fourcade (2007 p.1026) highlights how 
institutional field and performative analysis may not be as contradictory as they seem, 
‘Indeed the ability of market technologies to perform the economy cannot be readily 
assumed outside of a whole set of social conditions, the incorporation of which many 
science studies scholars often resist. Still, the relevance of ‘contextual’ factors is 
particularly well displayed by MacKenzie’s (2006) demonstration that the construction 
of the financial derivatives market presupposed not only the mobilization of a whole 
network of people with interests in the implementation of the technology at hand, but 
also on specific cultural assumptions about ways to make money, as well as on 
enabling political, legal, and economic conditions.’ This study does not discount the 
performativity perspective, the IMS calculative agency, may well ‘perform’ both 
markets and new regulatory arrangements. However, the focus here is on how 
institutional arrangements are shaping social practices for compliance and not on how 
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such practices perform regulations and markets. Although, researching the 
performativity of the IMS is identified as a potential avenue for future research.   
Institutionalist perspectives have addressed how rules, norms and logics in the 
form of intertwined material and symbolic elements may become encapsulated within 
IT artefacts (Orlikowski and Iacono 2001). Thus, institutional orders may become 
embedded within IT systems (Scott 2003). Financial markets may be shaped by 
coercive regulations and normative and cultural elements including networks of social 
relationships and social structures of power, dominance and status both across and 
within organizations (Granovetter 1985).  
This study focuses specifically on institutional forces arising from the 
introduction of large volumes of regulatory mandates arising from the recent financial 
crisis and associated Great Recession within the field of asset management. 
Specifically, this study focuses on a type of regulatory technology, an IMS, which 
simultaneously provides a trading platform and applies automated rules derived from 
regulatory mandates. The IMS technology includes algorithms, visualization tools, and 
databases which facilitate transactions and interaction across social networks between 
market participants. To summarize, the IMS may be viewed as part of the 
‘technological materiality’ of the market as it acts to frame markets for the purposes of 
regulatory consumption through the actions it affords and the controls it applies (Millo 
and MacKenzie 2009; Williams 2013).   In summary, the IMS contributes to the 
‘technological materiality’ of the markets by providing technological affordances and 
constraints and thereby aiming to facilitate regulatory compliance by influencing 
trading behaviours.  
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2.2. Compliance and Technological Affordances 
In order to answer the research question and make a contribution by 
understanding how compliance related practices and behaviours have changed, it is 
important to understand how technology may afford or forbid actions and thereby 
influence and steer compliant practices. Financial regulations seek to govern the 
behaviours and actions of those individuals and organizations engaged in trading 
securities and so internal controls and oversight are a key component of compliance 
(Agrawal et al. 2006; Martinez-Moyano et al. 2013; Tuttle and Vandervelde 2007; 
Williams 2013). As Black (2001 p.138) noted over a decade ago: ‘The role of 
technology in regulating is not yet part of the mainstream regulatory literature, but I 
think it is something that needs to be explored more systematically in the study of any 
regulatory system. The point is that the ability to control is hampered or facilitated by 
technology, that is by extent to which we do or do not have technological capacity, and 
by the inherent characteristics of that technology.’  
In the post-crisis period following 2008, a ‘tsunami of regulations’ (FT 2013) 
has imposed further requirements on financial firms. Whereas previous financial 
scandals were depicted as corporate failures with the emphasis on dishonest behaviour 
and accounting deficiencies (Benston 2006; McLean and Elkind 2004), the recent 
crisis’ impact extended beyond the collapse of a few financial corporate entities 
(Lehman Bros and Northern Rock) but instead created a systemic ‘shock transmission’ 
to the international financial industry (De Haas and Van Horen 2012) which has 
created global contagion (Aloui et al. 2011). However, the introduction of increasing 
regulatory controls as a response to organizational and economic failures is not new. 
The last decade has witnessed a significant increase in regulation of the financial 
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services industry. In response to the high profile corporate failures of Enron and Arthur 
Andersen, among others, regulators in European and US jurisdictions have sought to 
extend and improve controls and internal and external reporting of financial firms. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act was introduced as a response to such failures. The most 
contentious part of SOX was Section 404 which requires that organizations asses their 
internal control structures for management and for external auditors to report on the 
adequacy of those controls. In order to meet these requirements the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations’ (COSO) internal control framework is often utilized 
(Agrawal et al. 2006; Damianides 2005). Previous research has shown that there is a 
positive relation between IT related weaknesses in COSO components and firms which 
have reported material weaknesses in their internal controls under SOX (Klamm and 
Watson 2009). Data quality has also been found to impact internal controls (Fields et 
al. 1986). SOX obligations posed serious challenges for IT departments, as increased 
demands to document and test important manual and automated controls required 
extensive revisions to internal business processes (Li et al. 2012). Consequently, the 
role of IT in complying with regulations became more critical, requiring senior IT 
professionals to pay close attention to new regulatory obligations (Currie 2008).  
Regulations and laws, however, are not objective but require social 
interpretation (Edelman and Suchman 1997). Information systems underpin internal 
controls and compliance efforts as interpretations of rules, norms and logics become 
encapsulated within IT artefacts (Orlikowski and Iacono 2001). Regulatory 
technologies, correspondingly, are also not objective (Bamberger 2010; Callon and 
Muniesa 2005; Itami and Numagami 1992; Muniesa et al. 2007; Preda 2007b; Zaloom 
2003). They create their own world view which alters the perceptions of those decision 
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makers the system was designed to inform (Heidegger 1954). Indeed, various scholars 
have outlined the performativity of finance related technologies and correspondingly 
the technological constitution of financial markets, see 2.1. IT artefacts, ‘might 
authorize, allow, afford, encourage, permit, suggest influence, block, render possible, 
forbid...’ actions and thereby implement internal controls (Latour 2005 p.72). In this 
way, IS play a key role in underpinning compliance and control practices by affording 
and constraining actions (Gibson 1986; Majchrzak and Markus 2013; Zammuto et al. 
2007). Such constraints and affordances are composite of intertwined human agency, 
‘the ability to form and realise goals’, and material agency, ‘the capacity for non-
human systems to act on their own apart from human intervention’ (Leonardi 2011 
p.147 and 148). A key element of the IMS material agency is the ability of the system 
to evaluate current and potential financial holdings against automated compliance rules 
to determine if breaches have occurred.  
In summary, regulatory technologies are constitutive of material elements 
which intervene in the construction of markets by applying controls derived from 
regulatory obligations (Muniesa et al. 2007). In this way, technology and the 
affordances it forbids and creates, contribute directly to the governance of regulated 
economic activity (MacKenzie 2006; Preda 2006).  
2.3. Governance, Transparency and Asymmetric Information 
A further stream of literature has been identified as providing insight into the 
main research question, vital to meeting regulatory obligations is the effective 
governance of financial organizations demonstrated through transparency and sharing 
of information. Correspondingly, technologies which collate structure and disseminate 
such information have an important role to play in ensuring compliant behaviours and 
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demonstrating robust and fair practices. Within capital markets a key focus of 
governance activities is to ensure transparency to stakeholders, such as Regulators and 
Shareholders. However, asymmetric information may hinder such transparency and so 
reduce the accountability sought by regulators (Solomon 2013). Financial transactions, 
however, are characterized by asymmetric information and understanding (Greenwald 
and Stiglitz 1994). The uses of incomplete or distorted information by senior managers 
to obfuscate, mislead, distort, or confuse regulators and investors have long been 
identified as an important issue (Solomon 2013). The UK Regulator’s handbook states 
that firms must, ensure there is ‘adequate transparency of and access to information in 
the UK financial markets.’ (FCA 2013b). Transparency and the disclosure of 
information is a key element in an effective system of corporate governance. The 
Cadbury Report (1992 p.33) on the financial aspects of corporate governance suggests 
that the ‘lifeblood of markets is information’. The code proposes that barriers which 
prevent the flow of relevant information will cause imperfections in the markets, 
conversely if a firm’s activities are transparent then, the report argues; their securities 
will be valued with a greater degree of accuracy. A key role of corporate governance, 
therefore, is to oversee compliance and risk management functions and to ensure they 
are effective. Accounting scholars have long advocated that disclosure through 
financial reporting may lower the costs of capital which arise from asymmetric 
information (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000) and that reliable disclosure attracts 
institutional investors (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Kim and Verrecchia 1994) and 
correspondingly increases in ownership by institutional investors (Healy and Palepu 
2001).  
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Yet, the objectives of financial reporting and regulation while overlapping do 
have important differences. The objective of financial regulation is to reduce risks to 
investors and systemic risks to economic systems and so, traditional accountancy 
driven financial reporting clearly has a role to play. However, regulators do not limit 
themselves to information contained in general purpose financial reports (Barth and 
Landsman 2010). Furthermore, regulatory disclosure may provide useful information 
for investors (Kothari 2001). IS plays an important role in facilitating financial 
reporting. Organizations which have material weaknesses in their financial reporting 
systems are likely to have less accurate management forecasts (Li et al. 2012). 
Conjointly, the Financial Reporting Council’s (FRC 2012 p.21) combined code on 
corporate governance states that, ‘The board should, at least annually, conduct a review 
of the effectiveness of the company’s risk management and internal control systems 
and should report to shareholders that they have done so. The review should cover all 
material controls, including financial, operational and compliance controls.’ This 
process relies heavily on the data and systems which facilitate controls, metrics and 
reporting (Bamberger 2010; Pryke 2010; Williams 2013).  
Asymmetric information may result in the mangers of financial organizations 
being much more aware of the company’s activities and financial positions than its 
investors. Thus, inadequate information places them at a disadvantage. These 
disadvantages may lead to a ‘moral hazard’ whereby incomplete or inaccurate 
information is used to mislead a party as to the true nature of risk involved in a 
transaction (Solomon 2013). In a speech made in 2012, the Chairman of the UK 
Regulator provided examples of how asymmetric information can be exploited to 
create moral hazards and espoused the need for financial organizations to adopt an 
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ethical culture to prevent this issue: ‘…if a fancy new product design will enable a 
corporate or a country to conceal from the market the scale of its indebtedness, or if a 
trading desk manages to offload a problematic position onto an unsuspecting 
customer, does the top management and the board say ‘Congratulations, take a bonus’ 
or does it say, ‘That’s not what we do?... If it is serious about values and culture, it has 
to do the latter’- Speech at Bloomberg, London, 24th July 2012  (Turner 2012a).  
The globalization of financial services has contributed to asymmetric 
information. Firms seeking to raise revenues through issuing corporate bonds or 
equities may never have opportunities to meet potential investors whom may be 
geographically located in other parts of the world and so both parties trust in 
organizations such as investment banks and asset management houses to act as 
intermediaries and ensure that deals are conducted properly and that each parties’ 
interests are protected. Corporation executives may have difficulty in understanding if 
their initial public offerings are being appropriately structured and marketed. Often 
investors have little understanding of the securities they are buying, the firm issuing 
them and the financial intermediaries selling them. Corporate treasurers may often 
have difficulties dissecting the numerous technological solutions available and 
determining the solutions’ level of effectiveness once deployed. Parties involved in 
acquisitions or mergers often also have incomplete information (Morrison et al. 2012). 
Consequently, in each of these contexts third parties are trusted and relied upon to 
provide sound guidance and unbiased advice. However, such trust may be misplaced. 
In 2010, Goldman Sachs was fined $550 million by their regulator, at the time the 
largest fine of its kind, for misleading investors by failing to disclose they were also 
working with a hedge fund on the other side of the deal who was targeting debt 
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instruments which held strong ratings but nevertheless were likely to default (BBC 
2010). Furthermore, it has been argued that a lack of transparency contributed to the 
financial crisis as information relating to asset securitizations and derivatives was 
insufficient for investors to adequately asses the values and risks of securities (Barth 
and Landsman 2010). In summary, capital markets rely on disclosure mechanisms to 
create transparency and accountability and thereby trust in financial transactions and 
organizations. However, following the financial crisis trust in financial organizations 
and regulatory agencies to ensure appropriate governance and transparency has 
weakened. 
2.4. Gaps in IS Literature 
The finance literature is primarily concerned with financial models for 
executing trades, rather than on the technologies used in this process. Conversely, the 
information systems literature focuses on cutting edge technologies in various 
organizational settings, with few studies linking regulation, finance and technology 
(Cleven and Winter 2009). However, an appreciation of how senior executives within 
financial services firms work together to meet current and emerging complex 
regulatory requirements using information technology (IT) offers an important area for 
academic enquiry, with a potential contribution to practitioners. Yet despite a 
burgeoning increase in infrastructure and applications implicated in the regulatory 
process, the role of ‘technology has not been subject to any kind of serious inquiry’ 
(Williams, 2013, p.545) either in the ‘mainstream regulatory literature’ (Black 2001 
p.138) or in information systems (IS) research. Other scholars have also highlighted 
this gap (Cleven and Winter 2009; Currie 2008). 
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The IS community has provided little insight into the role of regulatory 
technologies which support new policies and regulations. Related work has focused on 
IT governance and internal controls (Brown and Grant 2005; Korac-Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse 2001; Ross and Weill 2005; Trites 2004), specific regulatory acts such as 
SOX (Braganza and Hackney 2008; Kim et al. 2008; Klamm and Watson 2009; Li et 
al. 2012; Mock et al. 2009; Panko 2006; Wagner and Dittmar 2006), IS security 
(Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Chen et al. 2011; Gupta and Zhdanov 2012; Spears and Barki 
2010) and risk management (Ciborra 2006; Ciborra et al. 2000; Scott and Perry 2012). 
The systematic investigation of practices for regulatory compliance and the associated 
role of regulatory technology is also largely absent from the management and finance 
literature (Black 2001; Williams 2013). Previously, scholars have focused on 
surveillance and detection technologies utilized by regulatory bodies to identify 
improper trading in markets and data mining by regulatory agencies for suspicious or 
risky transactions (Williams 2013). Yet few studies have considered regulatory 
technologies embedded within financial organizations.  
A stream of empirical IS literature which has touched on regulatory issues has 
focused on IT governance. Notable studies include organizational arrangements for IT 
governance  (Sambamurthy and Zmud 1999; Weill and Ross 2005; Weill and Ross 
2004); changes in IT governance structures as a consequence of mergers and 
acquisitions (Chin et al. 2004); the role of top management in designing IT governance 
procedures, policies and processes (Lainhart 2000; Meyer 2004; Peterson 2004); 
hybrid IS governance solutions (Brown 1997); IT and transformation (Hvalshagen 
2004); and organizational readiness and stakeholder participation (Rau 2004). In 
summary, IS researchers have suggested a shift away from the traditional focus on 
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governance structures, with the accent on centralized, decentralized, or federal forms 
and sourcing arrangements toward more complex structures reflexive of contemporary 
practice (Ross and Weill 2005; Ross et al. 2006; Williams and Karahanna 2013). 
However, these studies are focused on the governance of IT. The role of IT in changing 
institutionalized governance structures for regulatory compliance is understudied. 
Furthermore, previous studies which have focused on the interplay between 
technology and trust have focused on how institutional structures may impact effects of 
trust on online markets (Gefen and Pavlou 2012), implications of cognitive and 
emotional trust on web-based recommendation agents (Komiak and Benbasat 2004; 
Komiak and Benbasat 2006), e-commerce (Kim and Benbasat 2003; Liu and Goodhue 
2012; McKnight et al. 2002) and interpersonal trust and virtual collaborative 
relationships (Jarvenpaa et al. 2004; McDaniel and McDaniel 2004). However, few 
studies have considered the implications of regulatory technology on institutional 
based trust arrangements.  
The use of institutional theory to guide information systems research is 
relatively new and has taken broadly two approaches: those studies that conceptualize 
the effects of institutionalization on an entity and those that treat institutionalization as 
a process (Mignerat and Rivard 2009). IS studies which have explored institutional 
effects have investigated large scale IT implementations, how institutionalized 
technologies may be under exploited, organizational change, e-government, e-health 
and organizational integration (Avgerou 2002; Cordella and Barca 2006; Huigang et al. 
2007; Mangan and Kelly 2009; Mekonnen and Sahay 2008). Studies which have 
concentrated on the process of institutionalization are more scarce (Barley and Tolbert 
1997; Mignerat and Rivard 2009) and have focused on application service providers, 
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security standards, professional services automation and customer relationship 
management (Backhouse et al. 2006; Currie 2004). Overall, the literature is missing 
studies utilizing institutional theory to investigate technology and the process by which 
logics for compliance evolve and become embedded. Two studies conducting a review 
of the use of institutional theory within the IS field found no research focused on IS 
and regulatory compliance (Mignerat and Rivard 2009; Weerakkody et al. 2009). 
Furthermore, the application of institutional theory to explore the effects and processes 
of the 2008 financial crisis has also been surprisingly scarce (Munir 2011).   
2.5. Summary and Further Critique 
The review has highlighted how markets are socially constructed and how 
technologies can afford and constrain practices and that ethics and culture can be 
influenced through technology. The review has also highlighted how asymmetric 
information, between financial markets participants, has the potential to create ‘moral 
hazards’ and  so regulations  and correspondingly compliance practices should 
facilitate appropriate governance and transparency within financial organizations. 
Essential to this process are systems which facilitate and audit transactions, such as the 
IMS.  
The body of literature addressed in 2.1, the ‘social construction of markets’ and 
the ‘technological constitution of financial markets’, highlights how finance related 
technologies are not neutral and may influence and perform markets. These are useful 
points of departure for social studies of finance and technology. However, these 
literatures, whether they emphasize fields, performativity or networks,  often provide 
little insight into the technologies being considered and, in my opinion, do not 
adequately address how the performativity of such systems are influencing and 
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changing working practices. The technologies addressed are not well defined and 
‘unpacked’ in sufficient detail to allow a deep understanding of how all elements of the 
technology, including its data structures, architectures and the vendors’ competitive 
environment are changing and shaping the systems, which in turn may be implicated in 
the social construction of markets. An example is Zaloom’s (2004) interesting work 
which, according to the tag line on the cover of her book focuses on, ‘Traders and 
Technology’. However, none of the chapters in her book unpack and discuss the 
technologies employed in any depth. This study seeks to overcome this shortcoming by 
unpacking the IMS and providing a deep analysis of its context.  
A further critique of this body of work is that it has, to a large extent, neglected 
to address how issues such as calculative agency or shared perception frames have 
influenced or altered working practices within financial organizations. Often the 
analysis provided is purely at the field or network level and focused on how such 
phenomena influences or shapes  markets while the impact of these social mechanisms 
on working practices are not well addressed. This body of literature is lacking a 
practice orientated perspective of the social construction of markets. In contrast, 
section 2.2 addresses how systems may influence working practices by considering the 
constraints and affordances they create. Such studies are useful in understanding the 
potential of technology in disciplining practices. However, it should be noted that often 
individuals seek to circumvent the controls embedded in systems and that when faced 
with coercive pressures conformity is often just one possible path available to 
individuals. In addition, systems may create unintended affordances and constraints 
and that related outcomes may also act to perform or influence the environments in 
which they operate. Thus, whilst many studies have shown how affordances and 
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constraints provide stability the adoption of practices of control may also shape 
unforeseen and unwanted paths in the system which in turn may also influence the 
social construction of markets, in unforeseen or unexpected ways.   
The literature outlined in section 2.3 builds on ideas of control to outline studies 
in governance, transparency and asymmetric information. These studies emphasise the 
need for transparency and sound governance through robust controls. Yet the 
technologies which facilitate such controls and transparency are often not considered in 
depth. Again, the ways in which technical architectures and data structures, often 
developed of over many years and subject to numerous technological iterations, may 
inhibit transparency and governance and thus amplify information asymmetries are 
rarely considered. Similarly, the incentives provided through systems’ vendors’ 
competitive markets and the subsequent choices vendors make in designing their 
systems and thereby privileging certain affordances may also act to prohibit 
governance and allow only specific transparencies.  For example, it is often assumed 
that individuals inappropriately profiting through asymmetric information are doing so 
by deliberately withholding information. However, it is possible that the systems 
employed and underlying technical and social components may have prevented such 
information being available in a format and standard that could have been easily shared 
with the other party at the point in time when decisions were being made. Whilst, no 
excuse for unethical behaviour, the limiting nature of technology in facilitating 
governance and transparency, beyond those limits predetermined and pre-programmed 
into the system by its designers is often overlooked.  
The previous subsections have highlighted many gaps and different streams of 
relevant scholarly work and so position this study at the intersection between two key 
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strands of interrelated literature, the social studies of IS through an institutionalist 
perspective and the social studies of financial markets. The study seeks to bridge a gap 
in existing literature by investigating an under researched phenomenon, regulatory 
technology, in a new and contemporary setting and by applying established 
institutional concepts to this empirical context. Thus, it is hoped to make a contribution 
to both practitioners engaged in this complex and dynamic environment and also those 
areas of academia focused on the application of institutional theory to understand the 
use of systems and the post-crisis environment.  
The issues and topics outlined in the review and derived from the post-crisis 
environment in financial services are, however, too large in scope and depth to be 
adequately covered within this research, constrained as it is by the structure of a PhD 
and the researcher’s own limited time and resources. Much useful work and effort 
could be applied investigating the role of technology in post-crisis regulatory 
compliance within financial organizations in relation to: corporate social responsibility 
and ethics or governance and transparency or (re)building trust in financial firms, 
regulators and markets. Consequently, the following chapter narrows the study’s focus 
and concentrates on the concepts which specifically underpin this research focused as it 
is on how technologies are implicated within institutional arrangements, derived from 
post-crisis regulations, to influence compliance related working practices.  
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3. A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF REGULATORY COMPLIANCE 
The high-level general research question (Punch 2000) for this study focuses on 
addressing the question: How does pre-embedded IMS technology influence behaviours 
and practices for post-crisis regulatory compliance within financial organizations 
engaged in investment activities? 
This chapter outlines the conceptual model used to address this question and 
provides a lens through which to interpret and analyse the research findings. Drawing 
from the last chapter’s discussion, two levels of analysis are adopted. Firstly, the 
organizational field, governed by the regulations, and secondly the intra-organizational 
level, where compliance practices are deployed. Figure 5 depicts this model. The focus 
of the subsections within this chapter is to explain the components and relationships 
outlined in the model. The model draws from the concepts outlined in the previous 
chapter and is organized into two distinct sections. Firstly, having previously discussed 
how regulatory institutions are well defined as a type of social institution, the model 
draws from the institutional logics perspective to frame the research context. By doing 
so, it is hoped to articulate to the reader the theoretical boundaries of the study. The 
following subsections delineate the meta-theoretical concepts which underpin the 
institutional logics perspective and so provide the foundations for the model namely: 
social structure and action, material and symbolic elements, historical contingencies 
and multiple levels of analysis. Secondly, the chapter further narrows the focus of the 
study by identifying and discussing the key theoretical constructs which are utilised to 
guide the study’s analysis. Specifically, theoretical constructs regarding how 
institutions are carried and diffused (Scott 2008), pressures for deinstitutionalization 
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(Oliver 1992) and mechanisms of institutionalization (DiMaggio and Powell. 1983; 
Scott 2008). 
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Figure 5: Conceptual Model of Regulatory Compliance Source: author 
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3.1. Defining Regulatory Institutions 
This chapter delineates theoretical concepts which guide this study. Institutional 
theory provides the theoretical underpinnings for this research. This theoretical body of 
knowledge focuses on the causes of institutionalism and the process by which 
organizations affirm themselves and achieve legitimization as a consequence of their 
alignment and compliance with the institutional contexts of their environment 
(DiMaggio 1998; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Scott 2008). In the post-crisis environment, 
where financial organizations are under increased media and governmental scrutiny it 
is an increasing priority for such organizations to appear credible and legitimate in the 
eyes of regulators and other stakeholders, such as their shareholders and those 
investing in the financial services and products they offer. 
Scott (2008 p. 48) provides a useful definition of institutions: ‘Institutions are 
comprised of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements that, together with 
associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life.’ A 
substantive theme focuses on how social choices are shaped, mediated and channelled 
by institutional arrangements. Jepperson (1991 p. 145 and 152) also provides a relevant 
definition.  Institutions are: ‘a social order or pattern that has attained a certain state or 
property’, while institutionalization, ‘denotes the process of such attainment’. 
Jepperson’s definitions are relevant to the research context as regulatory mandates may 
be viewed as social orders which have attained a persistent state, when they come into 
force. In fact, Scott (2008 p.50) highlights regulative systems as a ‘vital ingredient for 
institutions’.   
The use of institutional theory to investigate wide ranging organizational 
phenomena has facilitated greater understanding of social structures and has taken 
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broadly two approaches: those studies that conceptualize the effects of 
institutionalization on an entity and those that treat institutionalization as a process 
(Mignerat and Rivard 2009). The latter is the focus of this study. Haunschild and 
Chandler (2008 p.360) observe that: ‘the process of institutionalization is a cycle – 
institutions emerge, diffuse, change, die, and are replaced by new institutions’. 
Oliver (1992) provides a seminal paper which offers a framework for 
deinstitutionalization and identifies related social, political and technical pressures.  
Empirical studies of deinstitutionalization are rare relative to studies of 
institutionalization (Ahmadjian and Robinson 2001; Dacin and Dacin 2008; Maguire 
and Hardy 2009). However, the empirical studies which have been conducted have 
concentrated on a variety of settings and phenomena. Fligstein (1990) showed how 
federal antitrust regulation ruled out horizontal mergers and Davis, Diekmann and 
Tinsley (1994) investigated how changing regulatory environments and shifts in power 
and resources, contributed to the breakup of US business conglomerates. Kraatz and 
Zajac (1996) highlighted how technical and economic pressures may cause 
organization to adopt practices which are contrary to embedded organizational values. 
Greve (1995) emphasized how the abandonment of standards, in this study a radio 
format, is driven jointly by behavioural contagion and competition from other 
organizations. Ahmadjian and Robinson (2001) examined the deinstitutionalization of 
permanent employment among publicly listed companies in Japan and found that 
economic pressures caused downsizing, with social and institutional pressures shaping 
the pace and process by which downsizing spread. David and Bitektine (2009) suggest 
that the expansion of institutional theory has peaked and that the use of the theory itself 
is becoming deinstitutionalised. Hiatt, Sine and Tolbert (2009) examined the 
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deinstitutionalization of breweries and the corresponding creation of entrepreneurial 
opportunities. Maquire and Hardy (2009) concentrated on the abandonment of wide-
spread but taken for granted practices regarding the use of DDT and focused on 
‘outsider-driven’ deinstitutionalization driven from actors outside the organizational 
field. Seal (2003) utilized Oliver’s (1992) pressures for deinstitutionalization to 
examine incremental budgeting in UK local government. Dacin and Dacin (2008) 
extended Oliver’s (1992) framework of deinstitutionalization by highlighting the roles 
played by custodians, collective memory and ritual in the lighting of traditional 
bonfires on university campus. Nicholson and Sahay (2009) provide a rare study which 
incorporates both concepts of deinstitutionalization and IS. They focus on the software 
export policy making in Costa Rica and the effects of subcultures in the generation of 
dissensus contributing to the deinstitutionalization process. Studies which empirically 
text Oliver’s framework are scarce and, in the author’s opinion, have not tested the 
specific pressures Oliver identifies at a sufficiently granular level. Furthermore, the 
literature is missing an empirical application of Oliver’s theory within multinationals 
operating in financial services. This research contributes to the discourse on 
deinstitutionalization by applying Oliver’s concepts of political, functional and social 
pressure to an empirical study of regulatory change within capital markets and thereby 
provides insight into the usefulness and application of related theoretical constructs 
within this setting.  
Over time different strands of institutionalism have emerged with differing 
areas of comprehension and interpretation. Scott (2008) provides a useful framework 
for incorporating the strands of institutionalism he identifies, known as the ‘Three 
Pillars’. Scott suggests that each of these pillars provide a unique area of support for 
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resilient social structures or institutions and that ‘… together with associated activities 
and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life’ (Scott 2003 p.80). The first 
pillar is termed ‘regulative’ and focuses on the contribution of rule-setting, surveillance 
and monitoring as well as the setting of sanctions to influence behaviour. The second 
pillar is ‘normative’ and addresses the setting of expectations which provide a 
prescriptive, evaluative and obligatory element to social behaviour. The last pillar is 
known as ‘cultural-cognitive’ and involves the development of shared conceptions 
which collectively constitute the essence of social reality and frames through which 
meaning is derived. Table 5 describes the different aspects of each pillar. 
 Regulative Normative Cultural Cognitive 
Basis of 
Compliance 
Expedience Social obligation 
Taken-for-
grantedness, shared 
understanding 
Basis of Order Regulative rules Binding expectations Constitutive schema 
Mechanisms Coercive Normative Mimetic 
Logic Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy 
Indicators 
Rules, laws, 
sanctions 
Certification, 
accreditation 
Common beliefs, 
shared logics of 
action 
 
Basis of 
legitimacy 
Legally sanctioned Morally governed 
Comprehensible, 
recognizable, 
culturally supported 
Table 5: Three Pillars of Institutions (Scott 2008) 
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While Scott is at pains to highlight the fact that most institutions are made up of 
a mixture of these diverse elements and that few ‘pure-cases’ exist, often institutional 
phenomena will vary with respect to the degree of dominance which each pillar holds.  
However, an important critique of institutional theory comes through broad 
interpretations and applications of the term ‘institution’ which may be applied to a 
plethora of research contexts. As Martin (2004 p.1249) observes, ‘While rarely giving 
reasons for doing so, social scientists apply the term social institution to an amazing 
array of phenomena, including, for example, taxation and handshakes (Bellah et al. 
1991), schools (Due et al. 2003), socialism (Parboteeah and Cullen 2003), mental 
hospitals (Goffman 1962), courtship (Clark 1997), community and property (Nisbet 
1953), healing (Johnson 2000), sports (Andersen and Taylor 2007; Messner 1992), 
appellate courts (March and Olson 1989), religion and marriage (Waite and Lehrer 
2003) universities (Benschop and Brouns 2003), heterosexuality (Rogers and Garrett 
2002), and ‘proliferating going concerns’ (Gubrium and Holstein 2000).’ 
Correspondingly, within IS research the concept of ‘institutions’ has been applied to 
various contexts and research settings including: active service providers (Currie 
2009), technical standards (Garud et al. 2002), the legitimation of IT innovation 
(Avgerou 2000), organizations influencing IT innovation (King et al. 1994), the UK 
NHS Program for IT (Currie and Guah 2007; Currie 2012), intranets (Baptista 2009), 
Amazon rainforest monitoring systems (Rajão and Hayes 2009), shifts in 
institutionalised patterns of radiological work through the introduction of CT Scanners 
(Barley and Tolbert 1997), the institutionalization of patterns of action associated with 
ERP systems (Lyytinen et al. 2009), healthcare (Jensen et al. 2009), software exports 
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(Nicholson and Sahay 2009) and supply chains and platforms (Gawer and Phillips 
2013).  
However, despite the ambiguity over what constitutes an institution and the 
numerous context and research settings explored, a reading of Martin (2004) provides 
some useful guiding criteria, which can be compared to financial regulations thereby 
conceptualising the elements which define them as social institutions - see Table 6. 
Defining Social Institutions 
1. Institutions are profoundly social; they are characteristic of 
groups 
2. Institutions endure/persist across extensive time and geographic 
space. 
3. Institutions entail distinct social practices that recur (Giddens 
1984), recycle (Connell 1987) , or are repeated (over time) by 
group members. 
4. Institutions both constrain and facilitate behaviour/actions by 
societal/group members. 
5. Institutions have social positions and relations that are 
characterized by particular expectations, rules/norms, and 
procedures. 
6. Institutions are constituted and reconstituted by embodied 
agents. 
7. Institutions are internalized by group members as identities and 
selves and they are displayed as personalities. 
8. Institutions have a legitimating ideology 
9. Institutions are inconsistent, contradictory, and rife with conflict. 
10. Institutions continuously change. 
11. Institutions are organized in accord with and permeated by 
power. 
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12. Institutions and individuals mutually constitute each other; they 
are not separable into macro and micro phenomena. 
Table 6: Criteria of Social Institutions (Martin 2004) 
It is worth clarifying what is termed a ‘regulatory institution’ within this 
context in order to avoid confusion. While financial organizations and regulatory 
agencies are often referred to as institutions, within this study, regulatory mandates are 
conceptualised as the key institution under consideration. From regulatory institutions, 
organizational practices for meeting related obligations may also become embedded 
and institutionalised internally within organizations. Such compliance practices 
become established as ‘the way things are done round here’ (Deal and Kennedy 1982). 
While it is accepted that financial organisations and regulatory bodies may also be 
considered institutions in their own right, this work applies the term ‘institutions’ to 
describe legislation and regulations and related embedded practices.  
Regulatory institutions in the form of legal mandates structure and govern 
capital markets by stipulating principles and rules by which financial organizations 
must abide. These regulatory institutions are enforced by sanctioning organizations, for 
example the Financial Services Authority in the UK (FSA) or the Securities and 
Exchange Commission in the US (SEC). Post crisis, new regulations have been 
introduced with considerable breadth spanning such diverse areas as market abuse, 
short selling, market transparency and collateralization. These changes have altered 
many existing regulations. For example, the new EU Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive II (MiFID II) extends the scope of the original mandate to include additional 
asset types and markets.  
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3.2. Framing the Research Context through Institutional Logics 
Institutional logics are defined as ‘the socially constructed, historical patterns of 
material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules by which individuals produce 
and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space and provide meaning 
to their social reality’ (Thornton and Ocasio 1999 p.804). This perspective approaches 
the challenge of institutional analytics by exploring the demarcating content and 
meanings of institutions. A key assumption is that behaviours are located within 
specific institutional orders, which act to regularize actions while providing 
opportunities for agency and change. Such perspectives build on the work of Friedland 
and Alford (1991) who view institutions as being supra-organizational arrangements 
which are embedded in both material practices and symbolic systems. Furthermore, the 
relationship between institutional logics and systems is well established: ‘…systems 
institutionalize select managerial actions, beliefs, and rationalities in the form of 
institutional logics’ (Lyytinen et al. 2009 p. 287). 
Changing public expectations has created pressure on the state to 
deinstitutionalise outmoded approaches to regulating financial organizations. Prior to 
the financial crisis the UK Regulator adopted a ‘principles based’ or ‘light-touch’ 
approach to regulation. However, this approach was abandoned in the wake of the 
financial crisis. Post-crisis, the Regulator announced a move towards ‘intense 
supervision’ (Financial Services Research Forum 2009; International Securities 
Association for Institutional Trade Communication 2011; Turner 2009b). As a 
consequence of reduced profit margins, industry restructuring regulations and 
enhanced supervision by regulatory bodies, we are observing, post-crisis, a change in 
the institutional logics which legitimise the practices and institutional arrangements for 
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compliance. As Ocasio (1998 p.196) notes, institutional logics ‘provide the formal and 
informal rules of action, interaction, and interpretation that guide and constrain 
decision makers in accomplishing the organization’s tasks and in obtaining social 
status, credits, penalties and rewards in the process.’ Previous studies which investigate 
institutional logics emanating from the field level have emphasised the existence of 
competing logics (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). Scholars have observed that, prior to 
the crisis; there was a move away from regulation towards self-regulation of free 
markets (Gillespie et al. 2012; Munir 2011; Thornton et al. 2012). This thesis supposes 
that, post-crisis, there has been a shift in institutional logics aimed at decreasing 
economic risk in global financial systems through strengthening regulatory 
frameworks. Consequently, reduced margins and heightened levels of regulation are 
causing pre-crisis institutional arrangements and associated logics of action for 
structuring compliance practices, to be questioned and reconfigured. Thornton and 
Ocasio (2008; 20012) delineate four meta-theoretical principles which underpin the 
institutional logics perspective. I now discuss each of these in order to further explore 
the relevance of this perspective to the research context.  
3.2.1. Social Structure and Action 
The first of these principles is termed Social Structure and Action. This refers 
to the premise that ‘identities, values and assumptions of individuals and organizations 
are embedded within prevailing institutional logics.’ and so distinguishes this 
perspective from the purely macro-structuralist approaches (Thornton, et al 2012 p.6). 
The institutional logics perspective does not ignore the role of structure, but is not 
limited by it. Instead it focuses on how practice is shaped by how organizations and 
individuals are influenced by different institutional spheres of order each espousing a 
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differing view of rationality. Within the context of this study, established institutional 
orders for conducting transactions and meeting regulatory obligations are being 
challenged by changes in the regulatory environment as new practices compete for 
dominance over historically embedded practices.  
Financial organizations have agency over regulatory effects by being selective 
over the types of products and services they offer and the transactions in which they 
engage and thereby may avoid regulatory obligations which are perceived as overly 
onerous and expensive. By doing so, they are allowing new institutional logics, in the 
form of new regulation, to shape their business models and the practices which 
underpin these models. A global compliance manager in C.6, noted:  
‘[The country Turkey is] forming some quite hard tricky rules that may mean that 
certain firms can’t operate in there because they don’t have a large enough profit 
share of the market [in certain instruments].’ 
The study reveals that financial organizations do have a limited degree of 
discretion when choosing how to respond to institutional pressures with respect to the 
types of markets they deal in and their corresponding regulatory exposure, as well as 
the types of systems and processes adopted. However, organizations may also find 
themselves subject to institutional pressures to operate in certain markets. It may be 
expected that organizations of a certain size and reputation are expected to be able to 
handle certain transactions.  
Furthermore, new regulations are requiring financial organizations to hold more 
collateral, termed regulatory capital, to offset risky trading activities and ensure 
liquidity, which is reducing returns and requiring firms to reduce their balance sheets 
89 
 
and cut back on trading. UBS recently announced it would wind down its fixed income 
trading business and streamline other investment banking activities in part due to the 
increased demands of Swiss regulators to hold increased levels of regulatory capital 
(Keoun and Logutenkova 2012). Thus, new regulatory requirement for UBS to hold 
higher levels of collateral are causing existing institutional logics for operating in 
certain markets to be questioned and consequently business models to be adapted. UBS 
is not the only firm shrinking its trading activities, Nomura, Deutsche Bank and 
Barclays Capital all made their intentions to do so public (The Economist 2012b).  
3.2.2. Institutions are Material and Symbolic 
A key meta-theoretical principle focuses on how each institutional order 
comprises both cultural symbols and material elements which may be intertwined and 
mutually constitutive (Thornton et al., 2012). Material aspects refer to structures and 
practices, while symbolic elements relate to ideation and meanings drawn from culture. 
The institutional logics perspective acknowledges that institutions change and develop 
as a result of interplay between material and cultural elements and that such elements, 
while analytically separate, are intertwined and mutually constitutive. Cultural symbols 
may be embodied in structures and practices. Conversely, structures and practices may 
express and affect the ideation and meaning of cultural symbols (Zilber 2008). Within 
neo-institutionalism the use of the hyphenated label, cultural-cognitive signifies the 
relationship between internal interpretive processes shaped by external cultural 
frameworks (Scott 2008). In this case, symbolic representations of appropriate 
practices, in the form of new regulatory rules, are themselves being shaped by broader 
cultural changes. The debate over what levels of risk are appropriate within our 
financial systems has been precipitated as a result of the crisis. An outcome of this 
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dialogue is the reduction of society’s appetite for risk in its economic systems, leading 
to enhanced regulatory frameworks which are interpreted collectively and individually 
and transcribed into material structures and practices, such as the IMS under 
consideration in this study.  
Essential to this reconstruction of the regulatory landscape will be the effective 
utilization of technological infrastructures to support new organizational processes and 
routines (Cule and Robey 2004). Such a move will clearly also require cultural 
transformation. Previous studies have highlighted the role of technology in facilitating 
culture change, see Error! Reference source not found., through structuring practices 
and so this study explores the potential for IMS to contribute to cultural change by both 
enabling and constraining trading behaviours (Doherty and Perry 2001; Doherty and 
Doig 2003; Leidner and Kayworth 2006),  
Furthermore, technology has a key role to play in facilitating change by 
applying disciplinary effects to enable or constrain practices and thereby produce new 
patterns of action for meeting compliance (Labatut et al. 2012; Latour 2005; Leonardi 
2011; Majchrzak and Markus 2013), see 2.2. This perspective complements Martin’s 
(2004) view that institutions are recursive and allows specific affordances. The IMS 
which provides the subject of this study is an example of a system which embeds 
regulatory rules by transcribing them into automated rules. These automated rules 
govern transactions and thereby both constrain and enable trading practices and so 
facilitate demonstrable compliance with post crisis mandates associated with 
maintaining limits on risky transactions and concentrations of exposure. The system 
provides aggregated views of firm-wide positions held by the organization thereby 
affording specific risk management capabilities. The absence of such firm-wide 
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perspectives was a contributing factor to the collapse of Lehman Brothers (McDonald 
and Robinson 2009).  
3.2.3. Historically Contingent Institutions 
The third meta-theoretical principle suggests that organizations are historically 
contingent. Thornton and Ocasio (2012) highlight changing regulatory frameworks as 
an exemplary case. As regulations change and develop over time they alter 
organizational arrangements and logics for selecting such arrangements. Studies of 
organization and economic phenomena may be contingently valid only for that time 
period (Freidland and Alford 1991). This is an important distinction. At the time of 
writing many of the EU’s regulatory responses to the financial crisis are still being 
crystallized and implemented. Furthermore, institutional orders may vary in 
importance over time and that the increasing influence of one institutional order may 
not necessarily act to replace another. This perspective aligns with Martin’s (2004) 
observation that institutions are dynamic, persistent and contradictory. While new 
institutional arrangements may prescribe a dominate logic these may cohabit with other 
arrangements which may have been created at different points in time under different 
historical contingencies (Streeck and Thelen 2005; Thornton et al. 2012).  
Technology may play a role in introducing new practices, derived from 
institutional logics which may clash with existing embedded practices, for example, 
‘ERP systems institutionalize select managerial actions, beliefs, and rationalities in the 
form of institutional logics (Berente 2008; Berente et al. 2007; Gosain 2004; Pollock 
and Williams 2008; Tolbert and Zucker 1983; Zucker 1977) that clash with local 
institutions and face major implementation and use problems (Berente et al. 2007; 
Davenport 1998; Markus and Tanis 2000; Nandhakumar et al. 2005; Ward et al. 2005)’  
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(Lyytinen et al. 2009 p.287). Displacement as a mode of institutional change refers to 
the removal of existing rules and practices and the introduction of new ones (Mahoney 
and Thelen 2010; Streeck and Thelen 2005). Systems such as the IMS aim to enable 
such displacement through transcribing and encoding post-crisis regulatory rules and 
thereby constraining and structuring behaviours to ensure appropriate outcomes. 
However, various scholars have shown that their remains a distinct possibility that such 
displacement may be hampered or rendered incomplete by persistent conflicting 
institutions (Berente et al. 2007; Davenport 1998; Lyytinen et al. 2009; Markus and 
Tanis 2000; Martin 2004; Nandhakumar et al. 2005; Streeck and Thelen 2005; 
Thornton and Ocasio 2008; Thornton et al. 2012; Ward et al. 2005). 
Post-financial crisis, we are observing a strengthening of regulatory institutions, 
which are competing with historically dominate logics for conducting business and 
structuring operations. Previous to the crisis such logics were primarily influenced by 
market forces with regulatory logics being secondary and termed ‘light touch’. Within 
the context of this study, I observe in the post-crisis environment, an increase in the 
influence of regulatory driven logics which compete with market influenced logics 
embedded prior to the crisis. While, market forces may still be primary, the influence 
of regulatory focused logics has certainly increased.  
3.2.4. Multiple Levels of Analysis 
The last meta-theoretical principle adopts the view that ‘institutions operate at 
multiple levels of analysis and that actors are nested in higher order levels – individual, 
organizational, field and societal.’ (Thornton et al. 2012 p.13). Correspondingly, 
institutional logics may evolve at different levels such as markets, industries or 
geographic communities. Thus it is necessary to specify the level of analysis being 
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considered in order to effectively explore theoretical mechanisms, operating at 
different levels from the main phenomenon being considered (Freidland and Alford 
1991). By exploring mechanisms operating across different levels of analysis, theory 
generation increases in generalizability and precision (Stinchcombe 1991).  
This study investigates changes in regulatory institutions occurring at the 
organizational field level of capital markets, which impacts internal working practices 
for maintaining compliance and conducting transactions enacted at the intra-
organizational level. Thus, the levels of analysis considered by my study are at the field 
level and at the intra-organizational level. Previous studies which investigate 
institutional logics emanating from the field level have emphasized the existence of 
competing logics (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). As noted previously, institutions may 
conflict with one another while also providing constraints and opportunities for actors. 
However, the variance of levels considered and the associated breadth of analysis may 
encourage imprecision as it might be inferred that interpretive schemas or logics, 
cultivated at any level may be considered institutional logics. Institutional logics are 
demarcated as being beyond mere strategies or logics but in addition provide 
legitimacy and a sense of order and so typically function at numerous levels. Thus, I 
conceptualize compliance as a form of institutional logic derived from financial 
regulation. Furthermore, the change in the macro regulatory landscape, following the 
financial crisis, has clearly created new logics at the intra-organizational level, which 
focus on legitimatizing organizations through compliance with the newly created 
regulatory order.  
In summary, Oliver (1992) discusses how institutional change may occur at the 
environmental level as well as at the intra-organizational level and that pressure for 
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change may occur at either levels of analysis. Similarly, post-crisis institutional change 
can be observed at two levels, organizational and environmental. At the environmental 
level, the introduction of large scale regulatory change has altered many regulatory 
institutions. Correspondingly, changes in the regulatory environment and the creation 
of new regulatory institutions will naturally cause changes in local, possibly also 
institutionalised, operational practices, which may succeed or fail to create desired 
behavioural changes. These new organizational practices may also become 
institutionalised within organizations.  
3.3. Key Theoretical Constructs  
In order to answer the general research question I now draw down the focus to 
more specific research questions (Punch 2000). The following sections specifically 
outline the theoretical constructs used to analyse the findings and address the more 
specific research questions. The first of these: How do regulations and compliance 
practices become inscribed and transmitted through IMS technology? This question is 
addressed by considering concepts of institutional carriers (Scott 2003). The second 
specific research question considers: How are outmoded compliance practices 
becoming deinstitutionalised through the IMS? This question focuses on how pre-crisis 
compliance practices are being discontinued and so focuses on concepts of pressures of 
deinstitutionalization (Oliver 1992). The third specific research question considers: 
How are new compliance practices and behaviours becoming institutionalised through 
the IMS and what factors may prohibit this? The last question focuses on 
understanding the new compliance practices being introduced post-crisis, by 
considering concepts of institutional mechanisms (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 
2008).  
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The three theories employed  regarding how institutions are carried and 
diffused (Scott 2008), pressures for deinstitutionalization (Oliver 1992) and 
mechanisms of institutionalization (DiMaggio and Powell. 1983; Scott 2008) were 
selected as being useful in addressing the research questions and also compatible with 
one another. These perspectives are thought to complement one another by together 
providing insight how regulations and compliance practices are diffused, 
institutionalized and deinstitutionalized and so collectively provide a useful lens to 
understand how technology is implicated in influencing behaviours and practices for 
meeting post-crisis regulatory obligations. Secondly, each theory is compatible with 
Martin’s (2004) guiding criteria for defining institutions and Thornton and Ocasio’s 
(1999; 2008; 2012) institutional logics perspective drawing as they do from concepts 
such as historical contingency, social structures and affordances, values and  norms, 
sociality, persistence, legitimacy, power, isomorphism, recurring practice and the 
material and symbolic nature of institutions. Crucially, each theory embraces the 
concept of entanglement as they include constructs which function across the field and 
intra-organizational levels so are relevant to the view that institutional logics operate at 
multiple levels of analysis. In summary, the key constructs employed are viewed as 
being both complementary and compatible. They are collectively useful in addressing 
the research questions and are also underpinned by similar meta-theoretical concepts 
and so are theoretically harmonious with one another.   
3.3.1. Institutional Carriers 
All institutions regardless of whether they are cognitive-cultural, normative or 
regulative are conveyed through carriers (Jepperson 1991). Scott (2008) identifies four 
broad classes of institutional carriers and advises that the distinctions between carriers 
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are largely orthogonal to the three pillars outlined in Table 5. Table 7 describes the 
ways in which the different classes of institutional carriers are manifest and cross-
classify them against Scott’s pillars. 
 
Carriers 
 
 
Regulative 
 
 
Normative 
 
 
Cultural-cognitive 
 
Symbolic 
systems 
Rules, laws 
Values, expectations, 
standards 
Categories, typifications, 
schema 
Relational 
systems 
Governance 
systems, power 
systems 
Regimes, authority 
systems 
Structural isomorphism, 
identities 
Routines 
Protocols, standard 
operating 
procedures 
Jobs, roles, obedience 
to duty 
Scripts 
Artefacts 
Objects complying 
with mandated 
specifications 
Objects meeting 
conventions, 
standards 
Objects possessing 
specific symbolic value 
 
Table 7: Institutional Pillars and Carriers (Scott 2003; 2008) 
The first are termed ‘symbolic systems’ (Scott , 2008 p. 80) and these refer to 
the ‘full range of rules, values and norms, classifications, representations, frames, 
schemas , prototypes and scripts’ which are used to influence and guide behaviours. 
Scott highlights the fact that modern developments in information and communication 
technologies such as television or the web have enabled the increase of markets, 
increased the length of supply chains and created a far more integrated global 
economy. 
Scott (2008 p. 81) terms the second carrier ‘relational systems’ and refers to 
those systems which ‘rely on patterned interactions connected to networks of social 
positions: role systems’. Many of these systems transcend and intersect organizational 
boundaries, as in the case of communities of practice and professional connections. 
Rules and belief systems may become encoded into roles and so incorporate and 
instantiate institutional elements. As with symbolic systems, relational arrangements 
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may be shared across numerous organizations and so create similar forms or relations 
amongst forms. 
The third carriers of institutions identified by Scott (2008) are ‘routines.’ This 
category relates to structural activities within which institutional elements have become 
embedded in the form of habitualized behaviour. Routines are reliant on patterns of 
actions which reflect the tacit knowledge of actors. They may range broadly from 
activities encoded into technologies to procedures for assembling fast food. These 
routines all require a level of acting and problem solving which goes beyond a mere 
system of rules.  
The final carriers identified by Scott are ‘artefacts’, created by humans to act as 
tools to be used in various activities and so includes hardware and software related 
technologies. Scott (2008) supports his perspective by highlighting Suchman’s (2003) 
view that artefacts contain both technical and symbolic elements.  
3.3.2. Pressures for Deinstitutionalization 
Oliver (1992 p. 564) describes deinstitutionalization as: ‘the process by which 
the legitimacy of an established or institutionalised organizational practice erodes or 
discontinues’. Figure 6 depicts Oliver’s (1992) framework for understanding the 
process of deinstitutionalization and highlights how the dissipation or rejection of 
institutions due to various pressures are integral to the process.   
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Figure 6: Process of deinstitutionalization (Oliver 1992) 
The financial crisis of 2007 has caused considerable change in regulatory 
institutions with the aim of removing embedded working practices which create 
unwanted outcomes: for example, the controversial Volcker Rule within the US Dodd-
Frank Act. This rule restricts financial organizations from proprietary trading (that is, 
trades made on their own account for their own benefit as opposed to those of their 
clients) and sponsorship of private funds, hedge funds and private-equity firms. Thus, 
previously established working practices facilitating proprietary trading and 
sponsorship of funds are to be discontinued. Another example is the EU’s European 
Markets Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) which requires that where possible, 
derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms as 
opposed to directly traded between the buyer and seller thereby, discontinuing 
practices for trading certain derivative contracts outside electronic venues.  
Level of Analysis Political Pressure 
Functional 
Pressure 
Social Pressure 
Organization 
Mounting 
performance crisis 
Changing economic 
utility 
Increasing social 
fragmentation 
Conflicting internal Increasing technical Decreasing historical 
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Table 8: Pressures for deinstitutionalization (Oliver 1992) 
Oliver identifies the existence of three main pressures for deinstitutionalization. These 
are political, functional and social. Table 8 outlines the types of pressures explored by 
Oliver (1992). These pressures guide the analysis of the study’s findings. Oliver’s 
analysis surmises that these pressures operate at both the environmental or field level 
and the intra-organisational level. Consequently, in order to empirically test Oliver’s 
theories the study adopts both the intra-organisational and field levels as appropriate 
areas of analysis. 
The study investigates the ways in which compliance practices are becoming 
eroded or discontinued as a result of large scale changes in regulatory institutions at the 
field level. Thus, we see institutional change at two levels at the field environmental 
level where legislative mandates are changing the rules enforced by regulatory bodies 
and at the intra-organizational level where these changes are deinstitutionalizing 
established working practices. Correspondingly, Oliver (1992) suggests that political, 
functional and social pressures to deinstitutionalise may occur at both intra-
organisational and field levels. 
Political pressures to change practices may result from shifts in interests or 
power distributions which support existing institutions. Functional pressures to 
deinstitutionalise practices may arise from changes to the perceived utility or the 
technical instrumentality of existing institutions. The third pressure identified by Oliver 
interests specificity continuity 
Environment 
Increasing 
innovation 
pressures 
Increasing 
competition for 
resources  
Changing 
institutional rules 
and values  
Changing external 
dependencies 
Emerging events 
and data 
Increasing structural 
disaggregation  
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is termed social pressure and relates to ‘normative fragmentation’ or a loss of cultural 
consensus or agreement as to meanings and interpretations attached to organizational 
tasks and activities. In contrast to the previous two political and functional pressures, 
where organizational members consciously acknowledge the need to discontinue 
working practices and so emphasize agency, social pressures refers to conditions under 
which organizations are not pro-active agents intent on abandoning an institutionalised 
practice and so social pressure, as a theoretical construct, is closer aligned with the 
‘structuralist’ perspective.  
3.3.3. Mechanisms of Institutionalization 
Scott (2008) identifies regulative, normative and cultural cognitive systems as 
being ‘vital ingredients’ of institutions. Table 9 highlights Scott’s three ‘institutional 
pillars’ and relevant component elements.  
 
 
Regulative Normative Cultural-Cognitive 
Basis of Compliance Expedience Social Obligation 
Shared 
Understanding 
Mechanisms Coercive Normative Mimetic 
Indicators 
Rules 
Laws  
Sanctions 
Certification 
Accreditation 
Common beliefs 
Shared logics of 
action 
Isomorphism 
Table 9: Mechanisms of Institutionalization (Scott 2008) 
These three systems are both interdependent and also mutually reinforcing and 
act as pillars to support and ensure the resilience of social structures. Each of the three 
pillars incorporates various component elements; not least the mechanism by which 
each pillar supports institutional behaviours. Dimaggio and Powell’s (1983) seminal 
paper focuses on the mechanisms which enable institutional isomorphic change, the 
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process by which one unit in a population is constrained to resemble other units in the 
population which face the same set of environmental conditions. They identify three 
mechanisms which Scott includes in his typology: coercive, normative and mimetic. 
This perspective aligns well with Martin’s (2004) view of institutions being constituent 
of rules, norms and cultural values.  
Coercive mechanisms refer to formal and informal pressures which are applied 
to organizations by organizations upon which they are dependent, in this case 
regulatory bodies. Normative mechanisms may act to shape and remove practices 
through institutional configurations shaped by professional backgrounds and the 
expectations of key industry participants, such as clients, to adopt prescriptive 
practices. Mimetic mechanisms may influence practices as standard responses to 
uncertainty are sought, in this case through informal networks and forums for creating 
and sharing responses to regulatory challenges (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
Uncertainty is a key issue within post crisis regulatory compliance. Due to tight 
deadlines for remediation, organizations must start planning their responses to 
requirements before the rules are finalised by policy makers.  
The previous section has highlighted how the process of deinstitutionalization 
often takes place around the institutionalization of a new practice. Where old 
institutional orders are denigrated, it does not necessarily follow that practices 
associated with the outmoded institutions are completely eroded or discontinued 
(Dacin and Dacin 2008). These theoretical perspectives raise important questions 
regarding the extent to which post crisis regulations will be able to completely embed 
appropriate new behaviours. In order to evaluate the extent to which unwanted 
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practices have become displaced, it is necessary to consider the mechanisms which 
support institutions and will be instrumental in the institutionalization process.  
3.4. Summary 
Figure 5 outlines the conceptual model which guides this study and utilises 
constructs discussed in this chapter and the previous two. Changes in the regulatory 
environment and the creation of new legislative institutions cause changes in 
compliance practices, which may succeed or fail to create desired behavioural changes. 
For example, the second Markets in Financial Instrument Directive (MiFID II), in its 
current draft form requires that organizations report trades to the market as close to 
real-time as is technically feasible.  
Within this study, I conceptualise two types of inter-related institutions. The 
first type of institution, termed regulatory institutions, occurs at the organizational field 
level and includes the legislation and regulations which stipulate the rules enforced by 
regulatory bodies as well as the techniques by which they supervise financial 
organizations. The second type of institution identified occurs at the local intra-
organizational level and refers to embedded working practices which implement 
regulatory institutions, termed compliance practices.  
In summary, the study investigates ways in which the IMS technology inscribes 
and transmits regulatory institutions into compliance practices and how such systems 
contribute to the deinstitutionalization of pre-crisis practices and the institutionalization 
of post-crisis practices. The following chapter discusses how this model will be 
operationalised through outlining the research methodology and by describing the IMS 
case. 
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4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND CASE DESCRIPTION  
This chapter seeks to outline the research methodology employed and also to 
contextualise the IMS in order to provide the reader with an understanding of how the 
research study was conducted and also the IMS functionality and the environment in 
which it is used. Firstly, the philosophical perspective which underpins the research 
method and its relation to the institutionalist theoretical constructs previously reviewed 
are discussed. Next the research design is defined, following which data collection and 
analysis approaches are described. The following sections then seek to outline the IMS 
case and so provide an overview of the Vendor, the IMS functionality, its architecture 
and the complimentary services the Vendor provides. Finally, key points are 
summarised. 
4.1. Philosophical Underpinnings 
The philosophical perspective adopted, regarding the nature of knowledge, 
meaning and reality, acts as a foundation to support the theoretical lens and research 
methods which have been selected. Ontologically, this research adopts a social 
constructionist perspective. Correspondingly, Astley (1985) argues that studies of 
administrative science are socially constructed bodies of knowledge. The Oxford 
Dictionary of Sociology defines Social Constructivist approaches as emphasizing ‘the 
socially created nature of social life’ and ‘the idea that society is actively and creatively 
produced by human beings. They portray the world as made or invented – rather than 
merely given or taken for granted. Social worlds are interpretive nets woven by 
individuals and groups.’ (Scott and Marshall 2005 p.698). Such perspectives build on 
Max Weber’s view that social sciences are concerned with Verstehen or understanding 
(Crotty 1998; Weber 2009). Another strong influence on social constructionists is the 
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work of Alfred Schutz (1967). Schutz was interested in the ways common meanings 
are constructed through social interaction. He advocated the view that sociological 
analysis should focus on the way individuals subjectively view their environment. A 
further influential scholar was Husserl (1982) who argued that through a process of 
consciousness, which utilises concepts, ideas and images, the individual constructs 
meaning related to objects or phenomena. Thus, the emphasis is on the first person 
perspective and related experiences of the world.  
Berger and Luckman (1966) provide a critical link between these works and 
organizational scholars (Scott 2008). They argued that, although the social world may 
seem to be objective, it is actually constructed through human action and interaction. 
Human beings are continually constructing the social world, which becomes a reality 
to which they must respond and interact. Individuals are born into a world already 
constructed by their ancestors and so it is this pre-constructed world which is taken for 
objective reality. Berger and Luckman termed this process institutionalization. 
Fundamental to their construct of institutionalization is the human ability to create 
symbols which can carry meaning beyond the immediate. Human beings are viewed as 
symbol-manipulating animals who can transmit their culture and history via semiotics 
and language. Through language we can externalise personal experience and make it 
accessible or available to others. In this way, interpretive frames are built and 
meanings become shared and embedded. As Berger and Kellner (1981 p.31)  observe: 
‘Every human institution is, as it were, a sedimentation of meaning or, to vary the 
image, a crystallization of meanings in objective form.’ Correspondingly, Berger and 
Luckman (1966) describe a second order of meaning belonging to institutions, namely  
legitimacy. This view corresponds with Martin’s (2004) defining criteria of institutions 
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providing legitimacy. Berger and Luckman (1966 p.111) suggest that:  ‘Legitimation 
‘explains’ the institutional order by ascribing cognitive validity to its objectified 
meanings. Legitimation justifies the institutional order by giving a normative dignity to 
its practical imperatives.’ Such perspectives have important epistemological 
implications for studies investigating the management of regulation and technology, 
which is fundamentally about institutions, organizations, individuals, and technological 
artefacts. 
Correspondingly, this study is guided by interpretivist approaches to social 
research whereby is it accepted that knowledge cannot be obtained outside of personal 
judgement and social construction (Daft 1983). Consequently, ‘value-free’ data cannot 
be obtained as the researcher may employ preconceptions to guide the process of study 
and interacts with the human subjects of the research altering perceptions of both 
parties (Walsham 1995). IS research may be considered interpretive ‘if it’s assumed 
that our knowledge of reality is gained only through social constructions such as 
language, consciousness, shared meanings, documents, tools, and other artefacts. 
Interpretive research does not predefine dependent and independent variables, but 
focuses on the complexity of human sense making as the situation emerges (Kaplan 
and Maxwell 2005); it attempts to understand phenomena through the meanings that 
people assign to them (Boland 1985; Boland 1991; Deetz 1996; Orlikowski and 
Baroudi 1991).’ (Klein and Myers 1999 p.69). Furthermore, Walsham (1995) suggests 
that interpretive studies of IS are focused on creating an understanding of the context 
and process whereby information systems are both influenced by the context and also 
influence the context, in this study IMS and regulatory compliance for asset 
management firms.  
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4.2. Research Design 
Guided by an interpretivist epistemology, a case study approach was selected as 
an appropriate research method given that the operating context of the organizations 
considered is a key factor in investigating the behaviours of the research participants. 
As Yin (2009 p. 4 and p. 23) notes, a case study approach is appropriate where 
researchers wish to ‘retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life 
events,’ and where ‘the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident.’ The study has important regulatory-related contextual conditions which are 
specifically pertinent to the phenomena of compliance-related systems in financial 
organizations. Consequently, context and phenomena cannot easily be divorced from 
one another.  
The study adopts ‘purposive sampling’, which allows researchers to ‘seek out 
groups, settings and individuals where… the processes being studied are most likely to 
occur.’ (Denzin and Lincoln 2000 p. 370). The IMS Vendor, henceforth referred to as 
the Vendor, was selected under the criterion of being one of the market leading 
providers of IMS, whose customer base included small to large firms operating 
globally. Data collection was conducted within the participant organizations over three 
phases. C.6 ceased to be a client of the IMS Vendor between phases two and three. 
Table 10 outlines the financial organizations selected. 
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Selected Financial Organizations 
 C.1 C.2 C.3 C.4 C.5 C.6 C.7 C.8 
Year IMS 
Implemented 
2000 2001 2003 2003 2002 2004 2002 2001 
Asset Under 
Management ($bn) 
250 70 40 450 240 15 200 150 
Rules 16,000 3000 1500 10,000 5,000 800 3,000 8,000 
% of rules that are 
non-automated by 
the IMS 
15% 6% 15% 10% 15% unknown 20% 20% 
Investor Accounts 1000+ 250+ 100 + 1000+ 500+ 80+ 1000+ 1000+ 
IMS Compliance 
Team Size 
 
 (for Vendor’s 
System only) 
UK (8) + Global 
(5) 
 
CCO - Lawyer 
 
9 globally 
 
CCO – Lawyer 
 
3 staff near 
traders. 
 
10 globally 
 
3 staff 
Positioned on 
trading area to 
manage day to 
day issues 
 
UK (7) + US 
(13) 
 
CCO - Lawyer 
UK (5)  + Asia (4) 
+ US (3) 
UK (2) + US (3) 
UK (8) + US (4) + 
AP (3) 
UK (10) + US (6) + 
AP (6) 
Phase 1 2009-2010 X X X      
Phase 2 2010-2011 X X X X X X X X 
Phase 3 2012-2013 X X X X X  X X 
Table 10: Participant Financial Organizations (Data supplied by participant organizations and IMS Vendor)
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Adoption of a typical case purposive sampling strategy required a search for 
information-rich cases which were illustrative of IMS usage in financial 
organizations (Patton 1990). As Symon and Cassell (2012 p.42) note: ‘Typical case 
purposive samples are chosen to provide an illustrative profile that is considered 
representative, albeit not statistically.’ Sampling criteria for selecting the Vendor’s 
clients focused on identifying replicable cases of IMS use (Stake 2013; Yin 2009). 
Thus, a multiple case (Yin 2009) or collective case (Stake 2013) method was 
adopted. Such an approach allows for inductive building of theory through the 
selection of cases which provide rich empirical descriptions of the phenomena 
under consideration (Eisenhardt 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). Indeed, each 
of the client sites selected offered rich examples of how the IMS was implicated in 
complying with regulatory policy. Organizations were selected on the basis that 
they were using the IMS to manage comparable financial products and services and 
thus had a similar level of regulatory exposure, and had global operations across the 
UK and the USA, at the least. Specifically, the financial organizations participating 
used the IMS for trading equities, derivatives, fixed income and currency securities. 
Participating organizations were also long term adopters of the system, utilizing it 
for a minimum of six years at the beginning of the study. Long term adoption of the 
system was a necessary sampling criterion to ensure that IMS related practices were 
institutionalised within each organization and thereby potentially provide insight 
into how, post-crisis, such practices were becoming deinstitutionalized.  
The combination of comparable levels of regulatory exposure, global 
operations and long-term IMS adoption was felt to ensure the necessary criteria to 
provide replicable instances of IMS use not least as the data collected addressed 
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similar topics of regulatory change and so allowed for cross-case comparisons 
(Miles and Huberman 1994). However, the study does not explicitly seek to present 
contrasting and comparative compliance practices adopted by different 
organizations for complying with specific regulatory rules. Instead the study draws 
from collective interpretations of experiences across the eight financial 
organizations to illustrate a rich tapestry of regulatory change and socio-technical 
issues being driven by shifts in the regulatory landscape occurring as a result of 
economic and organizational failures (Patton 1990). The number of cases of IMS 
usage (eight organizations) was deemed an appropriate number (Eisenhardt 1989). 
As Stake (2013p. 22) observes: ‘The benefits of a multi-case study will be limited if 
fewer than say, four cases are chosen, or more than ten.’ Too few cases and the 
‘interactivity’ between phenomenon and context would be lost while too many 
cases, over ten, may create more ‘uniqueness of interactivity’ than may be 
manageable for one researcher, particularly one operating within the confines of a 
PhD. 
A multi-case research design allows for both external and internal validity 
(Leonard-Barton 1990). External validity was achieved by adopting a multiple or 
collective case study approach allowing ‘literal replication’ through ‘typical case’ 
sampling (Patton 1990; Stake 2013; Yin 2009). This approach allowed for internal 
validity by allowing close inspection of the context and causes of changes in 
compliance practices.  Internal validity was achieved by considering different 
empirical data sources. Scope, depth and consistency was enabled by discussing 
key concepts, constructs and terminology with each of the informants and 
triangulating the findings across primary and secondary data sources (Flick 1998; 
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Seale 1999). For example, interviewee references to particular areas of regulatory 
change were triangulated with the original regulations and industry commentary to 
ensure key points were fully understood and consistent across sources.  
4.3. Data Collection and Analysis 
A case study approach to data collection allowed for a combination of 
different data sources to be utilised (Yin 2009). Table 11 summarises the sources of 
data utilised in this research.  
Overview of Data Sources 
 Data Source Purpose 
Primary Data 
Interviews with key 
individuals engaged 
in compliance 
practices 
Representatives from: 
 IMS Vendor  
 UK based Financial 
Organizations Firms 
 3
rd
 Party 
Consultancies 
To provide rich interpretations 
of the impact of regulatory 
change on the socio-technical 
compliance environment within 
participant financial 
organizations over time.  
Secondary Data 
White Papers, press 
releases and 
speeches 
 Regulator’s white 
papers and press 
releases 
 Speeches from key 
policy 
makers/influencers 
To provide insight into policy 
changes and associated 
motivations for changing 
regulatory structures.  
News articles   BBC 
 Economist 
 Financial Times 
To provide overview of key 
economic events and failures  
Regulatory 
mandates 
 EU Directives 
 US Acts of Congress 
 UK Regulator’s 
Handbook 
To provide understanding of 
specific areas of regulatory 
change and associated rules 
Commentary from 
Legal and 
Accounting Firms 
 White papers 
 Websites 
 
To support understanding of 
the interpretation of regulatory 
mandates and the associated 
impact on organizations 
Marketing Materials  IMS website and 
marketing pamphlets 
 Financial 
organization 
websites and annual 
reports 
To provide insight into the 
products and services being 
offered by financial 
organizations 
To provide insight into the 
infrastructure, outsourcing 
and consulting services 
offered by the IMS Vendor 
Technical manuals  IMS user manuals To provide insight into IMS 
functionality and capabilities 
112 
 
 
Table 11: Data Sources 
Across the participant organizations, the strategy for data collection 
involved interviewing a diverse range of stakeholders (Miles and Huberman 1994; 
Silverman 2001). Table 12 outlines the interview sources and the purpose of 
conducting those interviews. Individuals had many different titles and so in this 
table they are grouped against broad categories describing the focus of their role.  
Interview Sources 
 
Total No. 
of 
Interviews 
Purpose 
Date:  2009-2013 
Phase 
1 
Phase 
2 
Phase 
3 
IMS Vendor 
IMS 
Consultants 
(2) 
5 
To provide insight into 
different implementations and 
upgrades of the IMS 
undertaken over time 
X X X 
IMS 
Relationship 
Manager (1) 
6 
To provide insight into the 
changing business 
requirements of the Vendor’s 
clients 
X X X 
Financial Organizations 
Compliance 
Professionals 
(9) 
15 
To provide user  insight into 
the impacts of regulatory 
change on financial 
organizations over time 
X X X 
Trading 
Professionals 
(4) 
6 
To provide user insight into 
the impact of regulatory 
change on investment 
strategies, trading practices 
and supporting technologies 
X X X 
IT and 
Project 
Managers (8) 
9 
To provide technical insight 
into the impacts of regulatory 
change on financial 
organizations projects, 
processes, technical 
architectures and strategies 
X X X 
3
rd
 Party 
Consultants 
(2) 
2 
To provide insight into the 
management structures and 
practices which may enhance 
remediation efforts in financial 
organizations 
 X X 
Table 12: Summary of interviews 
In total, forty three interviews were conducted. The majority of interviews 
were conducted face-to-face with seven interviews conducted over the phone. 
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Interviews lasted between approximately thirty minutes and two hours. Follow up 
questions were typically conducted over the phone. Initially, the interviews were 
transcribed by myself within a week of the interview in order prevent loss of depth 
and meaning. However, later interviews were transcribed by a third party due to 
time constraints imposed by full-time work. To ensure ethical practice, this person 
was required to sign a non-disclosure agreement. I also ensured that I received 
permission to record each interviewee and described how the data was to be used in 
this study. In total, seven hundred and twenty four pages of transcribed data was 
produced, see Appendix 4. Notes were also taken during the interviews to assist 
with the transcription process, see Appendix 6. On occasion these notes were sent 
to the interviewee, on request, and so had to be professionally presented.  
Primary data collection was achieved through semi-structured interviews at 
both Vendor and Client sites. The Vendor provided rich material about the origins 
of the IMS and how it was changing as a result of shifts in the regulatory 
environment. The eight client sites gave detailed examples of how the IMS was 
implemented in relation to complying with regulatory changes and compliance 
policy. At the IMS Vendor site, senior systems consultants and the client 
relationship manager were interviewed. This was especially insightful as 
collectively they had much experience of implementing IMS and dealing with 
clients, post and pre crisis. Within the financial organizations, trading, compliance 
and systems professionals were interviewed all of whose responsibilities were 
intertwined with the IMS. Two third party consultants who were working on 
restructuring compliance practices were also interviewed. 
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Over the data collection period, responses to the financial crisis became 
more developed and demarcated as further drafts of upcoming regulations were 
released. As the regulations became more defined, the reactions of the system 
vendor and financial organizations to these changes also became more granular, 
particularly in phases two and three of the data collection. A semi-structured 
approach to data collection allows the flexibility to explore new and contemporary 
issues whilst ensuring important topics were covered (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009). 
Emphasis, however, remained on the researcher to frame what was important in 
understanding the behaviours, events and patterns related to the research topic 
(Bryman 2008). The interviews I conducted were often discursive in nature and 
allowed both researcher and interviewee to play a role in framing and constructing 
meaning. Consequently, I must acknowledge that the data obtained is not ‘value 
free’ as my own preconceptions guided the process of study and interaction with 
the research participants. However, I took care in the interview process not too try 
to elicit specific responses (Walsham 1995). Furthermore, semi-structured 
interviews have previously proved successful in providing the necessary depth to 
explore complex and dynamic regulatory phenomena (Tsatsou et al. 2009). The 
semi-structured approach allowed the flexibility to pursue new topics as the 
discussion evolved, and also as responses to the crisis emerged and became better 
defined (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009; Punch 2005). This approach also allowed the 
interviewees the opportunity to discuss the issues they felt to be important and 
meaningful. Typically, interviewees were re-contacted during transcription and 
analysis in order to provide clarification on key issues.  
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An interview guide (see Appendix 3) was designed and then refined 
throughout the data collection period. Interviewees were provided with a copy of 
the guide prior to the interviews being conducted. This was a prerequisite stipulated 
by the IMS Vendor, if I was to have access to their clients, and so it was important 
the guide looked professional and included the University logo. Questions in the 
guide were formulated around key theoretical constructs identified early in the 
study, such as the work of Scott (2008) and Oliver (1992), while other constructs 
were added later on as the depth of my reading increased and my familiarity with 
institutional concepts deepened for example, the possibility that institutions may be 
conflicting or contradictory was not considered initially. Other questions were 
formulated in relation to developments in the post-crisis regulatory landscape 
established through reading industry reports and materials distributed by the 
Regulator. I was also careful to ask respondents what were the key issues they were 
currently facing in relation to the IMS. In this way, the semi-structured approach 
allowed me to identify key, yet contemporary, issues and develop future questions 
around those findings, and to also triangulate interview findings against secondary 
data emerging from sources such as the Regulator. This approach also allowed me 
to reduce my own bias by allowing concepts and ideas to also come from the 
participants and not only through my own preconceived questions (Kvale and 
Brinkmann 2009). Where interviews were being conducted with numerous 
individuals within the same organization, questions were also derived from 
previous findings relating to the IMS and its use within that firm. At the end of each 
interview, time was allocated to reflect on the answers and refine the interview 
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guide where necessary. These updates were based not only on interview responses 
but also on developments relating to emerging regulatory responses to the crisis.  
Although the interview questions were partly developed from theoretical 
constructs relating to institutional carriers, pressures of deinstitutionalization and 
mechanisms of institutionalization, as well as analysis of the post crisis regulatory 
landscape, it was imperative that interviewees were not confused by terms they 
were unfamiliar with, such as isomorphism. Use of such terms early on in the study 
created a level of frustration in the research participants. Examples of the types of 
question presented in plain English include: ‘What measures, if any, has your 
organization taken to coordinate implementing new compliance practices 
globally?’ This question evoked responses which provided insight into how 
organizations, responding to common regulatory themes derived from the G20 
agreements, are centralizing approaches and thereby creating isomorphic 
compliance practices across the enterprise.  
The identification of changes in environmental factors, such as the 
introduction of new regulations were derived through analysis of secondary data 
such as regulations, speeches, press releases and white papers from regulatory 
bodies as well as industry commentary by the business press, accounting and legal 
professions. Secondary data was also collected from IMS manuals, financial 
organization’s annual reports, websites, and sales and marketing literature aimed at 
the Vendor’s clients or investors with the financial organizations. Table 12 
summarises the primary and secondary data sources employed.  
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Data analysis was conducted through long established interpretive 
techniques for analysing data through the recursive identification of patterns, first 
through categorization and then abstraction (Gibbs 2007; Guest et al. 2012; Miles 
and Huberman 1994; Saldana 2009; Silverman 2001; Spiggle 1994; Symon and 
Cassell 2012). During the process of data analysis, primary and secondary data 
were closely reviewed to determine points of importance and interest. Common 
themes were identified and categories assigned. Thus, long interviews were 
simplified through the adoption of simple categories (Punch 2005). The analysis 
adopted a two cycle approach to coding. The first cycle adopted a ‘Descriptive 
Coding’ approach for summarizing segments of data. This method is appropriate 
for inductive studies utilizing semi-structured protocols (Saldana 2009). This 
approach requires the application of a content phrase to a segment of data 
representing a topic of inquiry, for example ‘Use of Spreadsheets, ‘Use of 
Templates’ and ‘Increased Compliance Costs’. The second cycle adopted a ‘Pattern 
Coding’ approach to identify major themes by searching for causes and 
explanations from the data. Such an approach builds on the first cycle of analysis 
and are, ‘explanatory or inferential codes, ones that identify an emergent theme, 
configuration or explanation. They pull together a lot of material into more 
meaningful and parsimonious unit of analysis’ (Miles & Huberman, 1994 p.69). 
Examples of such codes include ‘Standardization’, ‘Consolidation’ and 
‘Harmonization’. Furthermore, Pattern coding was also guided by the theoretical 
constructs related to institutional carriers, pressures of deinstitutionalization and 
mechanism of institutionalization. Examples of coding built from theoretical 
constructs include ‘Coercive Mechanisms’ or ‘Mimetic Mechanisms.’ Appendix 5 
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outlines examples of how the data was analysed. The table provides examples of 
scheduled and non-scheduled interview questions, the interviewees’ responses and 
how the responses were analysed and categorized.   
The interviews conducted can be delineated into three distinct phases from 
2009-2013. The first phase, from Dec 2009 - May 2010 focused on understanding 
the IMS and how the system was used to organize compliance practices. In this 
phase, pilot interviews were held with the Vendor as well as three financial 
organizations to aid understanding of how the system functioned and to formulate 
pertinent questions. The second phase from Aug 2010 - Oct 2011 and the third 
phase Feb 2012 – Dec 2013 built on the previous phases’ findings to develop 
understanding of how compliance practices were being changed to meet post-crisis 
regulatory requirements, and to incorporate changing environmental factors such as 
the introduction of increased levels of regulatory supervision, and as further details 
of new regulations emerged. The second and third phases were predominantly 
conducted with the eight financial organizations with a few interviews conducted 
with the Vendor to understand developments in the system and related services 
being offered. However, as the length of data collection was extended as a result of 
unforeseen personal events and as other aspects of the study were unplanned, I 
should acknowledge that an a posteriori justification and rationalization contributes 
to my account of the research methods employed, which is often the case in such 
studies (Weick 1999; Weick 2002). Furthermore, in order to make the research 
process as transparent as possible, it is important to acknowledge that some 
decisions regarding the research design, data collection and analysis were 
consciously made prior to the first phase of data collection and others resulted from 
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changes in factors outside of my control as well as the emergence of new 
opportunities and my own judgement at the time regarding the best way to proceed. 
For example, the decision to use a multiple case based approach with semi-
structured interviews was made early on. However, decisions regarding the number 
of cases to be used and who to interview were made as the research progressed. As 
I built trust with the Vendor and specifically their Senior Relationship Manager, 
who became increasingly comfortable with introducing me to his clients, further 
access was facilitated. Often, when asking questions in interviews the interviewee 
would refer me to a colleague whom they thought would be better able to answer 
the question. I would then subsequently contact and arrange to interview them if 
they were willing, which was not always. On one occasion, having sent the 
interview guide prior to the meeting the interviewee unexpectedly decided to bring 
along a colleague whom they thought better placed to answer some of the questions 
outlined in the guide. Thus, the number of interviews conducted and access to some 
of the respondents were not predefined at the outset. Furthermore, it was initially 
planned to conduct the interviews over a condensed period of time in two phases. 
However, this was not possible as the availability of participants varied and people 
were not able to give large chunks of their time in a short time-frame. Furthermore, 
my own personal circumstances changed as I moved to full-time employment and 
continued the PhD part-time. In addition, family sickness also delayed opportunities 
to carry out data collection activities. Consequently, the data collection period was 
extended into a third phase.  
Although not initially intentional or pre-planned, a longitudinal approach 
allowed me to overcome common shortcomings in retrospective research designs 
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limited to snapshot time-series data, which may result in accidental or purposeful 
misrepresentation and fail to capture immediate and distant experiences (Golden 
1992; Pettigrew 1990). In addition, this approach allowed time for policy makers’ 
responses to the crises to become clearer and better defined.  
Another decision made prior to the start of the data collection was the use of 
NVivo software, see Appendix 2. The system was adopted in the third phase of data 
collection. The system was used as the volume of data being produced became 
difficult to manage. However, while NVivo provides much useful functionality 
ultimately this technology was used, in this study, chiefly as a document repository 
and management tool. The use of NVivo’s functionality for quantifying qualitative 
evidence through the frequency of a particular answer was not employed, as the 
study does not seek to equate statistical frequency with significance. During data 
analysis the tool was employed to manage and group sections of transcripts which 
belonged to codes derived during the data analysis process. However, in order to 
avoid striping out the context in which the data was provided, which I have since 
found is an established criticism of NVivo (Welsh 2002), I often ended up attaching 
large chunks of data to each code/node. As a consequence, I often still had the 
challenge of managing large documents of qualitative data anyway. Overall, the use 
of NVivo made the data marginally more manageable.   
4.4. Methodological Reflections and Lessons Learnt 
Research into the impact of regulatory change in a complex and dynamic 
environment posed many challenges. Firstly, it became clear from early on in the 
project that the Regulator would not permit me to conduct any interviews directly 
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with their staff. Their legal team prevent such interviews. The Regulator is 
concerned that any published comments on regulations and supervisory practices by 
their staff might be taken as guidance on how to meet compliance obligations and 
consequently be cited as a defence for non-compliance, by firms looking to justify 
inappropriate approaches. This obstacle, I found, was common not just for 
academic researchers but established journalists as well. When I spoke with an 
editor of the FT (Financial Times), who often writes on regulatory issues, he 
commented on having the same problem and could only get regulators to comment 
off the record to him. He advised that they were only willing to do so as he had 
developed these contacts over many years. So, for researchers who did not have 
such contacts or may feel that having people comment off the record is unethical 
(they may face disciplinary proceedings if found out) understanding the regulator’s 
perspective, which often changes over time, can be quite challenging. This was 
overcome by drawing together secondary data provided by the regulator including 
transcripts of speeches, white papers and the FCA handbook as well as the 
regulations themselves. 
Another challenge I faced, was to understand the regulations themselves as 
well as the complexities of capital markets coming, as I do, not from a legal or 
finance academic background. Furthermore, understanding the FCA handbook also 
proved quite challenging as much of the Regulator’s rules and guidance are 
communicated in legalese. To overcome the important hurdle of making one has 
correctly understood and interpreted the rules and regulations and their impact on 
complex financial operations and products, I recommend any future researchers to 
take the time to explore the historical context of the why the regulations are being 
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introduced and to also triangulate their own understanding of rules, practices and 
events with comments derived from interviewing practitioners as well as documents 
from the Regulator (transcripts of speeches, white papers and press releases) and 
knowledgeable third parties such as legal and accounting firms. Thus, the need to 
collate and analyse secondary data and triangulate such data with primary data 
should not be overlooked. Legal and accounting  organizations often provide their 
own white papers and ‘micro web sites’ dedicated to specific areas of upcoming 
regulatory change, In addition, the regulator as well as legal and accounting firms 
will often host free special events with panels and guest speakers discussing current 
issues. I often found that such organizations would often, but not always, be happy 
to have a researcher attend at little or no cost.  
Finally, where complex technologies such as the IMS are being used in 
dynamic yet also complex operational environments, I found it very useful to 
understand as much about the technology as possible including its technical 
architecture and the business model of the vendor as well as any ‘value added’ or 
consulting services provided. By doing so, it becomes much clearer to understand 
how the technology supports the research environment and why specific changes to 
practice have occurred. This is the focus of following sub-sections within this 
chapter.  
4.5. The Case Description: Contextualising the IMS 
The Klein and Myers (1999 p.73) criteria for evaluating interpretive 
research in IS includes the ‘Principle of Contextualization which requires critical 
reflection of the social and historical background of the research setting, so that the 
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intended audience can see how the current situation under investigation emerged.’ 
Our introduction included a brief history of regulation in the UK and US and 
introduced the current regulatory landscape - see 1.4 and 1.5. However, the 
following section seeks to contextualise the IMS by providing a thorough 
background of the system and its social and technical settings. The following 
sections focus on providing the reader with a solid foundation to understand the 
complex use of the IMS and the post-crisis regulatory environment in which it 
functions. By drawing upon upcoming regulations and commentary on these 
regulations, Vendor marketing materials, interviews with IMS users and Vendor 
employees as well as the UK regulators’ websites, a rich picture of the context 
under which they IMS operates is synthesised. The chapter outlines key aspects of 
IMS use which are drawn upon in future chapters. Consequently, the following 
sections are guided by the following questions:  
 What is the post-crisis regulatory landscape in which the IMS operates? 
 How does the IMS functionality and architecture contribute to meeting 
regulatory obligations? 
 What are the services offered by the Vendor for managing compliance 
practices? 
4.6. The IMS Market 
In addition to the Vendor, there are essentially three categories of 
participants within the financial markets where the IMS operates. The first type of 
market participants are Investors. This category includes individuals who directly 
own securities, as well as financial organizations that own securities for the firm’s 
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benefit or hold securities on behalf of others. The second category is Issuers, 
including corporations issuing shares in their company and corporate bonds, 
governments and local governments issuing bonds. The process of securitization, 
essentially selling future cash flows from revenue streams as bonds, means that an 
increasing number of firms have become Issuers. These firms’ offerings are 
controlled through the rules or principles of a regulatory body. This control may 
take the form of authorising and registering offerings, as well as defining 
information disclosure requirements to both markets (Investors) or regulators 
(Hazen and Ratner 2005; Loss and Seligman 2004; Moloney 2002; Palmiter 2005). 
Financial Intermediaries are the third type of market participant, and act in 
one form or another as intermediaries between issuers and investors. Financial 
Intermediaries such as investment banks will often assist companies wishing to 
raise capital through share offerings or corporate bonds. Financial Intermediaries 
offer a variety of services and financial products. This category of participants 
includes broker-dealers who buy and sell securities for their clients, investment 
advisors and investment firms such as asset management houses. Often the line 
between these three broad categories may become blurred; for example a Financial 
intermediary investing money for its own benefit or an Investment Bank which also 
issues shares in the bank, such as Goldman Sachs (Hazen and Ratner 2005; Loss 
and Seligman 2004; Moloney 2002; Palmiter 2005).  
Financial Intermediaries engage in two completely distinct sub-sets of 
activities. The first is termed the ‘Buy-side’ of the business and refers to the buying 
and selling of securities for investment purposes (to make a profit) on the behalf of 
clients. Examples of such organizations are Hedge Funds, Asset Management 
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Houses, or Mutual Funds. The term Buy-side is used to distinguish between the 
other ‘sub-set’ of activities termed the ‘Sell-side.’ This area of business activity 
focuses on creating and servicing securities, and so includes structuring new 
securities’ offerings, marketing them, analysing securities performance and 
providing a market for them by acting as Broker-Dealers. (Jellis et al. 2009). 
The Vendor’s clients include small hedge funds to large asset management 
houses and so may be considered under the umbrella term ‘Financial 
Intermediaries.’ The IMS focuses exclusively on facilitating practices around the 
‘buy-side’ of the investment banking industry. However, many of the Vendor’s 
clients, the larger financial organizations, may engage in both buy and sell side 
activities. The Vendor’s clients operate in the institutional asset and fund 
management, hedge funds, wealth management, insurance, banking and pension 
markets. Organizations operating in these markets are focused on purchasing 
securities for investment purposes and accruing revenues through making shrewd 
investments, often on behalf of clients. For example, Asset Management Houses 
may attract clients looking to invest capital from a charity or pension fund in order 
to meet specific returns required by that organization (Brindley et al. 2008). 
The process of investment firstly involves the creation and fulfilment of 
orders. These orders relate to either the buying or selling of assets, also termed 
securities. Thus, a Fund Manager may create orders on the behalf of Investors 
which are then fulfilled in the markets by Traders, often through Broker/Dealers or 
through direct access to the markets. Once the Trader places the order, it becomes 
‘Executed’ and the process of order fulfilment or Post-trade processing begins. This 
process focuses on completing the underlying transaction whereby both of the 
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transaction’s counterparties receive their respective securities or funds. 
Consequently, orders enter the process termed ‘Clearing and Settlement’. This is 
often achieved through a third party or Clearing House. The ‘Clearing’ process 
requires matching the buyer’s and seller’s records and checking that there are no 
discrepancies in the trades attributes, for example in the price. Many trades are 
conducted manually over the phone directly between counterparties, as opposed to 
being conducted electronically through IT networks. Where this trading practice is 
utilised, the opportunity for human errors and mistakes is increased.  If there are 
discrepancies, they are resolved between the traders and broker/dealers. The 
Clearing House also confirms that both counterparties are finally willing to conduct 
the transaction. The Settlement process involves changing records of ownership and 
facilitating the transfer of securities and cash. The cash is transferred to a 
depository. The securities are transferred to a Custodian who holds and administers 
the securities on behalf of their clients, for example by assisting with the collection 
of dividends or interest payments or calculating tax liabilities. (Hazen and Ratner 
2005; Loss and Seligman 2004; Moloney 2002; Palmiter 2005). 
4.7. Overview of the Investment Management System 
The system’s functionality allows individuals in various roles to collaborate 
on the purchase or selling of securities. Senior Traders/Fund Managers define 
orders for the selling or purchase of assets. These orders are then fulfilled by 
Traders in line with the parameters and tolerances stipulated within the order. Each 
transaction is checked against automated compliance rules. The IMS generates 
warnings and alerts where these rules are breached. Compliance executives monitor 
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rule breaches and sign off trades to ensure on-going compliance. The system also 
provides auditable records of transactions and how associated compliance breaches 
were managed.  
The IMS is designed to be central to investment management operations 
within financial organizations. The Vendor describes the system as a, ‘control 
centre and information hub.’ The systems act to connect internal departments 
within financial organizations to external trading destinations, such as 
broker/dealers or directly with markets and to post trade venues to facilitate 
clearing and settlement. Automation of the investment process facilitates best 
execution
2
, as well as integrating with accounting systems and trading 
counterparties to reduce errors, mitigates risk, and decrease inefficiencies’. Figure 7 
highlights these connections. 
                                                 
2
 The EU’s 2004 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) Best Execution requirement 
states that: ‘A firm must take all reasonable steps to obtain, when executing orders, the best possible 
result for its clients taking into account the execution factors.’ Execution factors are defined as, 
‘price, costs, speed, likelihood of execution and settlement, size, nature or any other consideration 
relevant to the execution of an order.’ FCA. 2013a. "Cobs 11.2 Best Execution."   Retrieved 26th 
June 2013, from http://www.fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/COBS/11/2. 
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Figure 7: IMS as Control and Information Hub (developed from Vendor materials) 
The IMS is modular based and is offered individually or as part of an 
integrated suite. These modules offer functionality around portfolio management, 
dealing and trading, compliance and post trade processing. The Vendor offers 
various additional services to compliment these modules. 
4.7.1. The Vendor 
The system’s Vendor, which provides the case study for the research, is a 
well-established compliance systems solutions provider in business since the early 
1980’s. The Vendor provides Investment Management Systems (IMS) which can 
handle numerous securities and currency types to facilitate trading activities. The 
IMS functions across the front and middle office. The organization began as a 
software application and consulting firm and has developed its software and 
services over time. The organization is privately held and owned entirely by the 
firm’s management. The IMS was initially developed and marketed within the US 
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as a system for compliance with US mandates but is now used to manage 
compliance in numerous geographical regions. The Vendor’s headquarters are 
based in the USA. The firm has over three hundred and twenty clients across the 
globe, with a significant presence in America, Europe and Asia. Over the years the 
functionality of the IMS has grown from facilitating trading of equities to trading, 
fixed income securities, derivatives and currencies. The firm provides various 
services around the IMS including: implementation and consulting services, data 
management, connectivity to broker/dealers and electronic trading venues, 
application management and hosting, technical support and educational courses 
around the IMS. 
4.7.2. The IMS Competitive Environment  
The number of vendors competing with the IMS Vendor is quite limited 
with only a dozen or so such systems on the market. Each system has particular 
capabilities and associated strengths and weaknesses. The IMS Senior Relationship 
Manager compared the strengths and weaknesses of the IMS with its competitors: 
‘Our core strength, in terms of product, is equity.  We’re superb at equity.  We’re 
catching up on fixed income and derivatives and OTCs [derivatives], but we’re not 
there yet.  And other competitors, like [IMS Competitor 2], are better than we are 
on fixed income. We’re better than they are in equity, but vice versa, but they have 
very good fixed income driven rules and processes and workflows. It gets far more 
complex when you’re looking at bringing in price curbs for market prices and 
you’re looking to extrapolate what the future price is going to be for an OTC 
[derivative], to get the fair value.  It just goes to a, devilish, depth of complexity and 
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we can do a lot of this stuff, but not as well as say [IMS Competitor 1]. You’ve got 
the Greek’s the Alphas, and different measurements which are used for derivatives, 
to work out yields and exposures and fund managers want all this to try and help 
them make their decisions. And we can’t generate those at the moment. We can 
bring them in, but at real-time, we are still a year away from providing that.  So 
what a fixed income house would say is, ‘Yes, [IMS Vendor’s] very good, but 
actually I need to have [IMS Competitor 1], because it’s cheaper or [IMS 
Competitor 2], because they provide a better outsourced software as a solution 
service.’ And don’t get me wrong, [IMS Competitor 2], they charge millions a year 
for their product. You can look on the Internet and you can find out the pricing for 
[IMS Competitor 1].  They’re extremely open on how much they charge per user, 
full stop and it’s a lot cheaper than [IMS Vendor] is. Except [IMS Competitor 1] 
have 20 people in the company. [IMS Vendor] has got 500.  And so, in terms of a 
system that is used by a company that’s located in one city, it works.  If it’s going to 
be a global for example [C.3] or [C.5], there’s no way that you can have [IMS 
Competitor 1] to be used as an enterprise solution, because it just hasn’t had the 
development. It hasn’t had the involvement. It hasn’t had the investment. I mean 
[IMS Vendor] invests about $50 million a year in product development, which is 
about as much [IMS Competitor 1], gets in a year.  The problem is, [IMS 
Competitor 1] is good to look at, a great look.  It’s, dare I say it, a pleasure to work 
with and the problem with [IMS Vendor] is the big clients are using older versions 
and for them to upgrade to a new version, it’s effectively a big project. And it can 
cost, you know hundreds of thousands of pounds, which they confuse with the price 
of a system like [IMS Competitor 1], which costs that for a license. And the 
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implementation is seen to be cheaper, because they don’t utilise their own internal 
professional services, they bring people off the street to do it.’ 
The Vendor’s Senior Relationship Manager also highlighted how important 
it was that the IMS system is able to integrate with the adopting organization’s 
existing systems. Key to this is the adoption of widely applied technological 
standards and third party technologies such as databases: 
‘What wins business isn’t just  can-do compliance, it’s also how it integrates, how 
the workflow would impact and influence existing workflows, and how it will 
integrate with other database systems, and so on and so forth.  So you’ve got just 
compliance systems out there which have sold and are being replaced by [IMS 
Vendor], not because  they are poor systems; it’s because they don’t integrate with 
the workflow and data’  
 An IMS Consultant commented on how the amount of resources the Vendor 
spends on research and development has, in his opinion, provided the Vendor with 
an advantage: 
‘All of these products have a limited shelf life unless they’re constantly changing. R 
and D, it kind of comes out of not only knowing what your clients want, but also 
what you need as a business to be able to survive in a very competitive market. 
[IMS Competitor 3], is finished. Their investment into R and D is just fractional. I 
mean [IMS Vendor] is like £30 million a year into R and D which is as much as 
some companies make. That’s a huge amount there just isn’t matched at all by 
[IMS Competitor 3]. So whilst in the beginning [IMS Competitor 3], would bring a 
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new version out we would trump them and they would bring out another and trump 
us in particular areas, but now they’ve just not got the critical mass.’ 
4.7.3. Portfolio Management 
The portfolio management component of the IMS is chiefly used by 
managers in charge of investment portfolios. These managers will define the 
investment strategy for the portfolio to meet the investment criteria of their clients. 
Such individuals include pension fund, hedge fund and asset managers. The IMS 
enables managers to create and implement investment strategies and maintain 
control over their holdings. This is chiefly achieved through the system’s central 
work space termed the ‘Workbench’. The Workbench provides investment 
managers with tools to assist with formulating investment strategies. The graphical 
user interface of the Workbench is designed to be similar to an Excel spread sheet 
and allows users to ‘drill-down’ to further levels of detail as required. The module 
brings all the current holdings within a portfolio and current orders into a single 
workspace, thereby allowing investment managers to manage groups of portfolios 
and also to track orders being fulfilled by the trading desk.  
An integral part of the Workbench’s functionality is its ability to allow 
managers to perform ‘What-if’ analysis. This aspect of the system allows managers 
to analyse their funds or positions, pre-trade, and asses the implications of possible 
future scenarios. In addition, the Workbench allows managers to bring in numbers 
relating to risk calculations and the financial performance of assets held and to 
rebase the portfolio against a particular index, model or benchmark. The IMS can 
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then calculate what to buy, what to sell and what the compliance implications of 
these potential trades are. 
A key element of ‘What-if’ analysis is the ability to benchmark the existing 
portfolio against models constructed internally or provided by the Vendor. A senior 
trader in C.4 described using a benchmark provided by the Vendor: 
‘Okay, you’ve got your benchmark, something against which you want to model a 
fund. So you’ve got say for example, a FTSE 100 benchmark, which contains all the 
securities within the FTSE 100 and there are yields and values associated with that 
information. So what [the Vendor] provides is a complete FTSE 100 benchmark as 
a single source file, that then opens out all the securities within the FTSE 100.  So 
rather than us having to try piece together what’s in the FTSE 100, the [Vendor] 
would do it for you’ 
Once the investment manager has performed the analysis required and is 
confident that the strategy adopted is correct, the IMS will generate orders and 
communicate them to the trading desk. These orders will then be worked on by 
traders. The Workbench also crucially allows the investment manager to understand 
the implications of benchmarking on the portfolio’s compliance position. The IMS 
Senior Relationship Manager described how the Workbench functionality provides 
the Investment Manager, with the comfort that their adjustments to the portfolio 
will not cause compliance breaches:  
‘…when you’re doing the modelling, when you’re in Workbench, you say, ‘Here’s 
my portfolio, here is the benchmark against which I want to model, firstly does the 
benchmark break any concentration tests?’ In other words the benchmark says 
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‘own 4% of something’ and the compliance rules says ‘don’t,’ So before even 
thinking about sending the orders to the trading desk and saying work these 
orders,’ the fund manager can run compliance on the proposed changes to the 
portfolios, the new orders. They can then tweak and tune it and then push 
something through which as of half past seven in the morning [for example] works. 
It’s basically a way of giving a degree of confidence to the fund manager that what 
he’s looking at, at that moment in time, can be tuned and tweaked so that none of 
the orders will breach any compliance criteria.’ 
This type of compliance checking is known as pre-trade, as it occurs before 
the orders have been fulfilled by the traders, and so is hypothetical. It is also worth 
noting that when the investment manager performs the pre-trade compliance check, 
the proposed changes may be compliant at that point in time but that by the time the 
orders are fulfilled, movements in the markets, such as the value of an equity 
increasing or decreasing, may cause that order to be non-compliant by the time it 
comes to be executed. Thus, orders may have to be further ‘tuned and tweaked’ at 
the time of execution and so pre-trade compliance testing can only provide 
investment managers with a broad sense of comfort that their alterations are 
compliant.  
In contrast, post-trade compliance testing refers to checking compliance 
limits against current holdings. As the name suggests, this type of trade occurs after 
the order has been conducted and thus tests against existing holdings. Post-trade 
compliance testing provides the organization with its actual compliance position, so 
post-trade compliance checking is not hypothetical. 
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Once the potential orders have been checked against appropriate 
benchmarks and the pre-trade analysis is complete, the orders are sent to the 
trader’s to be fulfilled. An IMS consultant summarized this process: 
‘So in the Workbench you are able to basically look at, for example, your funds or 
your positions, your value with the concentrations, whatever you want to see in 
here, you can always bring in the performance measurement numbers and the risk 
numbers. And so this is predominantly the ‘What-If management tool. So if I have 
my portfolio and I want to rebase it against a particular model or a particular 
benchmark you can do that in there, it will then calculate what you have to buy, 
what you have to sell if you want particular bonds to stay neutral, your exposure to 
durations or whatever it is.  It can work out where you sit and you can then say, you 
know what? I don’t want to do this and you can cancel it and nothing’s been saved, 
it’s all lost in the memory. You could even run compliance against it and check at 
this moment in time, does it all fit and meet compliance? and say, ‘Well, this will 
fail compliance, therefore I can reduce or change that particular stock,’ and so the 
tool allows you to model, to look at and to make a decision on what you want to buy 
and then having convinced yourself you’re there you press a button, you say, ‘Buy.’ 
It will then either, depending how you’ve configured [the Workflows], send those 
orders to the [Traders] blotter where you then still see each of those orders and 
monitor them. Then the trader can go away, take the orders and progress the 
transaction. The trader will work with the price parameters you stipulated, with the 
broker that you may have selected, the trader will push it through and complete the 
transaction, the whole lot. Or, if you are one of the smaller companies, you can be 
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both fund manager and trader. You’ve got your different hat on and so you can 
create orders and fulfil them.’ 
The process of order fulfilment may take many days, or even weeks if the 
security is particularly illiquid. Furthermore, orders may be conducted over 
extended periods of time to prevent disclosing to the markets who the transaction’s 
counterparties are and what their investment strategy might be. The number of 
securities involved may also be high. A systems manager observed that he had seen 
orders which took several weeks and involved half a million different equities.  
4.7.4. Trading 
The next significant element of the IMS is the component which facilities 
dealing and trading. This element of the IMS consists of two component systems: 
an Order Management System (OMS) and an Execution Management System 
(EMS). OMS, ‘…supports the investment management and trading process and ties 
together the portfolio manager, trader, back office and compliance department 
through a common solution.’(Kanter 2009 p.1) and is defined as: ‘An electronic 
system developed to execute securities orders in an efficient and cost-effective 
manner. Brokers and dealers use OMS when filling orders for various types of 
securities and are able to track the progress of each order throughout the system.’ 
(Investopdeia 2013 p.1). The OMS incorporated into the IMS facilitates 
configurable workflows for trading and customizable interfaces which allow 
different traders and compliance executives to collaborate on order fulfilment. A 
key selling point of the IMS is its ability to support different asset classes such as 
equities, fixed income, derivatives, options, futures and currencies. The Vendor’s 
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Senior Relationship Manager described how developing the OMS is a key focus of 
their research and development function:  
‘Out of 85 development teams, there are 20 teams working on nothing other than 
the OMS. So the focus is trying to make sure what we’re doing for workflows are 
relevant and that new asset types, mainly derivatives, can be integrated.’ 
The EMS provides ‘functionality such as smart order routing, connectivity 
to multiple and a large array of trading venues, market data and real-time pricing, 
pre-trade transaction cost analysis and algorithms’ (Kanter 2009 p.1). EMS are 
often broker owned, although not in this case as the IMS consists of both OMS and 
EMS. The IMS Senior Relationship Manager described how the Vendor’s strategy 
is to provide a complete solution to compete with its competitors: 
‘ You’ve got [Vendor CEO] who will say, if the product was just to be this OMS 
then there’s a shelf life, because people want more and more products and you get 
more and more products such as [Vendor Competitor 2], who are a broker 
providing EMS and OMS. You’ve got the integration between [Vendor Competitor 
3], (OMS) and [Vendor Competitor 4], (EMS) and clearly where does [IMS 
Vendor] sit?  And so what we have done is said, right, we’ve gone from being an 
onion, where you have layers upon layers, you have your compliance, then your 
equity, then your derivatives and so on, to being a quiche or a pizza, where you’ve 
got your OMS, your EMS, your compliance, your performance measurement, your 
risk, your, analytics and it’s different pieces, different sizes of  bowl.’ 
The central work space of this component is known as the ‘Blotter’ which is 
a real time and configurable application that consolidates all dealing activity and 
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allows traders to manage and execute incoming orders from multiple investment 
managers. The Blotter allows traders to merge, split, cancel, replace and clone 
orders, as well as calculating the trade execution and settlements amounts in 
multiple currencies. An IMS consultant described the interaction between the OMS, 
EMS, Blotter and the Workbench:  
‘What you are looking at there is the blotter that is the OMS piece.  It’s basically 
where you say I want to do the following transaction for these accounts.  I want to 
buy or sell, in this case it’s Vodafone, across six accounts and so that happens in 
the OMS. The EMS piece actually sits inside this so you can, from the same single 
stream, look at different aspects of a market in the Blotter, but you’ve also got bits 
that the EMS brought through which is your prices.’   
The workflow functionality allows the creation of personal trading 
environments whereby multiple customised Blotters can be set up displaying 
preferred columns, sorting and grouping columns by user’s preference and mapping 
personal icons to access data or systems in a single click. Analytics can be 
customised by traders, as can real-time reports and graphs. The real-time aspect of 
the system is enabled by third party data feeds which provide information on 
changing markets from organizations such as Bloomberg or Reuters. Traders may 
incorporate elements of real-time market data to perform custom calculations 
within the Blotter, to provide visual representations of market changes and also to 
provide analytics on existing orders and current positions. For example, customised 
fields may display the order’s size as a percentage of the current market volume or 
the percentage change of an assets price throughout the day. Table 13 summarizes 
the wide spectrum of data types utilised by the IMS.  
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Data Type User Purpose 
Indexing and 
Benchmarking  
Investment Managers 
Traders 
Investment Performance Analyst 
Compliance Executives 
Portfolio Modelling and 
Rebalancing 
Portfolio Performance 
Measuring 
Ensure Portfolios Comply 
with Benchmarks 
 
Referencing Data for 
Different Securities 
(e.g. Ratings and 
Classifications) 
Investment Managers 
Traders 
Investment Performance Analyst 
Compliance Executives 
Trading Accuracy  
Access to New Financial 
Securities  
Current Securities 
Ratings and 
Classifications 
 
Pricing (Both real-time 
and snapshot) 
Investment Managers 
Investment Performance Analyst 
Compliance Executives 
Portfolio Modelling and 
Rebalancing 
End-of-day Compliance 
Testing (Batch) 
Portfolio Valuation 
Asses Liquidity and 
Volatility  
 
Issuer Details Compliance Executives 
Managed Risk and 
Exposure 
 
Operational Data  
(e.g. logs on systems 
and network  
performance) 
IT and Operations Managers Systems Administration 
Table 13: Types of Data Required by the IMS (developed from Vendor Materials) 
  
In order to support the MiIFD ‘Best Execution’ requirement and to enable 
analysis of trading costs, the OMS can automatically take a snapshot of market 
price and trading costs to further support the ‘Best Execution’ requirement. The 
OMS allows traders to route orders to preferred trading destinations through 
embedded access to key brokers and the Vendor’s proprietary trading network. 
Traders may also route multiple, orders and ‘drop’ them into preferred execution 
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venues. The OMS facilitates the solicitation, calculation, selection and tracking of 
brokerage fees and commissions. Furthermore, the system allows Traders to ‘slice’ 
orders and send each part to a different trading venue. The OMS allows traders to 
assign ‘broker reason codes’ to orders. These codes map to common reasons for 
selecting specific brokerages and so facilitate the future demonstration of meeting 
‘best execution ‘requirements.  
The OMS further facilitates the order execution process through algorithmic 
trading which allows brokers to embed specific algorithms into the system. An IMS 
consultant outlined how algorithmic trading functions: 
Interviewer: 
‘Okay.  And how does the system facilitate algorithmic trading?   
Respondent: 
Well, we provide a hook and so different brokers will provide the algorithms that 
they want to run on trades, and … there’s a logic within how you want to try and go 
to the market, so you don’t disclose who you are or what you’re doing and those 
algorithms are written by the broker and they then get linked in to the [IMS].  And 
so you can press a particular button and it will then process an order based upon 
an algorithm that’s written by Bank of New York or whomever.   
Interviewer: 
So effectively, instead of having the trader monitoring the markets for that quantity 
and price, you can set it to do it automatically? 
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Respondent: 
Yes.   This is what has caused problems in the exchanges, whereby the algorithm is 
looking for volatility and when the process of trading is automatic.  With high-
frequency-trading, what it’s going to do is then say, ‘Right, here are some trades. I 
will sell them.’  And it gets into a recursive loop, because what it then does is it sees 
the volume changing, based upon what it’s done, and it continues selling, selling, 
selling and you know, this is what has caused all sorts of crashes in the Indian 
market and the US market.   
Interviewer: 
I see.  Okay.  So when you were saying about how the [IMS] functions, it’s not high 
frequency trades then?   
Respondent: 
No, it’s not, but it still runs algorithms in a similar way, but it’s not a black box, 
which is just being allowed to run amok.  It’s a target quantity going through a 
particular algorithm and that algorithm will complete. So if the algorithm messes 
up, it’s only going to mess up on, you know, half a million pounds or twenty 
thousand units of a particular stock’. 
The ‘Workflow Monitor’ application within the OMS allows system events to be 
tracked or queried. The ‘Workflow Monitor’ triggers user defined alerts to assist 
senior compliance managers with overseeing the Trading process. A senior 
compliance manager, in C. 2, described how this application functions,  
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‘Well, it’s was implemented a few years ago, but Workflow Monitor is something 
the system does and if certain criteria are met, it enables you to then flag, to a 
screen, and provides a live pop-up on your screen when these alerts get deleted if 
they are resolved. So, if a trader receives a trade onto their blotter but doesn’t do 
anything, as in its fallen off the list or it’s forgotten about or their away from their 
desk and... If it stays there and is untouched for more than an hour then we’ve 
potentially got issues with the timely execution of our clients’ orders. And so there’s 
a pop-up... on my screen saying, there are however many orders that haven’t been 
touched for an hour and I can click on a link and say, oh right, well okay the reason 
that hasn’t been touched, is because they are US equity trade... it’s ten o’clock in 
the morning, the US wouldn’t open until two, don’t worry about it. Or, I could say, 
it’s a UK equity trade that was sent through at half nine, it’s now quarter to eleven, 
why hasn’t anyone done anything with it? And make a phone call to the dealer 
room to say, ‘What’s going on?  Why haven’t you picked up this order? What’s 
happening is there a valid reason?’ Our old way of looking at that was basically 
getting order histories from [IMS] and then looking at the timing and saying, 
there’s that and that. Oh yeah and that one took more than an hour. So it’ was kind 
of an old audit process and now we’ve got a system that tells us when anything gets 
delayed. It’s moving from sample based testing to exception based testing.’   
The Blotter also integrates with the compliance monitoring component of 
the IMS. This functionality allows traders to run compliance checks from the 
Blotter before executing orders and thereby reducing costs associated with 
managing compliance breaches. Traders can drill down to view the variables 
effecting compliance calculations such as details of the asset, rules stipulated by the 
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client and current positions being held. This is termed ‘pre-execution’ compliance 
testing. 
4.7.5. Compliance 
The third component of the IMS is the compliance function which is 
integral to the system’s ability to meet compliance requirements. Its purpose is to 
provide a real-time centralised view of the of the organization’s investment 
operations. At the heart of the IMS are the automated compliance rules. These rules 
are derived from regulations and legal mandates. Figure 8 highlights the 
relationship between regulatory legislation, regulatory rules and automated rules 
within the IMS.  
 
Figure 8: Legislation, Regulatory Rules and Automated Rules: Source: author 
Once the EU Directives or Acts of US Congress have been passed, they are 
interpreted by the home state’s regulatory body. In the UK, this is currently the 
FCA, whilst the US has numerous regulatory bodies including the SEC and the 
CFTC. Based on legislation, these regulatory bodies define and publish specific 
rules and principles to which an organization operating under the jurisdiction of that 
regulatory body must adhere. Within the UK, these regulatory rules were collated 
within the FSA’s Handbook which outlines all the requirements for firms over 
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which it has jurisdiction.  These rules are now held within the FCA Handbook. The 
EU Directives or Acts of Congress provide the regulators with the powers to define 
and enforce rules. It is these regulatory rules which are interpreted and inscribed in 
the IMS as automated rules. The regulations are interpreted, translated and codified 
by compliance executives and systems experts into ‘automated compliance rules’, 
which are then inscribed into the IMS and applied on a transaction-by-transaction 
basis. That is, each transaction must be compliant with the relevant regulatory 
requirements and therefore, the corresponding automated rules are run against each 
transaction. This occurs prior to the order being fulfilled and after the transaction to 
see if changing market positions have altered compliance positions.  
The types of regulations which are encoded in the IMS automated rules are 
quantitative in nature. As a senior compliance professional, in C.2, noted: ‘we’re 
very much, sort of coders of quantitative restrictions for investment compliance’. 
Typically these ‘quantitative restrictions’ or calculations put limits on the numbers 
of securities traders may buy or sell.  
A compliance manager, in C.3, gave an example of how the IMS applies 
regulatory rules to financial holdings and how the system provides an aggregated 
view of compliance positions:  
‘So there may be many different issuers for a single security. When you’re applying 
regulations… and for example a compliance rule has got to say no more than five 
percent in a particular issuer, but you need to know, not just who is the issuer for 
that security. But when you have a unit trust or a collective fund where that then 
contains other securities, you want to look through and discover in the unit trust, 
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which securities there are and who are the issuers for those securities. And then 
you can say, ‘Well, if I’ve got Coca Cola in my unit trust and I also own Coca Cola 
as a stock, then what’s my combined exposure to this issuer in Coca Cola and is it 
more than five percent?’ 
Both US and EU Regulators require organizations to set quantitative limits 
on specific types of transactions, calculate exposures to certain securities, calculate 
risk values, and perform pre and post-trade analysis on compliance positions and 
leveraging limits. The IMS Senior Relationship Manager provided an example of a 
specific regulation which may be inscribed within the IMS:  
‘And we now need to be compliant with UCITS which are these regulatory 
compliance rules which were meant to allow you to very quickly and easily look at 
buying Swaps or particular variations and make sure you that comply and firms 
can say that you are UCITS III or UCITS IV compliant and for that you have to 
have all these regulatory rules wrapped into your compliance checks.’  
From a systems perspective, the ability to accurately access, monitor and 
structure transaction related information is essential to meet regulatory 
requirements. The post-crisis regulations focus on transactions, asset types, levels 
of capital buffers and associated limits, concentrations and exposures which 
organizations must observe - see 1.5.2. These mandates require systems to impose 
structured rules on the financial organization’s activities to ensure compliance. For 
example, the post-crisis EU Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive of 
2011 (AIFMD) requires that a private equity or hedge fund which holds controlling 
or voting shares in a company must make public the identity of the fund manager, 
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as well as its policies for managing communications and conflicts between the fund 
and the company. In order to comply  with these requirements it is essential that the 
Fund has appropriate systems in place, such as the IMS,  to monitor the  number of 
voting shares held against the number required to exercise ‘control’ over the firm.  
As well as regulatory rules, the system also allows rules based on 
requirements set by the Investor. For example, The Church of England as a charity 
may wish to invest in the markets in order to generate capital flows to maintain its 
estates. However, the Church may stipulate that for religious reasons they do not 
want to invest in companies which are engaged in the defence/arms industry or in 
the tobacco industry. Consequently, automated rules would be defined for that 
portfolio to ensure that if a trader attempted to buy shares in British Aerospace the 
IMS would prevent it. An IMS consultant highlighted the difference between 
regulatory and client rules:  
‘So regulatory [rules], for example, you can’t own more than 50% of a particular 
bond without having disclosure to the [Regulator], the client mandate is we are a 
green company and we therefore do not want to buy anything from Shell’. 
In addition, automated rules may be created to enforce compliance with internal 
policies. For example, a senior manager may wish to prevent the purchase of assets 
which are deemed too risky. An IMS consultant gave the following example: 
‘You’ve also got, again with [automated] rules; you can say I don’t want to buy any 
of the following. So you can block - you may say, looking at the underlying security, 
it’s too risky. If I am holding an option on a particular bond and that option 
happens to be the Maxwell Mirror Newspaper Group then if I’m buying some of 
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this, which is actually underlined by that security then management may want to 
block that, because they have no faith in where the Maxwell Brothers are going to 
push their particular bonds through.’   
 However, although the IMS can also provide compliance with internal policies and 
individual client requirements, the focus of this study is on automated rules derived 
from regulations.  
The IMS allows financial organizations to define who is notified when 
alerts and warnings are generated and compliance breaches occur. Compliance 
managers are provided with a ‘Dashboard’ which contains relevant information 
relating to a compliance breach or warnings and drill down to provide further 
details on the holding. A trader, in C.1, described how the system provides alerts 
and warnings if automated rules are breached and how they may be dealt with:  
‘[A Regulation may]… say if I can’t have a concentration of IBM more than 3% of 
my total portfolio market value. So the automated rules state that, if I am at 2.5% 
then let me know. The Compliance Team may not block the order from going 
through but they have to be told and may decide no, I want someone to authorise 
that I can buy the additionals or may say no, no it’s just a warning.  So you’ve got 
the hard and the soft warnings for those types of things.  
As a result of checks against the compliance rules, the system generates 
alerts and warnings which are forwarded to the trader and, if necessary, the 
compliance team. Traders can then acknowledge the alert or warning, notify others 
upon correction of the problem, request higher-level approval, or override the alert 
or warning as appropriate.  Breaches are often dealt with by selling securities to 
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ensure limits and concentrations return to acceptable levels. The IMS also creates 
alerts if trades are not conducted or corrected in a reasonable time frame. A senior 
systems manager, in C.1, described the process, by which breaches may be handled: 
‘So, the compliance officer, he will then be contacted and the trader may say, ‘You 
know, the system’s wrong, pass it. There is money coming in that I can confirm.’ Or 
the compliance officer sees the report each day of all the alerts and warnings, and 
then he tells the Fund Manager or he himself talks to the traders and says, ‘This is 
in breach, you must correct it and this is what you’ve got to do.’’   
The IMS allows both compliance executives and traders to drill down to view the 
compliance rules, trade information, security details, positions, and trades 
contributing to the compliance breach. 
The quantity of automated rules may be vast. One financial organization 
participating in this study had upwards of sixteen thousand rules. The Senior 
Relationship Manager for the IMS vendor suggested:  
‘Someone like [Financial Organization C.1] has got up to 10,000 compliance rules 
which run every single day and these rules can run at the point at which the fund 
manager says ‘I want to buy’ which are the pre-trade compliance rules. It can run 
once the trader has bought something so you can also have additional checks made 
to make sure, which are the post-trade. You’ve also got the overnight, the batch 
process, which starts off all over again and recalculates all the numbers to make 
sure that what you’ve got is compliant and does fall within the parameters and 
tolerances that you’ve got.’ 
149 
 
 
The number of checks required makes it impossible for such a system to 
operate manually. An overnight batch process is required to check that the current 
holdings do not breach compliance based on the closing market prices. This is 
termed ‘end-of-day compliance testing’. Furthermore, as orders may take long 
periods of time it is possible that by the time orders are fulfilled the conditions 
under which the trade was deemed compliant in pre-trade checking have changed. 
This may be through market movements in price or due to other orders being 
fulfilled, meaning that the total number held of a specific asset has increased. As 
result of these changes and the order being fulfilled, it is now possible that the 
positions being held create breaches in compliance requirements. Consequently, 
end-of-day compliance checking is essential to ensure the firm meets regulatory 
requirements on an on-going basis.  
A compliance manager in C.5 described the impracticality of using a 
manual system to check all rules and how before the IMS was introduced, only 
random checks were conducted: 
‘The way it was done before, it was one bloke would check the odd rule to make 
sure that it was within breach but there was absolutely no way you could check 
each and every compliance condition against transactions, unless you’ve got teams 
of hundreds of people because quite simply the volumes are massive to calculate 
the numbers, look at the concentrations or… the easy ones are to say you cannot 
buy tobacco.  The hard ones are to work out the concentrations or to look at and 
incorporate any user-defined dynamic denominator in looking at what a number 
should be.  I mean you just can’t do that unless you’ve got a lot of gap between end 
of day, close of business at 4.30 and half past seven kick-off the next day.’ 
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The automated rules are stored in a database known as the ‘rules library’. 
The IMS provides an interface for designing and building rules in-house. In 
addition, the IMS Vendor provides example standard rule libraries to assist with 
rule creation. These pre-written ‘automated compliance rules are based on key 
requirements for compliance with regulatory bodies in different geographies, such 
as the UK. In addition, the Vendor may release rule templates for complying with 
new regulatory directives. However, due to the different ways financial 
organizations may classify assets and customise the IMS, the application of these 
pre-written rules may be problematic. An IMS consultant described the issue:  
‘We provide out of the box hundreds upon hundreds of compliance rules.  The 
problem is the system has to be mapped to make use of those rules, so you may say 
right I want to trade a particular bond and the system comes out and says here’s a 
corporate bond, here’s a government bond.  You may have created your own bond 
type for whatever reason you’ve got and therefore our standard rules do not map to 
yours. You’ve therefore got to go and add to the list of section criteria in the 
compliance statement bits which you’ve done or bits which you’ve changed. So yes, 
rules come out of the box, regulatory rule, UCITS rules, the standard rules or 
examples of how to do concentration tests, examples of how to do an exclusion rule, 
an example of how to do a look-through rule. What we’ve now actually got in 
Version [X] is you can write your own rules, you can do whatever it is you want 
and bed and map it into the product. You own it, you maintain it, you manage it but 
yes, the system does have those templates or does have that flexibility to allow you 
to utilise what comes out of the box. 
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The Vendor currently provides over one thousand seven hundred pre-
written compliance rules across thirty-five regulatory bodies in twenty countries. 
 
Figure 9: Overview of IMS Users and Functionality (developed from Vendor Materials) 
Figure 9 provides an overview of the IMS and the interaction between the 
IMS users and functionality. 
4.7.6. Post Trade Processing 
The IMS Post-trade processing component is a hub connecting dealers, 
brokers, operations departments and custodians to facilitate the clearing and 
settlement process. This component ensures that for each transaction portfolio 
managers, traders, compliance and operations personal have the same real-time 
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view of post-trade processing activities,  thus, enabling the reduction of errors and 
‘fast forwarding’ the settlement process. Figure 10 outlines a typical Post-trade 
Processing workflow. 
 
 
Figure 10: Post-Trade Processing (developed from Vendor Materials) 
After the order (1) is placed through the IMS with the Broker/Dealer a 
‘Notice of Execution’ (2) is sent back to the system.  Frequently, Investment 
Managers will block large trades across several portfolios which may then have to 
be allocated (3) to numerous Broker/Dealers, following which the IMS and 
Dealer/Broker will exchange settlement instructions (4). At this point the trade 
attributes such as price and quantity for the buyer and seller are matched and any 
exceptions are raised. The Depository holding the funds is provided the details of 
the trade, affirmation that the trades have been confirmed and authorization for the 
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settlement of the transaction. The next stage of the process is to communicate the 
change of ownership to the Custodian (5). The IMS then receives confirmation 
from the Depository of the trade’s details. Finally, the IMS provides affirmation (6) 
of the trade to the Depository. 
The IMS routes orders and order allocations to the required counterparties 
and automates the trade attribute matching process. By allowing portfolio 
managers, traders, and compliance personnel access to the Blotter, matching 
exceptions to trade attributes can be centrally managed. A key innovation is the 
IMS ability to communicate automatically with the Brokers/Dealers, Depositories, 
and Custodians, thus providing ‘straight through processing’ (STP) which ideally 
achieves completion of the Clearing and Settlement process within the day. From a 
regulatory perspective, the IMS ability to automatically route trades to preferred 
Broker/Dealers facilitates the implementation of the Best Execution requirement.  
4.7.7. Proprietary Network  
The Vendor provides a proprietary network for connecting to the ‘global 
institutional investment community’. This network effectively connects IMS users 
electronically with Broker/Dealers or direct to Stock Exchanges and other 
electronic trading venues. The integration of this network allows the IMS to route 
orders to various different trading venues, for equity, fixed income and foreign 
exchange securities. Due to the dynamic nature of capital markets, a key 
requirement for systems which facilitate trading activities is that delays in receiving 
market updates and processing orders should be minimized, termed low-latency. 
The Vendor describes its proprietary network as, ‘reliable, secure and scalable 
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providing low-latency connectivity’. The proprietary network architecture uses the 
Financial Information Exchange (FIX) Protocol which stipulates a specification for 
electronic trading messages.  
4.7.8. Technological Architecture 
The IMS adopts a 3 tier service-orientated architecture. This architecture 
was selected by the Vendor as providing a number of key benefits. Firstly, an 
architecture derived from different service components provides the scalability 
required to keep the system current with changing complex financial products and 
shifts in the regulatory landscape.  In addition, the architecture supports 
organizations operating multi-site global operations. The Vendor’s strategy is to 
incorporate established technologies and industry standards within the system. 
Table 14 summarises the technologies and standards utilised by the Vendor. 
However, the Senior Relationship Manager gave an example of how the Vendor 
was selective about continuing to support certain standards stating that: ‘We no 
longer support[s] Sybase as Sybase has stopped developing but now Sequel Servers 
and Oracle are the two main tools that we support.’ 
Technology/Standard Function 
Microsoft.NET using C# 
Front End Graphical User Interface 
(Presentation Tier) 
Java 2 Platform Enterprise Edition (J2EE) 
Server Side Processing (Service 
Tier) 
JDBC Database connectivity 
SQL Database Access 
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Oracle, Microsoft SQL Server, Sybase Databases (Database Tier) 
Intra-organizsationalsoft Windows, Sun Solaris 
(Unix), Red Hat Linux 
Operating Platforms 
.XML, .CSV File Formats 
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) 
Protocol for communicating across 
Presentation and Service Tier 
Business Object’s Crystal Reports 
Third Party Embedded Report 
Writer 
IBM WebSphere, MQ TIBCO Rendezvous, 
Microsoft Messaging Queuing, SonicMQ, Open 
JMS. Java Messaging Services 
Web Services 
ISO 15022 
Messaging standard for trade 
settlement and payments 
Financial Information eXchange (FIX) Protocol 
 
Messaging standard for trades 
Omgeo OASYS, Omgeo CTM 
Interfaces to Post-trade 
Confirmation/Affirmation Venues 
Table 14: Technologies and Data Standards Utilised by the Vendor (developed from Vendor Materials) 
The architecture adopted by the IMS is a 3 Tier system incorporating a Presentation 
Tier, a Service Tier and a Database Tier. However, the Vendor terms this 
architecture ‘Multi-tier’ as systems adopters may deploy any number of servers for 
individual services and also to achieve scalability and load balancing. Furthermore, 
smaller organizations may choose to situate the database and service tier on a single 
back end server. Figure 11 summarizes the IMS architecture.  
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Figure 11:  IMS 3 Multi-Tier Service Orientated Architecture (developed from Vendor Materials) 
The Presentation tier consists of the user interfaces for the Service tier. This 
presentation tier is responsible for all user-system interactions and for the 
presentation of data. The key technology utilising or delivering the Interface is the 
Microsoft.net framework. The IMS Relationship Manager commented on this tier 
and how it can provide users with different media presented in different ways: 
‘Basically, you can bring into this tier whatever you want.  You can have Excel, you 
can have TV, you can interface with absolutely everything and you are not limited 
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by the size of your screen because of course with now Dot Net it means you can 
have six screens horizontally and detach windows and put it into any of those 
screens but all still linked in together. It’s all one distributed system.’ 
The second or service tier contains the business logic associated with the 
IMS and also the database connectivity. This tier is written in Java and so provides 
platform independence across Windows, Unix and Linux. In addition, the use of 
Application Programming Interfaces (API) provides easy interfaces with other 
systems and data feeds. The use of Web services within this tier means that trading 
and compliance functionality can be accessed across the entire organization. A key 
service provided at this tier is the Compliance Engine, also written in Java, which 
provides pre-trade, post-execution and end-of-day compliance. This service can be 
accessed through a number of technologies including XML, which allows this 
service to be easily integrated with other systems.  
The third tier is the database tier. An IMS consultant, described how data 
from different databases for will be viewed through the IMS presentation tier:  
‘… the whole benefit is that all this information can be viewed from one single 
screen so you may have three different databases, one for the transaction 
processing, one for your [benchmarking calculations], one for ‘as of compliance’, 
you are still viewing it from one system it’s just, under the covers, the databases do 
what they have to.’  
Accurate data was seen as crucial for effective compliance and meeting new 
requirements. A compliance manager, in C1, noted:  
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‘That’s right,  the data really is key. I always say to the guys at work… you can 
code the perfect compliance test and if it’s not supported by the data its useless.’ 
Furthermore, data availability and accuracy were highlighted as key issues 
when creating new automated rules to meet regulatory requirements An IMS 
consultant stated that:  
‘The biggest chore of being able to implement a rule… is the availability of data. 
You know that’s what we have found, particularly when new regulations come 
along as well. If there’s any changes to requirements, in terms of what we need to 
have available. There’s certain data you need for trading and then beyond that you 
might have other requirements for compliance and that data may not be readily 
available.’   
The automated compliance rules are underpinned by SQL statements to 
query the databases. An IMS consultant describes how the rules use a syntax which 
is more palatable for compliance managers, who may not be technically proficient 
with SQL:  
‘The rules themselves are pseudo SQL statement and they’re not SQL because that 
would be far too limiting for the users, who may not have deep technical know-how. 
To create rules, the user is given a wizard and can either build [the rule] in real 
word syntax or can use the hard core coding bit to define the rules and you can 
swap between the two…’ 
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4.7.9. Professional and Managed Services 
The Vendor provides what it terms ‘professional services’ in order to help 
financial organizations and its clients to implement and administer the IMS. The 
Vendor provides an implementation team who asses the financial organization’s 
current situation. Each member of the Vendor’s implementation team undertakes a 
series of training courses to achieve ‘certification’ in the IMS. The implementation 
team utilise the Vendor’s own proprietary methodologies. Factors considered 
include ‘technology, hardware, geographical distribution, workflow and key 
constraints.’ Key variables which differ across organizations include workflow 
requirements, data requirements and how each financial organization classifies 
securities.  
An IMS consultant commented on how defining the Workflows for new 
implementations worked: 
‘The IMS can provide the appropriate authorization for those who are the back 
office which is the data, those which are the fund managers who put in orders, 
those which are traders who will execute that order be it through [Vendor’s 
Proprietary Network] or not, those users which are compliant can create and 
authorize rules which have been defined and then make sure that if a rule is broken 
by a particular transaction then that’s authorized and can go through or not.  This 
is all about what that individual can see, so we haven’t got ‘oh, here is a 
compliance user, this is what he can do’, it’s the reverse.  We want to make a 
compliance user who can look at the following screens, the following parts of the 
system and therefore you will define a user or a group of users who are compliant 
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and then say from those ‘this is what they can do, these are the actions that they 
can perform, they select, update, delete on a particular screen and so on every 
single screen you can say what a person can do.  There are two options, one is you 
can give the person the right to the entire system and then just take away from 
screens what you do not want them to do or take everyone’s rights away completely 
and say for these compliance people these are the only screens, they can see every 
screen they want, but these are the only screens that they can do any edit or do any 
select or do any update upon…The way I would always drive it, is remove 
everyone’s rights and then define the users you need and then associate them with 
the user group, the screens that they should be using and then from there associate 
users though those groups to then create workflows.’   
 As a result of implementing the IMS, financial organizations are often 
required to create new teams. The Vendor’s Senior Relationship Manager 
commented:   
‘Clients often realise that they have to extend their teams to have the coverage.  
You know someone who knows how to write rules and test rules. Someone who 
knows how to analyse breaches maybe have a data exception team, someone to 
follow up on security data and compliance data.’   
 The IMS consultants and IT Professionals interviewed considered data to be 
the biggest challenge when implementing or upgrading the IMS. An IMS 
implementation consultant commented:  
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‘And the biggest problem with each and every single client is data.  Low and behold 
people still do not, have not, got their data right and this is the biggest problem 
everywhere.’ 
This issue was found to be compounded in smaller organizations. An IMS 
consultant commented:  
‘I’m not sure. I think it depends on the organisation. Some organisations are small, 
some of them are large. I mean it depends on the resource you have available to 
deal with the data issues and set up the rules. If you’re a larger organisation you’d 
probably have better access to the data you need.  We have had smaller clients that 
have been frustrated, because the business won’t buy the data. You know if they 
don’t buy the data then they have to find other ways of monitoring their exposure.’ 
In addition to services around new implementations, the IMS Vendor also 
provides consulting services around upgrades. The Vendor prefers its clients not to 
customize the IMS beyond the configurable permutations within the system.  
However, the Vendor will try to accommodate request from its clients in future 
upgrades. The Vendor’s senior relationship manager commented on how feedback 
is collected from clients and how the Vendor will try to accommodate them:  
‘Our implementation people get information from their clients, what they like, what 
they don’t like. And that may result in requests for changes to the existing product.  
So effectively, we are responsive to what the clients want and we have to prioritise 
those issues. Sometimes the client wants something that... they’ll actually pay for it. 
Maybe it’s unique to them themselves. Okay, they want a specific report or they 
want some functionality that we don’t currently have in the product and we don’t 
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see all the clients asking for that functionality. But what we try to do, you know... 
the minimum we try to cover is the regulatory rules’.  
 The IMS Senior Relationship Manager commented on how future releases 
of systems may incorporate changes previously developed for a specific customer: 
Interviewer: 
‘Sure, that makes sense.  So essentially you try and avoid bespoke development as 
much as possible?’ 
Respondent: 
‘Absolutely at all cost.  And we have done bespoke development in the sense that a 
client wants an interface and there is no way we can with the version that they’re 
on give them a specific interface, but what you say is this interface, if you tell us 
exactly what the configurations are, what the criteria are for your testing, then 
we’ll do the same thing and we’ll certify it, for that particular piece. However in a 
later release we will then have a fully interfaced version so that everyone can use it, 
it’s not just tied down to [that client’s] particular workflows.’  
However, the IMS Senior Relationship Manager described how customizing 
the IMS caused issues when upgrading the product: 
‘… this goes back to my earlier comment why the US [head office] hate us 
customising [the IMS], is massively, massively configurable and the problem with 
anything that is configurable is that when you get given another release, another 
version, it’s not like buying Word where you get what you’re given, this has 400+ 
system parameters which work out your permutation and combinations, how many 
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different types of variation there are. No two customers use the same system in the 
same way at all and that is our strength and our weakness, and its our strength as 
you can trade however you want, wherever you want with whatever workflow you 
want. The problem is when it’s time for an upgrade the clients that’s moved that 
field to here… we end up shaking our heads as it wasn’t tested by us and oh dear 
it’s caused a problem...’ 
   An IMS consultant commented on challenges in completing upgrades 
where Financial Organizations have customised automated rules: 
‘[Clients]… may have worked on the rules and tried to alter the [IMS] and we go to 
do an upgrade and they realise there’s a lot of new functionality and their rules 
may not have been working the way they had thought.  For example, they may not 
have had in place a good procedure to test pre-trade rules and batch rules for 
example.’   
Furthermore, the Vendor also provides consulting services focused around 
improving efficiency and productivity. Typically, this area of consulting may focus 
on reviewing workflows and incorporating best practice, tuning databases, 
analysing hardware and the integration with other systems, as well as trading 
platforms and settlement venues.  A senior IMS consultant commented on the need 
for improving the efficiency and productivity of data related processes:  
‘I think you want to ensure that you have robust processes for creating the data, 
validating the data, updating… yeah, maintenance of the data and I suppose 
closure, termination of the data. I think making those processes more robust, is 
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important cause there’s no point making a big push to correct the current set of 
data if it will not be maintained.’ 
The IMS Vendor also provides Technical Support. However, the IMS 
Senior Relationship Manager highlighted that many of the Vendor’s larger clients 
have their own IMS support team in-house: 
‘The bigger companies, they have all got very good teams of in-house individuals 
who receive all of the issues as a first point of call.  We’ve got a help desk here but  
before I went to visit [C.1] and [C.4] I had a chat with our support guy who says 
‘well, they’ve never raised an issue here in my life, I’ve no knowledge at all of what 
is happening’ because what they do, not only have they got their own in-house team 
which look at the problems and try and resolve them, if there are problems because 
they are domiciled in US they send their issues back to their US counterparties who 
then send it to the US partial help desk.  So even though these issues will go on the 
system, if they get raised we have never been told or informed about them because 
the bigger companies understand that the time it will take to resolve a problem 
going through [Vendor support] is going to be slower than doing it themselves. And 
why? Because we’ve got 9 people, we’ve got here 90 companies, they want to trade 
right here and now and therefore they want their in-house people to get there. So 
yes, every big company has its own help desk. The smaller companies, the hedge 
funds, those without any real IT savvy are the ones who use us as their crutch and 
will happily exhaust all of the support time allocated to them and more because it is 
cheaper for them to do that than to hire.’ 
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In addition to services focused around implementations, upgrades and 
support the IMS provides consulting services focused on optimizing financial 
organization’s use of the IMS. This service focuses on reviewing workflows and 
incorporating best practice, database tuning and analysis of hardware as well as 
analysing the IMS integration with the financial organizations’ in-house systems, 
trading destinations and settlement venues. The Vendor may provide consultants to 
help financial organizations develop interfaces to integrate the IMS with both in-
house and external systems, such as clearing houses or stock exchanges. The IMS 
also provides services around setting up and optimising compliance rules. Such 
work may focus on migrating rules from previous versions of the IMS or 
competitors’ systems, analysing rules libraries and optimising rules as a result of 
changes in the financial organization’s business focus to incorporate new products 
and services and correspondingly new asset classes. For example, an Asset 
Management House previously focused on equities and now providing new 
products utilising fixed income securities would have to incorporate new regulatory 
rules for trading fixed income products into the IMS. 
4.7.10. Move to an Outsourcing Business Model 
The IMS Vendor also provides ‘Managed Services’ to its clients. These 
services allow financial organizations to outsource maintenance and administration 
of the IMS. The Vendor offers two models. The first is termed ‘Remote Application 
Management’. This model involves the financial organization keepings its hardware 
and software on-site. However, the Vendor will administer the IMS by remote 
monitoring through a secure network.  Daily monitoring reviews data imports and 
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exports, end-of-day batch processes, interfaces, logs and performance. In addition, 
the Vendor remotely applies software patches and upgrades. 
The second model is termed ‘Hosted Application Management’. This model 
of outsourcing is more comprehensive and involves the Vendor deploying and 
managing the entire IMS for the financial organization. Consequently, the Vendor 
manages hardware, software network connectivity, systems and data 
administration, disasters recovery, support and hosting.  
In the third phase of the research, the interviews revealed that the IMS 
Vendor was changing strategy regarding the services offered in order to move to an 
outsourcing business model. This change was described by the IMS senior 
management as being driven by competition. Two of the Vendor’s key competitors 
had already moved towards an outsourcing business model. An IMS consultant 
gave an example of why competitive pressures are causing the Vendor to introduce 
new services and move to an outsourced model: 
‘[IMS Competitor 5] is a different solution.  [IMS Competitor 5] is similar to [IMS 
Competitor 2], in that they will host the database for you and what you see is 
basically software as a service. It's information that is sent to you by [IMS 
Competitor 5], by [IMS Competitor 2], that you get what you’re given.  You can’t 
configure and tweak and change and have the flexibility that [Vendor] gives you.  
But that’s the problem with the [Vendor], is it’s allowed every single company to do 
whatever they want. And by giving them the chance to do whatever they want, it 
means that when they come to upgrade, because it’s non-standard, it becomes 
lengthy, costly and then clients [financial organizations] then switch to the other 
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side. [C.7] in Holland, have gone to [IMS Competitor 5]. And they’re phasing out 
[Vendor] and they’re phasing out [Vendor], because they [C.7], could not manage 
the data. They couldn’t manage the workflows and the system was being managed 
by way too many firms. And you had [the IMS] being managed by [C.7]. [The IMS] 
was also being managed by [Vendor] and [also] being managed by [IT Consultancy 
A] and all the projects failed.  And they failed, because they couldn’t deliver. They 
couldn’t provide something extra, something which works that’s kept them all 
happy, because they are… the Dutch are quite chaotic. [Laughs]. You know they go 
home at half past two on a Friday.  They work hardly any hours all the week and 
what they wanted was a solution, which took care of everything.  Literally from the 
accounting system, to the data feed, to the order management, execution 
management, through to the position keeping, to settlement. That's all done by 
[IMS Competitor 5].’ 
The IMS Senior Relationship Manager described the broader rationale for 
the change and how it was being driven by senior management: 
‘More and more clients want us to take care, to host it, and in fact, this is our 
strategy.  We want to host it and this comes down from the guy at the top, and his 
view is clients can’t manage it. They don’t know what the data is. They don’t know 
what the right way to structure and look after all things [Vendor]  therefore, we 
should do it and this is interesting, cause what we’re doing is now moving away 
from… moving away from [Vendor] being given to the client as a software and they 
run away and do what they want.  Too, we host it, we manage it, we run it, we 
maintain it, we provide the data, we provide the compliance, we provide the review 
process. We do all the things that [IMS Competitor 5], do, that [IMS Competitor 2], 
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do.  The only difference is that we are more flexible in what the system looks like. 
We’re more flexible in the way the workflows have been structured.  However, what 
some clients want, they’re saying,’ Just give us the standard workflow, tell us what 
we can use and we’ll use it. And if that’s not quite how we currently trade, we’ll 
trade the workflows. We want the simplest workflow process, because it means 
when you come to upgrade, you’ve tested it, you know it works, you roll it out, 
we’re going to be happy.’  
As a result of the changing competitive environment, the Vendor has begun 
developing two new services which, along with the managed and remote hosting 
services, allows financial organizations to outsource the management of the IMS.  
One new service focuses around data outscoring and management while the other 
focuses on delivering and monitoring compliance rules. The new data service 
provided by the Vendor aims to coordinate with external data vendors on behalf of 
financial organizations to manage data feeds, interfaces with data feeds and new 
data requirements. Figure 12 summarizes the Vendor’s Data Management Service.   
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Figure 12: Vendor Data Management Service (reproduced from Vendor materials) 
 Actions performed by the Vendor include aggregating data from multiple 
sources into a single feed, data validation and auditing and monitoring of data 
feeds. Table 15 outlines the benefits advocated by the Vendor of the new Data 
Management Service.  
Proposed Benefits of Outsourcing Data Management 
Increase data quality by receiving ‘scrubbed’ data 
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Reduce data management costs and the IMS total cost of ownership 
Reduce operational risk associated with data validation, auditing  and monitoring of data 
feeds 
Deploy new security types and benchmarks quickly 
Eliminate managing multiple data vendors 
Decommission redundant applications and spreaders 
Ensure Data Availability and Disaster Recovery 
Table 15: Proposed Benefits of Outsourcing Data Management (developed from Vendor materials)  
The second new service offered by the IMS Vendor is focused around 
delivering the automated compliance rules. The IMS Relationship Manager 
outlined the new service: 
‘We’re looking to provide a service where [Vendor] will come and, not just 
evaluate your rules and give them a testing, and make sure that you’ve not coded 
them badly, but actually write your rules, roll the rules out into production and then 
even manage the alerts and warnings that get raised each day or each night in the 
batch process. So we’re providing is, we will review the compliance rules 
exceptions, the alerts, the warnings that are happening on a daily basis and then 
provide recommendations, written reports, instructions on potential problems with 
rules, whatever it is, and try and help and guide the client. So overalls, with rules, 
you’ve got, for example, two services.  The first is, we will come in and we will give 
you a review of the rules that you’ve got and every year we believe that 20 percent 
of the rules each year go out of sync, do not look at or reflect what they should be.  
And also, write the rules and the rules themselves aren’t a proper interpretation of 
the required syntax that they need, the required conditioning that they have got to 
have for the logic to work as it should.  So it’s just, you know getting your SQL or 
your rule syntax written correctly and people… people make mistakes, simple 
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mistakes. And so [Vendor’s Consultants] come in and they will review them and 
they will give you a bucket of hours where, having reviewed them, they’ll spend 
some time working with [the Financial Organization] on correcting and amending 
some of these.  We’ve also got another new service where we will completely write 
all the rules for you. We will take away the expectations, requirements for you to 
have pockets of knowledge.  Now this is an important point, because another client 
has outsourced every single process in their company, apart from one.  And that 
one is [IMS], and they want to outsource [IMS].  They want [IMS] to be as a 
service.  They want to literally have no in-house expertise.  They don’t want to have 
to employ people on the day-to-day maintenance. Employ people on the 
management and the creation of rules.  I mean day-to-day maintenance is basically, 
you know changing the blotters or adding things to particular individual screens 
that they can, you know look at different types of data.  They want none of this.  
They want to have a [IMS Competitor 2], model.  They want us to completely take 
care, to host, to support and again, more importantly, upgrade the software for 
them.  They don’t want to do it.   
4.8. Summary 
The first section of the chapter outlines the study’s philosophical 
underpinnings and the research design and methods of data collection and analysis 
which complements the epistemological and ontological perspectives discussed. 
This chapter has also focused on contextualising the IMS and specifically, the 
competitive, operational and technical environment in which the IMS operates its 
functionality and the products and services offered by the Vendor around the IMS. 
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The Vendor operates in a highly competitive environment and distinguishes itself 
by spending a considerable portion of its income on R and D and by providing a 
hugely configurable system. However, the highly configurable nature of the system 
has caused problems for its clients when the IMS is upgraded.  
The system focuses on allowing ‘buy-side’ activities by facilitating portfolio 
and trading management and post trade processing. Trading is either facilitated 
through electronic networks or over the telephone. If the trade is conducted over the 
telephone then the trade details are manually inputted into the system. Key to 
ensuring that this process is compliant to regulatory rules is the application of 
automated rules (inscribed into the system as quantitative restrictions on financial 
holdings), on transactions. Such systems are becoming increasingly important as 
governments respond to the financial crisis by introducing new regulatory 
obligations which require quantitative rules to be applied to trading activities. 
Across the EU and US there is considerable overlap in the new regulatory 
requirements, not least as many post-crisis regulations emanate from G20 
agreements. In the wake of the financial crisis, the UK regulator has moved away 
from a principles based towards more intensive supervision of firms, while post-
crisis, EU Directives have defined prescriptive rules-based regulations. The IMS 
provides firms with an established and legitimised process for managing 
prescriptive quantitative rules and for providing a complete auditing process for 
regulators. The IMS does so partly by utilising established technological standards 
in its architecture. A key challenge in implementing such systems is the quality of 
the underlying data sourced from external sources which underpins the system. 
Furthermore, the Vendor has responded to an increasingly competitive environment 
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by imitating the services of other IMS providers and moving towards provisioning 
the IMS as an outsourced service.  
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5. FINDINGS: IMS USE POST CRISIS 
This chapter outlines the research findings. The findings were derived by 
collecting and analysing primary and secondary data. By drawing upon upcoming 
regulations and commentary on these regulations, Vendor marketing materials, 
interviews with IMS users and Vendor employees as well as the UK regulators’ 
websites, a rich picture of how the IMS is facilitating changes in practice was 
derived. The previous chapter focused on describing the context of post-crisis IMS 
use. The detailed findings are drawn upon throughout the analysis in Chapters 7, 8, 
9 and 10. Drawing on the theoretical concepts previously outlined in Chapters 3 and 
4, the analysis of data focuses on two levels, the organizational field and the intra-
organizational level. At each level, the findings also highlight factors which may 
negatively impact or limit the changes identified.  
Thematic analysis of the data collected revealed common themes which are 
here presented as new interrelated practices for organizing regulation and 
compliance, operating at both the organizational field and intra-organizational 
levels. These findings encapsulate the changes in practice and behaviours the 
general research question aims to uncover. Table 16 summarises these logics. 
Post-crisis Organizing Practices for Regulation and Compliance 
Organizational Field Intra-Organizational 
Heightened Regulatory Supervision Enhancing Governance Practices  
Empowerment of the Compliance 
Function 
Structuring Around Global Teams and 
Common Compliance Themes 
Resource Austerity  Rationalising Compliance Systems 
Tight Deadlines for Remediation Internal Compliance Committees 
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Investor Focus on Compliance Aggregating Compliance Data  
Rejection of Generic Templates Defining and Sharing Best Practice 
Competing Organizations Sharing 
Compliance Practices   
Retiring Manual Processes 
Table 16: Organizing Practices of Regulation and Compliance. Source: author 
The chapter is structured as follows: First, logics related to the 
organizational field are outlined. Secondly I review the logics found at the intra-
organizational level. Lastly, I summarize the findings at the field and intra-
organizational levels. 
5.1. Organizational Field Level Change 
The organizational field ‘connotes the existence of a community of 
organizations which partake of a common meaning system and whose participants 
interact more frequently and fatefully with one another than with actors outside the 
field’ (Scott 1994 p.207-208), and, ‘focuses on the degree to which a field of actors 
is characterised by a single predominant or by multiple, potentially competing 
institutional orders or logics.’ (Meyer 2008 p. 525). Within this context, the ‘order 
or ‘common meaning system’ relate to regulatory compliance within the ‘buy-side’ 
of capital markets. Specifically within this study, findings at the organizational field 
level relates to changes in practice occurring between the Regulator, the Vendor, its 
clients, the financial organisations, and their clients, the investors.  
5.1.1. Heightened Regulatory Supervision  
The results show that post-crisis, the regulator moved away from a 
principles-based approach to regulatory supervision towards a new approach 
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termed ‘intense supervision’. Correspondingly, the views of the participants 
changed over time regarding the degree to which the Regulator became more 
prescriptive in its dealings with the financial organizations participating in this 
study.   
 In 2010 a compliance executive in C.6 predicted that the regulator would 
not completely abandon the principles-based approach: 
‘I think what there’ll be is a balance between the two. I think they’ll move to rule 
and principles. So, I’m not saying they’ll get rid of the principles, but I think 
there’ll be a move to slightly more rules based with increased scrutiny on 
oversight.’ 
 Another compliance manager, in C.7, went further suggesting that the crisis 
would result in a further move towards principles based regulation: 
‘I think you’ll see the principles-based approach remaining even though the [UK 
Regulator] is now moving away from principles to outcomes, which I have always 
struggled with as a legislative process. The [US Regulator] I think will move away 
from very prescriptive and more towards principles and outcomes based. Away 
from this very prescriptive stuff. I think it’ll be more as a principle you need to do 
this. There’ll still be the rules there, but as a principle you’ll need to do this, this or 
this. You need to make sure that you’re doing this in the best interests of your 
underlying client and that’s the way I think regulators will be moving.’ 
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An IMS consultant, discussed how ambiguity caused by the principles- 
based regulations had caused uncertainty amongst his clients, the financial 
organizations:  
‘I think the [Regulator] needs to go not only to a principle-based approach, but has 
also to advance in more of a rule-based approach for the community so we have 
more guidance, because what I kept hearing from our clients is, ‘We’re not sure 
how to implement these rules. We’ve talked to other clients to find out how they 
have done this.’ 
However, by the second and third phases of the data collection process the 
Regulator’s reaction to the financial crisis was more crystallised. A compliance 
manager, in C.1 commented on this change: 
‘As the politicians go, ‘well we want to make sure that [financial organizations] do 
only that, that and that.’ And then the regulators are going to work out how they’re 
going to have to do all the things the politicians said.  But…, there’s a view that the 
[Regulator] was trying to go down a more principles-based approach and that 
didn’t particularly seem to work with the credit crisis happening so… let’s get back 
to our lovely old rules.’ 
Another compliance manager in, C.4, commented on how, in his view, the 
Regulator had become more focused on enforcement: 
‘I think the regulator is enforcing its will more strongly. Different banks used to 
listen to the regulator… I mean they’ve always had to adhere, but there’s 
complying to the letter of the law and complying to the spirit of the law. And I think 
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there are certain banks that used to bend the rules a little bit, perhaps a bit more 
than others. And others would stick a bit more. But I think now, across the board, 
there is much more sticking to the letter and the spirit of the law, of what the 
Regulator says. There’s much more enforcement and acceptance of enforcement. So 
it’s affected all areas and the approach for managing compliance.’ 
In 2010, the Managing Director of Supervision for the UK Regulator 
outlined the change in the Regulator’s supervisory approach. In a speech he 
explained that the new regime would be ‘…delivered through intensive 
supervision. This approach is centered on intervening in a proactive way. To do 
this we needed to operate entirely differently, changing both our philosophy of 
‘what supervision means’ and our approach to and the use of resources. We now: 
 undertake more extensive business model analysis, to understand the key 
drivers of risk and sustainability of your business; 
 make judgments, on the judgments of senior management; 
 act quickly and decisively;  
 proactively look to influence outcomes, not merely react to events; 
 apply a greater depth of analytical rigour – for example, through 
embedding severe stress tests into our assessment, of how much capital a 
firm should hold; and 
 we back up our intensive supervision with credible deterrence when 
standards are not met – as evidenced by fines of over £33m for last year. 
This intensive approach is not just a battle hungry [Regulator] looking for 
confrontation for its own sake. Our message to firms is clear – where necessary we 
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will intervene and we will not be pressurized to back off. Firms will be well advised 
to engage with us in a proactive and open-minded manner rather than believe they 
can bulldoze the regulator at the last minute. To successfully deliver better 
outcomes we will of course need to deliver intensive supervision through more 
effective engagement and understanding of firms business. – Speech at the 
Financial Intensive Supervision Conference 18
th
 May 2010 (Pain 2010).  
The new ‘intense supervision’ approach adopted by the regulator was deemed by 
the research participants to be far more prescriptive than the principles based 
approach. A senior compliance executive, in C.5, observed:  
‘The [Regulator] is coming up with more and more rules-based stuff now, in that 
they basically thought, oh principles based, we’ve used that for a couple of years it 
certainly doesn’t seem to be working… let’s have a load more rules and details.’ 
Another compliance manager, in C.1, who had previously worked as trader 
concurred: 
‘I mean there’s definitely a perception about the fact that we’re moving away from 
light touch and onto rules-based. I mean personally I was a trader during light 
touch and it was wonderful but those days are gone now.’ 
The [Regulator’s] abandonment of principles based regulation and the move 
intense supervision has made systems such as the IMS more relevant, as the IMS 
deals with absolute quantitative measures for compliance. A compliance manager 
interviewed in C. 3 observed:  
180 
 
 
‘The [Regulator]… has in the past adopted a principle based approach to 
regulation, which is no good to [IMS], cause [the system] can’t cope with it.  You 
know, [the system] deals in absolutes. 
The Regulator suggested that their new approach of ‘intense supervision’ 
would be outcome focused. However, as the Regulator noted the majority of post-
crisis EU regulations are rules based.  
‘Historically, the [Regulator] characterised its approach as evidence-based, risk-
based and principles-based. We remain, and must remain, evidence- and risk-based 
but the phrase 'principles-based' has, I think, been misunderstood. To suggest that 
we can operate on principles alone is illusory particularly because the policy-
making framework does not allow it. Europe, in particular, has a particular 
penchant for rules… What principles-based regulation does mean and should 
mean, is moving away from prescriptive rules to a higher level articulation of what 
the [Regulator] expects firms to do. In other words, it helps emphasise that what 
really matters is not that any particular box has been ticked but rather that when 
making decisions, executives know they will be judged on the consequences - the 
results of those actions. Similarly, the [Regulator], when it supervises, needs to 
supervise to a philosophy that says 'It will judge firms on the outcomes and 
consequences of their actions not on the compliance with any given individual rule'. 
Given this philosophy, a better strapline is 'outcomes-focused regulation'. - Speech 
at the Reuters Newsmakers ‘event March 12th 2009 (Sants 2009). 
Consequently, a contradiction developed between the Regulator’s 
articulations of an outcome based approach, representing a refinement of the 
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principles based approach, when in fact the majority of rules being introduced were 
done so through EU Directives and so were prescriptive and rules based. Ultimately 
the fact that the majority of Regulations being introduced were EU Directives led to 
a perception that a more prescriptive approach was being adopted.  
In the first phase of the research, the IMS Senior Relationship Manager 
observed how senior management in financial organizations were becoming more 
compliance focused:  
‘We’ve seen it come from the top down now a couple of our clients, where the 
Chairmen, they don’t want breaches, they don’t want violations.  They don’t want 
bad publicity. They’re putting an emphasis on compliance and I think that they are 
going to have to continue to do so in the future.’ 
A compliance manager, in C.1, also commented on the changes in the Regulator’s 
approach and how, as a result, his organization was being more closely monitored:  
‘I think the regulators have more power and more resource and more oversight So, 
previously they may have said they’ll be more principles based, but I think that 
what they’ll do now is they’ll give the regulator so much power and prerogative to 
do whatever they want and not have to worry about their  resources. The previous 
approach was principles based, was risk based. So, before the crisis the regulator 
said, ‘Who’s got the risky business model and we’ll go and look at them.’ Now it 
doesn’t matter, cause they’ll look at everyone, cause they have the resource and the 
capability to do it.’ 
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By the second and third phase of the data collection, it had become 
increasingly clear to some of the participants what the new regime would mean to 
their organizations. Several of the research participants observed the regulator 
taking a heightened interest in the types of systems adopted by financial 
organizations for compliance purposes. One compliance manager, C.2, summarised 
how he perceived the regulator’s perspective had changed:  
 ‘We’re in a situation where the regulator is leaning towards preferred systems 
providers. So you’re likely to get less heat if you’re using a system that they’re 
happy with’. 
The study revealed that in the post-crisis environment senior management within 
financial organizations are responding to both the Regulator’s and investors’ 
expectations. A senior trader, in C.5, noted:  
‘The adoption of a well-known compliance system clearly demonstrates to both the 
regulator and our clients that we are committed to achieving on-going compliance 
and meeting our obligations consistently’ 
In summary, the study revealed that over time the research participants 
perceived the Regulators response to the financial crisis as changing by increasing 
the level of supervision of firms and also by being more prescriptive in the 
approaches deemed acceptable. This included requiring firms to adopt specific 
systems and move away from manual approaches through adopting electronic order 
systems, such as the IMS. Furthermore, the regulator was felt to be requiring 
financial organizations to adopt ‘core systems’ to ensure organizations have a firm-
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wide perspective of compliance positions across all the trading desks it operates 
globally. 
5.1.2. Empowerment of the Compliance Function 
The findings also show that as a result of the financial crisis many of the 
respondents felt that the compliance function’s authority had been increased. A 
senior trader, in C.5, noted: 
‘It’s across the board. The crisis has empowered compliance. They’ve all got more 
teeth as a result of the crisis and I think the sales functions recognise that there was 
some excess and pushing the limits before, and they recognise the need for 
constraint.’  
Another trader, in C.4, concurred and suggested that the power of compliance 
executives had increased:  
‘I think their role [previous to the crisis] was as a check and balance.  They 
certainly did not have as much power as they have today. I mean before 
theoretically they’re able to say no; on occasion they would be overridden. 
Whereas now, when they say no, they have much more power. They can force that 
through now and control the sales and those trading functions in a much stronger 
way’. 
 A trader in, C.7 also agreed and gave an example as to how this increase in 
power has impacted the sales function: 
‘So, you find that a lot of the things [compliance] did [previous to the crisis] were 
similar. It’s just they wouldn’t have had so much power. Take an example. 
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Important customer is near his credit limits or its credit limits. I’m thinking of 
companies here. A corporate near its credit limits. Wants to have another loan or 
another trade or whatever that doesn’t really fit in with the risk appetite that the 
bank has as defined by the credit risk department and compliance. What would 
historically happen is that compliance will say, ‘No, you can’t really do that.  Can 
you change it in some way?  Can you take some more collateral?’  And the 
salesman will go back and say, ‘Hmm, no, they can’t do that, but it’s an important 
customer.  We don’t want to annoy the customer, but we really want to do it.’ And 
there’ll be a negotiation and maybe the compliance officer will give in. Maybe he’d 
stand his grounds. If he stands his grounds, it may get escalated to the next level 
and they’ll say, ‘Oh, it’s an important customer, and so forth.’ Again, compliance 
may give in or they may stand their ground and it just escalates up. And sometimes 
compliance would win. Sometimes the sales force would win and do more than 
what the firm had a risk appetite for. Whereas I think now, that’s a simple example 
where if compliance said no, that would be a no.’   
5.1.3. Resource Austerity and Tight Deadlines for Remediation 
The costs of regulating the financial industry must be tempered with the 
results achieved. Furthermore, however, refined and enhanced regulatory 
obligations are and however intense supervisory practices are, regulatory structures 
‘cannot possibly prevent all malpractice in advance, without employing a hugely 
increased army of supervisors and probably not even then. And if [the regulator] 
did deploy that army, [the regulator] might well add more cost to the industry than 
185 
 
 
the cost of customer detriment averted.’  – Speech at FSA City Banquet at the 
Mansion House, London, 11
th
 Oct 2012, (Turner 2012b). 
The study revealed that across the financial services industry the overall 
resources available to financial organizations has been reduced at a time when the 
costs associated with meeting post-crisis regulations has soared due to the scale of 
financial reform being introduced (The Economist 2012b).  New regulations are 
requiring financial organizations to hold more collateral, termed regulatory capital, 
to offset risky trading activities and ensure liquidity, which is reducing returns and 
requiring firms to reduce their balance sheets and cut back on trading. In 2012, 
UBS announced it would wind down its fixed income trading business and 
streamline other investment banking activities in part due to the new demands of 
Swiss regulators to hold increased levels of regulatory capital to offset the risks of 
operating in these areas (Keoun and Logutenkova 2012). As the scale of regulatory 
change became more demarcated the scale and scope of change being enacted 
caused organizations to add additional resources to their compliance function. An 
IT manager, in C.5, noted: 
‘Well I was going to say, there’s a bit of a contradiction there as well, because file 
volumes are decreasing, because trading volumes are decreasing, the cost of all the 
back office functions have to be cut as well.  So you see all sorts of news, less jobs, 
we will be at the lowest headcount in the business since 2003, I saw in an article 
the other day. So there are costs being slashed across the board, headcount being 
cut. So when you say there’s more money being spent on compliance, okay, it’s the 
allocations of costs. So a greater percentage of the spend is on this regulatory 
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adherence. The total amount spent is probably less than it used to be, as we’re 
spending much less on everything else.’ 
One of the study’s participants included a global compliance manager, in 
C.1, who had recently changed roles. Previously, he was a senior trader and had 
recently decided to join one of the financial organization’s global compliance team. 
He commented on how his firm was investing in the compliance function in his 
organization while other departments were facing cuts: 
‘We’ve got cuts coming, every bank’s got cuts coming.  So there’s a fair amount of 
people looking over their shoulders at the moment, especially on the [Investment 
Banking (sell-side)], which is where most of our cuts will happen. The compliance 
department is feeling rather self-satisfied at the moment because we’re pumping 
money into it but that’s mainly because of Basel III and a whole bunch more 
regulations coming down the road.  We’re very aware of the fact that we have a 
great deal of work to do on the compliance and general counsel side of the 
business. And we’ve been supported in that viewpoint from, senior management. So 
we’re getting the funding and we’re getting the personnel which one of the reasons 
I was hired was part of our huge push to improve the industry’s knowledge within 
the compliance department rather than just having a compliance professional, they 
were trying to get people in who’ve done it on the other side of the fence, as it 
were.’ 
However, a major finding of this study is that tight deadlines for 
remediation and a lack of available resources within financial organizations are 
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causing ‘non-strategic compliance architectures’ to be developed. A third party 
consultant, in C.4, commented:  
‘We are seeing non-strategic solutions built on non-strategic solutions.’ He 
elaborated: ‘The Dodd Frank dates for adhering to various things are fairly tight, 
they’re very tight. And the requirements are still being clarified and the approach 
being taken by the US regulator is one of, well we’re gonna evolve the regulations. 
You better start building against draft sets of regulations and we’re gonna keep on 
evolving and evolving them and then go live. And their point is, from where the 
draft regulations appear to when the go-live is maybe a fair amount of time. 
However, the time from when the final regulations appear to go-live will be a very 
short time. So you’re forced to just do things on an evolutionary basis, not taking 
the long-term strategic view of how you’re gonna meet this need, just to meet these 
aggressive timelines and be flexible enough to cope with the factors as these 
regulations evolve.’ 
A compliance manager in, C.7, commented on how a lack of resources was 
preventing the optimization of compliance practices:  
‘Resources are a massive issue. There’s always an opportunity cost with everything 
we do. If you’re reading and dissecting one regulation, you’re committing your 
resource to that, you can’t optimise, you can’t do both. So we either get more staff 
or we choose our projects carefully.’ 
Another compliance manager, in C.2, commented:  
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‘There’s always a fight to say, ‘Let’s get something that’s required for compliance 
in, which will have to be at the expense of something that they want out there.’ 
Cause there’s only finite resources. If it’s something you have to absolutely have, it 
will be done.  If it’s something that’s a nice to have, it’ll just make things easier or 
something like that, then there’ll be a, ‘Well do you have to have it this time, could 
you have it next time?’ 
Another compliance manager, in C.8, concurred and suggested that:  
 
‘If you had the time, the resource and the consultants and the money, you would 
increase efficiency for everything [compliance related] but we don’t have that 
luxury.’ 
 A senior compliance executive, in C.7, also commented on how resources to 
optimize projects were scarce and not a priority: 
‘The problem is that [compliance] costs a lot of money and so in this very, very 
competitive world, you do what you need to do so that you can tick the box for the 
regulator. The stuff you do, the added value stuff, almost is a second thought.  If 
there’s money at the end of the year we’ll schedule this project for us to be able to 
do that [optimise compliance practices], unless the Regulator or someone says to 
you, ‘Why aren’t you doing this?  You need to be doing this as well. In that case, 
that resource will get sucked up elsewhere’   
The respondents also highlighted how the tight deadlines for remediation set 
by the regulator were also preventing organizations from adopting strategic 
approaches. A compliance manager, in C.4, commented:  
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‘I mean a simple example is, the Dodd-Frank regulations. We’ll get draft 
regulations, then draft regulations and then they’ll say set the final version. But 
[the Regulator] expects you to have been building off the draft regulations and then 
they can give you time between the final regulations and the date it goes live. So 
you have to be someone that’s very flexible on changing, so you don’t have a 
chance to think strategically. You’ve just a short aggressive timescale. You’ve just 
gotta plough it on any way you can get it right.  You have to tidy it up later. Any of 
the US regulations are like that. Other European [regulations], where you know for 
your particular [IS] infrastructure it’s more complicated to meet a regulation, I 
think some aspects of Basel III  are proving that way and so we’ve gone with 
hacker solutions first, strategic afterwards. So a simple example there is around the 
liquidity aspects of Basel III. This bank went for a tactical solution first, because 
even though the liquidity aspects don’t go live until perhaps 2015 or some perhaps 
even 2018, but interim numbers need to be produced from nowish. Actually, they’ve 
already been producing some numbers, as we needed to provide interim numbers 
up to that date and we didn’t have the infrastructure in time, so we’ve had to build 
something that’s much more tactical not strategic.’  
Another compliance manger, in C.8, also highlighted how tight timeframes 
and the scale of regulatory change being required was preventing his organization 
from refining compliance practices. He commented:  
‘So you know, if Barclay’s has a massive fine against them, everyone’s panicking, 
asking questions, can it happen here?  So in a lot of ways, it’s very reactionary and 
the regulations don’t really help that because they’re not giving us, they’re not 
190 
 
 
giving a chance for us to actually review the business, and operate in a 
maintainable way, when they change all the rules every day. ‘  
5.1.4. Investor Focus on Compliance  
The study revealed that post-crisis the clients of financial organizations, 
investors, were becoming increasingly focused on the ability of organizations to 
meet regulatory requirements. A senior compliance manager, in C.5, in charge of 
several clients’ portfolios commented:  
‘I think that the last two to three years, has changed the climate quite significantly. 
When investors put money into funds, when you’re looking to win a mandate etc., I 
think there’s a huge, huge emphasis on compliance, you know.  What’s the track of 
the fund, have they breached, have they not breached?  Many due diligence tests 
have been done with prospects and they’ve asked us, ‘You know have you ever been 
criticized by the [Regulator]? Have you ever been investigated by the [Regulator]? 
Have you been subjected to this investigation or that investigation?’  Well, they’re 
not asking that because they don’t care, they’re asking that because at the current 
point in time in the markets I think there’s a huge emphasis on culture. You know is 
this going to be another one that blows up? Things are volatile right now and 
people wanna know that you’re in a good safe place and it all starts in compliance 
and that culture then resonates through the rest of the firm.”’ 
The research revealed that clients of the IMS now perceive demonstration of robust 
practices through the adoption of automated compliance systems, such as the IMS, 
as critical. In the post-crisis world, investors see the use of such systems as a 
legitimate means to ensure regulatory compliance. The IMS acts as a standard to 
191 
 
 
help assure investors that their financial interests will be safeguarded through 
compliant behaviours. A trader, in C.4, observed how the IMS may increase 
investors’ trust in his firm:  
‘When we talk about trust, for the investors, they must feel that all of the processes 
and procedures that are required to guarantee that their investments are being 
managed within the regulations are in fact being managed by a process that allows 
that.’  
As a result of the financial crisis and the consequential introduction of large scale 
regulatory change, the findings show that the study’s participants felt that investors 
are becoming increasingly focused on the ability of financial intermediaries to 
demonstrate robust compliance practices. A senior compliance manager, in C.2, 
commented on how the IMS assists in wining new business and also in reassuring 
existing investors:  
‘My standard pack of slides has got four slides on [IMS Vendor] and I give that to 
all clients. Now I either present them as the clients comes in regularly to do due 
diligence or in the marketing and sales process. Any client that wants to see me in 
the investment process, they get a half hour chat on [IMS Vendor].’  
A compliance manager, in C.3, also suggested that adoption of the IMS was 
integral in winning new business:  
‘Many clients want to make sure that you’ve got a proper system that would 
confirm that you don’t start going beyond the breaches, beyond the warnings.  In 
fact it can be used as a sales pitch, to say, you know, ‘We are compliant.  We trade 
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properly. Here are the systems we have to make sure your money’s managed 
properly.’ 
Another compliance manager, in C.6, also commented on how demonstrating 
robust compliance practices were necessary to reassure investors: 
‘The next stage for any client is, ‘Okay, so you can provide the returns, how do I 
know you are going do it with a minimum amount of risk and issues and pain for 
me as a client?’ 
The IMS Relationship Manager also commented on how the IMS provides 
confidence to potential investors: 
‘Our clients [financial organizations] have sold their portfolios on saying ‘we use 
[Vendor] which does the compliance checks’, ‘we use [Vendor] because it helps 
best execution’. It is something which allows confidence to a [investor] that the firm 
are not just doing compliance on the back of an envelope. The tool is for a 
particular purpose which is to guarantee that obligations are met. For example, 
when I was at one client and a manger walked in and said to the trader ‘sell two 
million IBM, it’s gotta happen now, it’s gotta happen, sell two million’. The trader 
says ‘well, this is a buy sheet, oh [expletive]’ he goes, and walks away. Had the 
manger literally just left it on the desk and walked away the trader would have 
bought two million IBM for a particular account that they just didn’t want.  The 
cost of that would have been massive because clearly then they would have to sell it 
and the price may have moved.’ 
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The participants also felt that Investors were becoming increasingly 
knowledgeable about compliance issues and required more regular updates 
regarding breaches. An IMS consultant commented on how pre-trade compliance 
testing, had been introduced in his organization as a result of changes in investors’ 
expectations: 
‘[Investors] want, I think because of the regulatory issues that have occurred, they 
want information sooner in the lifecycle than in the past. That’s why we’ve 
implemented the compliance tests early on in the trade lifecycle. Now I think there 
is much more interest [from investors] in knowing up front if the financial 
organization is going to potentially violate, the client wants it, the Fund Manager 
wants it. Ultimately the system prevents breaches. You know the breaching here 
and the breaching there and costing our clients a lot of money.’ 
5.1.5. Rejection of Generic Templates 
The study revealed that the Vendor provides pre-written templates of 
automated rules for implementing specific areas of regulation. The Vendor provides 
example standard rule libraries covering key regulatory rules in various 
jurisdictions including UK, USA, Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, Singapore, 
South Africa, Japan and Hong Kong. The key value of such templates was 
described by an IMS Consultant: 
‘They’ve got a very good sales value, because you can say, ‘Well the IMS ships 
with these rules, you don’t need to worry about them.’ 
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In total the IMS has over one thousand seven hundred pre-written regulatory 
rule templates across thirty-five regulatory bodies in twenty countries. An IMS 
Consultant explained:  
‘If there is a new regulatory condition that can be coded into a generic rule 
template, the measuring of types of stock for example, then we will create a 
template for that rule and then the clients can tweak the template to fit into their 
environment.’ 
The Vendor provides predefined schema, for organizing the Templates 
based on the regulations themselves and the regulatory jurisdiction in in which they 
apply, see Appendix 7. The IMS manual states: 
‘[IMS] Compliance uses templates and category codes to support, and conform to, 
all US and international regulatory rules that govern the securities industry.’ 
In the post-crisis environment the study revealed that the Vendor sought to 
partner with its clients to help define generic rule templates. An IMS Consultant 
noted:  
‘We might work with some very strong clients to build the templates and then the 
clients will use them and they may modify them’. 
An IMS consultant also commented on how templates are developed with clients: 
‘If it’s an important new requirement of our client base, some things may not be 
important to our client base, but if they are then the Product Manager and Advisory 
Committee will try to take a stab at understanding that regulation and try to write a 
template set of rules based on their understanding. The Product Manager would 
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want to look and try to find some clients that would be interested in this an advance 
group which will work together on defining the rules. We can provide some 
guidance as to the regulations, but we always feel that the client has to give their 
own due diligence.’  
The need for clients to perform their own due diligence is an important 
point as the Regulator does not allow financial organizations to outsource their 
compliance responsibilities. Ultimately the responsibility for compliance remains 
within the financial organization. According to the FCA Handbook:  
‘If a firm outsources critical or important operational functions or any relevant 
services and activities, it remains fully responsible for discharging all of its 
obligations under the regulatory system and must comply, in particular, with the 
following conditions: 
(1)  The outsourcing must not result in the delegation by senior personnel of their 
responsibility; 
(2)  The relationship and obligations of the firm towards its clients under the 
regulatory system must not be altered; 
(3)  The conditions with which the firm must comply in order to be authorised, and 
to remain so, must not be undermined; 
(4)  None of the other conditions subject to which the firm's authorisation was 
granted must be removed or modified.’ (FCA 2013h) 
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The IMS senior relationship manager commented on why the Vendor 
perceived the need for such generic templates and the difficulties in developing 
them in conjunction with its clients: 
‘We develop templates for Dodd-Frank, those types of regulatory rules. The 
requirement [for templates come from the need for us to], give advice and direction 
to the clients, because what is quite staggering is the lack of information, the lack 
of knowledge that the compliance officers truly have about what’s happening or 
what’s coming up. And they always rely on [IMS Vendor] to guide them, to direct 
them to almost do their job for them. So the expectation from our customers is that 
we will be the source of knowledge. The driver, the director, in defining what the 
rule is. Its interpretation, and how they can best apply it to their own environment, 
which sounds absolutely wacky, but there are few clients, hardly any client, who 
will say, ‘Oh, I would like to become more involved with [IMS Vendor] writing the 
rules, developing the Dodd-Frank rule templates, cause, you know I see this as 
important and I don’t quite see how the derivatives work or I don’t understand, x, y 
and z.’  The problem is though, you’ve got to really push and cajole [financial 
organizations] to say, ‘Yes, okay, I’ll try and be a partner with you.’   
The IMS Relationship Manager also suggested that the templates may still 
need to be modified by systems adopters, but if changes are made they may be 
moderate. He commented: 
‘These [rules] are out the box and what clients will do is look at the rules and then 
say, ‘No we don’t quite do it that way because for example out asset classifications 
are slightly different.’ But the concept is there’. 
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As an example of how the generic templates were being used the IMS Senior 
Relationship Manager commented on how the post-crisis UCITS rules were being 
incorporated into the IMS:  
‘And [the] compliance [module] also now has UCITS article inbuilt which are these 
regulatory compliance rules which allow you to very quickly and easily look at 
buying SWAPS or particular variations and make sure you that comply and you can 
say that you are UCITS III or UCITS IV compliant and for that you have to have all 
these regulatory rules wrapped into your compliance checks to be able to trade 
UCIT funds’.  
However, a senior compliance manager, in C.2, noted that although the UCITS 
regulations were highly relevant to his organization they did not utilize the 
Vendor’s templates:  
‘We run a lot of UCITS funds. We have actually got seven libraries coded in [IMS] 
for UCITS. UCITS is supposed to harmonise regulation across Europe across the 
fund industry but we didn’t use the templates’. 
This view was typical. In contrast to the views of the IMS Relationship 
Manager, the research revealed that the respondents did not value these templates 
specifically due to nuances in their own environment which rendered the templates 
irrelevant. One IT Manager, in C.7, highlighted data as the key issue: 
‘I would say that software providers, which supply a template, you find that in fact 
the structure of the data differs from one house to another. So therefore I haven’t 
seen a supplied template being actually applied.’ 
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Another IT manager, in C.5, concurred: 
‘[The IMS] does certain aspects of MiFID relating to trade execution, but it tends 
to be around the compliance guidelines, so it would look at UCITS III or COLL 
rules, the collective investment rules and so [IMS Vendor] will say they’ve got a 
templates for all of these rules. But for these templates you can’t get access to the 
underlying data, each firm would use a different data provider and so we don’t use 
any of the template rules relating to that. Because our data doesn’t make the use of 
those rules possible, so that’s what it comes down to.’ 
While a senior compliance executive, in C.2, suggested that a key issue 
preventing the adoption of templates was nuances in the organization’s taxonomy, 
the way the firm defined assets and products: 
‘There are vendor-supplied templates especially for things like regulatory rules.  
Even for non-regulatory rules, the [IMS Vendor] supplies templates, but we don’t 
use them. Because, although their templates are based upon generic security types 
and investment classes which are broader asset classes than ours. So. we define our 
own. So that means that we effectively can’t and wouldn’t want to use their vendor-
supplied templates.’  
An IT Manger in, C1, highlighted how he found the templates over 
simplified:  
‘The [Templates] that I have looked at, well let’s say… we in the past have built 
very complex rules codes and the templates that I have seen in the past have been 
very simple code.’ 
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An IT Manager, in C.6, whose organization were thinking about replacing 
the IMS with a competing system, commented that the flexible rule language 
allowed them to easily build and evolve their own rules and so was more valuable 
to them than templates: 
‘So we could build our own rules within [IMS]. But rather than have [IMS Vendor] 
create another template to cover another scenario, we could build our own custom 
scenarios using quite a flexible rule language. We prefer that mostly because of the 
speeds with which we can put something in. One of the vendors who presented last 
week… we were saying, well what if we want to change the scenario and instead of 
having this many minutes between trades, we’ll have this many minutes. And they 
were talking about a two month turnaround time. [IMS Vendor], were saying sure, 
just change that from whatever number you want to the next number and you’re 
done.  So the ability to adapt our rules ourselves on the fly as soon as we want is a 
very powerful’ 
5.1.6. Competing Organizations Sharing Compliance Practices   
The study revealed that, post-crisis, competing financial organizations are 
meeting on a regular basis to share approaches for managing regulatory change. A 
compliance manager described how views on collaborating have changed since the 
crisis:  
‘We as an industry, as an area of the industry, now our number one focus is 
ensuring that we are meeting the requirements that are laid on us by the regulators. 
I guess it’s evolved and it’s now understood that one of the best and most effective 
ways of doing that is to find out what everyone else in the market is doing.’ 
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The IMS Senior Relationship Manager commented on how his clients, 
financial organizations, shared compliance practices:  
‘The regulations can be very specific or they can be very vague. And we find the 
[financial organizations] will adopt [shared practices] if they feel it’s a best practice 
themselves. We find that clients will actually work together on regulatory rules. 
Where regulations are vague, if they find a common solution among themselves 
they feel that they’re at least making an effort to find the best solution collectively.’ 
Another compliance manager, in C.3, noted how executives collaborated to 
interpret upcoming regulations:  
‘Everyone will have slightly different interpretations on what [the regulations] 
actually means a lot of it is discussion groups and forums When we have worked 
with a company called [management consultancy], and they had a working group 
for the UCITS regulation, which involved, all your Project Managers and the 
people who are involved in UCITS projects, meeting up and saying to your peers, to 
all of these different fund management companies and saying, ‘How are you doing 
this?  Are you using [Vendor] ‘Yeah, we’re looking... we’ve focused on that and 
we’re going to do this.’ ‘Oh, that’s not a bad idea.  We don’t really trade that 
instrument, but we trade these instead, which are very similar, so we’re going to do 
this for this instrument and this for...’ And twenty clients sitting round a table 
talking about how they’re all going to approach it’ 
The willingness to share compliance practices suggests that the ability to meet 
regulatory requirements is not a source of competitive advantage. A senior trader in 
C.5, commented on this suggestion:  
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‘Bearing in mind that area you’re looking at, compliance is not an area normally of 
competitive advantage. It can be an area of competitive disadvantage if you mess it 
up…but for most of it, running a good compliance shop, I believe, is a benefit for 
the industry as a whole.’ 
A compliance manager, in C.2, also commented on how interaction between 
competing firms to discuss regulatory issues did not impact on the firm’s 
competitive advantage: 
‘You don’t hand over a copy of your entire final page compliance manual, cause 
you’re not silly, but what you do do is happily discuss how people are approaching 
certain legislative changes or implementing certain rules.’   
A senior compliance manager, C.7, shared his opinion that financial 
organisations compete on their ability to provide sound returns on investments only. 
He provided an anecdote of an interaction he had with the Regulator:  
In a recent [Regulator] meeting, when I said to the [Regulator], rather naively I 
said to the [Regulator]... they’d just spent three hours with me and the COO, the 
head of operations, talking about something very technical and I said to them, at 
the end of it... Written loads of notes, loads of papers being referred to, piles of 
paper everywhere and I said, ‘So, have you now got an understanding of how we do 
things?’ And they said, ‘Yeah, but we’ve still got some follow up questions, we’ll 
want to come back to you.’ And I said, ‘Okay.’ And just as the meeting was winding 
down I said, rather jovially, ‘How did we do?’ And the girl looked at me like I was 
a lunatic, because the [Regulator] would never ever tell you how you did. You’re 
either in compliance or you’re not.  And it’s no good for a business or an industry 
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to be not in compliance, because all that does, especially with financial services, as 
we found with the recent crash, is that if one business goes down then everyone sort 
of follows it’s a domino effect. So if the industry as a whole is not in compliance, 
the industry as a whole is screwed. So if everyone’s in compliance, everyone is 
therefore in a better position and then you’re competitive side is on the investment 
process, not the compliance side.’  
Another compliance manger, in C.3, commented that as demonstrating 
robust compliance practices to investors was becoming increasingly important his 
firm were only willing to share compliance knowledge at the application level:   
‘I think the level at which I am working is probably a good sharing environment. I 
think higher up you might find a slightly different viewpoint. What you’re talking 
about is not best practice or best methodology but more the [IS] application to 
deliver it.  So in the increasing regulatory environment that we’re facing and with 
the odd blow up that happens from the [IS] application point you have an 
advantage if you can say, I have a tight compliance department. That’s more 
recent. In previous years, I think it’s been a situation of being able to say to new 
clients, well don’t worry too much about the compliance side cause we’ll get it 
through anyway. I think nowadays, not too many clients in recent years buy that 
approach. So we have less risk appetite for that sort of problem than we’ve had in 
the past. Our reputational risk, especially in this current environment, is a huge 
thing we think about it.’  
Interviews revealed that users of the IMS, in competing financial 
organizations, had set up regular group meetings to discuss ways in which the IMS 
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was being utilized to tackle new regulations. A compliance executive, in C.2, and 
regular attendee commented on IMS related forums:  
‘You know we have one [forum] for [Vendor] compliance where we meet every few 
months with other firms in the City who use [Vendor]. We talk about different sorts 
of issues and implementations, including testing and configuration.’  
 A compliance manager, C.2, also commented on forums created by the 
Vendor to discuss specific regulations: 
‘There’s a lot of quarterly groups and quarterly you sit round the table, discuss 
things, you know and occasionally, and I’ve experienced this first hand, this, the 
[Vendor], will call a round table and they’d say for example to the compliance guys 
and all these firms to come along to a meeting where we’ll discuss for example, 
how they’re finding, interpreting, understanding this legislation and what we can 
do… this is proactive, this is before it’s come in, what we can do to facilitate that. 
You know and that happens now and it’s something that’s increasing more and 
more.’  
However, the study revealed that several compliance executives felt that the 
usefulness of these fora was limited by the Vendor’s presence as the Vendor has 
used these forums to promote the system. Consequently, the Vendor was 
deliberately excluded from some of these fora. A compliance manager in C.3, 
commented:  
‘And in fact, what happened with that is that [the Vendor], started attending these 
meetings and then they started taking them over and they became less useful 
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because they ended up becoming a [Vendor] forum for sales and marketing.  And it 
wasn’t meant for them. It was meant for us.’ 
Another compliance manager, in C.4, also commented on the Vendor’s contribution 
to these fora:  
‘Yeah. They got hijacked, they did get hijacked so they stopped. We’ve started them 
again just with the managers, the asset managers only’ 
Another attendee of these meetings highlighted how the development of 
common beliefs across his peers provided comfort. He commented  
‘In relation to something like say [IMS] we have for example regulatory discussion 
groups. You’ve probably heard this from members of other firms. We have 
regulatory discussion groups.  We sit round, we say, ‘Look guys, how you do this?’  
And we share the information and I guess seek comfort knowing that, okay 
[financial organization 4] are struggling with this but so are [financial organization 
6] and [financial organization 7], so we all adopted this approach and I guess we 
take comfort in knowing that, if we’re doing it wrong we’re all doing it wrong 
together and to the best of our ability.’ 
 The study revealed that compliance managers in competing firms were also 
meeting outside the formal setting of forums but also informally. A compliance 
manager, in C.3, described this interaction:  
‘You have fora, but you know I’ve found in my experience it’s not ever, you know 
an official conference or forum… We all know who’s doing what and where and 
you know if I want a conversation with someone who I know what he’s doing and 
205 
 
 
I’ve got a decent relationship with him, we’ll have a few beers a couple of times. 
I’ll call him up on his Blackberry and I’d say to him, ‘Can we meet up and have a 
drink and I’d love to talk about this?’  And he’ll take as much benefit and 
advantage from it as I would. You know if nothing else… cause when I say to him, 
‘What do you guys do?’ He’s going to tell me and then he’s going to say back to 
me, ‘What’ do you guys do?’ And I’m going to tell him something that he doesn’t 
know and he might tell me something that I didn’t know.  Either way he’s going to 
go back to his office the next day and he’s going to have a better understanding. 
He’s going to be better placed to put a value on how strong his control is. That’s 
how I find it often happens, informally.’ 
5.2. Intra-Organizational Level Change 
The study also revealed changes in compliance activities at the intra-
organizational level occurring as a result of the post-crisis environment. At this 
level, findings relate to changes in practices and working arrangements occurring 
within the financial organizations studied. The interviews focused on investigating 
the role of the IMS in underpinning existing and new compliance practices 
necessitated by post-crisis regulatory changes. 
The study revealed several changes occurring at the intra-organizational 
level and several factors which limit the effectiveness of these changes. Each of the 
themes is now presented with a choice selection of quotations to illustrate the 
analysis.  
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5.2.1. Enhancing Governance Practices 
The IMS provides functionality to allow users to define workflows and to 
monitor and trigger actions when predefined events occur.  In this way, the IMS 
acts as systems of governance. A senior compliance manager, in C5, described how 
he perceived the IMS as instrumental in monitoring and thereby governing 
behaviour: 
‘The [IMS] is essential in influencing people’s behaviour, because they now know 
they’re audited. As all their processes and transactions are being stamped in the 
system, then clearly their approach or their attitude shifts towards, ‘I’m now being 
scrutinized. I therefore, will have to work properly now, if I didn’t work 
appropriately before.’ 
While another compliance manager, in C.3, observed:  
‘I know that people have been sacked, because now looking at the audit trail 
they’ve been seen to be in serious breaches too often or perhaps trading 
irresponsibly.’  
A compliance manager in, C.8, observed that in his opinion, IMS adoption signals 
to employees that compliance related activities are important and being monitored: 
‘The IMS sends a message to our employees that we are serious about compliance 
and that breeches are being recorded and followed up.’ 
The IMS user manual outlines how the system structures workflows to 
ensure that appropriate monitoring and governance of trading and compliance 
practices. It states that   
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‘Workflow rules are built around queries about events, which are state changes 
within the system. An event might be the addition of data to a table, such as the 
creation of a new order, or a change in an existing record, such as a change in the 
order status. A workflow rule can also be linked to a system process, such as an 
import or export, or to a timer. 
Workflow queries now run on the middle tier server in real-time instead of on the 
client, improving performance and reducing possible contention for database 
resources. 
Notifications that can be triggered by a workflow rule include desktop alerts, email, 
log messages, workflow monitor alerts, web administration alerts, and others. 
Multiple destinations are supported. Workflow rules can also be used to update or 
route orders automatically. 
Additional escalation rules may be associated with a workflow rule. For example, if 
you set up a rule that emails a compliance officer when a compliance alert occurs, 
you can set up an escalation rule that sends a text message to the compliance 
officer's phone if that alert remains unacknowledged for more than 30 minutes.’ 
The crisis has caused the Vendor to review and update workflow 
functionality. A compliance executive, in C.1, described how the system facilitates 
a hierarchy of authority: 
‘For example, you can configure [the IMS] so that only a set or group of 
individuals can see a rule. You can have it so that only one individual or two 
individuals can override an alert and a specific rule. There is a hierarchy in terms 
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of the privileges. Now we have the ability to say, ‘No, these alerts can only be 
closed by this group. These alerts by this group or these set of rules by this group,’ 
or maybe, write the rule level itself so you have the ability to say, ‘Only this 
individual or this group of individuals can close these alerts,’ and that’s the 
ultimate hierarchy’. 
In addition to the Vendor updating workflow functionality, the study 
revealed that the financial organizations were also changing their approach. A user 
of the IMS, a compliance executive, in C.1, gave an example of how his firm were 
strengthening their workflow monitoring process in response to enhanced 
supervision from the regulator:  
‘When the portfolio manager has input his trade, normally he’ll press a button 
right? Which shoots it off to the trader, okay. What will happen now, is that when 
he presses the button, it’ll send the trade off to a system which will produce an alert 
which will do a check and if something appears to be wrong, it’ll send back an alert 
which the portfolio manager will have to look at and say, well that’s not a problem, 
or etc., etc., and then he’ll override it and send it on.’   
One senior IT Manager in C.2, described the process of changing workflows and 
running associated User Acceptance Tests (UAT) to strengthening handing of 
compliance breaches:   
‘So, the improved workflow tested and refined in UAT. So, users log into a test 
environment and… but they would replicate what they do every day in their normal 
job, and just make sure that the compliance checks are working.  And they can pick 
up the order from the fund manager okay. If an order requires a second 
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authorisation, then the order flows through to the second authoriser’s tray blotter. 
Then that second authoriser can pick up the trade from his blotter, authorise it and 
then it flows through to the dealers.’  
The IMS can be used ‘straight-out-of-the-box’ with workflows predefined 
by the Vendor or configured by their clients to fit their own perspectives of how the 
trading workflows should be structured.  An IMS consultant commented:   
‘The way the system comes out the shrink wrap as used by, for example, a managed 
service client and they have very simple work flows, they literally get the product 
out and they will have to turn on columns they want to see in particular screens and 
they can trade with it out the box.’  
The pre-existing workflows are designed in-house by the Vendor based on 
their own perspectives of best practice. The IMS Senior Relationship Manager 
commented on how the Vendor’s view on best practice is incorporated into the 
IMS: 
Respondent: 
 The system works in a particular way.  If the client decides that its own workflow is 
far superior then it will tailor and customize what we’ve got. 
Interviewer: 
But with your existing workflows they must come from some view of best practice, 
the stuff that comes out of the box? 
Respondent: 
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That’s right, yeah. These are the best practice which is driven fundamentally from 
US product managers coming over, talking and then going back out again and 
writing it, so… 
The study showed that the IMS Senior Relationship Manager perceived 
financial organizations’ attitude to using the Vendor’s pre-written workflows 
changing as a result of reduced resources. In the first phase of the research, he 
espoused the view that often his clients wanted to use their own bespoke 
workflows. He commented: 
‘The problem is with every company that they don’t want us to tell them how to 
trade, how to do the workflows. They want to map their particular workflow 
process into the workflow that the product has and you have things like a trigger 
where the system doesn’t do something. You want to make sure it does do 
something, therefore you put some bit of clever code in the database which, if 
something happens, it blocks, it rolls it back, it does whatever.’ 
However, the study revealed that configuration of bespoke work flows is a complex 
and costly process which has led to companies adopting the Vendor’s pre-
configured workflows. An IMS consultant described an implementation he worked 
on: 
‘There are, some companies that have spent, three years rolling out the software. 
And why?  Because they wanted their existing workflow to be mapped into [IMS] 
and it cost them huge amounts of money and they ended up with their workflow in a 
system and value for money clearly wasn’t thought                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
about. Other big companies are now saying, ‘We’ve done that, it’s no good, we now 
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want to roll out, or want you to tell us what is the best way of doing this particular 
trade, this Derivative process and we will adopt that particular process. And so, 
what there was to begin with, which was map my process into your system, is now 
map your system into my process.’ 
Later interviews revealed that the Senior Relationship Manager had changed his 
view. He now perceived his clients as being more open to adopting the Vendor’s 
workflows and then tailoring them as required. The IMS Senior Relationship 
Manager suggested: 
‘Cost has become much more critical now. In an attempt to save costs, clients are 
now saying just tell me how to do it and we shall make sure that our workflow is 
mapped to that workflow. Not even whether your workflow is better than ours or 
ours is better than yours, we don’t care, we want to use a product with a workflow 
and map it through.’ 
The study revealed an important weakness in the in the automation of the 
compliance workflows. The Regulator requires that workflows are appropriately 
segregated. The Handbooks states that firms: 
 ‘…should segregate the duties of individuals and departments in such a way as to 
reduce opportunities for financial crime or contravention of requirements and 
standards under the regulatory system‘ (FSA 2010).  
However, an IMS consultant noted that:  
‘In terms of monitoring, I think [the business process] changes [as new regulatory 
requirements become apparent]… clients have to change the workflow of the 
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compliance person [within the compliance system] for it to be able to support the 
business people. I’ve seen a situation where the clients have wanted to give the 
Fund Managers the ability to override violations. Normally we wouldn’t do that...’ 
In this example, the effectiveness of the workflows to meet regulatory requirements 
may have been eroded at the point of design if the Fund manager had been given 
the ability to override compliance warnings for his own orders.  
5.2.2. Global Teams and Common Compliance Themes 
The study revealed that financial organizations are beginning to centralise 
their compliance efforts globally. A senior compliance manager, in C8, observed: 
‘Well, the way we’re working is because of the G20, because after the G20 came 
out, it was such game-changer really. All these different papers that were coming 
out from different regulators and the underlying message was that different regions 
were doing X, Y, Z in terms of meeting the G20 efforts. And we’re a global 
organisation with impact in over I think 89 countries, something like that? So we 
now operate on a regulatory theme basis. We realized that the Old World approach 
where may be you could manage compliance regionally would not work or be cost 
effective. When [regulations] come out from [numerous different national 
regulators] you have to consider that actually they’re trying to meet the G20 rules, 
so there’s something coming out from [UK Regulator], there’s something coming 
out from [US Regulators], there’s something coming out from the [Hong Kong 
Regulator], all trying to address the same topic. And as a business, we have to 
upgrade on a global basis and think, how we’re going to build a successful global 
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business here, in the new regulatory environment, how do we do that?  And the way 
that we do it is we have to do it by organizing globally around regulatory themes.’ 
Another Compliance Executive, in C.1, concurred that organizing in themes was 
possible due to the overlap across post-crisis regulations being introduced. He 
suggested: 
Respondent: 
Yes, I would say is there are common themes. I use a few good examples that I think 
any bank would recognise. So the first one is clearing. That's common across Dodd 
Frank and EMIR, for example. The next one is trade reporting, post-trade 
reporting. Again, that’s common across Dodd Frank, EMIR and MiFID II. Another 
one is pre-trade transparency, advertising what your price is on exchanges, that’s 
common across Dodd Frank and MiFID II. Collateral, that's another one.  That’s 
common across Basel III, Dodd Frank. It’s probably in a couple of others as well. 
Tax is one that’s taking off, so it wasn’t originally a theme, but now there are 
others. So you have the American’s who started with [Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act] which is basically taxing Americans on their overseas income and 
making sure that is tracked. The famous example is Swiss banking laws, where 
many countries are trying to understand what their citizens have in assets in 
Switzerland or Lichtenstein. But there are many people who have assets abroad, 
and so in the current climate of clawing as much tax as you can within the law, 
there’s more regulations come out than… While the US started this drive there are 
many other countries that are now implementing their own versions. So there is a 
tax theme as another theme. So, there’s also a capital theme. There’s a liquidity 
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and funding theme, capital, obviously Basel III is the biggest.  Liquidity and 
funding, Basel III is the biggest.  I probably just did seven or eight there, so those 
are common across most organisations. 
Interviewer: 
And I suppose, if I’ve understood correctly then, the point of looking at these 
themes is to understand how that they could be applied across geographies? 
Respondent: 
Well, I think, yes, to what you said. I would say, making sure each theme has a 
sufficiently senior sponsor. Someone who is accountable for ensuring their theme 
delivers. Not whether the regulation delivers, that the theme delivers, which is an 
extract, from multiple regulations. So there is an owner of the capital theme. There 
is an owner of the liquidity theme. There is an owner of the collateral theme. There 
is an owner of the clearing theme. So that will be a senior person who knows that 
they’re accountable for delivering within that.  Now those people tend to be… well 
they are, in almost all cases, senior business people and not change people. And so 
they need, in some cases, a partner, which is a programme manager, a senior 
change person, who can liaise with that level of senior stakeholder, but coordinate 
across the contents of that theme.’   
A senior compliance manager, in C.1, who had previously worked as trader, 
described how his firm was also taking a thematic approach and organizing around 
common requirements globally: 
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‘So we have a centralised group that they’ve built here recently, in the last year, in 
the compliance department which looks at things from a holistic point of view 
rather than being at the coal face and doing the job. So, there’s a separate group 
that does the day-to-day surveillance and traders’ activity but I’m looking at things 
from the strategic perspective. And I have colleagues in the USA and Asia and 
Zurich who are looking at it in their own regions and we talk together about a 
global perspective as to how we are handling our trade surveillance and how we 
can do it better….. there is pretty much universal agreement we could do it better. 
The way we’ve decided to organise our trade surveillance is that we have a 
regional person and I am EMEA and we have one person who has the global 
responsibility. And then each of the three remaining regions are differently focused; 
my focus because of my background is asset management.  My colleague in 
America is covering IB [Investment Banking], my colleague in APAC is covering 
Private Banking. So I get a global perspective from the Asset Management 
viewpoint and then a regional perspective from the overall trade surveillance. If 
there is anything going on from the asset management perspective in the trade 
surveillance arena around the world my colleagues will keep me in the loop, will 
put my name into the frame to talk so that we get a consolidated asset management 
viewpoint.  
 And the whole concept of taking a selection of the compliance department and 
moving them away from being, what we call the advisory compliance people, the 
ones who deal with front office and do the day-to-day grind work, and moving 
something out into what we call the central compliance group, which is where I am, 
was to relieve the pressure on us and allow us to take a more big-picture view. And 
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my interaction so far with colleagues in other houses, and in the City, has been that 
they’ve taken great interest in that approach because of the pressure just to meet 
day-to-day requirements, not allowing them to look at the bigger picture’. 
The compliance manager elaborated on how global approach was being 
implemented using overlapping data fields:  
 ‘So, we’ll use the same approach, ideally we’ll move to the tightest, the most 
stringent regulation and apply it globally. So for example, if there’s a reporting 
obligation needs 80 [data] fields from Europe to meet a specific regulatory area 
and a reporting obligation from USA and another reporting obligation from Hong 
Kong to let’s say, 70 fields, where there’s only an overlap of 60 fields, we’ll 
produce all fields required and then try and filter out what’s redundant or 
irrelevant. So we’re trying to do the right thing by saying, we need to uncover all of 
this information but this person only wants this information, this person only wants 
that information.’ 
The IMS facilitates the introduction of global compliance teams. A 
compliance executive, in C.2, described how configuring the IMS workflows 
allowed a central office, in this case London, to authorise breaches and authorises 
others to handle the breach if that office is unavailable. He described this process: 
‘If you’ve got a compliance breach out there in Brazil, then who can take 
ownership for that? Where is the central nervous system for compliance offices? 
We have them in each location. The rules are set up, the overriding control is 
happening here in London. But you’ve got people in Brazil who have got the 
authority to say, ‘Ah, go to London, oh dear, clearly they are asleep, I won’t wake 
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them up, I will allow this breach to go through or I will do what I have to do to 
manage it’, because the local area doesn’t have the knowledge or the authority to 
so act.’  
 The study revealed an interesting critique of this approach. A senior 
compliance manager, in C.3, agreed that the G20 agreements provided the 
opportunity for common regulatory themes. However, she suggested that by the 
time the regulations are implemented by different regional regulators they may 
differ significantly. She suggested that this would allow global firms to exploit 
these differences and take advantage of ‘regulatory arbitrage’. She observed:  
‘I think if you start right at the top the biggest challenge for regulated firms right 
now is about managing the degree of regulatory change which is global. I 
recognise what you said about the G20 and clearly you’re right but I think we’re 
way, way away from a better scenario where we’ve got joined up regulatory change 
across the globe. Because even where we’ve got regulation change that is inspired 
by a global viewpoint, we’ve still got massive amounts of national autonomy 
indifference. And as stuff gets implemented down you see it change. And sometimes 
it can change, even if it looks the same on paper because the supervisory 
authorities in different countries just implement it differently and they ask for 
different things and they hold firms to different standards. So I think the challenge 
of managing regulatory change is huge at the moment. I don’t think anybody would 
say this but firms certainly would think about regulatory arbitrage’. 
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5.2.3. Defining and Sharing Best Practice 
The study revealed that financial organizations were using the IMS to create 
their own generic rule templates termed ‘Master Tests’. Such tests are often created 
by a centralised compliance team. The tests form the basis by which branches of the 
financial organization operating in different countries and under different 
regulatory jurisdictions can implement similar approaches for meeting analogous 
regulations. This is achieved by sharing the Master Test which can then be 
developed and refined to meet the specific requirements of that region. Thus each 
Master test may have many ‘child tests’ for each region where the Master Test is 
used. In summary, Master tests are used to share best practice across the financial 
organization and allow a standardised approach to be adopted across global 
operations.  
A compliance manager, in C.1, described how the Master’s Tests were 
being used in his organization:  
‘I’m in the global [IMS] compliance team. Our job is to essentially own the rule 
coding, ensure best practice for coding, and essentially ensure that rules globally 
are coded correctly. We don’t actually necessarily do the coding for the US for 
example. Um, they do the coding based on our Master Tests. We work very closely 
with US for example, to set up their Master Tests and then they will, use those 
Master Tests for their local needs.’ 
A senior compliance manager, in C.5 described a similar setup in his 
organization: 
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‘So, an old part of our responsibility, apart from coding regulations is also the 
master test setup. Master test is like this template. [The Master Test]… is a 
compliance rule.  It’s a pre-coded automated compliance rule.  An example would 
be maximum 10% in a single issuer. We would code a Master Test for that 
maximum 10% in a single issuer and somebody in Tokyo, if they wanted to code a 
similar rule, saying that’s 5% on a single issuer, they would find that Master Test, 
change the units from 10 to 5, maybe make any other minor tweaks and ensure the 
broad structure of the rule would be appropriate for our accounting data, and 
would effectively be meeting best practice internally. Someone in Hong Kong could 
copy that and attach their account to it and that that kind of removes the necessity 
for them to understand the coding, things like that. That process works quite well, 
but it has its drawbacks as well. There’s no perfect model for having [IMS] in seven 
offices.’ 
The Master Tests also reduced the need for regional compliance professions 
to develop technical knowledge relating to how compliance rules are coded in the 
IMS.  A compliance manager in, C.7, commented: 
‘And coding, by the pure nature of it, is, I use the word techie loosely, but it’s a bit 
like coding or writing a mathematical rule. It’s along those lines and you get the 
bracket in the wrong place or if you have ands and ors and you have brackets and 
you have equals, the coding’s around this kind of convention.  You get a bracket out 
of place or an ‘and’ instead of an ‘or’ and most people find it highly esoteric, then 
your rule won’t work properly and you could end up with, errors, mistakes. So 
that’s again the reason for having these Master Tests so that it takes away the onus 
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of responsibility for people in each of the offices to be a coding expert, when their 
focus and background may not be IT technical.’ 
Another compliance manger, in C.1, described how Master Test allows the 
standardization of compliance practices: 
‘Interviewer: 
So is there much mimicking across the compliance offices?  
Respondent: 
Yeah, absolutely, the master test allows template descriptions which helps to 
standardize things, with the master tests we are able to standardize coding 
conventions, things like that.’ 
Another compliance manager, in C.8, described how his organization used 
Masters Tests to apply common standards globally:  
‘So we might set up new master tests with the latest, best practices. Quite often 
there could be a problem which affects several offices. So people have their own 
way of dealing with it and part of what we try and do, as we are the global 
compliance team. So we try and harmonise processes. What we’ll usually try and 
do is kind of pre-empt changes and so will set up a new master test and say use 
this.’ 
This process of formulating best practice is not only top down from the head 
office but also bottom up from regional offices. A compliance manager in, C.2, 
explained: 
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‘We do talk to one another…... I kind of expect, on a daily basis, a call from New 
York, Hong Kong or Singapore or you know one of the other offices. So, there is a 
lot of sort of knowledge sharing, adopting best practices. Something that you might 
pick up in Tokyo that we might adopt as a house policy in London.  We might say, 
okay, no short selling -  we’ll adopt that in London as a best practice’.   
The use of similar underlying data was highlighted as key factor in utilising 
the Master Tests. This result corresponds with a previous finding which highlighted 
how generic templates provided by the Vendor were found to be problematic due to 
nuances in underlying data across firms. A compliance manger, in C.7, commented: 
‘We‘ve got a set up which is supported by functionality called Master Tests. The 
Master Tests are, internal template, and we use the Master Tests to promote 
consistency and best practice globally. We’ve got several offices, several offices 
using [IMS] globally. And we’re all on the same accounting system; we all use the 
same data, so that means there’s an opportunity to actually apply a consistent 
approach. The way we do that is through these Master Tests which are generic in 
nature but the idea is that each office has broadly the same suite of Master Tests. 
They can find the appropriate Master Test, make any minor adjustments to it for 
their local needs.’ 
A compliance manager, in C.2, in the global team commented on the 
importance of being able to adapt the Master Tests to meet regional compliance 
requirements. He suggested that securities which might be considered low risk 
government bonds in one jurisdiction may not be perceived the same way in a 
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different location. He described this issue and why having local knowledge was 
important when applying the Master Tests: 
‘This is where the local expertise is so important. I mean there are these regional 
and country differences as you say and but that’s why, it’s so important for us to 
work with our local colleagues in each office in understanding, their expertise and 
what would be considered necessary. Here’s a case in point. With the Hong Kong 
government agencies, that they’ve got things like housing and development board 
for example. The consumer board’s the same. They’ve got, lots of government-type 
agencies and in Singapore, you can invest away in all these Singapore government 
agencies. They’re considered government securities.  It’s a bit like our NHS issuing 
bonds, but you might have an investor in Canada who wouldn’t want 100% of their 
portfolio in these Singapore, government agencies. And they would not consider 
them to be government bonds. So you’ve, that’s why you have to be very careful. 
[The Master Tests] are tailored to each jurisdiction and we work very closely with 
the local compliance teams in understanding what their rules are. We spend a lot of 
time on conference calls with each of our country offices, understanding the local 
flavour of the regulations, the nuances, you know, the market conventions. Hong 
Kong clients will be quite happy having lots of Hong Kong government agency, 
quasi-government type bonds. Their rules and Master Tests would be based around 
that, based on the advice that we receive from our Hong Kong compliance team. 
But we also have a New York office who use [IMS] and their rules would be 
completely different. You know, that they would be quite happy having, their rules 
based on the US government offices, the Fannie Maes, Freddie Macs, G-MAs, you 
know, that they’re considered locally to be government bonds, whereas they 
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probably wouldn’t be elsewhere.  So, we work closely with regional offices and 
tailor the rules.’ 
The compliance manager also highlighted the need to balance regional 
requirements with standardized Master Tests: 
‘Well… this is an example where the top-down approach doesn’t work. Different 
countries have different views on what constituted an eligible government. So Hong 
Kong governments and all of the government agencies of the Hong Kong 
governments are eligible governments and what that means in Hong Kong is that 
you could have in theory 35 even 100% in Hong Kong government stocks. Whereas 
a US regulation would not permit that.  There are different rules. Even UCITS (EU 
Regulation), might not permit 100% in Hong Kong government, whereas Hong 
Kong would. Which is why you have to take each jurisdiction, in isolation and 
actually work from there. But the top-down approach suggested is saying, okay, 
Hong Kong’s an eligible government, but anyone anywhere in the world [whose 
portfolio is] going to have 100% in the Hong Kong government would get in all 
sorts of hot water. But our Hong Kong compliance team would understand that 
local interpretation, what would be understood to be ‘government’ and what 
wouldn’t. So, you take the Master Test and you apply it to your local areas and say, 
okay, well, here are the exceptions to the Master Test or this is why it doesn’t work. 
So there’s a balance you need local knowledge but also quite centralised 
knowledge as well.’ 
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5.2.4. Internal Compliance Committees 
The previous findings have shown how as a response to shifts in the post-
crisis regulatory landscape financial organizations have begun centralizing and 
standardizing compliance efforts across their global operations. The findings show 
that often compliance projects were being steered by upper-middle management 
directed by a centralized global team, see above. However, the study also revealed 
that one financial organization was creating an internal high-level forum whereby 
departmental heads could share ‘stories’ and senior leadership could be updated on 
current progress and outstanding issues relating to implementing new regulatory 
requirements. This initiative was being driven by an external consulting firm. A 
third party consultant described the forums as a ‘watch tower’. He commented:  
‘[The Watch Tower] is trying to add a control function that operates across the 
various departments, to give visibility of all the different issues in the different 
departments to advertise the regulatory dependences. It’s sponsored and run by the 
COO [Chief Operating Officer], with heads of departments attending and forces 
that multi-departmental view of regulatory change, and when one of those head of 
departments presents their story or presents their issues, you immediately have 
across the bank visibility.’ 
A senior compliance manager, in C.4, described how the new committee for 
overseeing regulatory projects across the organisations was implemented by the 
financial organization’s COO (Chief Operations Officer):  
 ‘I think it must have dawned on the COO that he was accountable for all this 
regulatory work, and not just the adherence, but the mitigation as well.  And he just 
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didn’t have the visibility of it and so, I don’t think as a COO you panic, but he sort 
of said, ‘Well, I need to change this.’  He knew that each of the projects had… or at 
least he hoped that each of the projects had their own current governance structure 
and had the appropriate controls. So what he didn’t want to do was create a strong 
command and control structure, which overrode that. What he wanted was a light 
touch one that was focused on visibility, identification of overlaps, and 
identification of gaps, making sure that there was the cross-departmental 
engagement in the various steering committees, to make sure that visibility was 
there and I think by him chairing at least the overarching committee that made 
people attend. If you’re called to a steering committee, focused on regulation, 
you’re a bit of a periphery stakeholder; you probably don’t attend very often. 
However, if the COO is saying, ‘Here…’ and they’re presenting on this, ‘… and I 
want you to be there.’ It gets more people there. So I think it was his way, it was his 
idea, his way of doing it and I think overall, it’s worked reasonably well.’ 
A senior compliance executive, in C.4, commented on this high level committee 
and the analysis and data collection which was required to underpin the reporting 
element of the forum as well as how they committee in focused head of department 
on their compliance related projects:  
‘It’s an hour and a half long usually, led by the COO. Facilitated by an 
[Management Consultancy] person, with heads of various departments or other 
senior people from those departments who attend. So that meeting is high level.  
The next part is, the administration that enables that visibility to occur.  So that’s a 
support part, so that is more pure PMO (Project Management Office), if you like, of 
tracking red RAGs (Red, Amber, Green Status), key issues and so forth.  The third 
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part is the ‘value add’ part, which is recommending to a COO that perhaps he 
should look into this or perhaps he should look into that. Or, we’ve done a 
comparison of this versus this and we think we’ve found some gaps. He may want to 
validate that those gaps are real and if so, initiate various projects and deploy 
funding and so forth. So I think that that value add piece, it’s adding a brain to all 
the information that’s flowing through, to analyse it and identify, an actually make 
those realisations that corrective action can be executed. And so, you have within 
those programmes, they have many projects that are delivering and so one aspect is 
to collate via the structure, the report onto those regulatory themes, or that’s the 
current structure. I think I mentioned to you previously it was by a work stream 
level and we’ve had a few different models over the time.  But to collate, okay, what 
is the summary status across that? What is the RAG status there?  Of the milestones 
in 2012, we’re 11th/12th the way through the year, are we 11th/12th of the way to the 
milestone, it’s a simple measure?  Oh we’re actually only sixty percent the way 
through the milestones. Bit of a warning there!  And so I think it’s looking at the 
data in appropriate ways, pulling out what are their key issues, articulating that in 
a way that’s appropriate for the COO. Cause I think another example is, I don’t 
think most project or programme managers, when they write their reports that go 
into the system, I’ve seen this over many years… I think a lot of people see it as, 
just gotta do it, no one really reads these and they’re certainly not generally in a 
format that you could present a C level person. And they just… so they require 
some translation, if you like.  And then some follow-up to say, ‘Okay, I notice 
you’ve got this in your reports. Can I check, does that mean A, B, or C? When you 
say you’re doing this about it, you’re not clear on the impact, does it impact this or 
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this?’ So there’s that discussion with the authors to clarify such that a C level 
summary can be generated. Or a summary can be generated. Such that, the COO 
can ask in his meeting, ‘I notice you’ve got this, this and this. What does that 
mean?’ and then the appropriate heads of department, can answer that question 
and explain it.  And if that head of department knows he’s going to be pulled up on 
it, then he’s much more likely to be on the ball about it. So it makes the heads of 
much more involved in the change work in their departments when they go to that 
meeting.’ 
A compliance executive, in C.4, partly responsible for collating the information 
presented to the senior committee commented on the required reports and how 
systems such as the IMS were essential for providing supporting information:  
‘There’s one [report] for tracking milestones. There’s another one for tracking 
budgets and headcounts. There’s a third one, which is associated with the PMO 
milestones one, which they put in their weekly report that highlight their top 
[project] risks and issues and so forth. So there are systems used across the 
investment bank including [IMS] which we need to draw information from. And we 
work with the leads to get the information they need. The general culprits are the 
closer you get to the front office, the less they follow the process I suppose. No, 
that’s just the front office culture.  They’re far more interested in results than the 
reporting of the results. And especially in the investment bank, where the market 
can change frequently, daily.  What someone thought they were doing this week or 
today may be very different. So it’s just the very much the culture of the front office.  
It’s very much more results oriented rather than process oriented.’ 
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The third party management consultant driving the committee explained how these 
high-level meetings may provide value beyond project reporting and may facilitate 
the optimization of compliance practices. He commented:  
‘It’s much more than reporting. Yes it does reporting, yes, and yes it does hierarchy 
of issues, yeah.  So that’s the admin side, but that’s only half of the story.  The other 
half of the story is the value add.  By looking across, if you like the analysis work 
across, you can then get overlap, challenges that are going to occur. You can 
identify actually the clashing, let’s pull these guys together. Let’s get a discussion 
going in that forum, or there’s a new regulation coming along.  This is going to 
impact you, you and you. Let’s discuss that one at that forum.  So, I think that as 
well as the more administration, reporting, tracking if you like, there is the value-
add of looking across the patch.’ 
However, the study revealed that several participants were critical of the 
‘watch tower’ committees. The consultant, whose firm implemented the committee, 
commented on why the value of these committees was questioned by some 
attendees.  He remarked:  
‘I think there has actually been substantial openness to it, because I think there is 
that general recognition of, the old ways can’t continue, and I think every time 
there is something presented at that governance forum that provides insight to one 
or two stakeholders who may see the value of it. I think where… I mean sometimes 
you’ll get a run of a few weeks where there’ll be nothing of value for a particular 
stakeholder and it’ll vary which stakeholder that is.  So, I think, unless they had 
something great out of it the week before some of them are slightly disillusioned.’ 
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A compliance manager, in C.4, also questioned the ‘openness’ of the ‘watch tower’ 
committees, suggesting that the presence of other peers and the COO prevented 
departmental heads from being open: 
‘Interviewer: 
Sure, and have you found that people are fairly open to admitting breaches and 
compliance shortcomings in their departments? 
Respondent: 
Well I think no one wishes to advertise that, but because there’s been an approach 
that it’s not so much a policing function and that is the culture that we’ve employed 
throughout this. I was going to say, nobody’s been told off, but it’s generally a 
forum listening and asking, a suggesting forum, as opposed to a shout at them for 
doing it wrong forum. And so I think the reinforcements of seeing that each week 
has made that more open, but I can think of two examples immediately where I 
know I do not believe their project plan. I believe that they’re hiding something. I 
see that there’s politics going on as to why they’re hiding things. Well, the 
department heads think, oh, that’s not going very well, that will reflect badly on my 
department, that will affect badly on my performance rating. People will realise 
that I kicked that off and I was the one responsible for that. So if that’s going 
wrong, that’ll look bad on me. So, people don’t like to advertise failures where 
things are going wrong if they can think they can rescue it. Some people would 
rather pretend it’s going okay. Or maybe it’s got a few issues and then basically 
behind the scenes trying to repair things.’ 
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The study also showed that the process of collecting data from the departments to 
provide the reports which feed into the committees was also resisted.  
A compliance executive, in C.4, commented on the resistance he found: 
‘For me to do this analysis across multiple departments, initially people were 
resistant to me poking my nose into their areas to try and come up with that 
information.  They were automatically… their starter opinion was defensive.  As in, 
they’re happy to present something, but they don’t want someone else poking their 
nose round in their areas. So I think initially defensive, individuals had a range of 
different opinions from open to closed.  The closed ones, I could always just use a 
bit of extra seniority [from the COO] just to force the door open.  I still think there 
were degrees of helpfulness. A standard tactic was to delay.’ 
The interviews revealed that this financial organization was not the only one 
developing compliance related committees. A compliance manager, in C.8, 
commented on how his organization were also utilising a committee structure but 
that the scope of it was limited to implementing new regulations and so lacked the 
‘value add’ component of the high-level committee  previously discussed. He 
commented:  
‘A little bit of my time was looking at new regulations; a lot of my time was looking 
at funds. I’m now looking at new regulations all the time… just looking at new 
regulations and then the business is planning to hire somebody to look at it form a 
business point of view. We’ve got a new committee looking at new regulations to 
give some structure to the sort of control over what we’re doing on it.  And so 
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there’s a lot more work being done than there was before, because there was so 
much coming out.  So yes, there’s a resource being put into all that.’  
He also highlighted how this committee was attended by predominantly compliance 
professionals with advice from other business units. Consequently, this committee 
was not as high-level as the ‘watch tower’ committee. He remarked: 
‘The committee consists of our own compliance staff from across the business and 
we invite people from other areas as necessary… systems, risk, finance, front 
office.’ 
5.2.5. Aggregating Compliance Data  
The study revealed that in the post-crisis environment the Regulator was 
perceived by the studies participants to be increasingly focused on the systems and 
practices used to deliver compliance. A senior systems expert, in C.2, noted:  
‘Understanding what’s between the functionality being on tap and what’s really 
required [is key]. That’s one of the big topics at the moment – is the compliance 
gaps.’ 
Correspondingly, the Regulator was seen to be focusing on the data quality 
which underpinned compliance activities. An IMS consultant commented: 
‘What we find when we, go to implementation is one of the first things is looking at 
the data requirements for each of the rules. You know and making sure that the 
organisation has that data, you’ll find that in almost every implementation, you’ll 
find that there may be roughly twenty or thirty thousand data exceptions. Then you 
can’t run something, you start to realise that the business just doesn’t have the data 
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that they need to run those rules, so you have to incorporate the new data into the 
processes’.   
A IT manger in, C.5, commented on the quality of compliance data in his 
organization: 
‘There’s all these different reasons combined to give you poor quality data in the 
compliance and operations functions and I think one of the lessons that’s been 
learnt over the past few years is, it that can’t go on’. 
A IT manager, in C.3, discussed reasons why sourcing underpinning data for 
compliance was problematic. Among other issues, he highlighted siloed data 
sources; lack of accuracy and differing points in time when data was cut as 
potential issues. He commented:  
‘The data causes so many problems. It’s always astonishing to people outside the 
industry, how can data always be such a problem? But at every level data is a 
problem.  Let’s give you a few examples of reasons.  Okay.  Number one, from the 
front office perspective, they may only care about fields A, B, C and D being 
required.  But from a risk or compliance perspective, maybe you also care about 
fields E, F and G. So, initially, when the front office implements their systems, if 
they’re thinking on a Silo departmental basis, they don’t include that stuff or they 
don’t put the same rigour around ensuring its accuracy. Maybe they don’t check it 
against something or maybe they just do a more junior check of its liberty before it 
goes into the system. So there are all sorts of ways that data can be less than 
perfect. I mean another point you can have is maybe risk and compliance take their 
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data cuts based on different time points, or they take their data based on slightly 
different data extraction queries, different SQL statements.’  
However, the Regulator’s handbook requires that organizations must ensure that 
data is relevant, reliable and timely,  
‘A firm's arrangements should be such as to furnish its governing body with the 
information it needs to play its part in identifying, measuring, managing and 
controlling risks of regulatory concern. Three factors will be the relevance, 
reliability and timeliness of that information. 
Risks of regulatory concern are those risks which relate to the fair treatment of the 
firm's customers, to the protection of consumers, to effective competition and to the 
integrity of the UK financial system. Risks which are relevant to the integrity of the 
UK financial system include risks which relate to its soundness, stability and 
resilience and to the use of the system in connection with financial crime.  
It is the responsibility of the firm to decide what information is required, when, and 
for whom, so that it can organise and control its activities and can comply with its 
regulatory obligations. The detail and extent of information required will depend 
on the nature, scale and complexity of the business.’ (FCA 2013f). 
The Regulator’s Handbook also implements the post-crisis AIFM regulations by 
requiring that Alternative Investment Fund Managers follow the requirements 
outlined below:  
AIFM shall provide the following information when reporting to competent authorities: 
  (a) the main instruments in which it is trading, including a break-down of financial instruments and 
other assets, including the AIF's investment strategies and their geographical and sectoral 
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investment focus; 
  (b) the markets of which it is a member or where it actively trades; 
  (c) the diversification of the AIF's portfolio, including, but not limited to, its principal exposures and 
most important concentrations. 
  The information shall be provided as soon as possible  
(FCA 2013e) 
The requirement to report information regarding, ‘principal exposures and most 
important concentrations’ necessitate Alternative Investment Funds to calculate and 
aggregate their positions. In order to provide an aggregated view of their positions 
financial organizations must be able to effectively source relevant data.  
In relation to these requirements a key issue identified by the studies 
participants was the need to move towards ‘golden sources’ of data and have a 
consolidated view of holdings and associated compliance limits across the 
organizations different spheres of operation. A compliance manager, in C.2, 
commented on how this approach was being driven by post-crisis compliance: 
‘Now in the old days, pre-2008, when compliance didn’t really matter, when 
compliance wasn’t an issue, people didn’t focus effort on data. Now that 
compliance is a prime driver of many things you do and is a prime constraint and 
stops you doing certain trades or stops you doing them in certain structured ways, 
or forces you to go back to the client and ask for more collateral… as an example.  
Or ask for a different time point or break clauses that can affect your competitive 
position in the marketplace, because the client may not wish to do that. So, the big 
push around compliance has meant there’s a big push around data quality.  Hence, 
the push on golden sources and many other things.’ 
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A compliance manager, in C.6, commented on the need for single source or 
‘golden sources’ of data: 
‘Golden sources? Simplistically, okay, what you currently have in many banks is 
that… let’s take an example of instrument data, all the different financial 
instruments. Or counterparty data. You may have different departments storing 
data from different original sources. Some may be keeping their own duplicate copy 
of some of the data, but they might be taking it at different time points or different 
points of accuracy. And then when downstream you come to compare compliance 
and finance data, it doesn’t sometimes line up.  So you want all your data to line up 
and one of the ways of doing that is making sure that all the departments in the 
bank use the same source with a single version of the truth, the single version of the 
truth ‘golden sources’ are interchangeable phrases for different groupings of data.  
So you want that for your external ratings data from the ratings agencies. You want 
the instrument data. You want that for counterparty data. You want that for your 
pricing or market data. You want, basically any grouping of reference data. You 
want, unless it’s only used in one specific area, you would want a consistent and 
coherent single source that everyone pulls from, that you know that is reliable.  And 
that will make your data line up so much more when you’re trying to meet cross-
departmental regulatory requirements.’ 
Another compliance manager, in C.8, gave further detail on the need to effectively 
aggregate data to meet regulatory requirements: 
‘An example might be when you’ve got a structured trade made up of four or five 
different trades. One department or one function may only care about the 
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aggregate position of those, whereas another one may well care about the 
individual components.  So, if you were to ask in a department, what do you think is 
the set of trades you have that meet these criteria?  Based upon different needs 
around internal trades, different time points at which you may endure extraction.  
Maybe your extraction query was based on different reference data or slightly 
different reference data in certain examples, each scenario can give you different 
datasets as to what you believe to be the real one.  Especially so when you’re not 
using golden sources and department A took their data from department B, as 
opposed to going to an original source. And department B maybe only update their 
data every couple of days and maybe on that particular day the update fails, so 
actually are three days out of date.’ 
The study found that organizing compliance around global regulatory 
themes, see 5.2.2, has also focused financial organizations on creating single data 
sources. A compliance manager in C.2, commented: 
‘The idea is to have a golden source globally for all sorts of data and not to have 
multiple sources globally. For tactical reasons or practical reasons, sometimes that 
is the case.  I’m trying to think of a few examples… Okay, here’s an example. Dodd 
Frank is a very American regulation. There are some regulations that come out of 
Japan that only the Japanese regulator cares about.  There are some that come out 
of Hong Kong, some come out of Singapore, some that come out of India.  In most 
cases, it’s not worth creating a global standard, if that regulator is only interested 
in local data. So, where you have a one off or maybe two off thing, then you do tend 
to get that sort of thing, but for the big regulations, which tend to impact multiple 
countries, and if you’re honest, have a good deal of common sense about them. 
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They are good practice in a lot of the cases.  And so it makes sense to go with a 
global approach.’ 
The move towards to ‘golden sources’ of data was also identified as 
providing potential to improve the infrastructure for delivering compliance. A IT 
manager, in C.3, commented: 
‘Okay, moving to golden data sources, there are all sorts of ways in which you can 
make this whole infrastructure more strategic, more streamlined, more efficient and 
able to upgrade to the lower cost.’ 
 The findings also show that as a result of the focus on golden data sources 
financial organizations were reviewing their data management processes. A 
compliance manager noted:  
‘I think you want to ensure that you have robust processes for creating the data, 
validating the data, updating… yeah, maintenance of the data and I suppose 
closure, termination of the data. I mean, I think making those processes more 
robust, cause there’s no point making a big push to correct the current data set if 
your on-going data management process is not robust’ 
The findings also revealed that not being able to source compliance data 
may have a competitive impact on the financial organization. If the underlying data 
needed to perform compliance checks on new financial products was not available 
then this may affect the organization’s ability to trade such products. An IT 
manager, in C.1, highlighted this issue:  
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‘When you’re setting up a new security and you’re testing it, the data may or may 
not be fully available at that point in time. And then you need that data and you 
want that data, that’s when it forces changes in how you source data. The Fund 
Managers want to turn something out very quickly and try to trade in it but he 
doesn’t have all the data required for issuers checking, for classifications, checking 
at that point in time, then you may not be able to promote that trade. And that 
probably is one of the reasons why a lot of firms have adopted direct interfaces and 
real-time updates from data providers to try to pull as much information 
automatically as they can.’ 
The IMS Vendor has responded to the need to enhance quality data by 
offering an additional service to its clients. The Vendor describes this as a 
‘…fully-managed data offering for [Vendor] Investment Management Solution 
clients. Users receive more complete and scrubbed reference data aggregated from 
multiple data providers, including benchmark/index, security reference, 
pricing/evaluation, issuer, and operational data’ – Vendor Marketing Materials.  
Competitors of the IMS Vendor are also responding to data challenges. IMS 
vendors are being absorbed into firms which provide market data. For example, 
[IMS Competitor 4] has been absorbed into MarkIT, a provider of market data to 
the financial services industry. In announcing, the purchase of [IMS Competitor 7] 
the Head of Enterprise Software at MarkIT highlighted how their data management 
offerings would complement the [Competitor 4] IMS: 
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‘We think that a combination of good, cleansed, scrubbed, quality data coming out 
of MarkIT [Enterprise Data Management System] and feeding into [IMS 
Competitor 4] is what the market really wants.’ (quoted in Rundle 2014). 
5.2.6. Rationalising Compliance Systems 
The study revealed that the ability to provide an aggregated view of a firm’s 
holdings was also dependant on the use of core systems. From the Regulator’s 
perspective, the use of disparate systems may affect an organization’s ability to 
aggregate its compliance positions across all the trading desks it operates globally. 
The IMS Vendor’s Senior Relationship Manager observed:  
‘You’ve got big companies who have multiple [IMS] systems and therefore, do not 
have a clear view of their entire book of records.’  
Furthermore a compliance manager in C.8, noted: 
‘The [Regulator] aren’t keen on having lots of different applications. They’d rather 
see a core, system and they’re not keen on lots of spread sheets either. So it is an 
issue.’ 
Core systems are also important where there exists a requirement to aggregate 
trades and consider all holdings in order to calculate risk limits. For example, the 
UCITS regulations require financial organizations to adopt a ‘risk limit system’ to 
ensure that trades do not breach the organizations risk management policies. The 
regulation requires that every transaction is taken into account thereby requiring a 
core system and consolidated data sources. The Risk management principles for 
UCITS (Consultation Paper) states:  
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‘The limit system should refer to the risk profile of the specific [Fund] and should 
set appropriate limits for all potentially relevant risk factors. That is, it should 
cover all risks to which a limit can be applied and should take into account their 
interactions with one another. The Company should ensure that every transaction is 
taken into account in the calculation of the corresponding limits.’(CESR 2009 
p.20) 
A senior compliance manager, in C.8, commented on why his organization 
was focusing on rationalising compliance related systems: 
‘We need to invest in making our infrastructure more streamlined. Getting rid of 
duplications. Where we purchased other companies before and just sort of ended 
up with two systems in place, we need to get it to one system, but we need to get rid 
of a lot of the quirks and business process. We need to iron out a lot of the niggles. 
We need to be able to run those business processes, especially the support 
businesses processes, with fewer people and so less cost. So that second chunk of 
investment spending is about moving towards a strategic architecture, instead of 
taking let’s say, six months or one year view.  Saying, ‘Okay, we need to improve 
this.  It’s going to be a three, four, five year journey to improve this area. We could 
be improving rationalising trading systems, rationalising [IMS]. We could be 
streamlining anywhere where we’ve got duplications with the different parts of the 
process. Another example is pricing systems. We may be pricing in twenty different 
places. Rather than just have one big pricing engine. You know you could be doing 
confirmations in multiple places and do that once. Have one common clearing 
structure. Why do you have one clearing for prime brokerage, one for OTC 
derivatives?’ 
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The study found that several of the financial institutions participating in the 
study used different systems with similar functionality to the IMS, provided by the 
IMS Vendor’s competitors. The IMS Relationship Manager outlined an example of 
one of the study participants which utilised five different IMS and was struggling. 
He commented:  
‘[Financial Organization C.8], they’re in the paper, so it’s not secret.  They have 
sacked about three hundred of their eight hundred people. Again it’s in the paper; 
they’ve bought [Hedge Fund X], which was like a hedge fund. However, they now 
have lost money on that. They’re looking to even disband the name and just, you 
know collapse it all together and we’re talking about trust.  We’re talking about 
how we [the Vendor] can give them a single system. At the moment they have got 
five order management systems within the two companies. I think two versions of 
the IMS and three from competitors. So you’ve got five systems, all of which 
manage different trades, different compliance, everything else, blah, blah, blah. So 
it’s a complete mess. However, I looked today, I had some work done for me to see 
just how many compliance rules each company had and what sort of data quality 
sits behind it and it was interesting that a company [Financial Organization C.8], 
has nearly 10,000 compliance rules. Of those 10,000 every single day, they have 
14,500 data exception, every single day, and they don’t do anything apart from 
close them, because they haven’t got the internal process and procedure to manage 
quality.  To manage the data that’s been brought in and to… if you’ve got a data 
exception, it’s a number that’s missing and all of a sudden, any concentration test 
or any exclusion test becomes meaningless if you’ve not got the right numbers 
coming in.  If this became public knowledge, the credibility of [Financial 
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Organization C.8], would go absolutely further out the window.  It’s really critical, 
but the problem with [Financial Organization C.8], is they’re looking at how they 
made all those cuts with employees, have made all those cuts with losing their 
Band-Aids, their assets under management. And they’re not small, where you know 
over two hundred billion, but by God, one day they’re a lot bigger than that. And 
they’re now thinking, how quickly, how cheaply can they bring in something to give 
one single order management system across the entire groups that they have within 
the company. And they’re looking at this driven financially, rather than by thinking, 
how can we best manage?  How can we best utilise, what we know, what we’ve 
got? And it’s effectively, for them to do it properly, it’s a fresh greenfield site, start 
again and look to see how you can rewrite rules, rewrite data feeds, rewrite all the 
workflow processes. And yet, they are absolutely against doing that, because they 
think, if you then suggest a Greenfield site, it means the cost of so doing, so 
replacing it, is many times greater. And the problem is, when you’ve got two 
systems, it’s comparable to Japanese and a Chinese person trying to talk to each 
other. There’s some overlap, but not enough and to put them together creates 
nothing but confusion and bigger problems. So that’s just like anecdotal. You talk 
about trust, talking about what we’re trying to do to make investors feel good and a 
company like [Financial organization C.3], for example, they have won numerous 
mandates on the back of they’ve got [Vendor] doing compliance. And as such, there 
is trust that the mandates will be looked at properly. That the data required for that 
is going to be there. But reality says, with a company like [Financial Organization 
C.8], people almost assume and think you’ve got the processes, because how can 
you not be good at what you’re doing, because you’re so big and you then look to 
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try and shave costs in the order management system. But we’re looking at 
potentially a million dollar implementation to get a new system in there. And that 
just replaces a couple of systems that they’ve got. It doesn’t integrate everything 
else. In terms of replacing the five systems with one and giving them a single data 
feed, giving consolidated compliance rules, consolidate the workflows. We’re 
looking a multiyear project, for multimillions of dollars to replace and to organise. 
And the big fault is, they want it by the end of this year, it’s all to be in place. And 
we’re saying, by October of this year, so October 2013. And it’s just almost a 
ridiculous position where you want to have the trust of the investor and yet really, 
you haven’t got the infrastructure and the quality of personnel to provide and 
maintain that process.’ 
5.2.7. Retiring Manual Processes 
As a consequence of the regulator’s change in approach, there has been a 
push to adopt systems such as the IMS and thereby retire older processes and 
systems. Organizations are being encouraged to move away from manual processes 
often facilitated by spread sheets. Unsurprisingly, the compliance executives 
interviewed stated a preference for automated controls over manual ones. They 
preferred to automate as many of their controls as possible through the IMS, as in 
addition to reducing input errors, automation also facilitates real-time monitoring. 
Table 10 shows the percentage of rules within the participating financial 
organizations which were not automated by the IMS. 
Prior to the crisis, the regulator was seen as tolerating the use of spread 
sheets provided that their use did not cause unwanted outcomes as was the case in 
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2006, when the Regulator fined Credit Suisse £5.6 million for ‘systems and controls 
failings’:  
‘The booking structure relied upon by the UK operations of Credit Suisse for the 
CDO trading business was complex and overly reliant on large spread sheets with 
multiple entries. This resulted in a lack of transparency and inhibited the effective 
supervision, risk management and control.’ (FSA 2008a). 
Using spreadsheets involves considerable risk to financial organizations, a senior 
Compliance executive, in C.3, commented: 
 ‘I saw a million pound breach at my old firm… it cost a million pounds, because a 
spread sheet was being used to monitor for compliance and it had a wrong formula 
in a cell.’ 
However, the study revealed that post-crisis the regulator was further coercing 
organizations away from the use of spread sheets and encouraging them to more 
fully adopt automated compliance systems such as the IMS. A senior compliance 
manager in C.3, commented: 
‘Compliance is becoming more and more important, simply because the 
competitive nature of the industry and the desperate need to meet all of the new 
regulatory requirements means that companies are being told they have got to have 
something in place. For example, we have some extremely successful fixed income 
fund managers and they have been told by the [Regulator] they have got to stop 
what they’re doing, which is currently Excel based, simply because the risk of what 
they’re doing. The possibility of checks not being done properly and borders being 
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mismatched and double counted etc. is so great. The fines that we’re going to get if 
they make any financial faux pas and trading errors is going to be so huge that the 
credibility of us, as fund managers, is going to be dashed, but also the financial 
cost will be massive’.  
The Senior Relationship Manager suggested that the complexity involved  
in handling large volumes of trades in organizations with large numbers of assets 
under management was driving the Regulator to insist on using an automated 
process: 
‘It’s because of the increased complexity in what’s happening. The volume of 
trades being as they are, the Regulator is stipulating that in order to reduce risk as 
far as possible, then the only way [financial organizations] will be allowed to trade 
is with an automated process. So [the IMS] are being used for reasons of 
credibility [with the Regulator], if nothing else, the whole process has an audit 
trail.’ 
Manual practices and in particular the use of spread sheets for monitoring 
and recording concentrations and limits are becoming increasingly discouraged and 
firms are being strongly encouraged to replace their manual systems. Prior to the 
development of IMS type systems financial organizations checked compliance by 
adopting a sample based approach conducted manually. A compliance manager, in 
C.5, described this process and the need for the overnight batch testing of 
compliance positions: 
‘If you’re looking at running a concentration test on every single account, that is so 
much more than you did before with a handful of random accounts and therefore 
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the process that you had before in picking out which random accounts, then go in, a 
process of pen and paper, do the number crunching… is just history. The way it 
was done before, it was one bloke would check the odd rule to make sure that it was 
within breach but there was absolutely no way you could check each and every 
compliance condition against transactions, unless you’ve got teams of hundreds of 
people because the volumes are massive to calculate the numbers, look at the 
concentrations or… the easy [calculations] are to say you cannot buy tobacco. The 
hard ones are to work out the concentrations or to look at and incorporate any 
user-defined dynamic denominator in looking at what a number should be. I mean 
you just can’t do that unless you’ve got a lot of gap between end of day, close of 
business at four thirty and half past seven kick-off the next day.’ 
The study found that before the 2008 crisis, the Regulator was less focused 
on manual processes provided that the financial organization could demonstrate that 
they were compliant and that their approach gave them the controls required. A 
compliance manager, in C.3, provided an example of how, prior to the crisis, an 
organization may have been able to provide pre-trade compliance analysis through 
a manual email system but that post-crisis the Regulator would require an 
automated approach such as the one provided by the IMS. He commented:  
‘Well, we manage just under fifty billion; in fact it might be forty four, I can’t 
remember. I think that makes it a fairly big chunk of money. The [Regulator] will 
come to us and say... And if we said, we don’t have a pre-trade compliance engine 
in place, the [Regulator] would say, ‘This is standard best practice. Everyone else 
who manages the same amount of money, got the same amount of infrastructure, 
owned by a large bank, have got this in place. Why do you not believe it...?’  And 
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you’d have to work bloody, hard to justify that you didn’t need to have that in 
place. The [Regulator] wouldn’t necessarily go into the granular detail of why 
you’re still using emails. Just as long as you could demonstrate that the emails 
gave you appropriate control over the process then they wouldn’t have a problem 
with it. Now it’s moved on and I now think to myself we need to bring ourselves up 
to speed. We need to change our process and the [Regulator] would look at your 
process and confirm whether or not you’re compliant. They would only confirm if 
they were uncomfortable with it then they’d tell you what was wrong.’ 
The study revealed additional benefits to using an automated process for 
managing compliance limits. A trader, in C.4, suggested that using automated 
processes, over manual practices, to manage investment limits provided assurance 
to investors’ that the potential of their capital was being maximized and that their 
investments were being taken up to the limits allowed by the Regulator. He noted:  
 ‘But… what would you rather do? Invest with a firms that says, ‘Scout’s honour, 
pretty close here, I’m you know, making a good guess and I will ensure that I will 
take you to the limit on your holdings wherever they may be, but it’s done 
manually.’ Or a firm that says the same thing and has less chance of being 
embarrassed because it discovers things in its closet and therefore has a 
compliance system which is an integral part of the process.’   
Several respondents suggested that the retirement of spreads sheets was 
likely to be resisted by fund managers, who were perhaps less IT advanced and so 
were resistant to technological change and who felt that the use of spread sheets 
was ‘tried and tested' and therefore lobbied to preserve this practice and prevent its 
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discontinuation. A compliance manager, C.7, outlined the role of the IMS in 
automating controls and how some individuals were resistant to retiring the use of 
spread sheets:   
‘So, I think that [discussion of controls] sort of exists on an automated versus 
manual basis and I think you’re always going to have a group of people within the 
company that want to stick to the tried and tested, back of an envelope, that is a 
spread sheet, I want to do it this way. And then you have the IT advanced 
individuals in organizations, who say,’ you know we should automate this, we 
should do it with [IMS vendor]’. If we can, we should put the time into the system, 
into the development of [IMS] and get this on a real-time basis’ and I’m saying my 
preference is keep as much of it automated as possible.’ 
A compliance manager, in C.2, commented on how the use of manual 
processes and spread sheets had caused significant errors:  
‘The biggest tool for the fund manager has and will always be Excel because it is 
just so flexible, so capable in having their own fields and methods and the problem 
is that you’ve now got not one single system which can be used to store and 
transact but lots of Excel spread sheets which are maintained, are looked after and 
I have seen one debt trader sacked, because the pricing that he’d had had not been 
updated and not been changed and because he then made a huge goof on a 
transaction it caused the bond to become junk status, it caused the portfolio to 
become junk because he had made such a huge sell on an incorrect price and so 
was forced to leave the company.’   
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The study found that traders and fund managers were perceived as 
preferring the use of Excel due its flexibility. The study revealed that despite the 
risk, the use of spread sheets by front office practitioners such as traders and fund 
managers was well embedded within the financial organizations. An IMS 
consultant commented:   
‘I mean you’ve got fund managers for example, and they all use Excel spread 
sheets, because that is for the pool of choice. They will not, they refuse to go onto 
systems, which don’t give them all the flexibility that their Excel spread sheet uses 
or offers. And the problem with that is there is risk in having old, stale Excel spread 
sheets. And unless they are forced by the regulator to upgrade and to have 
everything that they do put on a proper order management system they continue to 
use Excel and problems may come from that.’ 
An IMS consultant also described how the flexibility of spread sheets could not be 
replicated within the IMS. He suggested: 
‘However, today and yesterday, I saw some of the most amazing Excel spread 
sheets that are used by [C.6] and there is just no way you can create that in an 
order management system, which meets all the stuff that they’re doing. I mean they 
have got, in Excel, real-time prices coming in which dynamically change graphs, 
which dynamically restructure their portfolio, risk positions and it’s just amazing 
what they’ve done in Excel. It’s really, really clever and there’s no way you can get 
that in an order management system.’ 
A systems manager, in C.8, described how he felt the balance of power was shifting 
away from the front office and forcing powerful individuals, such as fund 
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managers, within financial organizations to adopt automated practices for enacting 
transactions: 
‘These fund managers are all assuming that they can do whatever they want, 
because they’re managing so much money and think they are above the world. 
However, there are regulatory clamps now being pushed upon them and what they 
are enforced to do is to use certain automated systems to provide accountability 
and traceability. And this has meant that they are being told really in no uncertain 
terms [by the Regulator] if you don’t use the approaches that we’re suggesting, 
then woe behold you if there are any financial problems or irregularities. So the 
culture is one where they used to feel that they can do whatever they want, but 
they’re now being pushed into the corner where they’re being forced to use the 
electronic order management systems and be held accountable.’ 
The study showed that there is a contradiction between the Regulator 
encouraging organizations to move away from manual processes and the need to 
adopt the IMS. The interviews revealed that the IMS is not always able to automate 
new regulatory obligations at the point in time when they come into force often due 
to tight implementation deadlines for new regulations. Consequently, there 
sometimes there exists a lag between the regulatory requirement coming into force 
and the IMS being able to automate the new rules, perhaps due to new data fields 
being required. In the interim, financial organizations are forced to use manual 
processes to meet the new regulatory requirement. A compliance manager, in C.1, 
described this phenomenon: 
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‘But the problem is, when you have a very short timeline, vendors haven’t had 
enough time to build a product that they can sell. So, there’s a bit of a contradiction 
there. If you’ve got any manual compliance checks and the [IMS] just cannot do 
that then [IMS automated checks and manual checks] will run in parallel. So that 
would still continue. There may be more hooks from the [IMS] where you can see 
what has to be run relatively, however the checks that were being done before will 
have to continue, if they ever get done properly’. 
Another compliance manger, in C.6, concurred: 
‘I mean sometimes the regulation comes out and the systems aren’t capable of fully 
supporting, in general aren’t able to support new regulations.  And the data may 
not be fully available to support the regulation. That’s common. I mean that has 
happened...’ 
 A compliance manager, in C.4, described the process whereby manual 
practices are managed alongside the IMS. He observed that firstly, there is an initial 
analysis and interpretation of the regulatory requirement where it is decided that the 
IMS will not support the requirement. In this case, they must design a manual 
process. The rule is then entered as a high risk into a larger ‘matrix of regulation’, 
which is also a manually updated spread sheet, used to track automated and manual 
regulatory controls. This analysis is then fed back to the IMS vendor who often 
builds an enhancement into the system allowing the manual rule to be retired. 
However, this process may take time, often over a year. The compliances observed:  
‘There’ll be an initial analysis and interpretation of the [regulatory] rule and it is 
decided that it has to be manually implemented. We will then enter that rule into a 
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larger matrix of regulation, again manual spread sheet based. So yeah, this now 
exists. We will enter a monitoring solution in there, that’s [IMS] automated, if it’s 
[not able to be implemented through the IMS] we have to propose or recommend 
something that will work. That matrix rule guidelines will then feed somewhere else 
that says, right, all the stuff that’s in [IMS] is automated. That’s fine, all the stuff 
we’re doing manually is high risk.  What can we do with it? And then you use 
something, that shows all your high risk rules that are manually monitored and you 
go to [Vendor] and say ‘Guys look how much stuff I am doing manually, I don’t pay 
you guys all this for doing these all manually, you need to incorporate this into the 
[IMS].’ Usually, a year later, we get an enhancement an upgrade patch from 
[Vendor] and we can retire the manual rule.’ 
The IMS Senior Relationship Manager’s role included canvasing his clients, 
the financial organizations, for the upgrades they required and communicating them 
back to the US so that required changes could be implemented in future upgrades of 
the IMS. He also observed that changes in the IMS were not only driven by 
regulatory change but also financial innovation and the need to support more 
complex financial products. He commented:  
‘Well manual processes may continue or may become automated, because the 
functionality is now available or the data becomes available with the upgrade.  You 
know they may not have wanted to source [the data] previously, but they may 
source it with the upgrade. So now you have to implement these new regulations. 
You have to make sure you have the right, you know checking process in place. You 
have to make sure that you have somebody agreeing to monitor the rule properly. 
We have foreign clients, for example, that are becoming more sophisticated with 
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the use of these [financial] products over time.  And demand functionality for more 
[complex] products and when you do an upgrade there is more emphasis on 
rewriting the way that they currently work, to benefit with the way the business is 
going and the direction the industry is heading in. You know, so if they want to 
introduce new instrument types. If they’re going to start trading more derivatives or 
start trading new fixed income securities, that you have the relevant data for 
compliance and support its trading in various marketplaces that they may be going 
into.’ 
One senior compliance manager, in C.6, commented that he would be loath 
to pay for bespoke changes to the systems as they would be later incorporated into 
future versions of the IMS. He observed:  
‘Well, new regs come in when they are written they pay no attention to the 
capabilities of the systems, which are used to apply the regs. And therefore the 
systems have to try to adapt to them. When we ask the [Vendor] for changes. Well, 
a software house would… could well say this is a bespoke… this is a bespoke 
development for which they would charge us, and you’ll get it earlier, but you will 
have paid the software house to develop their product, and then they will build it in 
three years later, they will build it in as a standard function of the system, for which 
you actually paid.’ 
Furthermore, the use of spread sheets alongside the IMS may also provide 
capabilities for monitoring the effectiveness of rules, processes and controls over 
time. In the case of regulatory compliance or business critical processes periodic 
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manual checks should also be undertaken to validate results. A compliance 
executive in in C.2, noted:  
‘Even if you’re fully automated, a manual process is vital, because you need to be 
validating the results that your automated systems are doing. You know there needs 
to be that element of validation and if you’re not able to effectively validate the 
results that [IMS] is giving you, then actually how diligent of an approach are you 
taking? You know you can’t just put a system or control in and forget about it 
forever. It will change over time. So, I think this has to be part of the industry; there 
will always be an element of manual checking.’ 
The findings show that spread sheets are not the only type of manual 
process which is being retired by the Regulator. Often financial organizations may 
not conduct trades electronically through the Vendor’s proprietary network. 
Instead, they will communicate their orders directly to brokers over the phone and 
then manually enter the orders into the IMS to check and monitor positions against 
compliance rules. A systems consultant, in C.5, commented on the different trading 
practices adopted by firms:  
‘You have some companies who currently do not trade electronically and pick up 
the phone, communicate their order to the broker and over the phone will conduct 
all their transactions.’   
One systems manager, in C7, revealed how the adoption of the IMS may not 
significantly alter this, manual practice:  
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‘In terms of their behaviour, what [Fund Managers] will do is they will continue to 
work the way they’ve always worked, but will employ people who are then forced to 
enter the data into the system and so there will be that track of what has happened, 
but they still intend to carry on working the way they’ve always carried on. So, it’s 
almost like, ‘You’re telling me what to do. I will have to buy an [IMS]. I’ll have to 
use it, but what I’ll do is, continue working the way I know best and employ more 
people to enter those transactions once I’ve chosen and decided what to do.’ 
However, the post crisis EU Directive, MiFID II, requires that organizations 
publish post-trade data relating to completed transactions as close to real time as is 
possible. The draft regulation states: 
‘Pre-trade information, and post-trade information relating to transactions taking 
place on trading venues and within normal trading hours, shall be made available 
as close to real time as possible. Post-trade information relating to such 
transactions shall be made available in any case within three minutes of the 
relevant transaction. ‘ 
This requirement has caused concern in the industry with many suggesting that it 
could herald the end of voice trading. At the time there was debate regarding, 
whether new exchanges and platforms for trading derivatives should allow voice 
trading or be purely and so automated and captured electronically (Rennison 2011). 
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5.3. Summary 
This chapter has focused on outlining the study’s key findings derived from 
the interviews conducted. Figure 13 summarises the research findings which occur 
at the organizational field level.  
 
Figure 13: Post-Crisis Changes in the Organizational Field. Source: author 
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Table 17 summarizes the findings and the associated limiting factors identified at 
the intra-organization level.  
Change in Compliance Practice Limiting Factors 
Further Automation of Governance 
Practices 
Design of Workflows 
(Segregating Duties) 
Implementing Global Teams and 
Compliance Themes 
Cost of Reorganizing 
Tight Deadlines for Remediation 
Defining and Sharing Best Practice Nuances in Regulatory Jurisdictions 
Structuring Internal Compliance 
Committees 
Resistance from Senior Management 
Unwilling to Share Issues with Peers 
Consolidating Compliance Data 
Cost and complexity of moving to a 
‘golden’ data source. 
Rationalising Compliance Systems 
Cost and complexity of moving to a core 
system. 
Retiring Risky Manual Processes 
Flexibility of spread sheets. 
Embedded use of spread sheets by senior 
front office professionals. 
Need to maintain manual processes for 
checking automated processes. 
Table 17: Post-Crisis Changes and Limiting factors at the Intra-Organization Level. Source: author 
The study shows how the IMS facilitates the automation of monitoring and 
governance practices. The research highlights practitioner’s perspectives regarding 
ways in which the Regulator has altered its attitude towards the use of systems. The 
Regulator was perceived to be adopting a more prescriptive approach requiring 
organization’s to adopt core systems, retire manual processes and to consolidate 
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data. A key driver of these changes is the need to provide aggregated views of 
compliance positions.  
The study found that post-crisis, the role of the compliance function has 
developed and that compliance executives were deemed to have been empowered 
and exercise more control. The structure of the compliance function is also 
evolving with some organizations adopting a more centralised approach by 
establishing and disseminating best practice by organizing around common 
compliance themes, creating global compliance teams and the using of Master 
Tests. The adoption of Masters Tests must be balanced with local knowledge of the 
regulatory jurisdiction to ensure its relevance. Thus, at the intra-organizational level 
the adoption of generic approaches was found to be possible across the 
organization. However, due to each financial organization’s nuances in asset 
classification and data the usefulness of Vendor defined generic templates was 
questioned by the study’s participants.  
The study found that competing financial organizations are meeting and 
openly sharing compliance practices. Such forums were also seen as an opportunity 
to lobby the IMS vendor for needed changes in future upgrades. The openness with 
which competing organizations shared their compliance practices suggests that 
compliance is not seen as a source of competitive advantage. However, the study 
also revealed several counter perspectives. One is that robust compliance practices 
may indeed assist in wining new business by providing comfort to investors that 
their assets are being appropriately managed. Another perspective is that robust 
compliance practices can allow financial organizations to bring new offerings to 
market quicker.   
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The findings highlight how in one organization high level management was 
becoming increasingly focused on regulatory projects and that regular committees 
to provide senior management with oversight of remediation projects were being 
implemented. The study revealed that investors were also becoming increasingly 
focused on compliance and that the demonstration of robust compliance practices 
was important in winning new business.  
Yet the findings also revealed several contradictions. Firstly, that the tight 
deadlines for remediation are preventing some of the organizations studied from 
implementing strong technical architectures to support compliance activities. As 
profitability in the industry is reduced, organizations do not have the time or 
resources to build robust technical foundations for compliance and that often they 
are implementing ad-hoc solutions. Furthermore, the tight deadlines are preventing 
the Vendor from implementing systems changes in time for the post-crisis 
regulations. This may force financial organizations to adopt manual process often in 
the form of spread sheets in the interim period.    
In this chapter, the findings have been presented under themes of organizing 
practices which encapsulate the changes the general research question aims to 
investigate. The following chapters seek to analyse and discuss the findings in 
relation to the institutionalist constructs outlined in Figure 5 to provide further 
insight into the phenomenon uncover.  
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6. ANALYSIS: IMS AS CARRIERS OF REGULATORY 
INSTITUTIONS  
This chapter focuses on how the IMS acts as a carrier for rules and actions 
associated with meeting post-crisis regulatory obligations. The motivation is to 
understand how the IMS acts as an institutional conduit and thereby contributes to 
the establishment and transmission of practices for complying with regulatory rules. 
The findings of this chapter were derived predominantly from the first and early 
stages of the second phases of data collection which focused on understanding the 
IMS and how it was utilised in the participant organizations. Thus, the chapter 
draws from the previous chapters focusing on the contextualization of the IMS and 
correspondingly interviews conducted with the Vendor’s employees and with users 
of the IMS in the participant financial organizations. This analysis was conducted 
early on in the study lifecycle, so an additional motivation was to assess the 
relevance and usefulness of institutional concepts to understand the IMS case and 
thereby support the selection of institutional theory as a theoretical lens for this 
research.   
Through this analysis, I aim to make a contribution by developing 
understanding of the social and technological elements, by which regulatory 
institutions and practices become diffused. Furthermore, this chapter seeks to make 
a theoretical contribution by evaluating and developing Scott’s concepts of 
institutional carriers. The chapter seeks to answer the following questions:  
 How do regulations and compliance practices become inscribed and transmitted 
through IMS technology?  
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o What elements of the IMS allow the transmission of regulations and 
compliance practices through the IMS? 
o How do these elements relate to categories of institutional carriers 
(Symbolic Systems, Relational Systems, Routines and Artefacts)? 
o What pillars of institutional theory (coercive, normative and cultural-
cognitive) are found to be relevant to the IMS research setting?  
In order to address the research questions each of Scott’s (2008) institutional 
carriers, as outlined in Table 7, will be considered in turn. By analysing the findings 
against Scott’s framework of institutional pillars and carriers, see Table 7, 
understanding of the different types of institutional carriers in play and their 
associated relationship with the differing pillars of institutionalism are developed, 
thereby guiding the analysis.  
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Figure 14:  IMS as Institutional Carriers for Post Crisis Regulation. Source: author 
Figure 14 outlines a conceptual model of how the IMS acts as an 
institutional carrier. Mandates from government allow regulatory authorities to set 
new requirements in the form of rules relating to the trading of specific financial 
assets or ways in which firms must conduct their overall business. Regulatory 
institutions and associated compliance practices for conducting transactions are 
transmitted and instantiated within the IMS as Relational Systems, Symbolic 
Systems, Artefacts and Routines. The following subsections addresses each of the 
institutional carrier concepts outlined previously and considers them against the 
study’s findings. Lastly, some conclusions are formulated. 
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6.1. Symbolic Systems 
Rules and laws are identified as being a manifestation of symbolic systems 
aligned with regulative perspectives of institutions - see Table 7. Clearly, a system 
originally designed to meet regulatory obligations, such as the IMS, will have a 
focus on rules and mandates. Regulatory laws are codified within the IMS as 
automated rules which are used to manage compliance obligations. The automated 
rules represent the abstraction and codification of regulatory rules into a useable 
model which can be applied by firms to evaluate the compliance of their 
transactions. Through such actions the IMS explicitly institutionalizes sets of rules 
for meeting specific regulatory obligations and tacitly institutionalizes associated 
local practices necessary for operating those rules, such as conducting overnight 
post trade compliance checks or the selected structure of workflows for managing 
breaches.   
The study shows that the Vendor  with selected clients develop generic rule 
Templates for specific regulations. Thus, these templates are socially constructed. 
Compliance practices in the form of automated rule templates are embedded into 
the IMS and consequently diffused to those systems adopters who utilise the 
templates, thus further legitimizing the approach through mass adoption. 
Furthermore, generic rule templates, developed internally by financial 
organizations, termed ‘Master Tests’ may also be used to diffuse and standardize 
compliance related best practice within organisations. Templates may then be 
modified as their significance to each financial organization’s individual operating 
environment is determined.  
264 
 
 
These findings align well with Scott and Thornton and Ocasio’s views of 
regarding the important role of symbolic systems in diffusing institutions: ‘For 
ideas to move from place to place and from time to time through the use of 
symbols, they must be encoded into some type of script that is then decoded by 
recipients who are necessarily embedded in different situations and possessed of 
different agendas’ (Scott 2008 p.140). Furthermore, Scott proposes that ‘laws and 
regulations are among the more influential and widely recognised modes of 
symbolic systems. While conventional approaches assume that such systems are 
readily transmitted and straight forward, requiring no translation, law and society 
scholars have taught us that laws are often ambiguous. Laws can often be obscure 
in their meaning and contested in their interpretation; their significance is often 
negotiated by various actors in the field – ranging from legislators and judges to 
policy administrators and managers. Legal environments are not simply imposed by 
legal authorities: they are endogenous, constructed by collective sense-making by 
multiple actors in the field (Dobbin et al. 1993; Edelman and Suchman 1997)’ In 
the case of the IMS, the collective sense-making described occurs at two levels. 
Firstly, as the Vendor and clients translate the regulations into generic templates 
and once again where financial organizations interpret and evaluate the templates 
against their own operating environments or develop their own bespoke set of rules.  
The analysis outlined already within this section focuses on regulative 
elements. However, normative and cultural cognitive elements were also found to 
be intertwined within the IMS symbolic systems. Normative elements of 
institutions ‘involve the creation of expectations that introduce a prescriptive, 
evaluative and obligatory dimension into social life.’ (Scott 2003 p.880). Symbolic 
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systems related to the normative pillar include values, expectations and standards -  
see Table 7. The definition and adoption of pre-defined templates for meeting 
specific regulatory mandates act as a means to transmit the values and expectations 
of policy-makers instantiated in the original legislation from which the templates 
are derived. The interpretation of regulations into automated rules provides 
outcomes and results against which policy-makers and regulators may judge if their 
requirements have been met and if the legislation has been successful in creating 
appropriate values and standards. The adoption and implementation of automated 
rules provides a departure point from which the Regulator can determine if the 
financial organization is meeting or likely to meet the Regulator’s expectations. 
Through the definition of generic templates the Vendor seeks to transmit their 
interpretation of the Regulator’s expectations and conjointly reinforces the use of 
the IMS as an appropriate means of meeting these expectations. Similarly, the use 
of Master Tests transmits interpreted yet prescriptive practices for meeting common 
regulatory rules across a global organization’s different compliance functions.  
Correspondingly, cultural-cognitive elements of neo-institutionalism 
‘involve the shared conceptions that constitute the nature of social reality and the 
frames through which meaning is made’ (Scott 2003 p.880) while carriers of 
cultural-cognitive institutions include categories and schema - see Table 7. Generic 
rule templates may help cognitively shape and frame ideas on how areas of 
compliance should be implemented and managed by IMS adopters by allowing 
such ideas to be easily shared. Although the research shows that users of generic 
templates, such as Master Tests, are likely to alter the rules to match their specific 
localised business and regulatory environment, the system allows the diffusion of 
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solutions to regulatory compliance which must then be further cognitively 
translated and applied to the users’ specific context. Furthermore, the IMS allows 
the categorization of generic templates. Appendix 7 shows an extract of the IMS 
user manual which shows how such templates are categorized. Categorization of 
regulations thus has the potential to create ‘perception frameworks’ to aide decision 
making (Preda 2007a). As templates relate to specific regulatory requirements and 
the IMS has prebuilt categories for them, there exists an underlying organizing 
pattern or schema to the predefined templates based on the regulation from which it 
is formed and the jurisdiction where it applies. Furthermore, the templates 
themselves may be seen as interpretive schemas which allow accessibility to 
generic symbolic representations of regulatory rules.   
6.2. Relational Systems 
Relational systems may also be conduits to assist the diffusion of 
institutions through ‘social connections among individuals, groups and 
organizations’ (Scott 2008 p.81). Within the regulative pillar, systems of power and 
governance are highlighted and at the normative level regimes and authority 
systems are emphasized, see Table 7. Scott (2008 p. 82) observes that  ‘normative 
and regulatory theorists are apt to view relational systems as ‘governance systems’ 
emphasizing either the normative (authority) or the coercive (power) aspects of 
these structures. Such governance systems are viewed as creating and enforcing 
codes, rules and norms and as monitoring and sanctioning the activities of 
participants.’ Using these concepts to guide the analysis, the IMS may be 
interpreted as a governance system whereby rules and norms are enforced through a 
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relational system of authority emanating, at the organisational field level,  for 
example from EU Directives, Acts of Parliament or the US Congress and then 
through regulatory authorities. Regulatory rules and requirements are diffused 
through symbolic and relational systems initially in the form or legislation and then 
further defined into regulatory rules by regulatory authorities before being again 
codified into automated rules within the IMS and perhaps disseminated in the form 
of Templates across organizations or as Master Tests within organizations. This 
view encompasses both the normative and regulative pillars as mutually 
reinforcing. The regulations’ coercive power is legitimized through normative 
authorities, such as the Regulator, who support and constrain the use of power.  
At the intra-organizational level, the IMS workflows are defined in a way 
which authorizes individuals within the firm to take specific actions, such as 
overriding breaches. Thus, the system acts to sanction trading activities conducted 
through networks of financial intermediaries, investors and issuers. The structuring 
of workflows creates boundaries and relationships and so establishes who has the 
authority to manage compliance breaches. This finding supports Scott’s observation 
(2008 p.82) that ‘classifications and typifications are often coded into 
organizational structures as differentiated departments and roles.’ In this case, the 
IMS workflows act to enforce boundaries between the front office trading desks 
and the compliance function. Furthermore, the IMS has a workflow monitoring 
function, which according to the IMS user manual, allows rules to be defined 
around specific events. Thus, the IMS may be interpreted as a relational system of 
governance which confers individuals with the authority to manage compliance 
related events and breeches. Correspondingly, the system provides functionality for 
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conducting well established governance practices in the form of ‘four-eye’ tests -  
see Appendix 8. This refers to the requirement for at least two people to review an 
approach. Thus, the system acts as an institutional carrier by facilitating established 
methods of conducting compliance checks through networks of individuals. 
Furthermore, the fact that the system is structured to incorporate this practice 
further institutionalises and embeds four-eye tests as a legitimate compliance 
practice. 
The research found individuals shared compliance related knowledge 
externally, that different financial organizations would often jointly attend 
meetings, often facilitated by consultants or legal experts, to discuss approaches for 
solving contemporary issues. Scott (2008 p.81) notes: ‘Many robust relational 
systems transcend and intersect with the boundaries of organizations as is the case 
with occupational and professional communities of practice.’ The study revealed 
that adopters of the IMS, in competing financial organizations, had set up 
communities of practice to discuss ways in which the system was being used to 
tackle new and challenging regulatory issues. Again, we can see that understanding 
the impact of a regulation on each firm requires a process of sense-making and 
cognitive framing. During these meetings insight into regulatory requirements was 
constructed socially amongst practitioners who collectively developed responses to 
regulatory problems.  
The study shows that networks of subject matter experts communicate both 
internally across global divisions and externally across firms to establish how 
specific regulatory issues are being tackled and to share approaches and practices. 
A consensus towards best practice and common approaches for meeting new 
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regulatory obligations, which are derived from such networks, may potentially 
create similar configurations of the IMS and consequently increase field level 
isomorphism across organizations’ IMS compliance practices. Internally, financial 
organizations were also found to share practices and approaches for using the IMS 
to meet similar regulatory requirements, through Master Tests thus creating 
homogeneity and isomorphism, at the intra-organizational level, across the firm’s 
geographically separated compliance functions. Thus, the IMS, through its 
inscription of regulatory rules, acts as a conduit for the diffusion of both regulatory 
institutions and associated practices.  
6.3. Routines 
Scott (2008 p.82) observes that: ‘institutions may also be embodied in – 
carried by- structured activities in the form of habitualized behaviour and routines.’ 
Scott highlights the work of Winter (1990: 274-275) who observes that routines, 
‘range from ‘hard’ – activities encoded into technologies – to ‘soft’ organizational 
routines… but all involve ‘repetitive patterns of activity.’ Furthermore Martin 
(2204) highlights recursive practices a one of her criteria for institutions. Building 
on these perspectives, the IMS facilitates ‘hard’ routines in the form of automated 
rules and associated pathways through the system and ‘soft’ routines in the form of 
workflows.  
Those theorists who emphasise regulative elements of institutions stress 
protocols and standard operating procedures (Scott 2008). Automated compliance 
rules and workflows collectively are standard operating procedures for ensuring 
regulatory obligations are met. Furthermore, Templates and Master Tests 
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encompass standardized routines for meeting compliance obligations. The IMS 
allows for the monitoring of workflows and, according to the IMS user manual: 
‘alerts the appropriate personnel of user-defined events or data of interest’. The 
Vendor provides its own predefined workflows which are pre- embedded within the 
system. For workflows or routines to be predefined the Vendor must make 
assumptions, in the workflow design, as to the broad type and structure of the tasks 
or routines’ being monitored and so further legitimises and institutionalises such 
assumptions by diffusing them within the IMS. The system allows for the user to 
also define their own workflows and both correspondingly the breaches that are 
flagged and how they are managed, the supposition is that surveillance controls are 
necessary and that pre-defined alerts and approvals processes will be required to 
effectively govern workflows. Thus, workflow related functionality is underpinned 
by the assumption that compliance practices can be structured around repetitive 
routines, which must be triggered on specific events. This analysis highlights how 
the system acts as a carrier and reinforcer of institutionalized patterns of behaviour, 
relating to meeting regulatory obligations. The research also highlighted that the 
routines built into the IMS require specific data to be able to operate and thus the 
IMS acts to institutionalize the use of certain data sources highlighted in Table 13. 
Scott (2008) advises that normative elements of routines may consist of 
jobs, roles and obedience to duty. The study found that the system also acted to 
structure, determine and legitimize roles within the organization and what tasks 
were appropriate to which users. The findings show that the IMS may be 
reconfigured to support the routines required by business users. The system 
stipulates tasks appropriate for fund managers, traders and compliance roles. The 
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system should allow the segregation of business and compliance operators and 
thereby act to define and reinforce their roles within the organization. Furthermore, 
the surveillance aspect of the system, acts to ensure employees’ obedience and 
conformity to professional standards associated with their ascribed duties and roles. 
Consequently, the IMS act as an institutional carrier for norms associated with jobs 
and roles which are in turn required to meet regulatory obligations, including the 
obligation that firms, ‘should segregate the duties of individuals’ (FSA 2010b).  
This analysis highlights how routine and relational carriers may be 
intertwined, while the relational carriers’ functionality of the IMS reinforces the 
boundaries of established roles and the nature of their interaction, the workflow 
functionality stipulates the tasks appropriate to each role. Scott (2008) notes that 
routines may be learned, sustained and renewed by relational systems and that the 
power and attraction of communities of practice is their ability to share routines 
within which is embedded the tacit knowledge of the actors who structure and 
operate the routines being shared. In the context of this research, the communities 
of practice set up by adopters of the IMS to share issues and approaches allow the 
process of learning to be extended beyond the confines of a single firm and thereby 
the IMS user community can benefit from the tacit knowledge of professionals in 
competing firms faced with similar challenges.  
However, Oxley (1999) suggests this learning comes at a price. Where 
participants may benefit from the acquisition of the ‘sticky’ knowledge embedded 
within other organizations, this benefit must be balanced against the ‘leakage’ of 
their own proprietary knowledge. The fact that financial organizations are happy to 
meet with their competitors to discuss approaches to utilize the system suggests that 
272 
 
 
compliance is not seen as a source of competitive advantage. Many of the 
interviewees concurred suggesting that the firms compete on the investment side of 
the business, with compliance being seen as ‘necessary but non-value adding’. If 
through remaining compliant, a competitive advantage is not gleaned then the value 
of a successful compliance function is in legitimizing the organization by meeting 
its regulatory obligations in the eyes of its stakeholders, such as its clients and 
regulator. However, there was a discerning voice. A senior compliance executive, 
in C.8, suggested that an experienced and effective compliance function working 
together with their risk department could potentially allow them to be first to 
market with a new financial product and thereby, provide a first mover advantage.  
6.4. Artefacts 
The IMS and its associated automated rules, templates, databases and data 
feeds, as well as the hardware on which it runs and the manuals and training 
materials which accompany it may all be considered instances of an artefact 
produced and transformed by human activity through a physical or cultural 
environment (Suchman and Edelman 1996). Orlikowski (1992 p.84) and Giddens 
(1984) advise that artefacts may be seen as products of human action but that once 
deployed may be seen as part of the ‘objective, structural properties of the 
situation’. This is a perspective often obscured, as there is a separation between 
those who design the system, in our study the IMS vendor and those who use it, the 
financial organizations (Scott 2008). However, Orlikowski (1992) advises that 
while the initial development of a technology may require a greater engagement of 
human agents, the on-going possibility that users will socially and physically 
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change the system should not be ignored. This was observed in the study. Rival 
financial organizations met to discuss issues relating to their common adoption of 
the same IMS. These forums allowed the users to not only share experiences 
regarding the IMS but also to act as a collective voice to lobby the Vendor to make 
changes. In this way, new approaches and practices were socially constructed and 
consequently these new practices became embedded and so locally institutionalized 
within the IMS.  
Scott highlights how regulative elements of artefacts may include objects 
which comply with mandated specifications, such as regulatory rules, while 
normative elements will include objects meeting standards and conventions. The 
on-going requirement that firms adhere to regulatory mandates is the raison d'être 
for the system’s existence. Also, the IMS acts as a conduit for industry related 
standards and so is acting as a carrier for such institutions to further their 
legitimization. Examples include the use of established risk methodologies, asset 
ratings and classifications, indexes and benchmarks (see Table 13), as well as 
underlying technical standards -  see Table 14. The research found that the Vendor 
is careful to ensure that the system utilises and meets current norms relating to 
technical standards and also to withdraw support of those standards which are 
deemed no longer relevant e.g. Sybase databases. In this way, the IMS contributes 
to the diffusion, institutionalization and deinstitutionalization of technical 
standards.   
Lastly, the cultural-cognitive perspective of artefacts as institutional carriers 
suggests how they might actualise and personify constellations of ideas (see Table 
7). The research found that the IMS has the ability to symbolically represent 
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various media, such as TV or Excel -  see 4.7.8. In this way, the IMS allows the 
compliance professional to coagulate and frame the different strands of 
information, which are required to enable their role in the organization. 
Furthermore, these predefined templates of rules and workflows and are also 
outlined within the IMS system’s user manual and release notes, thereby providing 
a further method of diffusion through semiotics. 
6.5. Conclusions 
This chapter demonstrates how regulations and compliance practices 
become inscribed and embedded through IMS technology and how the different 
types of institutional carriers and their association with different institutional pillars 
are in many ways intertwined and mutually reinforcing. For example, the research 
identified the practice of systems adopters meeting to discuss the IMS. This 
phenomenon was found to be relevant to the symbolic systems, artefacts and 
relational systems constructs, while the routines carrier may be interpreted as 
addressing the compliance focused activities around which the other carriers are 
built. Table 18 summarizes the institutional carriers identified and their 
classification against each institutional pillar. 
Carriers Regulative Normative Cultural-cognitive 
Symbolic 
systems 
Automated rules, 
and templates   
Regulator’s values 
and expectations 
Template schema and 
categorization 
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Relational 
systems 
 
Governance 
practices 
embedded in 
workflows 
Systems of authority 
embedded in 
workflows  
Boundaries between 
fund managers, traders 
and compliance 
identities/roles 
 
Routines 
 
Predefined 
Workflows, 
Templates and 
Master Tests  
Differentiation in 
activities undertaken 
by fund managers, 
traders and 
compliance 
executives 
Communities of 
practice sharing 
compliance practices  
Artefacts 
 
IMS hardware, 
software and 
databases/data 
feeds 
Benchmarks, 
indexes, ratings. 
Technical standards. 
Use of different 
screens and media to 
frame compliance 
decisions 
Table 18: Institutional Pillars and Carriers for IMS. Source: author 
The analysis indicates that elements of the three regulatory pillars were 
found in all four institutional carriers, as each of the elements outlined in Table 7 
are present. While the regulatory pillar was perhaps the most explicit, perhaps due 
to the context of the study, the normative and cultural-cognitive pillars were also 
found to be significantly present. This is a key finding, as the presence and 
interdependence of each institutional pillar suggests the appropriateness of 
institutional theory as a theoretical lens to investigate the IMS and its role in 
meeting regulatory post-crisis obligations.  
However, it occurs to the author that almost any human operated complex 
enterprise wide technology could be argued to have relational systems, symbolic 
systems, routines and artefacts e.g. an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system. 
Nonetheless, by using Scott’s institutional carriers to frame the discussion it 
becomes clear that the IMS acts to diffuse regulatory institutions and associated 
compliance practices and that coercive, normative and cultural cognitive ‘pillars’ 
are all present. This is an important point as the types of mechanisms being used to 
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investigate institutionalization in Chapter 9, coercive, normative and mimetic, are 
derived and correspond with  Scott’s (2008) typology of institutions -  see Table 9.  
An extension of Scott’s perspective is derived from the view that scholars 
have shown how regulatory technologies, are not objective (Bamberger 2010; 
Callon and Muniesa 2005; Itami and Numagami 1992; Muniesa et al. 2007; Preda 
2007b; Zaloom 2003). Neither is the IMS, in that it is designed to monitor 
compliance of regulatory rules which can be distilled into quantitative measures 
and metrics and so it privileges the quantifiable and acts to obscure uncertainty. In 
this way, the IMS has its own ‘calculative agency’ (Callon and Muniesa 2005). The 
IMS design limits the types of regulatory institutions and compliance practices 
which can be diffused and so further privileges the institutionalization of such 
practices as an appropriate means to regulate economic activity. This has the 
potential to obscure from policy-makers and managers unmeasurable hazards such 
as the weakening of cultural and ethical standards within the organization or wider 
industry. In this way, regulatory technologies such as the IMS may create their own 
world view (Heidegger 1954) which may dangerously alter the ‘perception 
frameworks’ (Preda 2007b) of those decision makers the system was designed to 
inform. Similarly, Bamberger (2009 p.676) observes how the automation of 
regulatory checks may, ‘create automation biases-decision pathologies that hinder 
careful review of automated outcomes, especially by those with financial incentives 
that promote risky behaviour. These very phenomena contributed to the failure of 
risk regulation and risk management to prevent the recent financial meltdown.’   
This IMS is also not neutral in that it allows the Vendor and Financial 
Organizations to be selective over the institutions and practices carried and those 
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which are not, such as the Sybase database. Thus, the IMS may act not only as a 
carrier of institutions but also as an agent of deinstitutionalization for those wishing 
to erode or displace an existing standard or practice. Building on such perspectives, 
the analysis is developed in the next two chapters by considering how the IMS is 
implicated in the deinstitutionalization and institutionalization of compliance 
practices. 
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7. ANALYSIS: DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF COMPLIANCE 
PRACTICES 
This chapter utilizes Oliver’s (1992) seminal work on deinstitutionalization 
to investigate how different types of social, functional and political pressure, 
channelled and applied through technology, causes compliance related practices to 
become discontinued or eroded -  see Table 6 and Figure 8. The chapter draws from 
the previous chapters focusing on the contextualization of the IMS and 
correspondingly interviews conducted with the Vendor’s employees and with users 
of the IMS in the participant financial organizations. I aim to make a contribution in 
two areas. Firstly, by utilising Oliver’s theory of deinstitutionalization in exploring 
the role of technology in implementing regulatory change, I aim to assess and 
extend Oliver’s work within this setting. This is achieved by investigating the role 
of technology in applying not only functional pressures relating to technical 
specification but also, pressures rooted in social and political dimensions. Secondly, 
the research aims to highlight the factors contributing to the abandonment or 
erosion of compliance related practices within the financial organizations studied. 
Consequently, the research employs the following research questions:  
 How are outmoded compliance practices becoming deinstitutionalised 
through the IMS? 
o What compliance practices are being deinstitutionalised through the 
IMS? 
o What are the social, political and functional pressures to 
deinstitutionalise practices for compliance  
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o What are the empirical predictors of deinstitutionalization within 
financial services? 
Figure 15 provides a model of the concepts discussed in this chapter to address the 
research questions. The post-crisis environment is theorised as causing the 
deinstitutionalization of processes and systems, behaviours and regulatory rules in 
order to ultimately prevent inappropriate trading behaviours and transactions. 
 
Figure 15: Deinstitutionalization of IMS Practices. Source: author 
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This diagram outlines the research context in relation to, social, political and 
functional pressures for deinstitutionalization applied at both the field and intra-
organizational levels.  
The chapter is structured as follows. The next sections review the empirical 
findings of the research in relation to the theoretical constructs previously outlined. 
The focus of the analysis is to understand how the IMS, acts as an agent for the 
deinstitutionalization of compliance practices. Consequently, each of Oliver’s 
antecedents of deinstitutionalization is considered in turn. Finally, some 
conclusions will be drawn.  
7.1. Social Pressures 
Oliver (1992 p. 575) explicitly highlights ‘changes in state laws or societal 
expectations that prohibit or discourage the perpetuation of an institutional practice’ 
as an antecedent for deinstitutionalization. This social pressure is at the core of the 
study and is perpetuated across the organizational field. Large scale changes in 
regulatory rules and principles create pressure to discontinue practices and 
behaviours now deemed inappropriate.  
Prior to the financial crisis the Regulator had adopted a principle based 
approach to regulation and ‘light-touch’ approach to supervision. This approach 
was contrary to a post-crisis; focus on prescriptive rules and intense supervision. 
The Regulator justified this approach by suggesting that large volumes of detailed 
rules were a burden on both regulators and firm’s resources and that a focus on 
outcomes was better suited to respond to rapidly changing markets. The Regulator 
argued that highly complex rules may divert firms towards obeying the letter of the 
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law as opposed to achieving the desired outcome and that dynamic markets may 
make prescriptive rules irrelevant quickly. However, 2009 saw ‘principles-based’ 
approaches to regulation replaced in the wake of the financial crisis. The Chairman 
of the UK Regulator, the FSA, advocated a move towards ‘intense supervision’ 
(Financial Services Research Forum, 2009; International Securities Association for 
Institutional Trade Communication, 2011; Turner, 2009).  
Oliver (1992 p. 574) notes that, ‘state pressures on organizations to conform 
to public demands and expectations typically displace or deinstitutionalise 
previously institutionalised practices’ and categorizes this as a social pressure. In 
this case, changing public expectations has created pressure on the state to 
deinstitutionalise outmoded approaches to regulating financial organizations. In 
2010, the Managing Director of Supervision at the FSA described how changing 
public expectations had shaped the previous approach: 
‘Previously the [Regulator] rarely intervened until it was clearly evident that 
something had gone wrong. Intervention needed to be based on evidence that risks 
had crystallised. The old approach was never going to stop firms making mistakes, 
as that was not its intention. This approach was of course the mandate for the 
[Regulator] set by the city and society at that time’ (Pain 2010). 
The study shows how state pressure to conform to public expectations to 
protect investors, in the wake of the financial crisis, may deinstitutionalize 
practices, once considered appropriate and necessary. Changing societal 
expectations have contributed to the deinstitutionalization of the ‘principles based’ 
approach to regulatory governance and supervision. The new approach adopted by 
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the Regulator was deemed by the research participants to be far more prescriptive 
than the principles based approach. As a consequence of the move away from 
principles to prescriptive rules, opportunities to exercise discretion in the enactment 
of financial regulation have diminished and so agency and correspondingly choices 
over the practices employed are also reduced within this context. For example, the 
study showed that the Regulator was perceived to be leaning towards preferred 
systems’ vendors. To summarize, new supervisory approaches act to 
deinstitutionalize established regulatory practices. These changes will require the 
reconfiguration of the IMS automated rules. Technology has a key role to play in 
facilitating change by applying disciplinary effects to afford or constrain practices 
and thereby produce new patterns of action  (Leonardi 2011; Majchrzak and 
Markus 2013; Markus et al. 2006). In this way, the IMS acts as facilitator to erode 
or discontinue outmoded practices. This pressure for deinstitutionalization occurs at 
the field level as the regulations apply across all financial organizations.  
Oliver suggests that social pressures resulting in deinstitutionalization may 
occur as the result of ‘normative fragmentation’. This fragmentation may occur as 
discordant views emerge between the organization’s members, regarding the 
meanings and interpretations attached to working practices. The first phase of the 
study revealed that the IMS Vendor collaborates with key clients to define 
templates of pre-written automated rules. These templates inscribe specific 
regulatory rules, thereby providing standardized responses to new regulations 
which are then disseminated to the Vendor’s wider client base. In this way, 
collective meanings and interpretations were attached to technical responses to new 
regulations. Such templates, if they are widely adopted, have the potential to 
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become embedded across organizations, thereby creating isomorphic configurations 
of the IMS through the adoption of similarly structured automated compliance 
rules. The second and third research phases revealed that few organizations were 
adopting these templates due to nuances in underlying data and differing 
approaches to classifying and categorizing assets. This is not a fragmentation of 
existing consensus as Oliver proposes. However, the low adoption of standardized 
rules templates points to a lack of consensus regarding best practice for asset 
classification and data amongst its clients. Classification, of assets may build 
‘perception frameworks’ which influence how assets are treated (Preda 2007a). As 
a result of disparities across organizations regarding how data is defined, employed, 
structured and sourced, the Vendor and its competitors are moving towards 
providing managed data services to improve the availability and quality of data but 
also to provide uniformity within the system to facilitate ease of future upgrades 
and systems support. New services are being introduced to slowly replace the 
standardized templates, as the Vendor offers service to write and support codifying 
regulations into automated rules. Thus, an old embedded practice, the development 
and distribution of rule templates, is becoming slowly eroded as the Vendor moves 
towards an outsourcing business model. This change is occurring through the 
Vendor’s identification of a naturally emerging lack of uniformity and consensus 
across its clients, regarding best practice for organizational practices.  
This finding highlights the blurred demarcation between the processes of 
institutionalization and deinstitutionalization and poses questions regarding 
whether, in this context, deinstitutionalization is merely a by-product of the 
institutionalization process. In this case, the new service being offered by the 
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Vendor acts to displace the existing practice. Here, deinstitutionalization occurs not 
as a result of ‘normative fragmentation’ but as the result of a lack of consensus and 
agreement in the first place. Oliver suggests that social pressures explain conditions 
whereby organizational members do not proactively deinstitutionalise practices. 
Thus, she emphasizes the importance of structural forces over agency in creating 
social pressures to deinstitutionalise practices. Indeed, the lack of uniformity and 
consensus regarding best practice for data sourcing and asset classification has 
developed as a result of organically developed historical nuances in each financial 
organization’s operating environment and not as a result of organizational members 
consciously choosing to adopt different approaches.  
At the intra-organization level, however, I do observe the 
deinstitutionalization of outmoded compliance practices as a result of building 
consensus around best practice and standardization. A global compliance team 
works with regional compliance teams to generate share and embed uniform 
practices, through Master Tests, which may be interpreted as form of internally 
derived best practice. In this case, deinstitutionalization occurs as compliance 
practices which do not meet best practice are made redundant. This happens not as 
a result of ‘normative fragmentation’ but as the result of ‘normative fusion’, the 
building of consensus and agreement regarding best practice. This process has also 
been enabled at the field level by reaching high-level consensus of the appropriate 
regulatory response to the crisis through international policy forums, such as the 
G20. Thus, I observe normative fusion, the creation of consensus, occurring at both 
the field and Intra-organizational level.  
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Oliver also highlights how previous scholars have shown that shared 
definitions of social reality and common understandings are often dependent on 
geographical proximity and that institutional norms and practices are more likely to 
be discontinued when organizational constituents are autonomous (Berger and 
Luckman 1966; DiMaggio 1998; DiMaggio 1988; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
Thus, she identifies both intra-organizational and field level structures as 
influencing factors in deinstitutionalization, thereby underlining her observation 
that social forces for deinstitutionalization are influenced, although not exclusively, 
by structural forces. 
 However, the study shows that through the use of technology, the necessity 
of a physical proximity to establish norms and standardized templates is negated. 
Oliver states (1992 p. 578): ‘Across organizations, geographical dispersion and 
parochial differentiation disaggregates institutional environments and reduces the 
likelihood that organizations will reproduce specific shared interpretations of reality 
through observation, imitation and network interaction.’ However, Oliver’s 
perspective was formulated in 1992, and so her view that interaction between 
geographically disparate entities is problematic, while possibly accurate at the time, 
it may now be considered redundant in light of advancements in networking 
information and communication technologies since 1992, when her paper was 
published, in particular the widespread adoption of the Internet and World Wide 
Web. Issues relating to ‘observation, imitation and network interaction’ can be 
somewhat overcome by subsequent technological developments. In the context of 
this study, the distribution of Templates and Master Tests allows interpretations of 
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compliance rules to become dissipated, established and refined and thereby 
facilitates the sharing of interpretations of regulatory obligations.  
Furthermore, the introduction of a centralized approach to compliance is 
becoming embedded in some financial organizations and represents a structural 
change within the organizations. Again, the process of institutionalization and 
deinstitutionalization may be seen as, two sides of the same coin. One approach, the 
geographically fragmented one, is becoming deinstitutionalised as a new approach, 
the centralized global compliance function, becomes institutionalised locally at the 
intra-organizational level. In this case, deinstitutionalization occurs not as a result 
of ‘structural disaggregation but as the result of ‘structural aggregation.’  At the 
field level, Oliver (1992 p. 578) suggests that ‘when the structure of an 
organizational field becomes more physically dispersed, loosely connected, non-
interactive or locally differentiated, deinstitutionalization of collective values and 
practices is more likely to occur.’ In doing so, she takes an aggregated 
organizational field where there are synergies and interactive behaviours as her 
starting point and then, as local differentiation is increased and interactivity 
reduced, this institutional field becomes disaggregated and embedded practices 
become discontinued. In contrast, the study shows that the global regulatory 
environment, is aiming to become ‘structurally aggregated’ as the G20, FSB and 
Basel Committee acts to develop common regulatory objectives to be applied 
globally. Thus, aiming to reduce local differentiation and deinstitutionalize those 
practices no longer deemed appropriate. By doing so, Regulators aim to reduce 
opportunities for global financial organizations to engage in regulatory arbitrage. 
However, the findings show that nuances in local environments still persist. Thus, 
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at the field level we observe ‘structural aggregation’ as the point of departure for 
deinstitutionalization not ‘structural disaggregation’.  
Similarly, at the intra-organizational level, the study reveals a pre-crisis 
environment where compliance practices were also ‘physically dispersed, loosely 
connected, and locally differentiated.’ (Oliver 1992 p.578). However, the findings 
show that financial organizations are beginning to ‘structurally aggregate’ by 
centralising and standardizing compliance practices through the use of Master 
Tests, the creation of global compliance teams and by organizing around common 
global compliance themes. The decision by organizational members to disregard 
previously siloed approaches for managing compliance is primarily driven by social 
pressures, in the form or regulatory reform, occurring at the field level. Specifically, 
the ‘structural aggregation’ occurring as a result of the G20 agreements allows 
global organizations to leverage compliance efforts globally and organize around 
regulatory themes common to numerous jurisdictions. The decision to reorganize 
and remove ineffective practices is one made actively by organizational members, 
selecting which practices to adopt in the wake of shifts in the organizational field. 
Thus, we can observe both agency and structural forces collectively acting to erode 
siloed compliance practices.   
In summary, Oliver (1992) identifies structural disaggregation happening at 
the field level, across organizations, as a social pressure for deinstitutionalization. 
However, the findings show how ‘structural aggregation’ may occur at the field 
level driven by international policy forums, as well as at the intra-organizational 
level as the structural arrangements for organizing common compliance activities 
are evolved. The study shows how some financial organizations are reacting and to 
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the G20 agreements and that resultant similar regulatory obligations being 
introduced in different jurisdictions to establish global compliance teams and to 
organize around common compliance themes. This has resulted in the 
discontinuation of some localised compliance practices. The IMS has underpinned 
the erosion of regional practices through its Master Test functionality. In addition, 
social fusion, the building of consensus and agreement, by the G20, at the field 
level and by the global compliance teams, at the intra-organizational level, have 
enabled financial organizations to structurally aggregate and centralise compliance 
practices. Furthermore, social pressure emanating from changing expectations 
within society has resulted in the regulator changing its approach to supervising 
firms and deinstitutionalizing ‘light-touch’ supervision. As a consequence of the 
regulator’s move towards a more prescriptive approach, firms are being encouraged 
to move further away from manual processes and adopt automated processes 
through systems such as the IMS, thereby eroding the use of spread sheets within 
the organization. This finding illustrates how the deinstitutionalization of 
approaches to regulatory supervision at the field level may lead to the 
deinstitutionalization of compliance practices at the intra-organizational level. 
Thus, I now consider how functional pressures may also contribute to the 
deinstitutionalization of practice.  
7.2. Functional Pressures 
The financial crisis was unforeseen and caused unprecedented losses and as 
a result caused a deep revaluation of existing regulations, which have in turn led to 
some compliance practices becoming deinstitutionalised. This observation supports 
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Oliver’s (1992 p. 574) argument that ‘although... events and data may be 
idiosyncratic, non-repetitive and unpredictable, their consequences may be 
profound in terms of deinstitutionalizing existing beliefs and activities.’ Oliver 
(1992 p. 572) further observes: ‘anything that acts to increase an organization’s 
technical specificity and reduce the ambiguity of an organization’s processes and 
outputs will provide fertile ground for deinstitutionalization.’ As a response to the 
financial crisis, financial organizations in conjunction with systems’ vendors are 
updating technologies to meet new regulatory obligations. An example is the EU’s 
Short Selling Regulation which requires that financial organizations report 
significant short positions (tacking a position that the value of an asset will go down 
as opposed to up) ‘to the …[Regulator] when they at least equal to 0.2% of 
company issued share capital and every 0.1% above that.’ (ESMA 2013). Thus, 
users of the IMS will have to create new automated rules which implement this new 
regulatory rule. Another example is UCITS IV which requires that a risk 
management policy must be in place which stipulates a system of limits for each 
fund in order to prevent inappropriate trading activity which could damage the firm 
and investors (CESR 2009). This regulatory rule requires organizations to consider 
their risk appetite, identify risks, and set limits on risky transaction and monitor 
transactions against limits. The Vendor enables this process not only by developing 
new data fields and automated rules to enforce limits but also by enabling 
organizations to measure and benchmark how assets are performing and to 
calculate risk values by applying relevant methodologies. Thus, the IMS technical 
capabilities are evolved to facilitate these new requirements.  
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The study found that compliance practices were being abandoned as new 
regulatory requirements came into place. A global compliance executive, in C.5, 
commented on reconfiguring workflows as a result of new regulatory obligations: 
‘What we will do [as a result of new regulatory obligations] is actually 
decommission part of other processes or setups and actually move to the new one.’ 
Another manger, in C.4, provided the following example of how they updated their 
workflows for monitoring derivative exposure as a result of the introduction of new 
regulatory rules:   
‘So, what we actually did was to create a new process and we could then scrap the 
old process and with the result being that we could better, more accurately and 
more robustly monitor derivative exposure.’ 
Furthermore, the results show how the Vendor’s pre-written workflows were 
becoming increasingly accepted and that some financial organizations were no 
longer seeking to define their own but instead were happy to apply the Vendor’s 
propriety workflows as it simplified use of the system. 
The deinstitutionalization of a ‘principles-based’ approach, through the 
introduction of intense supervision, means that the regulator is becoming more 
prescriptive in the practices deemed appropriate for facilitating trading and so 
technical specificity is increased. As regulatory rules become more prescriptive so 
are the regulators’ views on the types of processes and systems firms should use to 
impose controls on trades. As a result, processes and systems which do not fulfil the 
Regulators expectations are becoming discontinued. The Regulator’s increased 
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focus on how organizations conduct their business and they ways in which they 
achieve compliance has begun eroding embedded trading practices which rely on 
manual systems. In particular, spread sheets are further frowned upon by the 
Regulator. Oliver (1992 p. 571) observes that ‘the perceived worth of an 
institutional practice, is not invulnerable to re-evaluation or reconsideration in 
technical terms.’ She observes that this functional pressure may occur as the result 
of unexpected environmental events, such as the financial crisis, challenging the 
advisability of maintaining an institutionalised practice, such as utilizing spread 
sheets.  
In this case, manual processes implemented prior to the crisis have lost the 
support of the Regulator due to short comings in their functional capabilities and 
robustness and thus are becoming further discontinued as a result of changes in 
regulatory policy. Emerging economic events and the resulting crisis has created 
pressure to change the technical specificity of regulations and associated 
compliance practices. Thus, this functional pressure is applied at the field level. 
Oliver (1992 p.571) notes that  ‘the potential for innovative pressures and 
performance problems to deinstitutionalize enduring organizational practices is also 
related to technical or functional considerations that tend to compromise or raise 
doubts about the instrumental value of an institutionalized practice’. A review of 
press stories relating to fines levied by the Regulator provides various examples of 
financial organizations whose functional approaches to compliance have been 
criticised by the Regulator and as result have had to refine functional aspects of 
their systems and processes. Thus, performance problems in compliance related 
activities have led to approaches, deemed technically inappropriate, to be 
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discontinued. For example, the Regulator fined Credit Suisse £5.6 million for 
‘systems and controls failings’. (FSA 2008b). Another example was provided by a 
senior compliance manager who described how Financial Organization C.3’s fixed 
income fund managers were told by the Regulator that they had to stop using spread 
sheets. External assessment of organizational performance by the Regulator, based 
on technical criteria, has caused some financial organizations to reconsider and alter 
established practices. This pressure for deinstitutionalization occurs at the field 
level as the pressure emanates from the Regulator’s feedback.  
Oliver (1992 p. 571) suggests that ‘an institutionalised activity may 
discontinue or decay because its perpetuation is no longer rewarding.’ Furthermore, 
she (1992p. 572) notes that ‘the utility of an institutionalized practice will also be 
reassessed when economic criteria of efficiency and effectiveness begin to conflict 
with, or intrude on, institutional definitions of success.’ According to the Vendor’s 
senior implementation consultant, the financial crisis of 2008 and associated loses 
caused many financial organizations to reconsider their product offerings and risk 
management approaches, all of which had a direct impact on regulatory practices 
and the configuration of IMS.  
In this case, unexpected economic events caused assumptions regarding 
rules associated with risk management and compliance to become discredited. The 
IMS functionality and technical specificity is constantly evolving as a result of 
financial innovation, resulting in new products and associated changes to regulatory 
exposure, as well as the introduction of completely new regulatory requirements. 
As a financial product no longer provides appropriate economic rewards the 
technical or functional compliance practices associated with this product become 
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deinstitutionalized. Thus, automated rules are discontinued as new ones are created 
which are more relevant to the financial organization’s products and associated 
regulatory requirements. The study shows that Vendor seeks to evolve the IMS 
functionality so that it can manage new both new financial products and services 
and also new regulatory obligations. Consequently, the Vendor spends large sums 
on research and development activities. In summary, both technical changes in 
regulatory rules and financial products through innovation and refinement 
contribute to the deinstitutionalization of redundant IMS functionality and 
associated practices, as more compliance obligations can become automated 
through the addition of required data fields or the introduction of new algorithms. 
So, as the technical specificity of the IMS evolves, the possibility to further 
automate compliance practices increases and manual processes are further eroded 
or discontinued.  
Often, compliance related practices may become discontinued as new risk 
methodologies for evaluating financial instruments become available. This occurs 
as established methodologies become out-dated or irrelevant, frequently due to the 
introduction of new financial instruments and differing views on acceptable 
approaches to managing risk (FSA 2010a). A senior compliance manger noted:  
‘In terms of monitoring derivative exposure on a portfolio. Some people are quite 
reserved about, you know derivatives. How much exposure you can have. So, you 
know there are often new requirements creating new methodologies and ways of 
calculating derivative exposure’ and, ‘Yeah, what we might do is actually 
decommission part of other processes or setups and actually move to the new one… 
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if we find a better way of doing something. All of which has to be incorporated into 
[IMS]’.  
The IMS is evolved as old rules, benchmarks and indexes become 
functionally outmoded and new ones are introduced. For example the IMS utilises 
financial indexes, referential data and benchmarks, see Table 13. However, while 
such data structures may be institutionalised their use may become discontinued as 
practices underpinned by these data types are evolved. These changes may be 
driven internally or by the regulator and occur as these old rules, benchmarks and 
indexes no longer relate to the financial products being traded and so their adoption 
is of no instrumental value to the organization. The IMS facilitates the 
discontinuation of these practices by their removal from the system and 
correspondingly prevents user access to such functionality by constraining the IMS 
affordances (Leonardi 2011; Majchrzak and Markus 2013). Thus, the IMS imposes 
a disciplinary effect and constrains behaviours by preventing access to outmoded 
methodologies and rules and by enforcing revised governance practices. The 
findings show that as new benchmarks arise and achieve acceptance, then old 
methodologies may become discarded. In summary, the deinstitutionalization of 
methodologies associated with calculating acceptable limits on types of trades may 
also necessitate the reconfiguration of associated IMS. As these methodologies are 
introduced externally this mechanism of deinstitutionalization occurs at the field 
level.  
Oliver (1992) suggests that pressures arising from increased technical 
specificity will act to reduce ambiguity regarding the process and outputs required 
and so deinstitutionalise those practices which are no longer deemed functionally 
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appropriate. She advises that this pressure emanates from the field level, as when 
processes and technologies for achieving goals are unclear then their 
appropriateness is more likely to be determined by the confidence and collective 
understandings of field participants. If further clarity is provided regarding 
functional requirements, those practices which have been embedded but do not 
meet the new standards may become deinstitutionalised. For Oliver, a lack of 
technical specificity and the corresponding possibility of selecting various solutions 
allows for a forum where censuses can be reached between organizational members 
as to the most legitimate approach. In Oliver’s examples, institutionalised practices 
are removed as the organization internally decides that the practice is no longer 
functionally valid. Thus, Oliver places discretionary choices through collective 
decision making as central to the deinstitutionalization process. By doing so, she 
emphasizes an agency influenced perspective of institutionalization. The findings 
support Oliver’s argument, in that I find an environment where technical specificity 
through more prescriptive regulations has indeed caused practices, to become 
discontinued. However, in this study the pressure to deinstitutionalise does not just 
emanate at the intra-organizational level, from choices made within the 
organization but also from new external regulatory obligations, derived at the field 
level. For example, the pressure to discontinue the use of manual processes comes 
not from internal choice and agency but from external coercive regulatory pressure. 
Consequently, this finding gives primacy to the structuralist perspective. Due to a 
change in the regulator’s expectations, the use of the IMS is becoming embedded as 
firms seek legitimacy from the regulator through the adoption of such systems. 
Agency is reduced as the organization’s discretionary options for meeting 
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compliance is diminished. Therefore, this finding gives primacy to isomorphic 
forces and correspondingly the structuralist perspective.  
To summarize, at the intra-organizational level, the antecedents of 
deinstitutionalization identified include: the changing economic utility of 
established practices and the increasing technical specificity of the IMS. At the 
field level, Vendor changes to the IMS, the introduction of new methodologies, 
benchmarks and indices, unexpected economic events and the external assessment 
of performance have all acted as antecedents for the deinstitutionalization of 
previously embedded compliance practices. 
7.3. Political Pressures 
Oliver (1992 p. 569) suggests that ‘the development of political dissensus or 
conflicting interests that disrupt the unanimity of agreement among organizational 
members on the value of a particular practice will be a critical antecedent to 
deinstitutionalization.’ She suggests that the de-legitimization of organizational 
practices may be caused by ‘… a growth in the criticality or representation of 
organizational members whose interests or beliefs conflict with the status quo’ 
(1992 p. 568). The study showed that within financial organizations, fund managers 
and senior traders are perceived as powerful individuals critical to the 
organization’s success. The study highlights how pressures to adopt IMS are, on 
occasion, being resisted by such front office individuals. Often there was perceived 
to be a resistance on the part of Fund Managers to move away from manual 
processes such as trading over the phone or using spreadsheets towards adopting 
automated practices, in the form of trading through electronic platforms. In this 
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context, the dissensus is not just internal within the organization, as Oliver 
suggests, but between traders and fund managers at the intra-organizational level 
and with the Regulator’s views on appropriate practices at the field level. These 
finding shows how conflict between internal and external entities, advocating 
conflicting institutional practices, may act to deinstitutionalise the practice whose 
proponent loses the conflict. This finding is relevant to current discourse between 
institutional scholars. In addition to the structuralist versus agency debate, an 
additional dialogue centres on the role of performance (Heugens and Lander 2009). 
Scholars of institutionalism have highlighted how isomorphic conformity may 
conflict with the organization’s performance and technical efficiency (Lawrence et 
al. 2009a; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Zucker 1987). Some theorists hold the view that 
organizations adopt new practices primarily to be perceived as acceptable and 
legitimate, regardless of their impact on performance (DiMaggio and Powell. 1983; 
Heugens and Lander 2009). In contrast, other scholars suggest that organizations 
are likely to favour practices that allow them to achieve substantive benefits as well 
as status, reputation and legitimacy (Deephouse 1999; Westphal et al. 1997). The 
study contributes to this debate by investigating the tensions between practices 
prescribed by the regulator and those practices which are deemed by powerful 
organizational members as being superior. Where institutional adherence conflicts 
with efficiency, conformity may be ‘ceremonial’ or at the surface (Pfeifer 1983; 
Zucker 1987). This ceremonial conformity is achieved by decoupling symbolic 
practices from the organization’s performance driven activities (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). However, these practices deemed technically superior may themselves also 
be institutionally defined and embedded internally within organizations (Carroll et 
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al. 1986). Furthermore, Zajac and Westphal (2004) highlight how decoupling may 
occur in organizations where powerful actors may mediate institutional effects.  
The study revealed that traders and fund managers may conform to the 
requirement to adopt an IMS but may use the system merely to record trades after 
transactions have been conducted over the phone. By doing so, they circumvent the 
IMS capability to highlight non-compliant trades before execution and the resultant 
requirement to work closer with the firm’s compliance professionals. The outcome 
of this evasion is that these individuals avoid erosion of internally institutionalised 
trading practices by meeting the bare minimum requirements of the Regulator and 
so seek to maintain practices they deem to be superior. Thus, powerful individuals 
at the intra-organizational level seek to reduce the effects of external pressures to 
deinstitutionalise practices in order to preserve their own internally institutionalised 
working practices. Consequently, these individuals are attempting to exercise their 
own selectivity and discretion over the institutional practices available. Thus, we 
see institutions derived at the intra-organisational level competing with institutions 
from the field level and correspondingly, agency and selectivity competing with 
structural isomorphism.  
For Oliver, political dissensus may come from growth in the power or 
criticality of individuals. The study shows that there may be resistance to the 
regulators attempts to deinstitutionalise trading practices. However, this resistance 
emanates not from a growth in the criticality or representation of organizational 
constituents but from individuals which already hold powerful positions. Traders 
and Fund Managers seek ways to maintain their own institutions, while appearing 
legitimate in the eyes of other institutional constituents, such as the regulator. 
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However the study also revealed that the growth in criticality of compliance 
professionals was also an antecedent to the deinstitutionalization of practices. The 
findings show that compliance executives have become empowered as a result of 
the crisis. This has led to compliance professionals having more power to prevent 
inappropriate trading behaviours. For example, compliance executives were 
perceived as having increased power to veto risky transactions or the extension of 
clients’ credit limits. Prior to the financial crisis, the status quo was to allow trading 
professionals to sometimes overrule compliance executives. Yet, the research 
participants felt that the empowerment of the compliance function has led to the 
discontinuation of often over ruling compliance professionals. The empowerment 
of the compliance function has occurred in conjunction with a move towards 
strengthening compliance workflows. The automation of governance practices, 
through the IMS, allows structured workflows to be introduced which provide clear 
audit trails regarding how compliance breeches were managed. Thus, the 
introduction of such practices discontinues previous non-automated processes for 
managing breaches. The ability of compliance executives to restructure governance 
practices and correspondingly automate workflows is partly a result of increased 
empowerment across the compliance profession. This empowerment is drawn from 
the need to implement post-crisis regulatory obligations and also improve the 
robustness of compliance practices, to meet the Regulator’s enhanced supervisory 
approach.  
Oliver (1992 p. 568) notes that ‘the political conditions under which the de-
legitimization of organizational practices is predicted to occur include mounting 
performance crises’. The study found that one of the financial organizations was 
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found to be suffering a performance crisis and had lost money as a result of buying 
a hedge fund and had to downsize considerably. This organization was also found 
to be running five separate IMS type systems and so was in the process of 
rationalising these systems. Thus, deinstitutionalizing established systems and 
associated practices. Therefore, a performance crisis was also found to be an 
antecedent by which the organization sought to revaluate and rationalise its 
compliance systems to improve efficiency.  
Oliver (1992 p. 568), further observes that ‘increased pressures to adopt 
innovative practices’ may also cause deinstitutionalization. In recent years, as a 
result of declining returns on low risk instruments, firms have moved away from 
traditional product offerings and instead developed evermore complex financial 
instruments with higher yields, such as credit derivatives. These have in turn 
contributed to financial failures and so precipitated further regulation (Turner 
2009). In fact, the US Dodd-Frank Act and the EU European Market Infrastructure 
Regulation (EMIR) and Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation II (MIFIR) 
provide significant changes in the regulation of derivatives. These regulations 
implement G20 agreements to ensure that OTC derivatives, which have 
traditionally commanded strong margins, will now be cleared through a central 
clearing house and traded on regulated markets instead of being privately 
negotiated in order to reduce the risk of counterparty default and improve overall 
transparency within derivatives markets. (Financial Stability Board 2013).  
The study suggests that new innovations in products may delegitimize 
existing products and associated regulatory practices and thus require a 
reconfiguration of their IMS. An IMS Consultant explained:  
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‘We have one client who said that they would only always have one counter party 
for credit default swaps or for trading contracts for derivatives. But there would 
always be one counter party. Then all of a sudden they evolve the [financial] 
product and you find out that there’s multiple counterparties and the exposure has 
to be calculated for numerous counterparties and they had to seriously reconfigure 
the product…’  
Thus, at the organizational field level, we see financial innovation leading to 
financial failures and resulting in global regulatory change. By moving trading of 
derivatives to regulated markets regulators are deinstitutionalising previously 
embedded practices for trading such securities. As new complex financial products, 
such as credit derivatives, are found to have contributed to the financial crisis, 
further regulations addressing them have been introduced which require 
organizations to significantly change the underpinning practices which facilitate 
trading. Consequently, systems must again be reconfigured and unnecessary 
compliance practices made redundant. Thus, I observe pressures to innovate having 
a direct impact on regulatory practices. Furthermore, as firms increase the 
complexity of their product offerings in order to compete they may expose 
themselves to more onerous regulatory requirements, which in turn requires the 
reconfiguration of the IMS and the deinstitutionalization of established rule 
structures associated with now outdated practices.  
The findings show how political pressures emanating from regulatory 
changes can cause the deinstitutionalization of compliance practices through the 
reconfiguration of IMS. At the level of the organization, antecedents of 
deinstitutionalization which have been identified as present include, conflicting 
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internal interests and the criticality of organizational members whose interests or 
beliefs conflict with the status quo as well as mounting performance pressures. At 
the field level, increasing pressure to innovate was found to be an antecedent of the 
deinstitutionalization of regulatory practices.  
7.4. Conclusions 
This chapter aimed to answer three distinct research questions. The first 
question focused on identifying the compliance practices are being 
deinstitutionalised through the IMS. Table 19 summarizes the compliance practices 
which are being deinstitutionalised as a result of post-crisis regulatory change.  
Compliance Practices 
Principles based requirements and ‘light touch’ regulatory supervision 
Vendor defined Templates of regulatory rules 
Autonomous organizational structures for compliance 
Locally developed compliance practices which fall outside of newly defined best practice 
Manual processes for meeting compliance 
Redundant workflows and governance processes 
Outmoded automated rules, methodologies and data fields 
Retirement of duplicate systems 
Front office executives’ ability to override compliance executives 
Table 19: Deinstitutionalised Compliance Practices Source: author 
The second research question focused on identifying the social, political and 
functional pressures to deinstitutionalise practices for compliance. This question 
was addressed by empirically evaluating the theoretical constructs summarized in 
Table 8. Consequently, I delineate sub-pressures which draw from Oliver’s broad 
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classifications of pressures, political, functional and social to categorize and 
describe the social forces observed. 
Table 20 summarises the social, functional and political sub-pressures 
which were identified by the study at the intra-organisational and field levels. 
Level of Analysis Political Pressure 
Functional 
Pressure 
Social Pressure 
Intra-Organizational 
Mounting 
performance crisis 
Changing 
economic utility of 
financial products 
Increasing 
structural 
aggregation 
Conflict between 
internal and external 
regulators and 
internal managers  
Increasing 
technical specificity 
of regulations 
Increased social 
fusion 
Organizational 
Field 
Increased 
innovation 
pressures 
Increasing 
technical specificity 
of IMS 
Changing 
regulatory rules 
and values and 
increased 
structural 
aggregation 
Increased 
empowerment of 
compliance 
professionals 
Emerging 
economic events 
and data 
Lack of uniformity 
and consensus 
and increased 
social fusion  
Table 20: Pressures to deinstitutionalize compliance practices (Adapted from Oliver 1992) 
A comparison of Table 8 and Table 20 shows that the results broadly 
empirically validate the pressures identified by Oliver. The findings directly 
support Oliver’s views that: increasing innovation; changing institutional rules and 
values; emerging events and data; mounting performance crisis and changing 
economic utility may all act to deinstitutionalise practices. No relevant data was 
collected to consider pressures increasing competition.  
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The study also supports Oliver’s views that social fragmentation may lead 
to deinstitutionalization. However, the study builds on this concept and highlights 
how social fusion, the building of consensus and agreement regarding practices and 
norms, may displace embedded practices which fall outside this consensus. The 
analysis found no examples of Oliver’s concept of structural disaggregation. 
However, the analysis built on this useful construct and found that structural 
aggregation, the increased interactivity of dispersed geographical entities, may also 
cause working practices to be discontinued. Evidence of both structural aggregation 
and normative fusion was found at both intra-organizational and field levels. This is 
perhaps unsurprising, as conceptually they are related. While normative fusion 
refers to the building of consensus, structural aggregation refers to a reduction in 
geographical and parochial differentiation, which assists consensus building.  
The use of technology to centralize governance practices and achieve 
efficiencies is well established (Ross and Weill 2005). Given these findings then, 
scenarios where organizations move towards an aggregated, as opposed to 
fragmented strategy, seems likely to occur often. Furthermore, it is interesting to 
note that the creation, dissemination and application of standardised rule templates 
through the Vendor to various firms was unsuccessful due to nuances in each 
organizations data and asset classification. However, at the intra-organizational 
level this approach of developing standardised templates of automated rules is 
being applied within organizations across global divisions. As data and asset 
classification are already harmonised across different geographical operations 
within the same firm.  
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The findings supports Oliver’s view that increasing technical specificity 
may cause deinstitutionalization and shows how this pressure may be applied at the 
field level, by entities on which the organization is dependant becoming 
increasingly prescriptive in the results the practices by which they are achieved.  
The study revealed that financial organizations have a degree of discretion 
when choosing how to respond to regulatory requirements at the field or intra-
organisational level, although this is being diminished through the adoption of 
prescriptive regulatory rules.  However, organizations may control their exposure to 
regulatory responsibilities by being selective over the types of transaction in which 
they engage and the products they offer. They also have some degree of choice over 
the types of systems and processes they adopt to meet regulatory obligations.  
 The third contribution of this chapter is to define empirical predictors of 
deinstitutionalization relevant to this research setting and so extends the empirical 
predictors outlined by Oliver. Table 21 summarizes these predictors and highlights 
to practitioners and policy makers the factors contributing to the abandonment or 
erosion of established practices within financial services. 
Intra-organizational Factors Organizational Field Relations 
Political Dissensus 
Declining organizational performance or 
crisis 
Dissensus between the Regulator and 
proponents of embedded organizational 
practices  
Social environment pressures  
Changing regulations 
Changing societal expectations regarding 
regulatory governance and supervision 
International consensus regarding 
regulatory change and reform 
Changes in functional necessity Random external occurrences 
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Removal of manual processes and 
adoption of  automated systems 
Loss of discretion in in how compliance 
practices are implemented 
Need to efficiently reallocate resources and 
share best practice 
Unforeseen financial events and data  
Political Conflict  
Conflict between internally derived and 
embedded working practices and newly 
formed regulatory expectations 
Changes in Social Consensus 
Agreement regarding standardisation/best 
practice 
Greater cohesion in compliance and trading 
practices across geographical operations  
Changes in functional requirements 
Greater technical specificity and 
prescription in regulatory rules 
Table 21: Empirical predictors of deinstitutionalization within financial services: Source:author 
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8. ANALYSIS: INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF COMPLIANCE 
PRACTICES 
In Chapter 7, the discussion focused on how the IMS acts as carrier for 
regulatory institutions and associated compliance practices. While Chapter 6 
focused on pressures which may cause compliance practices and behaviours to 
become deinstitutionalised. This chapter addresses the third and final set of 
theoretical constructs considered, mechanisms of institutionalization, see Table 9. 
Many of the post-crisis regulations focus on introducing new regulations which are 
correspondingly causing new compliance practices to become embedded in 
financial organizations. The findings show that new practices are being embedded 
as a result of regulatory change. However, as the study progressed it became 
apparent that important counter mechanisms were also at work which limited the 
ability of the IMS to completely facilitate new practices. In this chapter I aim to 
make a contribution by highlighting the important role of the IMS in complying 
with post crisis regulations but also the limitations of the system in completely 
institutionalising new practices. The chapter addresses the following research 
questions: 
 How are new compliance practices and behaviours becoming 
institutionalised through the IMS and what factors may prohibit this? 
o What are the coercive, normative and mimetic mechanisms at work? 
o What are the sub-mechanisms by which new compliance practices 
are becoming established? 
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o What are the counter-mechanisms which may limit new compliance 
practices becoming institutionalised?  
 
Figure 16 A Model of Institutionalization through IMS use. Source:author 
Figure 16 provides a model of the concepts discussed in this chapter to 
address the research questions. The model highlights the relationship between, 
institutional mechanisms, the research context and non-prescribed persistent 
practices. The following section draws from the conceptual model outlined in 
Figure 16 to present the discussion. The first section focuses on how inappropriate 
trading behaviours may become displaced through monitoring and surveillance 
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practices facilitated by the IMS. The next section discusses the automation and 
consolidation of systems. Finally, the last section discusses how new compliance 
practices are developed through a social process of sharing and learning. Finally, 
some conclusions will be drawn. 
8.1. Mechanisms of Segregation and Monitoring 
The post-crisis regulatory landscape provides enhanced frameworks for 
enforcement and the application of sanctions. For example, the US Dodd-Frank Act 
establishes a ‘bounty’ for whistle blowers who report violations to the Regulator. 
The Act allows the whistle blower to receive a percentage of the fine imposed. This 
‘bounty’ has the potential to be of considerable value. For example, in 2012 
Goldman Sachs was fined $22 million for sharing non-public information with its 
Traders (Orol 2012) and Barclays Bank was fined $200 million for manipulation of 
the LIBOR rate (CFTC 2012). Employees and partner organizations are now 
strongly incentivised to report wrong doings. Consequently, organizations are 
seeking to enhance their systems and controls to prevent failures and associated 
costs and loss of reputation.  
The Vendor has responded to the need to provide enhanced surveillance and 
monitoring controls by introducing additional services. Their ‘Compliance 
Monitoring Services’ comprise specialists employed by the Vendor to review and 
assess overnight compliance incidents and provide a daily summary of alerts, 
warnings, actions taken and items requiring escalation. This service is deemed as 
complimentary and is not designed to replace their clients’ own monitoring 
activities. Instead, it enhances financial organisations’ existing monitoring 
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arrangements and so allows organizations greater assurance of maintaining 
compliance.  
However, the concepts illustrated in Figure 16 suggest that there may 
remain possibilities of inappropriate actions that new operational practices may be 
unable to eliminate. Individuals or groups of individuals may seek ways to 
circumvent systems of control. The creation of new regulations and associated 
systems of control are mostly reactive and may seek to plug gaps which have 
become evident due to events which have shown the existing framework as lacking 
and unable to fully prevent undesirable behaviour. Regulators’ abilities to foresee 
and prevent future scandals are limited. While often providing enhancements to 
existing frameworks, the introduction of new regulatory frameworks and associated 
systems of control also provide new opportunities for loopholes and shortcomings 
in design to be exploited (Gillespie et al. 2012). Even where new regulatory rules 
are robust, powerful individuals may act to influence and weaken controls at the 
point of design and implementation. By doing so, they may ensure that controls are 
not sufficiently robust to fully prevent inappropriate behaviour and that there exist 
pathways through the system‘s workflows which allow them to evade key points of 
control. Consequently, newly embedded practices are unlikely to completely 
eradicate market abuse.  
In 2012, the case of Kweku Adoboli, perpetrator of the UK’s biggest bank 
fraud at the time of writing, highlights how pre-crisis regulatory responses to 
market abuse have been unable to prevent losses. Adoboli was a former UBS 
employee, whose unauthorised and misguided market calls created loses of £1.4 
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billion (Croft 2012). In addition, the Regulator fined UBS £29.7 million for having 
‘systems and controls failings.’ (FSA 2012a p.1). The Regulator found that: ‘the 
trade capture and processing system had significant deficiencies, which Adoboli 
exploited in order to conceal his unauthorised trading.’ This case is illustrative of 
how existing regulation and UBS systems for monitoring transactions were 
inadequate to prevent the losses incurred. Systems such as the IMS may reduce the 
possibilities of such frauds by separating the process of order selection from order 
fulfilment and correspondingly the role of the fund manager from the trader. 
Research into fraudulent activities suggests that the potential for fraud is increased 
where there are incentives, often in the form of the need to meet targets or hide 
losses, together with the ability to rationalise the fraud and crucially, the 
opportunity to commit the act (Albrecht et al. 1995). The IMS provides a pivotal 
role in preventing opportunities for market abuse and assuring that individuals do 
not have inappropriate access to processes and systems by which they may commit 
unauthorised transactions. The Regulator’s (FSA 2010b p.1) Handbook states that 
organizations ‘…should segregate the duties of individuals and departments in such 
a way as to reduce opportunities for financial crime or contravention of 
requirements and standards under the regulatory system.’ 
The IMS separation of order creation and fulfilment goes some way to 
meeting this requirement. However, a senior implementation consultant described a 
case where the client wanted to configure the IMS workflows to provide the Fund 
Manager with the capability to override compliance violations generated as a result 
of rule breeches. This was seen as highly abnormal and in contradiction to the 
segregation of duties required by the Regulator and was strongly discouraged by the 
312 
 
 
IMS consultant. This suggests, though, that while firms may seek to use technology 
to embed appropriate trading practices and displace non-compliant and illegal 
trading behaviours, there remains potential for committed individuals to find ways 
round these systems and so the possibility for un-prescribed behaviour persists. To 
summarize, enhanced surveillance mechanisms, while certainly necessary, rely 
mainly on coercive mechanisms and are ultimately likely to prove fallible as 
conformity is only one possible response to such pressure (Streeck and Thelen 
2005). 
8.2. Mechanisms of Automation  
The findings provide evidence that compliance managers utilising the IMS 
in financial organizations now perceive their organization’s clients, the investors, as 
taking a heightened interest in compliance activities and that the demonstration of 
robust compliance practices through the adoption of automated compliance 
systems, such as the IMS, are now critical for winning new clients. 
 Furthermore, several of the compliance executives interviewed felt that 
post crisis, the Regulator has become interested in not only whether financial 
organizations are ensuring outcomes which meet regulatory requirements but on 
how they achieve these outcomes. In their view, financial organizations’ ability to 
exercise discretion in how they implement compliance practices has become more 
limited. Several of the study’s participants noted how, before the financial crisis, 
the Regulator operated on a principles-based approach and was not overly 
concerned with the systems financial organizations employed, as long as the system 
provided the required outcomes. However, post-crisis ‘intense supervision’ has 
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been adopted by the Regulator. One way in which this has manifest has been the 
perception that the Regulator disapproves of organizations utilising spread sheets 
and many different applications instead of a core system. Furthermore, the 
Regulator was seen as coercing organizations to adopt specific systems, such as the 
IMS, thereby reducing individual organizations’ discretion over how they met their 
regulatory obligations.  It was felt that the Regulator was leaning towards preferred 
systems providers and if those systems were utilised the adoptive organization 
would come under less scrutiny. However, many of the compliance executives also 
felt that the Regulator would not explicitly endorse specific systems’ vendors for 
fear of setting a legal precedent if such systems fail. Consequently, pressure to 
adopt automated compliance systems is an informal type of coercive pressure as 
opposed to one formally applied through rules inscribed in regulatory mandates. 
However, in the view of one respondent while organizations remain compliant, 
there is little the Regulator can do other than enhance its monitoring of that firm if 
that organization chooses to use such methods. In contrast, a systems consultant 
described how he felt the balance of power was shifting away from the front office 
and forcing powerful individuals working at the front office to adopt automated 
practices for enacting transactions. In the view of one of the traders interviewed, 
this new approach was seen to be unnecessarily prescriptive and dictatorial. Some 
companies currently do not trade electronically via IMS instead they will conduct 
their transactions via phone by communicating directly with a broker and then use 
the IMS to record trades through manual input. Whilst acknowledging the need for 
tighter regulation, the Trader would have preferred to maintain control over how 
transactions are enacted as he felt that phone trading allowed important advantages 
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over a purely electronic approach. Furthermore, some respondents were sceptical as 
to whether the adoption of the IMS would significantly displace existing manual 
practices such as telephone trading, suggesting that the adoption of the IMS may be 
merely ceremonial. They took the view that fund managers and traders will find 
ways to continue to work the way they have previously, but will comply with the 
need to have an IMS but only use the IMS to track holdings by employing people to 
enter data into the IMS after trades have been completed.  
However, a systems consultant suggested that it may be in the firm’s 
interest to trade electronically via the IMS proprietary network. In his opinion, 
benefits to this approach include allowing lower value orders to be traded 
algorithmically. This would allow these transactions to be automatically logged 
within the system and so prevent possible errors if they were to be inputted later. 
High value orders could still be traded over the phone and so Traders would still 
benefit from talking directly to brokers to ensure the best spread. Thus, it is possible 
that these benefits may act to further justify use of the IMS and enable it to become 
embedded within the organization, thereby displacing other trading practices. 
Currently, there is a debate as to whether new exchanges and platforms for trading 
derivatives will allow voice trading or be purely electronic (Rennison 2011). In 
addition, MiFID II requires that organizations report trades to the market as close to 
real-time as technically possible, thereby coercing firms into using systems which 
facilitate electronic trading.  
As a consequence of the Regulator’s change in approach, manual practices 
and, in particular the uses of spread sheets for managing trades are becoming 
increasingly condemned by the Regulator. A compliance manager provided the 
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example of his firm where, in the post-crises environment, they had some extremely 
successful fixed income Fund Managers. Despite their success, the Regulator 
recommended they stop using their current process which was Excel based, simply 
because the risk was deemed unacceptable. He noted that if there had been any 
‘financial faux pas’ or trading errors they would have been heavily fined and that 
the credibility of the Fund Managers would also have been damaged resulting in a 
large overall financial reputational cost.  
Unsurprisingly, all the compliance executives interviewed stated a 
preference for automated controls over manual ones. They preferred to automate as 
many of their controls as possible through the IMS, as in addition to reducing input 
errors, the IMS also facilitates real-time monitoring of positions against changing 
market data. However, a system’s consultant suggested that the displacement of 
spread sheets was likely to be resisted by front-office employees such as Traders. 
He suggested that some of these individuals ‘were less IT savvy’ and so were 
resistant to technological change and felt that the use of spread sheets was, ‘tried 
and tested’ and they therefore lobbied to preserve this practice and prevent its 
displacement. This perspective was shared by a Trader.  
Some compliance managers also felt that predicting the demise of spread 
sheets was premature. They suggested that the use of spread sheets may 
compliment the IMS by providing capabilities for monitoring the effectiveness of 
automated rules, processes and controls over time. An IT manager suggested that in 
the case of regulatory compliance or business critical processes, periodic manual 
checks should also be undertaken to validate results. This view was supported by 
several compliance mangers who expressed the view that a truly diligent approach 
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to compliance requires that the results of automated systems are validated, as 
controls like processes may change over time. Consequently, some managers were 
of the opinion that the use of spread sheets will persist if only for validation 
purposes.  
Furthermore, the IMS is not always able to automate new regulatory 
requirements immediately. Due to tight implementation deadlines for new 
regulations  there may exists a lag between the regulatory requirement coming into 
force and the IMS being able to automate the new rules, perhaps due to new data 
fields being required. A compliance manager described this process as, ‘Lagging 
Functionality.’ He observed that firstly, there is an initial analysis and interpretation 
of the regulatory requirement where it is decided that the IMS will not support the 
requirement. In this case, they must design a manual process. The rule is then 
entered as a high risk into a larger ‘matrix of regulation’, which is also a manually 
updated spread sheet, used to track automated and manual regulatory controls. This 
analysis is then fed back to the Vendor who often builds an enhancement into the 
system allowing the manual rule to be retired. However, this process may take time, 
often over a year and so there can be a significant lag between the regulation 
coming into force and the IMS being able to fully automate the necessary controls 
and underlying business process.  
8.3. Mechanisms of Standardization 
The post-crisis environment has caused organizations to revaluate their 
approaches to key areas of regulatory compliance. As more requirements come into 
force and the cost of compliance rises some organizations are looking to both 
317 
 
 
strengthen their own capabilities and ensure they are robust, while also looking for 
ways to reduce the costs of compliance. Several of the compliance managers 
highlighted the high costs of meeting post-crisis regulation, at a time where 
financial organizations’ profit’s margins are being diminished due to shifting 
economic circumstances (The Economist 2012b). Consequently all the compliance 
managers interviewed agreed that there existed more financial pressure to operate 
compliance activities in a cost efficient manner. By adopting a more strategic 
enterprise wide approach to managing common compliance themes, financial 
organizations are aiming to standardize compliance practices and reduce the overall 
cost of compliance. The opportunity to streamline and standardize practices across 
global operations is enabled by the fact that many of the new regulations are 
derived from G20 agreements and so post-crises regulations in different countries 
and regulatory jurisdictions are to a large degree similar in focus. Consequently, 
many of the financial organizations who participated in the study were seeking to 
run initiatives to standardize and streamline compliance practices globally by 
organizing efforts around common regulatory themes, such as surveillance and 
monitoring. Other organizations were continuing to organize compliance on a 
region by region basis. The IMS facilitates the standardization of compliance 
practices by allowing organizations to define and share standardised compliance 
rules, termed ‘Master Tests’ across different countries and trading desks. Each 
department would then use the ‘Master Tests’ as a template and modify them 
depending on their own individual requirements and nuances in the obligations 
stipulated by their local Regulator. Furthermore, the Senior Relationships 
Manager’s view that his clients are now more willing to adopt the Vendor’s pre-
318 
 
 
defined Workflows, if so, this will act to increase the standardization of compliance 
practices across financial organizations. 
8.4. Mechanisms of Consolidation  
From the Regulator’s perspective, the use of disparate systems may affect 
an organization’s ability to aggregate its compliance positions across all the trading 
desks it operates globally. The study found that several of the financial institutions 
participating in the study used different systems with similar functionality to the 
IMS, provided by the IMS Vendor’s competitors. Often these systems were in use 
as a result of systems inherited through mergers and acquisitions. Where global 
organizations use numerous IMS type systems, if such systems do not integrate 
then the firm will not have a clear aggregated view of their global positions and 
correspondingly their overall compliance status. A senior consultant suggested that 
such integration was extremely difficult to achieve due to overall complexity and 
nuances in underlying data utilised by the systems.  
The study also found that the consolidation of data into ‘golden sources’ 
was integral in creating an aggregated view of the organizations’ compliance 
positions. The IMS utilises different data sources, see Table 13, often provided by 
third parties, this adding extra layers of complexity to data management efforts. The 
issue is further compounded when data is shared across departments who use data 
sourced at different points in time or from different sources. 
In summary, the inefficiency of disparate systems combined with the 
Regulator’s preference for organizations to adopt core systems are contributing 
factors in motivating many of the IMS vendor’s clients to undertake initiatives to 
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consolidate compliance systems and data. The purpose of these reviews is to 
displace or retire compliance practices and systems, now deemed redundant, costly 
and counter to the regulator’s preferred method and to introduce new practices such 
as core systems or ‘golden data sources’.  
However, the findings show that there is a conflict between providing a 
compliance platform that utilises ‘gold plated’ standardized processes and 
implementing new regulatory requirements within the designated timeframes. 
While compliance managers are struggling with implementing the nuances of 
specific regulations under tight time frames, senior management are striving to 
reduce the costs of compliance and adopt more efficient and standardized 
approaches across the organization.  
As Figure 16 suggests, in addition to nonconformist behaviour new 
regulative institutions may also have unintended effects. Several compliance 
managers felt that there was a considerable ‘opportunity cost’ to implementing new 
requirements. They felt that the scale of change required to meet post-crisis 
regulations and the tight time frames for implementation required by the regulator 
were resulting in the development of poor compliance architectures as there was 
little time and few resources available to adopt fully automated solutions or replace 
disparate systems with a core system.  
8.5. Mechanisms of Interpretation, Sharing and Learning 
The respondents described the way they interpret and make sense of new 
regulations. Several of the compliance managers felt that they knew many of the 
post crisis regulations were ambiguous. Due to the tight timeframes between the 
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final regulation being released and the implementation deadline, organizations must 
begin working on remediation projects from incomplete draft versions of the 
mandate.  
While the Regulator’s approach is seen to be more prescriptive, teams 
working to implement new compliance requirements must still interpret the 
relevance of the new rules to the organization’s activities and products. 
Subsequently, they must design and codify relevant rules into the IMS rules library. 
As previous neo-institutionalist studies have shown, the interpretation of mandates 
may be seen as a dynamic process, led by informed professionals, to shape 
understanding of laws and their implications (Edelman et al. 1999). The 
participants suggested that programs for delivering specific areas of regulatory 
change often will require cross-functional teams. An example given was MiFID II 
which includes a requirement to extend the scope of trades and transactions which 
must be reported to firm’s regulatory authorities. Within this example, the IMS 
ability to manage asset classes and currencies is pivotal as is its ability to capture 
the transaction data to be reported to the regulator. The implementation of this type 
of requirement necessitates views from various professional perspectives and 
organizational functions including: legal experts, traders, compliance, IT, risk and 
project managers. In addition, these teams may draw from established standards for 
best practice, such as the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) 
framework for internal control or the Control Objectives for Information and 
related Technology (COBIT)
3
. 
                                                 
3
 From a regulatory perspective COSO and COBIT provide two important frameworks. The COSO 
framework outlines five major domains of control: the control environment, risk assessment, control 
321 
 
 
Respondents commented that in the post-crisis environment competing 
organizations are more willing to share regulatory solutions. The study’s 
participants discussed how existing compliance practices are often defined or 
amended as a result of sharing and social interaction with peers. Several 
compliance managers described how they would regularly attend ‘discussion 
groups’ focused on specific areas of regulatory change. These meetings, also 
termed ‘forums,’ were often hosted by third party service providers such as 
consultancies or law firms. The purpose of these meetings was to openly discuss 
and share challenges and approaches for meeting new regulatory requirements 
In addition to forums focused on specific nuances of regulation, the 
interviews showed that users of the IMS in competing financial organizations had 
set up regular group meetings to discuss ways in which the IMS was being utilized 
and configured. According to the research participants, typical areas of discussion 
at these meetings focused on issues relating to data, configuring and testing 
automated rules and discussing systems gaps and upgrades. Representatives from 
the IMS vendor were deliberately excluded from these meetings. It was felt that 
their presence had previously limited discussions around the system’s ability to 
meet current regulatory challenges.  
                                                                                                                                        
activities, information and communication, and monitoring (COSO. 1992. "Internal Control - 
Integrated Framework Executive Summary."   Retrieved 19th September, 2009, from 
http://www.coso.org/publications/executive_summary_integrated_framework.htm ). However, 
COSO is a highly abstract conceptual framework and does not specifically address IT. 
Consequently, organizations often look to supplement COSO with COBIT. COBIT provides 
organizations with reasonable assurance of their IT control structure and maps to the COSO 
framework (IT Governance Institute. 2012. "Cobit 5: A Business Framework for the Governance 
and Management of Enterprise It  "   Retrieved 15th October, 2012, from 
http://www.isaca.org/COBIT/Pages/default.aspx). Both frameworks are used as a benchmark by 
auditors and regulators specifically in the context of meeting the internal control requirements of 
Sarbanes-Oxley (Tuttle, B., and Vandervelde, S.D. 2007. "An Empirical Examination of Cobit as an 
Internal Control Framework for Information Technology," International Journal of Accounting 
Information Systems (8:4), pp. 240-263.) 
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Respondents highlighted how compliance managers in competing 
organizations frequently met informally on an ad-hoc one-to-one basis, to discuss 
the approaches being adopted by one another and how they were meeting new 
requirements through the IMS. One compliance manager in particular felt that these 
personal networks were far more useful than discussion groups and forums for 
sharing approaches to meeting new regulatory requirements. These findings show 
that compliance managers using the IMS have developed communities and personal 
networks whereby they can freely and openly exchange and mimic one another’s 
practices and so together derive similar responses to regulatory issues.  
The views of the research participants were extremely mixed when asked if 
overall compliance systems bought a competitive advantage. Some thought that it 
did and pointed to the role of the IMS in winning new business. In the post-crisis 
world, investors see the adoption of such IMS as a legitimate means to ensure 
meeting regulatory objectives. The expectation of the client is that firms will have 
such systems in place. The IMS acts as an expected norm or standard to assure 
investors that their financial interests will be safeguarded through compliant 
behaviours. In this way, the use of such systems is becoming further 
institutionalised. 
However, other participants felt that compliance system do not provide a 
significant competitive advantage. They felt that their businesses competed by 
making profitable investments and not meeting regulatory obligations. Other 
participants suggested that if compliance practices failed and the organization was 
fined and suffered a loss of reputation then compliance could be ‘a source of 
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competitive disadvantage.’ However, the fact that compliance professionals were so 
willing to share approaches with peers in competing firms suggests that compliance 
is not viewed as a source of differentiation. 
8.6. Conclusions 
This section also outlines the mechanisms distilled from the findings which 
act to embed compliance practices. Drawing on the work of institutionalists I 
identified three broad institutional mechanisms by which regulations may embed 
compliance practices, namely coercive, normative and mimetic mechanisms see 
Table 9. However, I find that these broad terms have insufficient granularity to 
explain the phenomena studied. Consequently, I delineate sub-mechanisms which 
draw from these three institutional mechanisms and categorize and describe the 
social forces observed. I find that these sub-mechanisms do not have an individual 
one-to-one mapping with each of the institutional mechanisms. Furthermore, the 
study identifies social mechanisms, termed ‘Limiting Mechanisms’ which may 
limit the ability of the IMS to institutionalise compliance practices. Such 
mechanisms may potentially limit the extent to which new compliance practices 
may become embedded and enable existing practices no longer deemed appropriate 
to persist.  Table 22 summarizes these findings. Each of the table’s sub-mechanisms 
is now discussed in turn.    
Sub-Mechanism 
Coercive 
Mechanisms 
Normative 
Mechanisms 
Mimetic 
Mechanisms 
 
Limiting 
Mechanisms 
 
Monitoring  
 
Y 
 
N 
 
N 
Exploitation of 
Loopholes  
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Segregation Y Y N 
Negatively 
Influencing 
Workflow 
Design  
Automation Y Y N 
Validation, 
Resistance to 
Technological 
Change and 
Lagging 
Functionality  
Consolidation Y N N 
Remediation 
Pressure 
Standardization N Y Y 
Remediation 
Pressure 
Sharing and 
Learning 
Y N Y 
Competative 
Ambience 
Table 22: Mechanisms of Institutionalization  
The first sub-mechanism is termed ‘Monitoring’ and refers to the way the 
IMS facilitates monitoring of trading behaviour against automated compliance 
rules. The system acts to ensure compliance by both constraining and enabling the 
transactions in which the financial organization may engage. In this way, the IMS 
seeks to coerce compliant actions and remove inappropriate trading behaviours 
through adherence to regulatory rules which are inscribed in the system. However, 
there exists the possibility that individuals will find loopholes in the regulations 
themselves, and thereby limit the IMS ability to prevent inappropriate behaviour. 
The ability of the IMS to prevent behaviour is highly dependent on the quality of 
the regulations inscribed in the system. If the post-crisis regulations are ineffective 
at preventing future crisis then so will be the systems that enact them.    
The next sub-mechanism is termed ‘Segregation’ and describes how the 
IMS acts to segregate the roles of those who define and select orders with those 
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who fulfil them. The IMS also seeks to segregate those who participate in trading 
activities from those who monitor and sign off compliance breeches. By doing so, 
the IMS seeks to meet regulatory requirements to appropriately segregate roles and 
so prevent the inappropriate structuring of processes for conducting investment 
activities. Thus, a key mechanism through which practice is changed is coercion to 
regulatory requirements. In addition, normative pressures are applied emanating 
from expectations regarding the duties and responsibilities contained with a 
person’s role in the financial organization. For example, it was not considered 
appropriate that a Fund Manager have the responsibility of signing off compliance 
breaches. However, the findings showed that powerful individuals, such as Fund 
Managers, may seek to limit the effectiveness of this sub-mechanism by aiming to 
circumvent these controls at the point where the systems’ workflows are being 
designed to fit the client’s business.  
The third sub-mechanism identified is ‘Automation’. This describes the 
process by which manual processes for managing trades and compliance are being 
displaced through use of the IMS. This is occurring as the result of the Regulator’s 
push for financial organizations to adopt automated approaches deemed more 
reliable for trading and compliance practices. This requirement is not explicitly 
stipulated in the Regulator’s Handbook. Instead, the Regulator is perceived as 
placing pressure on organizations to adopt automated systems by increasing their 
supervision and pursuing heavy penalties if manual systems are adopted and fail. 
So, while the Regulator cannot coerce organizations to adopt automated systems 
formally, they may apply a softer informal coercion instead.   
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Furthermore, the clients of the financial organizations using the IMS are 
increasingly interested in the quality of the compliance practices utilised by the 
organizations. Investors are now expecting that organizations use appropriate 
systems to manage their holdings and ensure that their investments are being taken 
to the regulatory limits specified but not beyond to the point of breach. The IMS 
provides a legitimate means by which to pursue the goal of regulatory compliance 
while maximizing the positions taken on behalf of investors. The use of the IMS or 
similar systems is now becoming an expected norm by investors. Investors have a 
common expectation for how compliance activities should be conducted. They 
expect an automated system to be in place over a manual system facilitated by 
spread sheets. Thus, I identify both normative and coercive mechanisms as enabling 
the automation of manual processes.   
The complete automation of manual process is potentially limited by three 
counter mechanisms. The first is that the use of manual processes and particularly 
spread sheets is seen by many compliance managers as a useful tool to validate 
automated systems. The second is that powerful individuals, who may be less IT 
savy, such as senior traders and fund managers, may be resistant to moving away 
from what they deem as tried and tested previously institutionalised practices. They 
may be unwilling to adopt an electronic system of trading over arranging deals 
through the telephone or reduce their dependence on spread sheets. Consequently, 
the impact of the IMS and its ability to displace inappropriate actions, enabled 
through manual processes, may also be limited by resistance to technological 
change. The third limiting mechanisms is termed ‘Lagging Functionality’ and refers 
to the way in which systems, such as the IMS, may not be ready to facilitate 
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regulatory changes at the time of the remediation deadline. Consequently, such 
gaps in functionality are temporarily plugged with manual processes while the IMS 
vendor seeks to incorporate the required changes into the next version release.  
The fourth sub-mechanism identified is ‘Consolidation’ and refers to the 
consolidation of disparate systems and the use of a core system as well as the 
introduction of ‘golden data sources’. Financial organizations are being encouraged 
by the regulator to adopt a core system, which will allow organizations to establish 
an aggregated view of their holdings. Furthermore, requirements to aggregate 
holdings across departments require organizations to also aggregate siloed data 
sources. These requirements are not explicitly stipulated in the Regulator’s 
Handbook. The regulator was observed exercising a softer form of coercion to 
move financial organizations away from using numerous applications towards 
using a core system.  
A limiting mechanism which may hinder the rationalization of duplicate 
systems is termed ‘remediation pressure’. This refers to external pressure from the 
Regulator resulting in organizations making changes to practices to meet deadlines 
for implementing new regulatory requirements. Organizations’ may find their 
limited resources channelled towards meeting the Regulator’s formal deadlines 
thereby limiting their ability to implement new efficient more practices. Often 
deadlines emanate from G20 agreements on when countries should implement 
changes and so are relatively inflexible. Furthermore, many interviewees suggested 
that the challenge of meeting new regulatory requirements was inadvertently 
creating ‘poor compliance architectures’ with ad-hoc manual systems being used to 
fulfil regulatory requirements within the designated time frame. In summary, 
328 
 
 
remediation pressure to meet tight deadlines may prevent organizations from 
reviewing and consolidating redundant systems and may act to increase the number 
of disparate systems as organizations struggle to meet deadlines through the use of 
non-strategic ad-hoc systems.  
The fifth sub-mechanism is termed ‘Standardization’. This refers to 
initiatives taken by financial organizations to capitalise on the common regulatory 
topics introduced by the G20 agreements to streamline and standardize approaches 
for meeting common regulatory themes and thereby introduce firm-wide best 
practice. By doing so, organizations are aiming to reduce the total cost of 
compliance at a time when resources are diminished due to reduced trading 
volumes. Consequently, organizations are under no coercive pressure from the 
regulator to conduct such programs. Instead, the will to embed and standardize 
compliance practices, firm-wide, emanates from a need to ensure that such 
practices are appropriate to the organization’s changing business circumstances and 
not out of an instrumental need to meet regulatory requirements. The IMS acts to 
constrain and enable behaviours to facilitate the implementation of preferred best 
practice through the application of standardised compliance rules, in the form of the 
Vendor’s ‘Templates’ or ‘Master Tests’. ‘Master Tests’ are shared across similar 
business units operating in different countries, while the Vendor’s Templates are 
shared across financial organizations. 
Standardized practices are formulated through normative mechanisms. The 
structure of the practice is arrived at collectively through the application of 
professional values and the use of established standards. The creation of a 
standardized approach is informed by the professional values held by those 
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participating in the creation of the practice. For example, employees from the legal 
or IT departments each draw from their own conceptions of desirable practice 
derived from their professions to contribute to the formulation of a standardized 
approach to monitoring trades. In addition, norms relating to standards, such as 
COSO and COBIT also help to guide and influence the formulation of standardized 
practice. In summary, normative mechanisms contribute to the formulation of 
standardized practices by drawing from institutional norms such as institutionalised 
professional values and standards.   
I also identify mimetic mechanisms as contributing to this phenomenon. 
Shared logics of action and mimicry, across different departments and different 
countries, create similar isomorphic configurations of the IMS within the 
organization. This is facilitated as ‘Master Tests’ are shared and applied to similar 
business units. Furthermore, as standardised compliance practices are adopted and 
become embedded, they become legitimized by senior compliance executives as an 
approved process, firm-wide. 
‘Standardization’ sub-mechanisms may also be limited by counter 
mechanisms relating to remediation pressures. The need to meet regulators’ 
deadlines may limit opportunities to standardize compliance practices in some 
organizations. Several compliance managers felt that they were struggling to meet 
regulatory deadlines and did not have the time and resources to create and 
disseminate standardized practices which could be applied across different 
countries. For some financial organizations the ‘opportunity cost’ of meeting new 
regulatory requirements is the possibility of applying a strategic and holistic 
approach to compliance across different countries. The tight timeframes and 
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associated resources required to meet regulatory deadlines limit the opportunity to 
increase the efficiency of compliance practices globally and remove duplicate 
practices. Thus, pressures for remediation are again contributing to the development 
of ‘poor compliance architectures’.  
The last sub-mechanisms identified are termed ‘Sharing and Learning’ and 
refers to how practices for meeting new regulatory requirements are further shaped 
through communities of practice and socialization between peers in competing 
organizations. As a result of these interactions new approaches to compliance may 
be derived which instigate monitoring, segregation, automation and consolidation 
mechanisms. The study found that compliance executives in similar roles attended 
‘forums’ and ‘discussion groups’ where approaches to meeting new regulatory 
requirements were shared. Compliance executives using the IMS met frequently to 
discuss how they were utilising the system to meet new requirements. Furthermore, 
one-to-one informal meetings between peers in competing organizations to discuss 
common issues also facilitated the sharing of compliance practices. Such 
interactions were driven by expedience and the need to meet new regulatory 
requirements and so here too we observe coercive mechanisms at work.   
The driver for these social interactions was the need to respond to the 
uncertainty of upcoming regulatory challenges. This uncertainty is compounded by 
tight regulatory deadlines and the corresponding need to meet regulatory 
requirements before the mandates have been finalised. As a result of the ambiguity 
of the regulations faced by organizations, compliance managers sought to share and 
learn from one another and so mimic each other’s approaches, resulting in shared 
compliance practices becoming embedded. Consequently, I identify mimetic 
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institutional mechanisms at work. The data provided no insight into potential 
limiting mechanisms for ‘Sharing and Learning’ though the highly competitive 
attitude prevalent in the financial sector may have inhibited the sharing mechanism 
amongst some of the participants.  
In conclusion, the IMS is found to play an important role in complying with 
those regulatory obligations that can be met by applying quantitative restrictions to 
trades. The Vendor markets the system as providing a consolidated compliance 
platform for trading numerous asset types in various currencies. Financial 
organizations that use the IMS place expectations on the Vendor to maintain the 
system in order to ensure that it is able to meet upcoming requirements. The IMS 
clients expect the system to be able to facilitate their trading activities, now and in 
the future, and to provide them with a controlled process which both facilitates their 
investment activities while ensuring that trades are compliant and individual roles 
are appropriately segregated. The clients of the financial organizations, the 
investors, view the IMS as a legitimate way to manage trading activities and 
provide assurance that their investments will be appropriately managed. The 
Regulators view the IMS as a legitimate means to automate compliance practices, 
appropriately segregate duties and aggregate compliance positions.  
Overall, the expectation placed on the IMS is that by applying automated 
compliance rules to trades, inappropriate behaviours will be constrained and 
appropriate behaviour enabled. Through mechanisms of institutionlization the IMS 
is expected to embed new compliance practices and deinstitutionalise practices 
deemed inappropriate. This study sought to establish if the IMS fulfils this 
expectation. By drawing on DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) coercive, normative and 
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mimetic institutional mechanisms I was able to identify the sub-mechanisms which 
facilitated this process. Overall, the expectation that the IMS will enable post-crisis 
regulations by enabling and constraining behaviours is reasonable and to some 
extent it is fulfilled. However, as the study progressed it became apparent that 
important counter mechanisms were also at work which limited the ability of the 
IMS to completely facilitate the displacement process. Consequently, I find 
evidence, which suggests that the institutionalization of technology-induced 
compliant behaviour is likely but uncertain. 
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9. ANALYSIS: IS CAPABILITIES FOR MANAGING 
COMPLIANCE 
The previous chapters’ analysis has been developed based on Figure 5 and 
related theoretical constructs and so collectively seek to make an academic 
contribution. However, the study also aims to make a contribution to the 
practitioner community and so this chapter seeks to distil the findings into a model 
of IS capabilities for regulatory compliance useable by practitioners. Consequently, 
the IS capabilities discussed in this chapter have been refined into a maturity model 
for IS compliance, see Appendix 9. 
 The financial crisis revealed that the failure of financial organizations, such 
as Lehman Brothers, creates significant systemic risk to our economy (Gillespie et 
al. 2012). The enactment of new regulations designed to mitigate such risk and their 
robust delivery, through compliance practices underpinned by effective IS 
capabilities, has potential to provide social benefit by somewhat protecting the 
organizations’ stakeholders and the wider economy. Consequently, this chapter 
addresses the following research question:  
 What are the IS governance and management capabilities which support 
compliance activities? 
This section delineates the IS capabilities outlined in Figure 17, which are 
empirically derived from the study.  
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Figure 17: IS Capabilities for Regulatory Compliance. Source: author 
These requirements will require organizations to set limits on specific types 
of transactions, calculate exposures to certain securities, calculate risk values, and 
perform pre and post-trade analysis. From a systems perspective, the ability to 
accurately access, structure, monitor and report transaction related information is 
essential to meeting regulatory requirements. 
Capabilities for supporting IS governance and management are well 
documented (Feeny and Willcocks 1998; Willcocks et al. 2006). Examples of 
studies which have addressed the use of IS capabilities within specific business 
contexts include outsourcing of financial organization’s back office functions 
(Lacity et al. 2004), mergers and acquisitions (Robbins and Stylianou 1999), the 
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impact on firm performance (Ravichandran and Lertwongsatien 2002), competitive 
positioning (Doherty and Terry 2009) and supply chains (McLaren et al. 2004). 
However, the literature lacks studies which address the capabilities which underpin 
technologies facilitating post-crisis regulatory compliance. The nuances of IS 
capabilities for supporting the new regulatory landscape are distinct from other 
industries and so warrant investigation. 
9.1. Managing Internal Controls  
The post-crisis environment will oblige organizations to set limits on 
specific types of transactions, calculate exposures to certain instruments, calculate 
risk and collateral values, perform pre and post-trade analysis, have the ability to 
perform audits, quickly report executed trades to the market and facilitate the 
clearing and settlement of transactions. Furthermore, these regulatory rules to 
which financial organizations must adhere are applied on a transaction-by-
transaction basis. These mandates require systems to impose structured controls on 
the financial organization’s activities to ensure compliance. Unsurprisingly, the 
compliance executives interviewed stated a preference for automated controls over 
manual ones. The respondents suggested that controls for ensuring compliance 
related policies and risk tolerances should, wherever possible, be automated. 
However, manual controls may also require IS support as they may often utilize 
systems such as spread sheets or databases. Table 10 shows the percentage of rules 
within the participating financial organizations which were not automated by the 
IMS. The study also revealed that the IS function may encounter some resistance to 
automating controls, as individuals may be used to manual processes, such as 
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spread sheets.  Furthermore, in the case of regulatory compliance or business 
critical processes, periodic checks of the results of automated processes should also 
be undertaken. This is often achieved through comparing the outputs of an 
automated process with the outputs of a manual process. 
Controls are essential, not only to set tolerances and limits on financial 
positions and assets held, but also to enable levels of authority. Technology plays a 
pivotal role in preventing opportunities for market abuse and assuring that 
individuals do not have inappropriate access to processes and systems by which 
they may commit unauthorised transactions. Thus, a key control is the appropriate 
segregation of duties to prevent conflicts of interests and unethical behaviour. 
However, the introduction of new systems may provide opportunities for 
individuals to circumvent established controls and practices. As a precaution, one 
organization interviewed conducted an audit of systems’ access rights on a regular 
basis. 
9.2. Measuring, Monitoring and Reporting Transactions 
The next IS capability relates to the need to manage and report across all 
compliance activities within the organization and also to report transactions to 
markets and regulators. The measurement, monitoring and reporting of compliance 
activities enables strategic thinking at both the business and IS levels. The role of 
IS, in ensuring reporting requirements, is to facilitate the various channels of 
communication which are necessary to provide the appropriate data and to collate it 
and format it as required. Furthermore, compliance management technologies allow 
the measurement, management and reporting of controls and risk tolerances 
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associated with transactions. These are benchmarked against internal policies and 
regulatory requirements, as well as industry best practice and standards. A key 
compliance system adopted by the respondent organizations aggregates and 
monitors the positions held in accounts and portfolios to ensure the organization’s 
total holdings are compliant on an on-going basis. The system allows regulatory 
rules relating to limits on transactions to be transcribed into automated rules. The 
system facilities orders and automatically checks them against the automated 
compliance rules when the orders are scoped and also during an overnight batch 
process once they have been processed. These checks are performed in real-time as 
they consider the actual holdings against live market data.  
The Vendor has responded to the need to provide enhanced surveillance and 
monitoring by introducing additional services. Their ‘Compliance Monitoring 
Services’ comprise specialists employed by the vendor to review and assess 
compliance incidents and provide a daily summary of alerts, warnings, actions 
taken and items requiring escalation. This service is deemed as complimentary and 
is not designed to facilitate the wholesale outsourcing of monitoring activities. 
Instead, it compliments existing arrangements and so allows organizations greater 
assurance of maintaining compliance. 
9.3. IS Development & Procurement   
This capability relates to obtaining required functionality, either by 
purchasing capabilities from a vendor or through internal development. Our study 
revealed that organizations needing to implement new systems in order to meet new 
regulations may be forced to source such systems externally, as they may not have 
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the resources to develop the necessary systems internally within required 
timeframes. A senior compliance executive, noted,  
‘If we develop in-house, we have the internal IS cost, and all the rest of it, head 
count, that we need to bring in to do that. So we have to balance the cost of doing 
that and having the people on board and the on-going maintenance with paying a 
license fee and putting a package in place’ and ‘I mean the trade-off is the time 
though. I mean we can get an off-the-shelf system put in and up and running within 
three to six months. If we start an analysis process in-house to build this thing that 
we want to do exactly what we want to do, it’ll be a couple of years at least.’ 
Whether a bespoke or off-the shelf- approach is adopted, the organization is 
required to develop a clear understanding of the new controls and associated 
functionality required. For example, the MiFID II Directive requires that post trade 
information be published as close to real time as is technically possible (Linklaters, 
2012). This requires organizations to adopt new systems enabling real-time 
reporting to markets.  
The study revealed that the introduction of new regulatory requirements 
may cause gaps in compliance systems as new requirements come into force before 
internal development teams or vendors are able to develop the necessary 
functionality to bridge the gap. In the meantime, organizations may be forced to 
adopt riskier manual processes as vendors lag behind developing new areas of 
functionality. Systems supporting compliance must be continually developed and 
improved to stay current with the organization’s changing regulatory exposure and 
dynamic business environment.  
339 
 
 
The study revealed that organizations needing to implement new systems in 
order to meet new regulations may be forced to source such systems externally, as 
they may not have the resources to develop the necessary systems internally within 
required timeframes. Furthermore, the availability of new functionality for enabling 
compliance may also act to initially displace older systems. The new MiFID II EU 
Directive requires that organizations ensure new products/services comply with all 
applicable rules and that risks associated with new products are adequately 
managed (Linklaters, 2012). Correspondingly, several systems experts suggested 
that technologies underpinning compliance must be continually developed and 
improved to stay current with the organization’s changing regulatory exposure.  
Organizations may find that well-developed compliance systems with 
advanced functionality may provide an income stream as such systems are sold on 
to other entities. As one compliance executive, noted,  
‘I mean, sorry to say, in most investment management firms [compliance] is a cost 
centre, but here actually those compliance services can be sold to other entities that 
might want to use your compliance platform, pulling in data from the accounting 
system, running compliance, because they don’t have one.  So it can be sold, so it 
can be a profit centre, which it is here.’ 
9.4. Managing Third Parties  
Where outsourcing/offshoring arrangements are in place, contracts must 
reflect the level of service required to support compliance activities, adhere to 
internal policies and meet regulatory obligations. When meeting regulatory 
requirements, organizations should not assume that outsourcing key processes 
340 
 
 
means that they have delegated responsibility to their provider. The FSA and FCA 
rules states,  
‘when relying on a third party for the performance of operational functions which 
are critical for the performance of regulated activities… [firms must] on a 
continuous and satisfactory basis, ensure that it takes reasonable steps to avoid 
undue additional operational risk.’ (FSA, 2007b p.1).  
This requirement applies where organizations outsource the coding of compliance 
related controls into systems. The study revealed compliance systems’ vendors may 
now provide their clients with data feeds and prewritten automated compliance 
rules as part of their service offerings, thereby allowing clients to outsource areas of 
data ownership and raw coding. Furthermore, knowledge and process outsourcing 
arrangements may have to be evaluated to ensure that the new practices do not 
degrade internal controls. Here, the role of IS management is to contribute to the 
creation of SLA/contracts by examining how new arrangements with third parties 
impact on systems’ controls and operations. When this capability is optimised, 
contracts and SLA agreements consider regulatory requirements, policies and risk 
tolerances and are aligned with business and IS strategies. The IS department is 
consulted when defining performance measures and controls for third parties.   
9.5. IS Leadership 
Effective leadership and project planning is essential for supporting 
compliance activities. The research findings suggest that IS management must be 
clear about what existing systems, architectures and data will allow when 
consulting with compliance executives. In addition, time frames and milestones for 
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establishing appropriate systems must be well managed and communicated, due to 
tight deadlines imposed by the regulator.  
The respondents suggested that IS should be represented on any committees 
which review new compliance practices or the alteration of existing approaches.  
Compliance executives should also be consulted when developing new systems. 
One compliance executive, described the structure of project teams,  
‘I’ve worked in a risk and controls team, which is sort of between compliance and 
business. But you will see a similar generic breakdown of functions, which is 
somebody who understands the business and comes from the business, such as a 
lawyer or a regulator or an internal compliance person. Somebody who 
understands the system and then perhaps people in-between who will put it into 
practice’. 
A senior compliance executive, in C.7, suggested that the creation of 
compliance focused senior committee, consisting of compliance directors and 
senior management from effected business functions, was essential. In her view, it 
is crucial that IS should be well represented on this committee. Within her 
organization, regular monthly meetings occurred between middle management and 
a monthly compliance report was prepared for their ‘Operating Management 
Committee’. However, a compliance executive noted that in his firm, 
‘…governance committees are infrequent and the actual real business is done on 
this ad hoc basis...’ 
IS leadership may contribute to understanding and evaluating the costs and 
benefits of adopting different approaches to compliance. Furthermore, strong IS 
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leadership is required to lobby systems’ vendors to ensure they are developing 
systems in alignment with the organization’s changing regulatory requirements. 
Increasingly, firms have to demonstrate compliance capabilities to attract clients. 
The IS function may provide a reassurance to clients by demonstrating compliance 
systems and thereby support sales and marketing activities.  
9.6. Sharing and Selecting Best Practice  
Our research revealed that many IS professionals were confused about the 
contribution of industry-recognized frameworks and best practice to the emerging 
regulatory landscape. A complete review of the various frameworks and standards 
is beyond the remit of this paper. However, Figure 18 highlights some of the more 
well-known frameworks.   
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Figure 18: Relevant Standards of Best Practice for Regulatory Compliance. Source: author 
All of these frameworks have a very different focus but give organizations 
insight and a point of departure from which to structure their compliance 
arrangements. Established standards provide a common language between the 
business and technicians, an operational foundation, incorporate best practice and 
facilitate knowledge sharing. Crucially, they are auditable and are well recognized 
by stakeholders including regulators, shareholders and investors.  
However, individual compliance requirements in each organization will 
differ due to nuances in their business environment, product portfolio, resources, 
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strategy and regulatory obligations. Due to this and also as no single framework or 
standard provides a complete compliance solution, organizations may often review 
these frameworks and then plan an approach that blends the best practices of each 
along with the needs of the organization.  
The findings suggest that in the post-crisis environment, IS experts and 
compliance managers are more willing to share approaches across organizations. 
Internally, different business functions and geographical divisions impacted by the 
same policy or regulation may also seek to share best practice. The study revealed 
that organizations with similar systems and regulatory exposures share best practice 
for dealing with common compliance issues. Informal networks are deemed 
especially valuable for sharing proposed practices for dealing with new regulatory 
requirements. The findings revealed that firms may also collaborate with other 
organizations to determine industry standards for defining compliance metrics, 
monitoring processes and reporting structures. 
Organizations with in-depth knowledge of a specific regulation may 
contribute at the industry level, through associations with high-level bodies and can 
also assist with the development of systems. A senior compliance manager noted in 
C.4: 
‘I am involved in the IMA, Investment Management Association, which is a UK 
body and I’ve sent out the information to them, just trying to get people to think 
about [EU Regulation: CESR 10-788]. And then I shall be contributing to software 
houses. We use [system vendor], and I’ve agreed that when they start to do their 
coding, I’m ready to have my brain picked on it.’ 
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9.7. Data Management 
Our study found data to be a key challenge when developing complex 
controls. As one IMS consultant noted: ‘what we find with a lot of clients, is they 
may not… have all of their supporting data.’ Furthermore in the case of controls 
relating to regulatory compliance and risk tests, such as stress testing and scenario 
analysis, data may have to be sourced externally. Our research also highlighted how 
changes in compliance requirements, often due to changes in regulatory obligations, 
will require new data. New regulations and mandates may require changes in data 
requirements.  
A key factor is the availability and format of the data which supports the 
controls. A systems consultant remarked that this is often the ‘biggest chore’ when 
implementing a rule. Furthermore, changes in compliance related activities may 
require a change in controls which in turn may require additional data, which must 
be appropriately formatted so that it can be shared across systems. The Senior 
Relationship manager for the IMS vendor observed that when the system was 
upgraded, ‘we introduced parameters that required certain data that the client can 
use and they have to make sure that they have that data available.’ 
Gaps in the data required to support controls relating to polices emanating 
from compliance activities may influence a firm’s ability to meet customer 
requirements and trade. In addition, gaps in data or functionality relating to 
compliance affected activities may require processes to be performed manually. 
This in turn may reduce the effectiveness of controls. An IMS consultant stated 
‘[Previously] …it was a manual process and they had to do this manually… the 
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functionality wasn’t fully there or maybe they didn’t have the data fully in place to 
correct the functionality’. 
Changes in business objectives may also require further data as new 
products must meet internal and external polices and established risk tolerances. 
Analysis derived from such data may alter business objectives and policies. An IT 
manager, in C.3, noted that ‘[new products may require] …more data may impact 
the business to a degree. To the extent that they may find that the calculations 
weren’t what they were expecting initially.’  
In summary, the findings suggest that the appropriate management and 
sourcing of data is essential to support all compliance activities. Consequently, 
effective IS governance is integral to defining policies which control data sourcing, 
formatting and management.   
9.8. Enabling Cultural Change 
A key challenge is to create the right culture. One senior compliance 
executive in C.5, observed:  
‘Things are volatile right now and people want to know that you’re in a good safe 
place and it all starts in compliance and that culture then resonates through the 
rest of the firm.’  
Prior to the crisis, senior traders and fund managers had increased control over the 
systems used for conducting transactions and for applying automated controls. 
Furthermore, respondents highlighted that adopting appropriate IS systems to 
provide controls reinforces a commitment to a culture of compliance. A senior 
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compliance executive, in C.5, commented that ‘it’s a good culture for people to 
know that they’re being monitored and reviewed’. Another systems consultant 
suggested that systems and controls act to influence culture by ensuring changes in 
behaviours. ‘COSO’s well-established Internal Control Framework explicitly 
requires organizations to develop a control environment in order to influence 
employees’ attitudes and goes as far as suggesting that such a culture is the 
foundation for effective internal control. Effective corporate governance is 
dependent on creating a culture which supports ‘doing the right thing’ (COSO 
1992).  
However, several respondents highlighted concerns regarding the 
development of a dominate control culture. Many organizations have built up 
considerable innovative and creative capabilities in order to think and act 
differently as a reaction to dynamic markets and ever-changing business 
environments. Thus, management has focused on developing a culture which 
ensures that organizations can change at the pace demanded. Our responses suggest 
that, if compliance is misunderstood, there is a danger of a culture of overt control 
developing which may stifle innovation. A compliance executive, in suggested that 
compliance could act as an aide to innovation by helping to ‘find alternatives if 
problems exist’ and that good compliance was about ‘business protection not 
business prevention’ and that ‘if compliance is acting as a barrier, it is not 
performing its role properly.’ Furthermore, one compliance manager, in 
commented that a culture where individuals are more risk aware could have a 
positive effect on innovation by helping to ‘identify new opportunities’ and 
situations, ‘where risks were worth taking’. 
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The respondents had much to say regarding the appropriate cultural tone. 
One compliance manager, observed that an important aspect of developing the right 
culture was the need for individuals to ‘take pride and gain recognition’ for doing 
the right thing. She suggested that the often championed ‘learning culture’ where 
people do not apply blame is in in contrast with the nature of compliance which is 
to ‘hold people responsible for their actions and behaviours’. A compliance 
executive noted that, in his opinion, organizations ‘need to accept that compliance 
is quality’ so that the attitude within sales, for example, is that a ‘trade is not a 
good trade unless it is a compliant trade’.  
In summary, firms should strive for a culture where individuals are aware of 
the expectations placed on them with respect to ethics, risk and legal regulations. 
However, this culture is balanced by a culture which simultaneously supports 
innovation. Compliance is welcomed and viewed as enabling new products and 
services innovations by ensuring they are legally compliant. IS has a key role to 
play in influencing behaviours and thereby changing cultures.    
9.9. Conclusions 
In the post-crisis environment, key stakeholders such as investors, auditors 
and regulators are increasingly looking for organizations to be able to demonstrate 
not just current compliance but also robust and quality practices in place for 
underpinning successful compliance in the long term. The IS Capabilities identified 
provide a series of categories from which organization may evaluate their own 
abilities in each area.  Maturity in each capability may be calibrated on a scale. At 
one end of the scale they are a set of fragmented or loosely interconnected activities 
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and technologies focused on risk, regulation and policy. At the other end of the 
scale IS capabilities for compliance may be conceptualized as an enterprise wide 
initiative with the potential to improve governance through developing an in-depth 
understanding of risk and compliance on business performance. Furthermore, by 
adopting an enterprise-wide approach to compliance and involving IT leadership, 
expenditure on compliance becomes more transparent. Appendix 9 outlines a 
maturity model of IS capabilities based on this analysis. 
The management of internal controls is essential to ensure rules are adhered 
to and limits respected. The outputs of such controls should be monitored and 
benchmarked and results reported to key stakeholders. Procurement and 
development of systems capabilities must ensure that new parameters and controls 
to meet upcoming requirements are incorporated and that data and system’s 
architecture’s will effectively underpin new practices and avoid causing an 
overreliance on manual process, while technical gaps are bridged. Where third 
parties are employed, their own abilities to support compliance practices should be 
considered and evaluated on an on-going basis. Meeting new compliance 
requirements which are still being reviewed and refined close to the deadlines is 
challenging, as are revaluating existing requirements in relation to shifting markets 
and the introduction of new and the retirement of old products. Strong IS leadership 
is important to ensure that IS has a voice when considering such changes and the 
impacts on the firm’s regulatory exposure.  
Often compliance is not perceived as contributing to a competitive 
advantage and so organizations’ should not be deterred from seeking to overcome 
the challenges of short implementation deadlines and shifting environment factors 
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by seeking to share best practice and approaches. Effective data management 
practices underpin all compliance efforts. Planning early and establishing the key 
data sources which will underpin controls and reporting requirements may assist 
organizations to build appropriate interfaces between systems which may in turn 
take time to test and refine. Changing cultures associated with pre-compliance 
views on appropriate trading behaviours is a huge challenge, which goes beyond 
the deployment of specific IS capabilities. By developing strong controls, robust 
systems and clearly structured and appropriately segregated workflows, 
organizations can demonstrate a commitment to a compliance culture.  
Furthermore, IS systems have the ability to both constrain and enable specific types 
of behaviour and so may contribute to the desired cultural reforms.   
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10. FURTHER CONCLUSIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
This final chapter seeks to draw out and summarize final conclusions from 
the analyses previously detailed. Firstly, the high level research question is revisited 
and the multiple findings and associated theoretical contributions are delineated. 
The section that follows summarises further contributions, for practitioners. The 
next section discusses the limitations of the study. The penultimate section provides 
suggestions for future research, and finally some concluding remarks bring the 
research monograph to a close.  
10.1. Revisiting the Research Question 
The high-level research question which has guides this study asks: How 
does pre-embedded IMS technology influence behaviours and practices for post-
crisis regulatory compliance within financial organizations engaged in investment 
activities? In order to answer this question institutionalist concepts have been 
employed to guide understanding of the ways in which the IMS acts as a carrier of 
regulatory institutions (Chapter 7), how social, functional and political pressures 
may lead to the deinstitutionalization of compliance practices (Chapter 8), and how 
mechanisms and counter mechanisms may facilitate and hinder institutionalization 
(Chapter 9). The discussion sections in Chapters, 7, 8 and 9 have already detailed 
the study’s findings and conclusions in each of these three areas. Key contributions 
include: establishing how elements of the IMS constitute Scott’s typology of 
carriers of institutions (see Table 18), identifying the compliance practices which 
are becoming deinstitutionalised (see Table 19), empirically identifying the social, 
political and functional pressures acting to deinstitutionalise established practices, 
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(see Table 20), identifying the empirical predictors of deinstitutionalization (see 
Table 21) and by identifying institutional sub-mechanisms facilitating the 
institutionalization process, and related counter mechanisms which limit the ability 
of the IMS to embed new practices and behaviours (see Table 22).  
However, it is recognised that the findings and analysis delineated in 
Chapters, 7,8, and 9  are interdependent and rely on the same set of data and 
findings and so this concluding section aims to bring each chapter’s findings 
together in order to address the high-level research question.  
Overall, the expectation that the IMS will enable post-crisis regulations by 
enabling and constraining behaviours is reasonable and to some extent it is fulfilled. 
Yet the analysis shows that even prescriptive rules-based regulations are not neutral 
and require interpretation (Edelman and Suchman 1997) and that as a result the 
rules encoded within the IMS (Orlikowski and Iacono 2001) have their own form of 
‘calculative agency’, biases and assumptions embedded within the system 
(Bamberger 2010; Callon and Muniesa 2005; De Goede 2005; Itami and 
Numagami 1992; Muniesa et al. 2007; Preda 2007b; Preda 2006; Pryke 2010; 
Zaloom 2003). For example, design decisions are embedded within the IMS shaped 
by underlying calculative and analytical approaches and through the use of 
established indices and benchmarks, which are often provided by third parties.  
The study underpins how regulative technologies are more than simple 
black-boxes of technology determining if trades are compliant but, are in practice 
complex systems comprising of symbolic systems, relational systems, routines and 
artefacts (Scott 2008). As Scott notes, institutional, ‘…carriers are not neutral 
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vehicles, but mechanisms that significantly influence the nature of the elements 
they transmit and the reception they receive.’ (Scott 2003 p.1). Thus, the IMS acts 
as an institutional conduit privileging certain institutions and practices thereby 
influencing the perceptions, possibly dangerously, of those decision makers, 
including regulators, compliance managers and traders, the technology is trying to 
inform (Barry and Slater 2002; Mirowski 2002; Muniesa et al. 2007; Podolny 2001; 
Zuckerman 1999).   
The IMS rules-based approach creates affordances which predetermine the 
scope of potential decisions and associated outcomes (Gibson 1986; Latour 2005; 
Leonardi 2011; Majchrzak and Markus 2013; Zammuto et al. 2007). The systems is 
enacted from evolving human agency in the form of the trading behaviours it 
facilitates, but simultaneously also constrains such actions (Leonardi 2011). As 
these carriers are in flux, the affordances and world views they create, which 
constrain and influence decision makers, are also in flux. Correspondingly, the IMS 
rules-based approach creates affordances which contribute to the predetermination 
of the scope of potential decisions and associated outcomes. As the institutional 
carriers inherent to the system are in flux, the affordances and world views they 
create, which constrain and influence decision makers, are also in flux.  
As constraints and affordances within the IMS are composite of intertwined 
human agency, ‘the ability to form and realise goals’ (in this case to conduct 
trades), and material agency ‘the capacity for non-human systems to act on their 
own apart from human intervention’ (Leonardi 2011 p.147 and 148), in this case by 
calculating if a trade is compliant or not), then both IMS material and human 
agency are influenced not only by coercive elements of regulatory institutions but 
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also from normative and mimetic elements as well (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
Furthermore, there exists a tension between human and material agency within the 
IMS, as the systems’ material agency is formed from institutionalised logics 
(Thornton and Ocasio 2012) derived from regulatory obligations, and so acts to 
constrain and discipline human agency influenced by, arguably, logics of action to 
create preferable trading outcomes, profitability and for individuals to receive high- 
bonuses and increased status within the firm. 
The study contributes by utilizing the same findings to illustrate concepts of 
institutionalization and deinstitutionalization so underlines how these two concepts 
are interrelated. The findings highlight the blurred demarcation between the 
processes of institutionalization and deinstitutionalization. Often there exists a 
dissonance between theoretical constructs of institutionalism and empirical research 
(Hasselbladh and Kallinikos 2000). This obfuscation of concepts may explain why 
studies of deinstitutionalization are rarer than studies of institutionalization. Within 
the post-crisis regulatory landscape the removal or addition of regulations and 
associated organizational practices was found to not occur in a vacuum. The 
findings show that the process of deinstitutionalization often takes place around the 
institutionalization of a new practice and that social, functional and political 
pressures as well as coercive, normative and mimetic mechanisms may collectively 
act to simultaneously institutionalise as well as deinstitutionalise practices. This 
finding provides an important critique of Oliver’s work, as it suggests that social, 
functional and political pressures of deinstitutionalization may also be applicable to 
processes of institutionalization. This poses questions regarding whether 
deinstitutionalization is merely a by-product of the institutionalization process and 
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where the boundaries and interfaces between the two processes exist. In this study, 
it seems that the two are often interlinked, complimentary and directly implicated in 
the unprecedented global regulatory change and corresponding changes to practice 
resulting from the crisis.  
Scholars have described a process where existing rules are removed and 
new ones introduced as ‘displacement’ (Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Streeck and 
Thelen 2005), that is, new institutions displace old ones. However, this study finds 
this definition useful as a bridging concept but insufficient to explain the interaction 
between pressures for deinstitutionalization and mechanisms of institutionalization. 
While some post-crisis regulations are, in the author’s view, new and designed to 
plug holes which were previously undetected and thus create new obligations, other 
areas of regulatory change are refinements and iterations of previous obligations 
e.g. UCITS IV, MiFID II, CAD IV. It seems, from the present study, that few 
changes actually retire existing regulatory obligations.
4
  The introduction of new 
regulatory obligations is causing a shift in the environment which are causing some 
practices to be refined, a few to be removed and many more to be introduced and so 
the view that a new regulatory obligation acts to displace another is perhaps an over 
simplification of this dynamic and complex environment in which many factors, 
including social, political and functional pressures, alter social interactions and 
technological artefacts.  
To summarise, the study addreses the reseach question by illustrating how 
regulative technologies are more than simple black-boxes of technology (Millo and 
                                                 
4
 The move away from principles based ‘light touch’ regulations was not the retirement of an 
existing obligation but instead a shift in the Regulator’s approach to rule making and supervision.  
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MacKenzie 2009; Williams 2013) determining if trades are compliant but, are in 
practice complex systems comprising of symbolic systems, relational systems, 
routines and artefacts that create a specific world view which influences the 
perceptions of regulatory bodies and the compliance managers it informs 
(Heidegger 1954). Furthermore, complex interplay between social forces for 
deinstitutionalization and social mechanisms for institutionalization structure 
regulatory rules and correspondingly the IMS. The resultant affordances the IMS 
forbids and creates contribute directly to discourses and ordering of regulated 
economic activity (MacKenzie 2006; Preda 2006). Through the instantiation of 
automated rules the IMS privileges the measurable over the unmeasurable. The 
system, while embodying normative and cultural elements ultimately provides a 
binary view of regulation, either a trade is compliant or not. Thus, the system does 
little to highlight important yet unmeasurable factors, such as the development of 
inappropriate cultural values.  
10.2. Comments for Policy Makers and Practitioners 
Chapter 9 provides a contribution to practitioners through the definition of 
IS capabilities for regulatory compliance and the related maturity model outlined in 
Appendix 9.  The study also highlights how, post-crisis, the regulator has reacted to 
criticisms of pre-crisis principles based on ‘light-touch’ regulation by increasing 
supervision and becoming more prescriptive through the introduction of EU 
Directives, which are rules-based, resulting in higher volume of rules, which further 
institutionalize the use of the IMS. High volumes of complex rules simply cannot 
be applied to existing financial holdings and tested against proposed transactions 
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without automation, which provides its own material (Leonardi 2011) or calculative 
agency (Callon and Muniesa 2005). Consequently, the EU and US regulators’ 
philosophy of responding to failings by introducing ever more rules, and the IMS 
corresponding ability to automate large volumes of rules is mutually reinforcing 
and acts to institutionalize both practices.  
The non-neutral nature of the IMS, it’s affordances and the resultant 
perceptions and decisions it creates and guides, has the potential to create 
information asymmetries (Greenwald and Stiglitz 1994; Solomon 2013 ) between 
those who have access to such systems and those who don’t.  
This is assuming of course that such systems’ calculations are underpinned by high 
quality data and appropriately defined indices and benchmarks. In fact the FCA’s 
Risk Outlook for 2014 (published after the study’s analysis was completed) outlines 
the major risks the industry, is facing from the Regulator’s perspective and 
highlights asymmetric information as an ongoing risk: ‘Information asymmetries – 
when one party in a transaction has more or better information than the other party 
– are common in most retail and wholesale financial markets transactions. They 
potentially affect outcomes along the distribution chain, causing miss-selling and 
reduced trust, and can affect market integrity if used to benefit the firm at the 
expense of one or more conflicted clients.’ (FCA 2014 p.8). 
Unsurprisingly, as the regulator moves away from a principles-based ‘light-
touch’ approach towards intense supervision and so focuses more on the processes 
and systems which support compliance, agency is reduced and structural forces 
emanating from the Regulator’s authority become more dominant. Thus, 
individuals’ and firms’ agency regarding how they implement compliance practices 
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are found to be reduced in the post-crisis environment. The tension between 
structural forces and agency are highlighted by this study (Deeg 2010; Giddens 
1984; Heugens and Lander 2009; Hirsch and Lounsbury 1997; Perrow et al. 1986; 
Seo and Creed 2002). The primacy of macro forces’ (regulatory institutions) ability 
to shape practices is underlined by the research. Yet at the time of the research, 
financial firms still had the ultimate control over the systems and processes they 
adopted as long as they remained compliant. However, the FCA has highlighted 
that it intends to continue to focus on risks created by technology in 2014 stating, 
‘Technology may create effective and cost-efficient distribution channels, 
increasing competitiveness, innovation and efficiency, but can also be limited by 
vulnerabilities in the design and management of systems and infrastructure.’ (FCA 
2014 p.9).  
Investment firms may also control their levels of regulatory exposure by 
selectively choosing which services and financial products to offer and which 
regulated markets to participate in. Since the crisis, various firms have chosen to 
exit markets where new regulations are reducing profitability (The Economist 
2012b). Whilst compliance practices are most overtly influenced by structural 
forces and mechanisms emanating from regulatory coercion and less overtly by 
normative and cultural-cognitive elements, organizations and individuals still 
excises some agency over responses to these institutional factors and may seek to 
limit their impact through deploying counter mechanisms to resist the 
institutionalization of new practices and the erosion of old ones.    
At a time when budgets are being squeezed and trading across the industry 
is reduced organizations are being required to pour resources into large scale 
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change management programs driven by regulatory change. Pressure on resources 
are compounded by tight deadlines for implementation set by regulators and the 
resultant need to begin working on implementing the regulations before final drafts 
have been agreed. Thus, uncertainty is creating an additional drain on 
organizations’ resources. Consequently, many organizations are focused purely on 
meeting compliance deadlines, and not on developing a strategic enterprise-wide 
approach to compliance, and creating much needed efficiencies. Instead, managers 
are in danger of implementing their own siloed compliance solutions within 
business functions. Furthermore, changes in regulations may create gaps in systems 
and processes which, in the short term, need to be plugged by manual processes. 
This may create a higher number of regulatory breaches, with possible financial and 
reputational penalties. This is a potentially a major issue given the scale of 
regulatory change in the wind. Thus, the post-crisis regulatory environment creates 
a paradox as short timeframes are forcing firms to focus on creating non-strategic 
compliance solutions which meet deadlines but are less robust in the long term.  
Software vendors’ abilities to assess the impact of regulatory change on 
their offerings and their ability to efficiently and quickly translate regulatory rules 
into structured systems has the power to ease the pain and cost of compliance as 
well as reducing the risk of breeches by reducing the need for interim manual 
systems. Compliance managers are advised to engage with vendors early to ensure 
the changes they require are being incorporated into future releases.  
While compliance may still not be seen as providing a competitive 
advantage, ineffective compliance management could certainly create a competitive 
disadvantage through reputational damage if failures are made public or by being 
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unable to take new offerings quickly to market, due to missing compliance data 
fields or absent underlying data. This study shows that understanding the data 
required to support regulatory change is essential, and that firms should consider 
data implications early on in the design of new compliance rules. Often new 
requirements will require organizations to consider sourcing data from third parties. 
The study shows how field level structural forces are acting to shape 
compliance practices and creating isomorphic patterns of compliance. Examples 
include the perception that the regulator is moving towards tacitly favouring 
specific vendors and systems, the use of Master Tests across global business 
operations to standardise compliance practices within organizations and the G20’s 
establishment of common regulatory goals across jurisdictions, allowing 
organizations to centralise and standardize compliance practices. Furthermore, 
financial organizations are meeting to discuss, share and derive practices for 
meeting specific upcoming regulatory obligations, which in turn, may lead to 
similar practice and structures being adopted across firms. Thus, new compliance 
practices are socially constructed. Correspondingly, Master Tests and generic 
Templates supplied by the Vendor may help cognitively shape and frame views on 
how areas of compliance should be implemented and managed by IMS adopters. 
Although the research shows that implementers of the system may slightly alter the 
rules to match their specific business environment, the system allows the diffusion 
of solutions to regulatory compliance which must then be cognitively translated and 
applied to the users’ specific context, thereby providing a hybrid combination of 
local structures and ideas derived from previous experience. This phenomenon is 
termed Bricolage by Scott (2008).   
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The presence of ‘Structural Isomorphism’ is an important finding from both 
a vendor and systems user perspective. If regulatory technologies are conduits of 
best practice and so act to create homogeneity, then future upgrades of compliance 
focused systems may leverage commonalties across organizations to further 
standardize compliance practices and so reduce associated investment. The 
development of effective inbuilt templates and workflows which provide a strong 
return on investment may provide a software vendor competitive advantages over 
rival software firms. However, the presence of Bricolage suggests that any such 
generic compliance frameworks which may be applied across similar organizations 
will have to be appropriately high-level, so that they can be refined for each 
adopter’s business environment, while being detailed enough to still be valuable. 
10.3. Limitations of the Study 
Firstly, it is worth noting that my findings do not purport to investigate the 
entire process of institutionalization, for compliance practices, but instead, the part 
of the process broadly termed ‘objectification’ by Tolbert and Zucker (1999) and 
‘legitimation’ by Currie (2004). That is the part of the process where the underlying 
rationale of the institution is developed, tested, refined, and propagated and 
consequently, where social consensus is formed. At the time of writing, many of the 
compliance practices considered were newly designed and not universally 
embedded. Correspondingly, the EU and US regulatory responses to the crisis are 
not yet fully crystallised and so a limitation of this study is that its findings are 
historically contingent on a period of time where the final outcomes of the new 
regulatory environment are uncertain. However, this is also a contribution of this 
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study as it provides a glimpse of this transient environment.  It is conceded that for 
a practice to become truly institutionalized it will have to be accepted and adopted 
beyond the eight financial organizations considered or indeed the user community 
of a single IMS. As institutions become further embedded they enter a state of 
‘sedimentation’ which is, ‘… characterized both by the virtually complete spread of 
structures across the group of actors theorized as appropriate adopters, and by the 
perpetuation of structures over a lengthy period of time’ (Tolbert and Zucker 1996 
p.184). The study revealed that practices which had reached the ‘sedimentation’ 
process were also present and being ‘carried’ by the IMS. Examples include the 
four-eye tests and the segregation of duties, which are well established best 
practice.   
The Vendor’s customer base are limited to organizations which participate 
in the ‘buy-side’ of the investment banking industry, the buying and selling of 
securities for investment purposes (to make a profit) on the behalf of clients and so 
the study’s findings are limited to this specific area of the industry. As post-crisis 
regulations come into force the IMS plays a pivotal but limited role in complying 
with new mandates. Its role is limited to managing compliance in regulatory 
obligations which require organizations to apply limits on trading positions and 
monitor trades. For example, the system has no role to play in capping banker’s 
bonuses, or controlling risks from banks being ‘too-big-to-fail’, and therefore many 
post-crisis regulatory requirements are not facilitated by the system. 
Correspondingly, the study is limited in its ability to address the plethora of factors 
which contributed to the financial crisis and the broad scope of regulations which 
aim to plug gaps in the regulatory system.  A further limitation of the study is that 
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the historical background used to contextualise the use of the IMS focused purely 
on the UK and US, as the participant organizations were either UK companies with 
US operations or US firms with UK operations. Thus, each firm was exposed to 
both US and UK
5
 regulatory obligations. Yet, some of these firms also had 
operations in Asia, which were not considered in the historical review. A further 
limitation of the study is that it focuses on just eight financial organizations using a 
single vendor of IMS.  
However, the study did seek to apply criteria to ensure that the cases 
considered were comparable and generalizable. The study applied Yin’s (2009) 
replication logic, focusing on criteria such as the length of time the IMS was 
adopted, the types of financial products offered and correspondingly the regulations 
they were exposed too.  The study applies what Yin (2009) refers to as ‘analytic 
generalizability.’ This approach involves applying a set of results to a broader 
theory through replicating findings across other cases.  
Correspondingly, interpretive studies  involve a reasoning process to 
generalise from first level constructs, the facts that the researcher interprets and 
records, to second level constructs, which are theoretical formulations created to 
explain the patterns found in the first level constructs. Thus, second level constructs 
may be thought of as ‘interpretations of interpretations’ (Maanen 1983 p.40). In this 
study, the identification of first and second level constructs was operationalised 
through ‘descriptive’ and ‘then’ pattern coding.  
                                                 
5
 Composite within UK regulations are EU directives. 
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Interpretative generalizability formulates theory in order to provide 
expectations to the researcher regarding what has been observed and also what 
might help researchers to be unsurprised or anticipate related observations made 
within the same research setting.  (Lee and Baskerville 2003). Thus, ‘the essential 
task of theory building here is not to codify abstract regularities but to make thick 
description possible; not to generalize across cases but to generalize within them.’ 
(Geertz 1973 p.25-26). Thus, at the minimum this study allows for generalizability 
across the user community of the IMS studied. The data collected did not allow for 
all findings to be replicated across all eight cases thus, the findings are may be 
viewed by some as illustrative not definitive (Patton 1990), for example only one 
organization was setting up an internal committee run by its COO. Yet, I would 
argue that the findings may well be generalizable to users of such systems provided 
by other vendors, which all function similarly through a rule based approach to 
automating compliance. The fact that many vendors of similar systems are adapting 
their offerings to overcome common issues, such as data quality and availability, 
supports the view that vendors and users of these systems are facing similar issues 
to the ones identified in the study.  
In summary, the theories outlined in the research may be bounded to the 
user community of the IMS during a specific period of time where regulatory 
responses to the financial crisis were being developed. Bounding the 
generalizability of the case to the user of the community of the IMS Vendor would 
not, however, detract from the study’s value as the, ‘… philosophical tradition of 
interpretivism places no particular emphasis on generalizability or the striving for 
universal laws. In interpretivism, theory’s pertaining only to the setting where it 
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was developed would not detract from its validity or scientific status. At the same 
time, interpretivism would not prohibit the researcher from extending his or her 
theory to additional settings.’ (Lee and Baskerville 2003). Indeed, aspects of the 
study do extend theory beyond the user community of the IMS for example, the 
identification of pressures to deinstitutionalize compliance practices (Table 19), the 
predictors of deinstitutionalization (Table 21) and the model of IS capabilities for 
compliance outlined in the previous section. However, it is accepted that these 
theories may require further validation through application to other settings where 
regulation, technology and capital markets intersect, to be fully validated.  
Finally, it is interesting to note that some of the theories outlined have some 
similarity to the findings of studies into other enterprise wide technologies, such as 
ERP systems, in different settings
6
. Specifically, issues arising from data quality 
availability, complexity and aggregation and issues arising from bespoke 
modification, ‘vanilla’ systems, templates and standardization of practices (See for 
example: Davenport 1998; Davenport et al. 2004; Themistocleous et al. 2001; Xu et 
al. 2002). Furthermore, the conceptualization of enterprise systems as carries of 
institutions has been applied in other studies focused on rules based systems. As 
Lyytinen et al (2009 p.287) observe, in their study on ERP systems in the Saudi 
steel industry, ‘… ERP systems act as material carriers of institutional logics 
(Berente et al. 2008) or in Jepperson’s terms: ‘socially constructed, routine-
reproduced programs or rule systems’ (Jepperson 1991 p.149). Consequently, it 
may be possible to generalise some of the findings, related to data quality, 
                                                 
6
 I am grateful to Professor M. Lynne Markus for pointing out these similarities 
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automation and standardization to other settings where rules based systems are 
used.  
10.4. Opportunities for Future Research 
At the time of writing, post-crisis logics and associated practices are newly 
designed and so their impact is currently uncertain and so future research may want 
to revisit such practices and investigate how they have matured. Thus, a natural 
development is to develop the longitudinal nature of this study and to continue to 
investigate responses to post-crisis regulations as they become more demarcated. 
Once post-crisis regulations are implemented and their impact on compliance 
practices further defined there is an opportunity for future research to revisit this 
phenomenon and assess the extent to which new practices were institutionalized 
and which deinstitutionalised and also to evaluate the role of technology in the 
ultimate success of failure of such regulations and practices. While this study 
explores the point of institutionalization termed ‘objectification’ by extending the 
longitudinal nature of the study it may be possible to glean insight into later  points 
of institutionlization termed ‘objectification’ and ‘sedmimention’ (Tolbert and 
Zucker 1999).  
While increased coercive pressure, derived from new regulatory obligations, 
may constrain organizations, firms still have considerable choice in how they 
organize compliance practices and may even respond by choosing to abandon 
products and services which expose themselves to new regulatory orders deemed 
too onerous. Thus, future research may also focus on investigating the variation 
between compliance practices adopted, post-crisis, and the extent to which 
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approaches and practices have become discontinued and which have become 
isomorphic across the organizational field. 
The study focuses on the ‘buy-side’ of financial markets and so further 
research may also explore technologies which facilitate post-crisis ‘sell-side’ 
regulation. Furthermore some scholars have suggested that systems of monitoring, 
surveillance and control may actually negatively impact trust and elicit negative, 
behaviours (Barratt 2008; Bernauer and Mahon 1994; Foucault 2008). Within the 
context of our research this remains a distinct possibility. The interviews revealed a 
perception that some powerful traders and fund managers are likely to resist the 
move away from manual spread sheets. When faced with coercive forces, 
compliance is just one option available to actors (Streeck & Thelen, 2005). So, 
future research may investigate the impact of IMS related technologies on 
employee trust and how powerful individuals may seek to subjugate the IMS.  
Preda (2007) offers the example of analysts who provide evaluations of 
securities to traders and investors and so act as ‘information intermediaries’. In 
order to evaluate and compare the performance of securities they must be classified 
and placed in sets (e.g. energy derivatives, technology stocks, manufacturing stocks 
etc.) such work creates a ‘perception framework’ within which traders and investors 
make decisions. However, securities which do not fit into one clear category or fit 
into several may lead to inconsistent classifications resulting in more volatile prices 
(Zuckerman 1999). Such perspectives resonate well with this study’s research 
context, financial organizations houses utilising IMS. Such systems seek to 
categorise trades and financial holdings in order to apply regulatory rules and guide 
investment decisions through the application of benchmarks and indices provided 
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by third parties (information intermediaries). An interesting avenue of future 
research may be to build on Zuckermans’ work and investigate if securities which 
have inconsistent categories are more frequently subject to compliance breaches.  
The literature review highlighted various streams of literature, relevant to 
addressing the financial crisis and so future studies may consider the role of 
institutional trust, asymmetric information, ethics and culture as well as governance 
and transparency in relation to technology and the financial crisis. The focus of this 
study, however, has been predominantly on how institutional arrangements are 
shaping social practices for compliance and not on how such practices perform 
regulations and markets. However, researching the performativity of the IMS and in 
how it shapes markets and regulations is a potential avenue for future research.   
The study was also useful in identifying areas of future research from which 
practitioners may benefit,  not least, in exploring the ways in which investment in 
regulatory compliance may provide a strategic advantage or in confirming the 
predominate view that compliance is a non-strategic function providing little or no 
competitive advantage. In addition, the impact of new regulatory developments and 
in particular the Regulator’s move to intensive supervision of organizational 
practices may also provide fertile ground for future research relevant to 
practitioners. For example, PwC notes, ‘Outsourcing has increased considerably in 
scale and complexity since 2007 when the UK Regulators' rules for such activities 
first became mandatory for UK banks under SYSC (Senior Management 
Arrangements, Systems and Controls section in the Regulators’ handbook). 
Although these rules remain unchanged, the implications for Recovery and 
Resolution Planning (RRP), resilient client service provision and reliable market 
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operations ensure these developments have become an increasing concern for both 
the PRA and FCA, and their interpretation and enforcement of SYSC requirements 
has hardened.’ (PwC 2014 p.1).  So, one potential avenue of research may seek to 
investigate the use of technology in managing regulatory compliance across 
financial organizations’ outsourcing providers.  
In summary, over the course of this study, ongoing events in the financial 
services industry as well as other industries, such as the press phone hacking 
scandal or the BP oil spill, has underlined to me the importance of regulation in 
dealing with organizational failures and I continue to believe that technology is 
implicated in the success and failure of regulatory institutions. Consequently, I 
believe that this area will provide an interesting and worthwhile research trajectory 
in years to come.  
10.5. Concluding Comment 
Why do these findings matter? The philosophy of reacting to organizational 
and regulatory failures by introducing ever more controls and rules means that 
compliance activities will become increasingly reliant on regulatory technologies 
which can encode and apply high volumes of rules to individual transactions. Yet 
such automation comes at a price by limiting the scope of regulatory structures and 
analytical processes, and does not address deep rooted unethical behavioural 
practices beyond providing accountability and surveillance of existing compliance 
rules. The financial crisis and resultant failures were the result of individuals and 
organizations exploiting areas where regulation was weak or non-existent. As more 
unethical practices through collusion across organizations, (for example the FX 
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scandal) become apparent then it seems the issue may not lie with individual 
organizational culture but the culture of the financial services industry as a whole. 
However, societal expectations for regulators to be able to completely foresee and 
prevent economic and organizational failures seem unreasonable. Furthermore, the 
cost of regulatory compliance is inevitably passed on to investors and so 
introducing more and more regulatory agents to totally safeguard economic systems 
may be counterproductive if the spiralling cost of compliance reduces access to 
economic systems and also dampens economic productivity. Technology, however, 
may play a key role in reducing such costs. Overall, it seems that public 
expectations to be completely protected from moral hazards in a system which 
thrives on risk may be unrealistic. In conclusion, it seems that along with a reactive 
approach to plug regulatory gaps, what is also required is greater open debate 
regarding the role of regulation in society, its costs and limitations and what levels 
of protection technologies can realistically afford. 
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Appendix 1: Nomenclature 
Affirmation: Message required for the settlement of the transactions, stating that 
trades have been confirmed and authorization. 
AIMFD: Alternative Investment Fund Directive (EU). 
Back Office: The administration and support functions within a financial 
organization. 
Basel I – III:  Accords defined  by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision 
(BCBS), which provides standards for regulation of risk and its relationship with 
regulatory capital. 
Best Execution: The obligation under MiFID for firms to ensure the best possible 
result for clients when executing orders.   
Blotter: Application within the IMS which application that consolidates all dealing 
activity and allows traders to manage and execute incoming orders from multiple 
investment managers. 
Buy Side: The buying and selling of securities for investment purposes (to make a 
profit) on the behalf of clients. 
CAD I-IV: EU Capital Adequacy Directives implement the Basel Accords. 
CCO: Chief Compliance Officer. 
CFTC: Commodities and Futures Trading Commission (US Regulator). 
Clearing House: Organization which facilitates clearing and settlement  
Clearing: Matching the buyer’s and seller’s records and checking that there are no 
discrepancies in the trades attributes. 
Concentration: The extent of exposure to a specific industry, country or 
organizations. 
Confirmation: Acknowledgement that a trade has been completed 
COO: Chief Operating Officer. 
Counterparty:  the other party involved in a financial transaction, either the buyer 
or seller.  
Custodian: Organization which holds and administers the securities on behalf of 
their clients. 
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Depository: Organization that holds and enables the transfer of securities. 
Derivatives: Contract which derives its value from an underlying asset or entity 
such as index. 
Dodd-Frank Act: US Act of Congress created as a response to the financial crisis. 
EMEA: Collective term for Europe, Middle East, Africa regions. 
EMIR: European Markets Infrastructure Directive (EU). 
EMS: Execution Management System 
Equities: Shares in organizations 
ESMA: European Securities and Markets Authority 
EU Directive: Legislation passed through the EU 
Execution: Completion of a buy or sell order 
FCA: Financial Conduct Authority 
FCA: Financial Conduct Authority (Current UK Regulator) 
FIX: Financial Information Exchange used by the IMS Vendors’ proprietary 
trading network  
Fixed Income: Securities providing regular payments. 
Front Office: Sales and corporate finance functions in financial organizations. 
FSA: Financial Services Authority (UK Regulator, 2001-2013 ). 
FX: Foreign Exchange (Currency Trading) 
IMS: Investment Management System. 
Investment Manager: Individual responsible for setting investment strategies 
Investors: Individuals or organizations investing in securities.  
Issuers: Organizations issuing securities. 
MAD I-II: Market Abuse Directives (EU). 
Market Data: Data related to the movements of financial markets. 
Master Test: Generic rule templates created and disseminated internally financial 
organizations using the IMS.  
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Middle Office:  The IT and risk functions within a financial organization. 
MiFID I-II: EU Markets in Financial Instruments Directive. 
OMS: Order Management System. 
Order Allocation: The allocation of a block trade to different brokers. 
OTC: Over the Counter. Trades conducted outside of an exchange or regulated 
market 
PMO: Project Management Office. 
PRA: Prudential Regulatory Authority (UK Regulator). 
RAG: Red, Amber Green (used to signify level of risk). 
Reference Data: Data which describes a security, price identifying code etc.  
Regulatory Capital: Capital which organization are required to hold to offset risk 
and ensure liquidity. 
SEC: Securities Exchange Commission (US Regulator). 
Securities: Collective term for financial products. 
Sell Side: Business activities focused on creating and servicing securities. 
Settlement: The delivery of securities and cash. 
SLA: Service Level Agreements 
SOX: Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
STP (Straight through Processing): Allows the complete automation of the trade 
process without manual intervention. 
Trading Destinations: Brokers, dealers and markets. 
UCITS I-V: Undertakings For The Collective Investment Of Transferable 
Securities (EU Directives). 
Vendor: The firm which supplies the IMS being studied. 
Workbench: IMS central workspace where order are created. 
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Appendix 2: NVivo Screenshots 
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Appendix 3: Sample Interview Guide 
 
Interview Guide Version 1.3 
Daniel Gozman 
Doctoral Researcher 
Mobile: +44 (0) 7917 301 255  
eMail: D.P.Gozman@lse.ac.uk 
 
 
Date:  
 
Name:  
Company:  
Position:  
How long in this company:  
 
Questions: 
1. From an industry wide perspective, how do financial regulations influence 
the design and structure of compliance related systems? 
 
2. From an industry wide perspective, how do systems influence the design 
and structure of regulations? 
 
Information Systems and 
Innovation Group  
Department of Management  
London School of Economics and 
Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London  
WC2A 2AE 
 
Tel: +44 (0)20 7955 7655 
Fax: +44 (0)20 7955 7385 
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3. How are shared values regarding best practice disseminated across 
compliance practitioners?  
 
4. How does best practice and the shared values of compliance related 
professionals influence the design, structure and capabilities of compliance 
systems? 
 
5. How do compliance systems’ design, structure and capabilities influence the 
assumptions about best practice and the shared values of compliance related 
professionals 
 
6. How do compliance functions mimic the approaches of one another in 
general, what are the similarities in approaches relating to workflows, 
systems adopted management practices and organizational structures? What 
is taken for granted by practitioners? 
 
7. How does the design and structure of compliance systems enable or cause 
organizations to adopt ‘taken for granted’ compliance practices regarding 
workflows, systems adopted, management practices and organizational 
structures?  
 
8. How do systems cause organizations to mimic one another? 
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9. How does imitation across compliance functions feedback and influence the 
design and structure of compliance systems?  
a. What is the advantage of having a compliance system 
b. For business performance? 
c. For your clients? 
d. For your relationship with the regulator? 
 
10. Please describe the process which you undertake when a new regulation, such 
as MiFID II is released, from understanding the impact of the regulation on 
the firm to incorporating the appropriate rules into a compliance system?  
 
11. Regarding the initial implementation of a compliance system at [C.3] and 
subsequent upgrades: 
a. What new compliance methods (such as workflows, systems, 
management practices and organizational structures) have been 
introduced? (Please give examples) 
b. What is the business reason/value for this adoption?  
c. Which old compliance practices (such as workflows, systems, 
management practices and organizational structures) have been 
updated? (Please give examples) 
d. What is the business reason/value for this adoption? 
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12. In the case of new regulations effecting [C.3]  which require that new 
methods (such as workflows, systems, management practices and structures) 
are adopted how have the new practices been influenced by the: 
a. By the regulations themselves? 
b. How prescriptive are the regulations? 
c. By compliance professionals?  
d. Does the compliance community share views on best practice? 
e. By the way other compliance functions operate? 
f. Copy other successful approaches? 
g. By the capabilities of existing systems? 
h. Need to obtain new functionality? 
 
13. Regarding the initial implementation of a compliance system at [C.3] and 
subsequent upgrades, have existing compliance related workflow, systems, 
management practices or organizational structures been: 
a. Absorbed into another existing practice?  
b. Considered over complicated and so un-worthwhile?  
c. Isolated from other practices and so irrelevant? 
d. To compete with existing practices? 
e. Completely replaced? 
 
14. In the case of new regulations (e.g. MiFID II)  requiring that [C.3] existing 
methods (such as workflows, systems, management practices and 
organizational structures)  are updated have the: 
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a. Parts of the old method been adopted in the new? 
b. Re-invention of existing methods occurred? 
c. Re-emergence of old methods occurred? 
d. How does [C.3] leverage compliance related practices in different 
global regions if at all?  
e. How do different compliance functions co-operate? 
f. How does [C.3] work to influence the design and application of 
mandates by the regulator? 
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Appendix 4: Sample of Interview Transcript 
D; Is it a new system then? 
O; Um, I’m not sure how long they’ve been marketing it. It’s their 
proprietary system um, which they’re now selling externally. But I think 
on the basis that they’ve got um, 53 clients, I guess it’s, they’ve been 
selling it externally for a while.  Um, I’ve heard it’s very good and 
certainly on the strength of the demonstrations that we’ve had. 
D; What sort of stuff does it do that Vendor doesn’t potentially? 
O; Yeah, it’s very different in the sense that [IMS Competitor] take a 
lot more ownership of um, data and compliance. So in many ways it’s, it’s 
partial outsourcing agreements. Um, one of the main differences 
between the two is that with [IMS Competitor], um, you’re outsourcing 
the rule coding. Um, at the moment, with [Vendor], we’re dealing with 
the rule coding, all the regulations, all the prospectus rules for retail 
funds, um, you know, segregated accounts, IMAs, industrial management 
agreements. We do all the coding for that.  Um, with [IMS Competitor], 
they would do the coding. They also own the data. So at the moment, we 
bring in the data from Bloomberg. [IMS Competitor] actually use 
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Thompson Reuters source. They take, um, the data into their systems, 
clean it and scrub it and then, they then disseminate that data to all of 
their clients. So there are a couple of key differences there. So you’re 
kind of tranching outsourcing your data over and completely outsourcing 
your raw coding.   
D; Well that’s fantastic because I think last time we spoke, we talked a 
little bit about the templates that are assigned and that’s almost like 
[Vendor] defines their own best practice. Then they give it to you to 
apply it to your business and there’s quite a lot of change again you 
mentioned, that goes on around products or perhaps you don’t even the 
use templates at all. 
O; That’s right, we don’t. Yeah. They are vendor-supplied templates 
especially for things like rules. Um, and even regulations rules that is.  
Even for non-regulatory rules, that they supply templates but we don’t 
use them.  Because we actually, although their templates are based 
upon their security types and investment classes which are broader, um, 
asset classes. We define our own. So that means that we effectively 
can’t and wouldn’t want to use their vendor-supplied templates.   
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D; So how will that change then with the potentially well, potentially 
change with the other system because they’re still have to understand 
what influences your data which I would imagine would be quite difficult 
for an outsourcing to do, to understand exactly you know, the structure 
of the data, and how it’s all getting integrated.  I mean it sounds to me 
what they’re trying to do is quite ambitious cause I always assume that 
the reason [Vendor] didn’t take that approach was because, everyone’s 
data’s so different.  
O; That’s right, yeah. And there is flexibility in [IMS Competitor]  um, 
service. So what you tend to find is with UCITS for example, even with 
I don't know UK UCITS, the coal rules or Luxembourg UCITS, even at 
that level, different clients will have difference interpretations um, 
different internal processes and procedures. And there is the 
flexibility with [IMS Competitor] products to actually um, take 
accounts and build those, manage a specific flavours of UCITS  into the 
rules. So that they will have a basic um, UCITS rule.  And into that they 
can build each management company’s interpretations.  
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D; Right. So would you be actually able to send them the transaction 
data then and they’ll be applying  transaction data and putting the rules 
on top of it? 
O; Um, it’s, it’s similar to [Vendor]. It’s a core kind of management and 
trading tool as well.  So we would be using their tool, their platform to 
actually manage our portfolios to generate trades, using their auto-
management system for the dealers to actually handle the trades. So 
it’s really more about using the, it’s doing what we normally do but on 
their platform. So it’s their coding, their data and then us doing our 
normal management activities on their platform. So we still retain our 
accounting system, for example, but, and that feeds our positions into 
our portfolios using their data and compliance is checked against our 
rules, coded by them.  
D; So this also, you’re almost sort of outsourcing some of the client 
functions, responsibilities then because I guess it’s um, in this case, 
[IMS Competitor] will make a decision about how regulations apply or 
the relevance of the regulations to your business and how the rules will 
come on top of that? 
O; That actually stays with us, yeah. 
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D; Right. So my next question was going to be, so I think the FSA who 
are, it’s time is limited, soon to expire, um, is you know, making it quite 
clear that you can’t outsource responsibility.  It does remain in-house. 
O; Yes, yeah, that stays with us.  So we effectively, for a UCITS fund 
for example, we would say, okay, this is a Luxembourg UCITS fund. This 
is how we interpret the Luxembourg UCITS rules, this is how we want 
them coded, please code them like this. They will go off and code them. 
And then there’s a bilateral process um, agreeing the results of activity 
off their coding. We sign off the fact that we’re happy with the way 
they’ve coded the rules.  Um, and then after that, although we can 
actually see the rules, we can’t change them. That’s their job. But we’re 
responsible for the monitoring of all the outputs of the rules. So any 
pre-trade or post-trade breaches um, are our responsibility to 
investigate.   
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Appendix 5: Sample Coding 
 
 
Scheduled 
Question 
 
 
Participant Answer 
 
Descriptive 
Coding 
 
Pattern 
Coding 
Can you please 
describe the 
process that [C. 
6] undertakes 
when a new 
regulation 
comes through?   
There’ll be an initial analysis and interpretation of the [regulatory] rule and it is decided that it has to be manually 
implemented. We will then enter that rule into a larger matrix of regulation, again manual spreadsheet based. So yeah, this 
now exists. We will enter a monitoring solution in there, that’s [IMS] automated, if it’s [not able to be implemented through 
the IMS] we have to propose or recommend something that will work. That matrix rule guidelines will then feed somewhere 
else that says, right, all the stuff that’s in [IMS] is automated. That’s fine, all the stuff we’re doing manually is high risk.  
What can we do with it? And then you use something, that shows all your high risk rules that are manually monitored and 
you go to [systems vendor] and say ‘Right, I don’t pay you guys all this for doing these all manually, you need to 
incorporate this into the [IMS].’ Usually, a year later, we get an enhancement an upgrade patch from [systems vendor] and 
we can retire the manual rule.’ 
 
 
 
 
Automated 
Rules Design 
Manual 
Practices 
 
Lobbying IMS 
Vendor for 
Changes 
 
Monitoring 
Rules 
Use of 
Spreadsheets 
Automation 
 
Monitoring 
 
Coercive 
Mechanisms 
 
Normative 
Mechanisms 
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Non-
scheduled 
Question 
 
 
Participant Answer 
 
Descriptive 
Coding 
 
Pattern 
Coding 
You mentioned 
that aside from 
conferences and 
forums 
approaches to 
designing new 
regulatory 
controls comes 
from personal 
networks. How 
does that work?  
We all know who’s doing what and where and you know if I want a conversation with someone who know what he’s doing 
and I’ve got a decent relationship with him, we’ll have a few beers a couple of times. I’ll call him up on his Blackberry and  
I’d say to him, ‘Can we meet up and have a drink and I’d love to talk about this?’  And he’ll take as much benefit and 
advantage from it as I would. You know if nothing else… cause when I say to him, ‘What do you guys do?’  He’s gonna tell 
me and then he’s gonna say back to me, ‘What’ do you guys do?’ And I’m gonna tell him something that he doesn’t know 
and he might tell me something that he doesn’t know.  Either way he’s gonna go back to his office the next day and he’s 
gonna have a better understanding. He’s gonna be better placed to put a value on how strong his control is.  That’s how I 
find it often happens, informally. 
Informal 
Networks 
 
Automated 
Rules Design 
 
Implementing 
New 
Regulations 
 
Normative 
Mechanisms 
 
Sharing 
 
Sense-making 
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Appendix 6: Interview Notes  
Date: 25
th
 October 2012 
Interviewee: XXXXX 
Company: XXXXXXX                                 
 
 
  
Back in time 5 years ago business in sales not bothered about risk and 
compliance 
‘Pain of adherence’ has increased 
Changed with the crisis sales and delivery can no longer park compliance for 
others  
Program of change being undertaken considers regulatory mitigation as 
important: 
o Involves revaluating Risk models 
o Extra hedging 
o Closing down business units 
E.g. Basel III requires that some higher risk is penalised for some business 
segments and becomes more expensive. No longer viable for some business 
units or asset classifications. So many IB selling business units. Not only 
because returns are not worth regulatory exposure but that the risk adjusted 
capital 
Compliance function’s role has moved no longer controlling oversight , 100 
people now involved, the COO is accountable no their exists a governance 
committee with head s of department. 
Regarding risk models, some banks will be using simplistic risk models as well 
as advanced. Termed in Basel II as standardised and advanced. 
Most big players advertise that they are using Advanced methods but there are 
exceptions e.g. Location such as Ireland or some asset classes excluded from 
advanced approach  
Need authorization from the regulator to use standardised approach. 
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Banks going through massive programs to update models not deemed risk 
competitive. If model is not sufficient they are unable to trade 
Moist major banks want to be able to offer wider range of products if not client 
will got to competitors. 
Causing banks to focus more specific transaction and products e.g. Citi group 
and Deutsch bank have best FX but clients still use other FX  e.g. hedge funds 
wishing to hide trades 
Previous to  Crisis Compliance has been very siloed 
Now no point in doing EMIR in Europa and Dodd-Frank in US ,projects are 
now structured on themes e.g. Trade Transparency and Clearing Program 
Change programs need to take oversee synergies gaps and overlaps ‘have to be 
holistic’ 
Watch tower team reports directly to COO 
They have 11 different themes or programs e.g. reporting  
The regulatory liaison group works with FSA SEC and each delivery team to 
ensure they are aware of regulatory developments 
In addition, internal and external audit ensure that regulatory efforts are up-to-
date and meet upcoming requirements 
Previous to the crisis solutions have been put in place as quick as possible. 
Budget were tight, things out in a minimal way causing ‘non-strategic solutions 
to be built on of non-strategic solutions’ 
Banks taught humility after crises and realise need help implementing 
wholesale change and don’t have the right capabilities or experience 
Bigger players have more capabilities and so role of consultants is to provide 
projects oversight for senior management 
Outsourcing and offshoring is becoming more prevalent as there is a 
recognition that cost of regulatory compliance is more significant  
Banks looking at streamlining and improve their operational architecture and to 
improve operating models to assist with competition 
SEC regulations have very tight timescales encouraging poor architecture as no 
time to build strategic solutions also creates lagging change 
Regarding rules vs. Principles Pauls view ‘SEC and FSA evolving their 
approach’ ‘Agree that the FSA is becoming more specific’. 
Current burst of regulation will reduce over time but settle at a higher level 
Politics drive regulation 
Generic regulation templates problematic due to differences in cores systems, 
operating systems and data within banks 
Need to fundamentally change business approaches require culture changes 
which are problematic 
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Appendix 7: Template Schema 
 
Extracted from IMS User Manual 
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Appendix 8: Four Eyes Test 
 
Vendor’s materials 
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Appendix 9: IS Capabilities for Compliance Practitioner Framework  
Maturity of IT Capabilities for Compliance 
Capability 
State 
Initial Controlled Managed Optimized Innovative 
IS Development & Procurement  
No compliance 
systems’ roadmap 
exists. Decisions are 
made by business silos 
on an ad-hoc basis. 
Many controls are 
manual. 
Understanding of what 
compliance related 
functionality is available 
and where gaps in 
functionality /opportunities 
to automate exist. This 
analysis feeds decision 
making for obtaining 
functionality.  
Organization is 
knowledgeable regarding 
vendor offerings and has 
built key relationships. 
Heavily regulated 
industries consider 
compliance implications 
when evaluating new 
requirements and during 
the development cycle.   
A clear compliance 
systems roadmap is 
developed which is in 
alignment with the 
organization’s policies, 
appetite for risk, 
upcoming regulatory 
requirements and its IT 
and business strategy. 
IT Governance and 
compliance practices 
are integrated. 
Organizations actively 
advise key vendors on 
opportunities for 
improvement and work 
with them to automate 
new requirements. 
Compliance personnel 
are integrated with IT 
development teams. 
Compliance systems 
may be sold as a 
service.  
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Maturity of IT Capabilities for Compliance 
Capability 
State 
Initial Controlled Managed Optimized Innovative 
Contract Management 
Compliance is not 
considered when 
defining SLA and 
contracts with 3rd 
Parties. SLA and 
contracts may fulfill 
regulatory 
requirements but are 
not monitored on that 
basis. 
Contracts are drafted with 
a view to meeting 
regulatory requirements 
with results being 
periodically monitored. 
Basic 
outsourcing/offshoring 
policies are defined. 
Outcomes relating to key 
processes and regulatory 
requirements are regularly 
monitored and validated. 
Risk management informs 
offshoring/outsourcing 
decisions.  
Contracts and SLA 
agreements consider 
regulatory requirements, 
policies and risk 
tolerances and are aligned 
with business and IT 
strategy. Compliance 
systems enable 
SLA/contact definition 
and monitor the 
performance of related 
controls. 
Long term 3rd party 
contracts are detailed 
and flexible enough to 
allow for changes to 
the organization’s 
regulatory exposure 
and risk appetite.  
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Maturity of IT Capabilities for Compliance 
Capability 
State 
Initial Controlled Managed Optimized Innovative 
IT Leadership 
IT is rarely 
considered during the 
planning of 
compliance efforts. 
Typically, IT is only 
consulted after 
breaches occur.  
IT becomes involved in 
compliance activities after 
requirements have been 
defined.  
At the middle management 
level, IT works with other 
subject matters experts 
across the organization to 
enable policy setting, risk 
management activities and 
remediation with 
regulatory requirements. 
IT governance policies for 
automated controls 
defined.    
IT is represented on senior 
committees defining 
compliance strategies and 
committees formed to 
discuss related issues at 
the business function 
level. IT Strategy and 
compliance are aligned. 
The firm’s IT Governance 
competencies are 
highlighted by sales and 
marketing.  
The relationship 
between IT and 
compliance leadership 
is bi-lateral with 
compliance and IT 
working together to 
develop strategic 
offerings for both 
internal and external 
requirements. 
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Maturity of IT Capabilities for Compliance 
Capability 
State 
Initial Controlled Managed Optimized Innovative 
Analysing and Tracking 
Regulatory Requirements 
Analysis and tracking 
of upcoming 
regulatory 
requirements is done 
individually by each 
business silo without 
IT involvement. No 
collaboration or 
benchmarking with 
external entities.   
Analysis of regulatory 
change is handled 
differently depending on 
the business silo 
impacted. Tracking and 
analysis chiefly achieved 
through spreadsheets.  
3
rd
 Party solutions used to 
monitor regulatory change 
e.g. Complinet.  Users of 
the same COMPLIANCE 
system collaborate across 
organizations. IT 
Governance practices 
supports all systems 
associated with 
remediation efforts. 
IT Governance activities 
define clear policies 
outlining the 
responsibilities of IT in 
analyzing the impact of 
new legislation and 
meeting associated 
deadlines  
Organization works 
with compliance 
systems’ vendors to 
develop approaches 
for complying with 
specific mandates  
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Maturity of IT Capabilities for Compliance 
Capability 
State 
Initial Controlled Managed Optimized Innovative 
Selecting Best Practice 
Standards 
Firms utilizes no best 
practices standards 
and does not 
collaborate. 
Firm borrows aspects of 
IT and professional 
standards but does not 
fully adopt them. 
Different silos may adopt 
different standards.  
Organization understands 
the usefulness of 
established standards and 
selects the ones which are 
the initial best fit with an 
aim to becoming 
accredited where 
appropriate.  
Firm has detailed 
understanding of the 
strengths and weaknesses 
of relevant standards for 
best practice and cherry 
picks accordingly.  
Organizations collaborate 
on compliance and 
systems’ issues with peers 
Organizations 
collaborate with 
compliance systems 
vendors and standards 
organizations to define 
best practice. 
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Maturity of IT Capabilities for Compliance 
Capability 
State 
Initial Controlled Managed Optimized Innovative 
Enable Automated and 
Manual  Controls 
Control automation 
occurs on an ad-hoc 
basis depending on 
the systems owner 
and the business 
function where the 
control resides.  
Effort to decommission 
manual controls, where 
possible. Policies require 
the automation of key 
controls, necessary to 
meet regulatory 
obligations and maintain 
risk policies.  
IT and Compliance 
collaborate across the 
business to develop 
controls, which are 
structured in a consistent 
manner. Best practice for 
internal control, such as 
COSO is observed. 
Controls are mapped to 
key policies and 
regulations. Compliance 
systems monitor controls.  
Greater emphasis is 
placed on monitoring 
manual controls focused 
on covering functional 
gaps and ensuring they 
become automated in later 
systems. Automated 
controls are validated with 
frequent manual checks.  
Organizations can 
demonstrate such a 
high level of control 
and an absence of 
breaches that the 
firm’s control 
structure becomes a 
sales or marketing 
tool. 
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Maturity of IT Capabilities for Compliance 
Capability 
State 
Initial Controlled Managed Optimized Innovative 
Data Sourcing and 
Management 
No analysis of data 
availability or format 
considered before 
designing 
COMPLIANCE 
processes and 
controls. Lack of data 
awareness diminishes 
compliance activities 
and creates 
unnecessary manual 
processes.  
In general, data 
availability and formatting 
does not hinder 
compliance. Data is often 
sourced from numerous 
external providers with 
different formats.  
Data for compliance 
activities is managed 
centrally with clear IT 
Governance policies 
relating to external data 
providers and formats. 
Data sourcing and 
management allows the 
design of effective and 
efficient controls. 
Data sourcing and 
formatting is considered at 
the design stage of 
compliance systems. 
Adopters of the same 
systems may compare 
approaches to data 
sourcing and management 
for remediation with 
particular regulatory 
requirements.  
Data sourcing and 
management enables 
the design of more 
advanced controls, 
which enable the 
business and enhances 
its risk management 
capabilities. The 
organization is able to 
offer data feeds and 
consulting to 
organizations 
requiring similar types 
of data.   
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Maturity of IT Capabilities for Compliance 
Capability 
State 
Initial Controlled Managed Optimized Innovative 
Measuring, Monitoring and 
Reporting 
Measuring, 
monitoring and 
reporting done on an 
ad-hoc basis by each 
individual business 
silo. Duplicate 
channels of 
communication exist. 
Measuring, monitoring 
and reporting are 
instigated by specific 
problems or regulatory 
requirements. Reporting is 
coordinated but 
inconsistent in format and 
content.  
Organization has a clear 
understanding of what 
compliance activities need 
to be measured, monitored 
and reported to which 
stakeholders. Consistent 
formatting and content 
achieved for reports.  
Channels of 
communication 
streamlined. 
Measurement, monitoring 
and reporting of 
compliance activities 
enables strategic thinking 
at both the business and 
IT levels. 
Firm collaborates with 
other organizations to 
determine industry 
standards for defining 
compliance  metrics, 
monitoring processes 
and reporting 
structures. 
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Maturity of IT Capabilities for Compliance 
Capability 
State 
Initial Controlled Managed Optimized Innovative 
Enabling the Right Culture 
Organization has little 
focus on culture 
beyond focusing on 
the need to adhere to 
legal requirements. 
IT systems provide some 
training on ethical issues. 
Risk tolerances are 
communicated where 
appropriate by individual 
departments.   
IT Governance policies 
require behaviours that 
reflect the organization’s 
risk tolerances and legal 
requirements. 
IT supports the 
development of regular 
training programs on 
ethics as well as regularly 
communicating 
expectations regarding 
risk and legal compliance. 
Confidential, help-line is 
proved for those with 
ethical dilemmas.  
A culture is developed 
where individuals are 
aware of the 
expectations placed on 
them with respect to 
ethics, risk and legal 
regulations. However, 
this culture is balanced 
by a culture which 
simultaneously 
supports innovation. 
Compliance is 
welcomed and viewed 
as ensuring that new 
ideas are risk 
appropriate and 
legally compliant.  
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